Minister for Justice v I.T (C-477/24)

Contents

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber)12 March 2026^note(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Citizenship of the Union — Right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States — Directive 2004/38/EC — Article 7(3)(b) — Derived right of residence — Third-country national divorced from a Union citizen who was no longer a worker or self-employed person at the time of initiation of the divorce proceedings — Meaning of duly recorded involuntary unemployment after having been employed for more than one year — Single continuous period of one year — Person having received social welfare — Proof — Applicant’s right of access to the social welfare file of his former spouse — Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Principle of good administration and right to an effective judicial remedy)In Case C‑477/24 [Deldwyn],^noteREQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Court of Appeal (Ireland), made by decision of 28 June 2024, received at the Court on 9 July 2024, in the proceedingsMinister for JusticevI.T.,THE COURT (First Chamber),composed of F. Biltgen (Rapporteur), President of the Chamber, I. Ziemele, A. Kumin, S. Gervasoni and M. Bošnjak, Judges,Advocate General: R. Norkus,Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,having regard to the written procedure,after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:– I.T., by M. Conlon, Senior Counsel, G. Keogh, Barrister-at-Law, and I. Khan, Solicitor,– Ireland, by M. Browne, Chief State Solicitor, S. Finnegan, A. Joyce and R. O’Donnell, acting as Agents, and by D. Conlan Smyth, Senior Counsel, and S.J. Hillery, Barrister-at-Law,– the German Government, by J. Möller and N. Scheffel, acting as Agents,– the European Commission, by E. Montaguti and J. Tomkin, acting as Agents,after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 25 September 2025,gives the following

Judgment

1This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 7(3)(b) and Articles 13 and 14 of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ 2004 L 158, p. 77, and corrigendum OJ 2004 L 229, p. 35), and of Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).

2The request has been made in proceedings between I.T. (‘the applicant’), a third-country national who is divorced from a Union citizen who is a national of a Member State other than Ireland, and the Minister for Justice (Ireland) (‘the Minister’) concerning the Minister’s final determination refusing the applicant retention of a residence card, which would have enabled the applicant to remain in Ireland indefinitely.

Legal context

European Union law

The Charter

3Article 47 of the Charter, entitled ‘Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial’, provides:‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article.Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented.…’

Directive 2004/38

4Recital 11 of Directive 2004/38 states:‘The fundamental and personal right of residence in another Member State is conferred directly on Union citizens by the Treaty and is not dependent upon their having fulfilled administrative procedures.’

5Article 7 of that directive, entitled ‘Right of residence for more than three months’, provides:1.All Union citizens shall have the right of residence on the territory of another Member State for a period of longer than three months if they:(a) are workers or self-employed persons in the host Member State; or…2. The right of residence provided for in paragraph 1 shall extend to family members who are not nationals of a Member State, accompanying or joining the Union citizen in the host Member State, provided that such Union citizen satisfies the conditions referred to in paragraph 1(a), (b) or (c).3.For the purposes of paragraph 1(a), a Union citizen who is no longer a worker or self-employed person shall retain the status of worker or self-employed person in the following circumstances:…(b) he/she is in duly recorded involuntary unemployment after having been employed for more than one year and has registered as a jobseeker with the relevant employment office;(c) he/she is in duly recorded involuntary unemployment after completing a fixed-term employment contract of less than a year or after having become involuntarily unemployed during the first twelve months and has registered as a jobseeker with the relevant employment office. In this case, the status of worker shall be retained for no less than six months;(d) he/she embarks on vocational training. Unless he/she is involuntarily unemployed, the retention of the status of worker shall require the training to be related to the previous employment.’

6Article 10 of that directive, entitled ‘Issue of residence cards’, reads as follows:1. The right of residence of family members of a Union citizen who are not nationals of a Member State shall be evidenced by the issuing of a document called “Residence card of a family member of a Union citizen” no later than six months from the date on which they submit the application. A certificate of application for the residence card shall be issued immediately.2.For the residence card to be issued, Member States shall require presentation of the following documents:(a) a valid passport;(b) a document attesting to the existence of a family relationship or of a registered partnership;(c) the registration certificate or, in the absence of a registration system, any other proof of residence in the host Member State of the Union citizen whom they are accompanying or joining;(d) in cases falling under points (c) and (d) of Article 2(2), documentary evidence that the conditions laid down therein are met;(e) in cases falling under Article 3(2)(a), a document issued by the relevant authority in the country of origin or country from which they are arriving certifying that they are dependants or members of the household of the Union citizen, or proof of the existence of serious health grounds which strictly require the personal care of the family member by the Union citizen;(f) in cases falling under Article 3(2)(b), proof of the existence of a durable relationship with the Union citizen.’

7Article 13 of the directive, entitled ‘Retention of the right of residence by family members in the event of divorce, annulment of marriage or termination of registered partnership’, provides, in paragraph 2:‘Without prejudice to the second subparagraph, divorce … shall not entail loss of the right of residence of a Union citizen’s family members who are not nationals of a Member State where:(a) prior to initiation of the divorce … proceedings …, the marriage or registered partnership has lasted at least three years, including one year in the host Member State ……Before acquiring the right of permanent residence, the right of residence of the persons concerned shall remain subject to the requirement that they are able to show that they are workers or self-employed persons or that they have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State during their period of residence and have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State, or that they are members of the family, already constituted in the host Member State, of a person satisfying these requirements. “Sufficient resources” shall be as defined in Article 8(4).Such family members shall retain their right of residence exclusively on personal basis.’

8Paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 14 of Directive 2004/38, entitled ‘Retention of the right of residence’, provide:2. Union citizens and their family members shall have the right of residence provided for in Articles 7, 12 and 13 as long as they meet the conditions set out therein.In specific cases where there is a reasonable doubt as to whether a Union citizen or his/her family members satisfies the conditions set out in Articles 7, 12 and 13, Member States may verify if these conditions are fulfilled. This verification shall not be carried out systematically.…4.By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2 and without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter VI, an expulsion measure may in no case be adopted against Union citizens or their family members if:(a) the Union citizens are workers or self-employed persons, or(b) the Union citizens entered the territory of the host Member State in order to seek employment. In this case, the Union citizens and their family members may not be expelled for as long as the Union citizens can provide evidence that they are continuing to seek employment and that they have a genuine chance of being engaged.’

Irish law

9The legislation transposing Directive 2004/38 into Irish law is contained in the European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations 2015 (‘the 2015 Regulations’).

10The right to reside in Ireland is governed by Regulation 6 of the 2015 Regulations, paragraph 3(a) of which states:‘A Union citizen … may reside in the State for a period that is longer than 3 months if he or she—(i) is in employment or in self-employment in the State,…’

11In accordance with Regulation 6(3)(b) of the 2015 Regulations, a family member who is not a national of a Member State may reside in Ireland for a period longer than three months provided that the Union citizen concerned is employed or self-employed in that State.

12Regulation 6(3)(c) of the 2015 Regulations provides, in essence, that where a person to whom Regulation 6(3)(a)(i) of those regulations applies ceases to be in the employment or self-employment concerned, the latter provision is to be deemed to continue to apply to him or her, including where that person (i) is in duly recorded involuntary unemployment after having been employed for more than one year and has registered as a jobseeker with the Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection or (ii) is in duly recorded involuntary unemployment after completing a fixed-term employment contract of less than a year, or after having become involuntarily unemployed during the first year, and has registered as a jobseeker with the Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection.

13Paragraph 2 of Regulation 10 of the 2015 Regulations, entitled ‘Retention of the right of residence by family members in the event of divorce, annulment of marriage, annulment or dissolution of civil partnership’, provides:(a) Subject to subparagraph (b), where the marriage or civil [partnership] of a Union citizen is dissolved or annulled and, at the time of the dissolution or annulment, as the case may be, he or she had a right of residence in the State under these Regulations, a family member who is not a national of a Member State may retain a right of residence in the State on an individual and personal basis.(b) A right of residence of a family member referred to in subparagraph (a) is subject to the Minister being satisfied that—(i) prior to the initiation of the dissolution or annulment proceedings concerned, the marriage or civil partnership had lasted at least 3 years, including one year in the State,…’

The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling

14The applicant entered Ireland in October 2002 on foot of a student visa. In July 2009 he married, in Ireland, a Union citizen who is not a national of that Member State, and subsequently made several applications for a residence card pursuant to Directive 2004/38 and the 2015 Regulations on the basis that he was the spouse of a Union citizen. The first two applications were refused on the ground that, at the time of the assessment of the application, the applicant’s spouse was no longer employed by the employer identified in those applications. The third application for a residence card, submitted in March 2013, was accepted, and the applicant thus acquired a residence card for a period of five years, valid until September 2018.

15Divorce proceedings were initiated in the Member State of origin of the Union citizen in June 2014, and the couple’s divorce was granted there in July 2014. The marriage had subsisted for five years by the date of its dissolution. The applicant’s residence card was not revoked following his divorce. He continued to work and his former spouse, who continued to reside in Ireland, was, according to information provided by the Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection (Ireland) (‘the DEASP’), in receipt of jobseeker’s allowance and child benefit.

16In August 2018, the applicant made an application for retention of his right of residence in a personal capacity. That application was based on Regulation 10(2) of the 2015 Regulations which provides for retention of a derived right of residence in the event of divorce in certain circumstances, where the marriage has lasted for three years or more and the couple has spent at least one year in Ireland. That application was accompanied by a number of documents, including several payslips of the applicant’s former spouse for intermittent periods between 2011 and 2013, and her tax certificates for 2010 and 2012.

17The application was refused by decision of the Minister of 7 October 2019 on the ground, in particular, that the applicant had not produced evidence of his former spouse’s activity at the time when divorce proceedings were initiated, namely in June 2014, given that his derived rights depended on his former spouse, a Union citizen, having continued to exercise her EU Treaty rights in Ireland at that time. The applicant was also informed that that decision had been taken in the light, inter alia, of information available from the DEASP which indicated that, from 13 September 2013 to 23 September 2017, his former spouse, in her capacity as a Union citizen, had not exercised those rights through employment, self-employment, the pursuit of a course of study, involuntary unemployment or proof of the possession of sufficient resources in accordance with Regulation 6(3) of the 2015 Regulations. The Minister found that, in so far as it was not established that, at the time when divorce proceedings were initiated, the residence in Ireland of the applicant’s former spouse was in conformity with the 2015 Regulations, the applicant did not qualify for retention of a right of residence under Regulation 10(2) of the 2015 Regulations.

18The applicant sought a review of that decision and, in that connection, requested a copy of the information transmitted to the Minister by the DEASP. In support of his request for review, the applicant stated that he no longer had an ongoing relationship with his former spouse, a Union citizen, but that he had asked her to provide him with details as to her activities in Ireland during the periods referred to by the Minister, reiterating a belief that she was in receipt of social welfare during at least some of the period concerned. The applicant’s former spouse having failed to respond to that request, the applicant informed the Minister that, in view of his former spouse’s lack of co-operation, he was not in a position to provide all of the information and all of the documentation required to establish that, at the time when the divorce proceedings were initiated, his former spouse was lawfully resident in Ireland and exercising her rights under the FEU Treaty. To that extent, the applicant asked the Minister for disclosure of the information transmitted by the DEASP.

19The request for review was refused by a further ministerial decision, issued in November 2021. In support of that decision the Minister found that, at the time of the initiation of the divorce proceedings, the former spouse was not exercising her FEU Treaty rights since her involuntary unemployment at that time had not been preceded by a period of 12 months of work. In that decision the Minister noted, in particular, first, that the former spouse had been employed in different positions between 2009 and 2013 when applications for residency had been made; second, that she had been in receipt of jobseeker’s allowance between September 2013 and September 2017; third, that there was no information on file in regard to the circumstances that had led to the departure of the applicant’s former spouse from her previous employment, whether that was voluntary or involuntary; and fourth, that there was nothing on file to suggest that she had been in employment for more than one year or that she had been on a fixed-term contract of less than one year prior to her registration with the DEASP, given that DEASP information on file indicated only that she had been in employment for 37 weeks in 2013 and 2 weeks in 2014, which was less than the one-year period set out in the 2015 Regulations. That decision also stated: ‘Although it is acknowledged that the EU citizen was in receipt of benefit payments in 2014, the Minister is not bound by any determination of the [DEASP], and the continued payment of social welfare payments to the Union citizen is not determinative of the EU Treaty Rights matter before the Minister’.

20The applicant having been successful in his action against that decision before the High Court (Ireland), the Minister brought an appeal against that judgment before the Court of Appeal (Ireland), which is the referring court.

21The issue before the referring court is essentially, first of all, whether, for the purpose of determining whether the involuntary unemployment of the applicant’s former spouse was ‘duly recorded’, the Minister ought or ought not to have taken account of the fact that the DEASP had granted her a jobseeker’s allowance; next, whether Article 7(3)(b) of Directive 2004/38 is to be interpreted as meaning that the words ‘for more than one year’ in that provision refer to an uninterrupted period of one year; and, lastly, whether the Minister ought, in the light in particular of Article 41 of the Charter, to have provided the applicant with the complete file relating to his former spouse.

22The referring court considers that the first two points raise questions of interpretation of Directive 2004/38 as to which there is not yet any case-law of the Court of Justice. With regard to the third point, the referring court queries whether the right of access to the file and the right to good administration which calls, in particular, for the cooperation of the administration, as interpreted by the Court, inter alia, in the judgments of 22 November 2012, M. (C‑277/11, EU:C:2012:744); of 8 May 2014, N. (C‑604/12, EU:C:2014:302); of 8 May 2018, K.A. and Others (Family reunification in Belgium) (C‑82/16, EU:C:2018:308); and of 12 July 2018, Banger (C‑89/17, EU:C:2018:570), constitute a sufficient basis for granting the request made by the applicant for disclosure of material in the file relating to his former spouse.

23In those circumstances, the Court of Appeal decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:(1)(a) Does the expression “one year” in [Article] 7(3)(b) of [Directive 2004/38] (“the Directive”) contemplate or require that the year in question be a single continuous period?(b) If the answer to (a) is “no”, does the fact that the periods of employment making up the year in question may have been accumulated or added together over a period of four or five years bring the EU citizen outside the scope of [Article] 7(3)(b) [of the Directive]?(2) Does the fact that the EU citizen was in receipt of Jobseekers Allowance from the [DEASP] in Ireland mean that he or she is in “duly recorded involuntary unemployment” in the State within the meaning of [Article] 7(3)(b) of the Directive?(3) Does the general principle of EU law which reflects [Article] 41 of the Charter, or alternatively, does the Directive interpreted in the light of that general principle, require the Respondent to provide its file to the Applicant (if necessary, in suitably redacted form) either:(a) before making a decision on retention of residence rights/a Residence Card pursuant to [Article] 14 of the Directive in relation to [Article] 13 and/or [Article] 7(3) of the Directive; and/or(b) when the applicant seeks to challenge such a decision by way of Judicial Review proceedings?’

Consideration of the questions referred

The first question

24By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 7(3)(b) of Directive 2004/38 must be interpreted as meaning that the expression ‘for more than one year’ in that provision refers to a single continuous period of employment or self-employment of more than one year, or to a period of more than one year which may be made up of several shorter periods of employment or self-employment, accumulated over several years.

25In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to Article 7(3)(b) of Directive 2004/38, a Union citizen who is no longer a worker or self-employed person is to retain the status of worker or self-employed person if he or she is in duly recorded involuntary unemployment after having been employed for more than one year and has registered as a jobseeker with the relevant employment office.

26That provision makes no express reference to the laws of the Member States for the purpose of determining the meaning and scope of the expression ‘for more than one year’. Nor is there any definition of that expression in Directive 2004/38. In those circumstances, it follows from both the need for a uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality that that provision must be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, taking into consideration not only the usual meaning of its terms, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment of 15 September 2022, Minister for Justice and Equality (Third-country national cousin of a Union citizen), C‑22/21, EU:C:2022:683, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).

27As regards, in the first place, the wording of Article 7(3)(b) of Directive 2004/38, it must be noted that, according to its usual meaning in everyday language, the expression ‘one year’ refers to a period of 12 months which is not necessarily the same as a calendar year, and which is based on the period in which the Earth completes one revolution around the sun. Nevertheless, it does not follow either from the wording of that provision or from that of other provisions of Directive 2004/38 that that period of ‘one year’ should necessarily refer to 12 consecutive months or that it should be uninterrupted.

28As the Advocate General noted in point 27 of his Opinion, since the wording of Directive 2004/38 does not include further clarification of what is meant by the expression ‘for more than one year’, it is necessary, in the second place, to provide a contextual interpretation.

29In that regard, it must be recalled that, according to the case-law of the Court, Article 7(3) of Directive 2004/38 guarantees that all Union citizens in a position of temporary inactivity retain their status of worker and, consequently, their right to reside in the host Member State, also establishing a gradation with regard to the conditions for retaining that status, by reference to, first, the reason for the citizen’s inability to work, in the case in point depending on whether he is unable to work because of illness or accident, involuntary unemployment or vocational training, and, second, the initial duration of his period of activity in the host Member State, that is, depending on whether that is longer or shorter than one year (judgment of 11 April 2019, Tarola, C‑483/17, EU:C:2019:309, paragraph 43).

30Thus, a Union citizen who has pursued an activity in an employed or self-employed capacity in the host Member State retains his or her status of worker indefinitely (i) if he or she is temporarily unable to work as the result of an illness or accident, in accordance with Article 7(3)(a) of Directive 2004/38; (ii) if he or she worked in an employed or self-employed capacity in the host Member State for more than one year before becoming involuntarily unemployed, in accordance with Article 7(3)(b) of that directive; or (iii) if he or she has embarked on vocational training, in accordance with Article 7(3)(d) of the directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 April 2019, Tarola, C‑483/17, EU:C:2019:309, paragraph 44).

31By contrast, in accordance with Article 7(3)(c) of Directive 2004/38, a Union citizen who has pursued an activity in an employed or self-employed capacity in the host Member State for a period of less than one year retains the status of worker only for a period of time which that Member State may determine, provided it is no less than six months (judgment of 11 April 2019, Tarola, C‑483/17, EU:C:2019:309, paragraph 45).

32The finding recalled in paragraph 29 of the present judgment, that the gradation established by Article 7(3) of Directive 2004/38 with regard to the conditions for retaining the status of worker that is guaranteed to Union citizens depends on the ‘initial duration’ of the period of activity in the host Member State, follows more particularly from the fact that subparagraph (b) of that provision refers to employment in which the Union citizen has been engaged ‘for more than one year’ and that subparagraph (c) refers to employment contracts with a fixed term of ‘less than a year’ or to the situation in which a Union citizen has become involuntarily unemployed during the ‘first twelve months’ of his or her activity in an employed or self-employed capacity in the host Member State.

33That reference to the ‘first twelve months’ militates in favour of Article 7(3) of Directive 2004/38 being interpreted as meaning that the periods of employment or self-employment referred to in that provision must be single continuous periods of employment or self-employment, so that the period of ‘more than one year’ referred to in subparagraph (b) of that provision cannot be made up of several shorter periods of activity, accumulated over several years.

34It must be added that that interpretation is also consistent with the case-law of the Court, according to which the second situation provided for in Article 7(3)(c) of Directive 2004/38 covers all situations in which a worker has been obliged, for reasons beyond his or her control, to stop working in the host Member State ‘before one year has elapsed’, regardless of the nature of the activity or the type of employment contract entered into for that purpose (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 April 2019, Tarola, C‑483/17, EU:C:2019:309, paragraph 48). Indeed, that expression, ‘before one year has elapsed’, necessarily refers to an uninterrupted period of 12 consecutive months.

35As regards, in the third place, the objectives pursued by Directive 2004/38, it must be noted, first, that the principal objective of that directive is to strengthen the right of free movement and residence of all Union citizens and, second, that the objective specifically pursued by Article 7(3) thereof is to safeguard, by the retention of the status of worker, the right of residence of persons who have ceased their occupational activity because of an absence of work due to circumstances beyond their control (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 April 2019, Tarola, C‑483/17, EU:C:2019:309, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).

36It must be added that Directive 2004/38 is also intended to strike a fair balance between safeguarding the free movement of Union citizens, on the one hand, and ensuring that the social security systems of the host Member State are not placed under an unreasonable burden, on the other (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 April 2019, Tarola, C‑483/17, EU:C:2019:309, paragraph 50).

37It must be noted that, as the Advocate General stated, in essence, in points 32 and 33 of his Opinion, to interpret the expression ‘for more than one year’ as referring not to a single continuous period but to a total period of one year that may be made up of several periods of employment or self-employment of less than a year, accumulated over several years, would effectively be to call into question the gradational nature of the conditions for retaining the status of worker laid down in Article 7(3) of Directive 2004/38, as referred to in paragraph 29 above, and, moreover, would affect the balance referred to in paragraph 36 above.

38In particular, that interpretation could, as the Advocate General emphasised in point 33 of his Opinion, be incompatible with the distinction made in subparagraphs (b) and (c), respectively, of Article 7(3) of Directive 2004/38 as to the duration of the period during which an employed or self-employed worker retains that status, that is, depending on whether the initial duration of the period of activity in the host Member State is longer or shorter than one year.

39Therefore, it must be concluded that the expression ‘for more than one year’ in Article 7(3)(b) of Directive 2004/38 must be interpreted as referring to a single continuous period of employment or self-employment of more than one year.

40That interpretation, moreover, does not prevent persons whose employment or self-employment in the host Member State has been involuntarily interrupted before the initial period of one year has elapsed from qualifying for the protection which retention of their status as worker entails, since, if it is not possible for them to come under the provisions of Article 7(3)(b) of Directive 2004/38, they will, if they are in one of the situations referred to in paragraph 34 above, be able to benefit from the provisions of Article 7(3)(c) of that directive.

41In that regard, it must be added that the Court has previously held that the criterion referred to, inter alia, in Article 7(3)(c) of Directive 2004/38, enabling those concerned to know, without any ambiguity, what their rights and obligations are, is consequently such as to guarantee a significant level of legal certainty and transparency in the context of the award of social assistance by way of basic provision, while complying with the principle of proportionality (judgment of 15 September 2015, Alimanovic, C‑67/14, EU:C:2015:597, paragraph 61).

42In the light of the above considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 7(3)(b) of Directive 2004/38 must be interpreted as meaning that the expression ‘for more than one year’ in that provision refers to a single continuous period of employment or self-employment of more than one year.

The second question

43By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 7(3)(b) of Directive 2004/38 must be interpreted as meaning that the fact that a Union citizen residing in the territory of a Member State other than that of which he or she is a national receives an unemployment allowance from that Member State must be regarded, by the authority of that Member State which is competent to issue residence cards, as proof that that Union citizen is in ‘duly recorded’ involuntary unemployment within the meaning of that provision.

44As a preliminary point, it should be noted that it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that the queries raised by the referring court are confined to the issue whether the fact that such a Union citizen receives an unemployment allowance from the competent national authority is sufficient to support a finding that the involuntary nature of the unemployment is ‘duly recorded’, within the meaning of that provision; they do not relate to the two other cumulative conditions set out in that provision: (i) having been employed for more than one year and (ii) having registered as a jobseeker with the relevant employment office.

45In that regard, it must be noted that, as the Advocate General stated in point 50 of his Opinion, Directive 2004/38 does not define the term ‘duly recorded’, nor does it contain any provision concerning the criteria or procedure for ‘duly recording’ that a person is in involuntary unemployment. However, in the absence of EU rules on the matter and in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, it is for the national legal order of each Member State to establish the rules concerning those criteria and that procedure, on condition that those rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and that they do not make it excessively difficult or impossible in practice to exercise the rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 June 2018, Diallo, C‑246/17, EU:C:2018:499, paragraphs 45 and 59 and the case-law cited).

46Moreover, as may be seen from recitals 1 to 4 of Directive 2004/38, the purpose of that directive is to facilitate the exercise of the primary and individual right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, which is conferred directly on citizens of the Union by Article 21(1) TFEU, and one of the objectives of that directive is to strengthen that right (judgment of 11 April 2019, Tarola, C‑483/17, EU:C:2019:309, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited). Directive 2004/38 is also intended, as is apparent from the case-law recalled in paragraph 36 above, to strike a fair balance between safeguarding the free movement of Union citizens and ensuring that the social security systems of the host Member State are not placed under an unreasonable burden.

47However, it is clear from both the preamble and the provisions of Directive 2004/38 that it does not seek to harmonise the granting of unemployment allowances, the procedure for granting those allowances or the criteria for establishing that the unemployment of a Union citizen is involuntary. In that situation, it is necessary to ascertain whether the national legislation concerned is such as to undermine the objectives of Directive 2004/38 or render its provisions redundant.

48In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that, as the Advocate General noted in points 52 and 53 of his Opinion, the request for a preliminary ruling does not disclose precisely the criteria according to which the national body competent to grant the unemployment allowances at issue in the main proceedings, namely the jobseeker’s allowance, may grant that allowance, it is sufficient to note that Ireland indicated in its observations, as did the Minister before the High Court, that under the applicable national provisions, the DEASP, which is the national body competent to grant that jobseeker’s allowance, is not obliged to inquire into an unemployed person’s reasons for leaving his or her employment, nor, moreover, is it therefore required to examine whether or not that unemployment is ‘involuntary’.

49Should it be the case, which it is for the referring court to ascertain, that the DEASP is not in fact obliged to inquire into the reasons why a person is unemployed and can grant a jobseeker’s allowance without it being established that that unemployment is ‘involuntary’ within the meaning of Article 7(3) of Directive 2004/38, it would have to be concluded that the grant of that jobseeker’s allowance is entirely unconnected to the involuntary or voluntary nature of the unemployment of the person concerned and cannot in any event constitute proof of the involuntary or voluntary nature of the loss of that person’s employment. In that situation, the non-consideration, by the national authority which is competent to issue residence cards, of the decision granting the allowance concerned as proof that that person is in ‘duly recorded’ involuntary unemployment, within the meaning of that provision, is clearly not capable of calling into question the objectives of Directive 2004/38 or the effectiveness of its provisions.

50By contrast, if, following the checks which it is required to carry out, the referring court were to find that the national body which is competent to grant the jobseeker’s allowance makes the grant of that allowance conditional upon the persons concerned being in ‘involuntary unemployment’, within the meaning of Article 7(3) of Directive 2004/38, that is to say, the activity of the persons concerned as employed or self-employed persons has ended for reasons – or due to circumstances – beyond their control (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 April 2019, Tarola, C‑483/17, EU:C:2019:309, paragraphs 46 to 49 and the case-law cited), and that body does in fact check that those reasons or circumstances are beyond the control of those persons, the national authority which is competent to issue residence cards would have to take account of the decision granting the jobseeker’s allowance as constituting, at the very least, evidence that the person concerned is in ‘duly recorded’ involuntary unemployment, within the meaning of that provision.

51Therefore, and in the absence of more specific information from the referring court as to whether, in accordance with the relevant national provisions, the national authority which is competent to issue residence cards is or is not required to take due account of the decision granting the jobseeker’s allowance as evidence that the person concerned is in ‘duly recorded’ involuntary unemployment, it is for the referring court, which alone has jurisdiction to interpret and apply national law, to ascertain whether the application of those national provisions complies with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness of EU law and, accordingly, is not such as to call into question the objective of Directive 2004/38 or the effectiveness of its provisions.

52Having regard to the above considerations, the answer to the second question is that Article 7(3)(b) of Directive 2004/38 must be interpreted as meaning that the fact that a Union citizen residing in the territory of a Member State other than that of which he or she is a national receives an unemployment allowance from that Member State is not, as such, to be regarded, by the authority of that Member State which is competent to issue residence cards, as constituting adequate proof that that person is in ‘duly recorded’ involuntary unemployment within the meaning of that provision.

The third question

53By its third question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Directive 2004/38, read in the light of the general principle of good administration, must be interpreted as meaning that the national authority which is competent to issue residence cards is obliged to communicate its file to an applicant who is a third-country national, if necessary, in suitably redacted form, either before making a decision on retention of his right of residence or of a residence card pursuant to Article 14 of that directive, read in conjunction with Articles 7 and 13 thereof, or only at the stage of proceedings for judicial review of that decision, where the documents in the file in question, on which the competent national authority relied in refusing the residence card and which have been requested by that third-country national, contain information relating, inter alia, to the periods of employment of his former spouse, a Union citizen, and the former spouse has refused to provide the third-country national with that information after having been invited by him to do so.

54In that regard it should be noted, in the first place, that Directive 2004/38 – in particular Article 7 concerning the right of residence for more than three months, Article 10 concerning the issue of residence cards, Article 13 on retention of the right of residence by family members in the event of divorce, annulment of marriage or termination of registered partnership, and Article 14 concerning retention of the right of residence – provides, in essence, that it is for applicants to produce the information necessary to establish that they satisfy the conditions for enjoyment of the rights conferred by those provisions and does not lay down an explicit requirement that the national authorities should provide applicants with information already in the possession of those authorities which applicants might need in order to demonstrate that they satisfy those conditions.

55It must, therefore, be noted that Directive 2004/38 does not explicitly provide for a ‘duty of cooperation’ by the authorities of the Member States when determining the relevant elements of an application for a residence permit, and differs in that respect from a directive such as Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted (OJ 2004 L 304, p. 12), which provides for such a duty of cooperation in Article 4(1) (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 June 2023, International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Others (Attack in Pakistan), C‑756/21, EU:C:2023:523, paragraph 48).

56It should be borne in mind, in the second place, that Article 41 of the Charter, which affirms the right to good administration and which provides, in paragraph 2, that that right includes, in particular, the right of every person to be heard, before any individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken (subparagraph (a)); the right of every person to have access to his or her file, while respecting the legitimate interests of confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy (subparagraph (b)); and the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions (subparagraph (c)), is addressed not to the Member States but solely to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 November 2014, Mukarubega, C‑166/13, EU:C:2014:2336, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

57Consequently, an applicant for a residence permit cannot derive directly from Article 41(2)(a) and (b) of the Charter a right to be heard in all proceedings relating to his or her application or a right of access to the file in the context of a national procedure (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 July 2014, YS and Others, C‑141/12 and C‑372/12, EU:C:2014:2081, paragraph 67, and of 5 November 2014, Mukarubega, C‑166/13, EU:C:2014:2336, paragraph 44).

58By contrast, the right to good administration affirmed in Article 41 of the Charter reflects a general principle of EU law which is intended to apply to the Member States when they implement that law (see judgment of 13 July 2023, Azienda Ospedale-Università di Padova, C‑765/21, EU:C:2023:566, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

59It must be added, first, that the right of access to the file is, in particular, the necessary corollary of the effective exercise of the rights of the defence (judgment of 13 September 2018, UBS Europe and Others, C‑358/16, EU:C:2018:715, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited), and that when the authorities of the Member States take measures which come within the scope of EU law, they are subject to the obligation to observe the rights of the defence of addressees of decisions which significantly affect the addressees’ interests (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 November 2014, Mukarubega, C‑166/13, EU:C:2014:2336, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).

60Second, in the context of judicial proceedings, respect for the rights of the defence guaranteed in Article 47 of the Charter means that an applicant must be able not only to ascertain the reasons upon which the decision taken in relation to him or her is based, but also to have access to all the material in the file on which the authority has based that decision, in order to be able effectively to comment on that material (judgment of 25 April 2024, NW and PQ (Classified information), C‑420/22 and C‑528/22, EU:C:2024:344, paragraph 92 and the case-law cited).

61In the present case, it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that the decision at issue in the main proceedings was taken pursuant to the 2015 Regulations, which transposed Directive 2004/38 into Irish law. Since the 2015 Regulations implement EU law, the requirements stemming from the right to effective judicial protection, the rights of the defence and the right to good administration, including the right of access to the file, as guaranteed under EU law, are applicable to the case in the main proceedings.

62It must be added that the situation at issue in the main proceedings is characterised by the fact, on the one hand, that the applicant is seeking to obtain a derived right of residence on the basis of information which is not in his possession, because it relates to another person, his former spouse, who has not given him access, and, on the other, that the national authorities which are competent to issue a residence card to the applicant already have that information and relied on it for their refusal to renew the applicant’s residence card.

63If, as the referring court seems to consider, the only means by which the applicant can obtain that information is to request access to the file relating to him, it must be held that national procedural rules which, de facto, place the applicant in a situation in which it is impossible for him to establish that, at the time when divorce proceedings were initiated, his former spouse satisfied the conditions laid down in Article 7(3)(b) of Directive 2004/38, and that he therefore has a derived right of residence pursuant to the provisions of that directive, call into question the effectiveness of the rights which the applicant may derive from that directive and fail to ensure that his fundamental rights are observed, particularly his right to effective judicial protection and his rights of defence.

64Admittedly, in the present case the information in question, which is already in the applicant’s file, does not relate directly to the applicant but concerns his former spouse; accordingly, the protection of the confidentiality of that information could be undermined.

65In that regard, it is settled case-law that fundamental rights do not constitute unfettered prerogatives and may be restricted, provided that the restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the measure in question and that they do not involve, in the light of the objectives pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference which impairs the very substance of the rights guaranteed (judgment of 13 September 2018, UBS Europe and Others, C‑358/16, EU:C:2018:715, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited).

66Such restrictions may, in particular, be designed to protect requirements of confidentiality or professional secrecy, which are liable to be infringed by access to certain information and certain documents (see judgment of 13 September 2018, UBS Europe and Others, C‑358/16, EU:C:2018:715, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

67Accordingly, the right of access to the file may be limited on the basis of a weighing up of, on the one hand, the general principle of good administration and the right to an effective remedy of the person concerned and, on the other, the interests relied on in order to justify the non-disclosure of an element of the file to that person (judgment of 25 April 2024, NW and PQ (Classified information), C‑420/22 and C‑528/22, EU:C:2024:344, paragraph 94 and the case-law cited).

68However, that weighing up cannot lead to the rights of defence of the person concerned being deprived of all effectiveness and to that person’s right to an effective remedy under Article 47 of the Charter being rendered meaningless, in particular by the failure to inform him or her or, as the case may be, his or her representative, at the very least of the substance of the information relating to the periods of the former spouse’s employment and on which the decision taken against him or her is based (see, by analogy, judgment of 25 April 2024, NW and PQ (Classified information), C‑420/22 and C‑528/22, EU:C:2024:344, paragraph 95 and the case-law cited).

69In a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, it is therefore for the national authority which is competent to issue the residence card or, as the case may be, for the national court before which an action in connection with the issuing of such a card has been brought, to take account of the divergent interests of the persons concerned and to weigh up the interests thus involved in the light of the circumstances of each situation and the type of procedure concerned, and to communicate to the applicant, in essence or in redacted form, the material in the file to which he or she would otherwise not have access and which is decisive in the determination as to whether his or her right of residence is to be retained.

70In the light of the above, the answer to the third question is that Directive 2004/38, read in the light of the general principle of good administration, and of the right to an effective judicial remedy affirmed in Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that the national authority which is competent to issue residence cards is obliged to communicate its file, if necessary in suitably redacted form, to an applicant who is a third-country national, or to his or her representative, before making a decision relating to the retention of his or her right of residence or to the grant of a residence card pursuant to Article 14 of that directive, read in conjunction with Articles 7 and 13 thereof, where the documents in the file in question, on which the competent national authority relied in refusing the residence card and which have been requested by that third-country national, contain information relating, inter alia, to the periods of employment of his or her former spouse, a Union citizen, and the former spouse has refused to provide the third-country national with that information after having been invited by him or her to do so.

Costs

71Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

Operative part

On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby rules:

1.Article 7(3)(b) of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EECmust be interpreted as meaning that the expression ‘for more than one year’ in that provision refers to a single continuous period of employment or self-employment of more than one year.

2.Article 7(3)(b) of Directive 2004/38must be interpreted as meaning that the fact that a Union citizen residing in the territory of a Member State other than that of which he or she is a national receives an unemployment allowance from that Member State is not, as such, to be regarded, by the authority of that Member State which is competent to issue residence cards, as constituting adequate proof that that person is in ‘duly recorded’ involuntary unemployment within the meaning of that provision.

3.Directive 2004/38, read in the light of the general principle of good administration, and of the right to an effective judicial remedy affirmed in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,must be interpreted as meaning that the national authority which is competent to issue residence cards is obliged to communicate its file, if necessary in suitably redacted form, to an applicant who is a third-country national, or to his or her representative, before making a decision relating to the retention of his or her right of residence or to the grant of a residence card pursuant to Article 14 of that directive, read in conjunction with Articles 7 and 13 thereof, where the documents in the file in question, on which the competent national authority relied in refusing the residence card and which have been requested by that third-country national, contain information relating, inter alia, to the periods of employment of his or her former spouse, a Union citizen, and the former spouse has refused to provide the third-country national with that information after having been invited by him or her to do so.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 12 March 2026.