Contents
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber)16 July 2026note(References for a preliminary ruling — Disciplinary sanctions in the area of sport — Temporary prohibition on the pursuit of certain professional activities, imposed by a national sports association on two directors of a professional football club — Infringement consisting in making or approving false financial and accounting statements — Internal market — Articles 45 and 56 TFEU — Obstacle to the freedom of movement for workers and the freedom to provide services — Whether justified — Legitimate objective in the public interest — Proper conduct of sporting competitions — Observance of the principle of proportionality — Determination of sanctions — Existence of transparent, objective, non-discriminatory, proportionate and verifiable criteria — Second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU — Effective judicial protection — Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Right to an effective remedy — Whether there is effective judicial review — National legislation allowing the court having jurisdiction over the indirect review of the lawfulness of those sanctions to award compensation to the persons subject to sanctions but not to annul or suspend those sanctions)In Joined Cases C‑424/24 and C‑425/24,REQUESTS for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Lazio (Regional Administrative Court, Lazio, Italy), made by decisions of 6 June 2024, received at the Court on 17 June 2024, in the proceedingsZD (C‑424/24),MI (C‑425/24)vFederazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (FIGC),Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano (CONI),Procura federale presso la Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (FIGC) (C‑424/24),Collegio di garanzia dello sport presso il Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano (CONI) (C‑424/24),Corte federale d’appello presso la Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (FIGC) (C‑424/24),THE COURT (Fifth Chamber),composed of M.L. Arastey Sahún, President of the Chamber, J. Passer (Rapporteur), D. Gratsias, B. Smulders and N. Fenger, Judges,Advocate General: D. Spielmann,Registrar: E. Sartori, Administrator,having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 17 September 2025,after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:– ZD, by V. Angiolini, G. Gomitoni and S. Invernizzi, avvocati,– MI, by N. Paolantonio, avvocato,– Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (FIGC), by G. Viglione, avvocato,– Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano (CONI), by A. Angeletti, S. Fidanzia and A. Gigliola, avvocati,– the Italian Government, by S. Fiorentino, acting as Agent, and by M. Cherubini and L. D’Ascia, avvocati dello Stato,– the Portuguese Government, by C. Alves and P. Barros da Costa, acting as Agents,– the European Commission, by S. Baches Opi, G. Conte and F. Ronkes Agerbeek, acting as Agents,after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 18 December 2025,gives the following
Judgment
1These requests for a preliminary ruling concern the interpretation of Articles 6 and 19 TEU, of Articles 45, 49, 56, 101 and 102 TFEU, and of Articles 47 to 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).
2The requests have been made in two sets of proceedings between (i) ZD, on the one hand, and the Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (Italian Football Federation; ‘the FIGC’), the Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano (Italian National Olympic Committee; ‘the CONI’), the Procura federale presso la Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office at the FIGC; ‘the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office’), the Collegio di garanzia dello sport presso il Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano (Sports Guarantee Board at the CONI; ‘the Sport Guarantee Board’) and the Corte federale d’appello presso la Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (Federal Court of Appeal at the FIGC; ‘the Federal Court of Appeal’), on the other, and (ii) MI, on the one hand, and the FIGC and the CONI, on the other, concerning decisions by which the Federal Court of Appeal imposed on ZD and MI each a sanction consisting in a temporary prohibition on the pursuit of professional activities within the FIGC.
Legal context
Italian law
The Constitution
3Under the first paragraph of Article 18 of the Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana (Constitution of the Italian Republic; ‘the Constitution’):‘Citizens have the right to form associations freely, without authorisation, for aims that are not forbidden to individuals by criminal law.’
4The first paragraph of Article 24 of the Constitution provides:‘All persons may take legal action to protect their individual rights and legitimate interests.’
5The first paragraph of Article 103 of the Constitution provides:‘The Consiglio di Stato [(Council of State, Italy)] and the other bodies of administrative justice shall have jurisdiction to ensure the protection, vis-à-vis the public administration, of legitimate interests and, in specific matters set forth by law, also of individual rights.’
6Article 113 of the Constitution is worded as follows:‘The judicial safeguarding of rights and legitimate interests before the courts of ordinary or administrative justice shall always be permitted against acts of the public administration. Such judicial protection may not be excluded or limited to specific remedies or for certain categories of decisions. The law shall establish which judicial bodies may annul decisions taken by the public administration in the cases and with the effects provided for by the law itself.’
Code of Administrative Procedure
7Article 1(1) of the codice del processo amministrativo (Code of Administrative Procedure) states:‘The administrative courts shall ensure full and effective protection, in accordance with the principles of the Constitution and of EU law.’
8Article 30(6) of that code provides:‘The administrative courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any claim for compensation for harm resulting from the infringement of legitimate interests or, in the areas falling within their exclusive jurisdiction, of individual rights.’
9Article 133(1) of that code provides:‘The administrative courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine, save where otherwise provided by law:…(z) disputes concerning decisions of [the CONI] or of sports federations which are not reserved for sports judicial bodies, and excluding disputes relating to the economic relationships between companies, associations and athletes.…’
Law No 280/2003
10Articles 1 to 3 of the decreto-legge n. 220 – Disposizioni urgenti in materia di giustizia sportiva (Decree-Law No 220 on urgent provisions in the field of sports justice) of 19 August 2003 (GURI No 192 of 20 August 2003, p. 4), converted into law, with amendments, by the legge n. 280 (Law No 280) of 17 October 2003 (GURI No 243 of 18 October 2003, p. 4) (‘Law No 280/2003’), are worded as follows:‘Article 1 – General principles1. The Republic recognises and promotes the autonomy of national sports law as an expression of international sports law falling within the purview of the International Olympic Committee.2. The relationship between sports law and the law of the Republic is governed by the principle of autonomy, except in cases where situations involving individual rights linked to sports law are of relevance to the legal system of the Republic.Article 2 – Autonomy of sports law1. In accordance with the principles laid down in Article 1, the regulation of the following matters falls within the area reserved for sports law:(a) compliance with and the application of the regulatory, organisational and statutory provisions of national sports law and its branches in order to guarantee the proper conduct of sporting activities;(b) conduct falling within the disciplinary field and the imposition and application of the related sports disciplinary sanctions.2. In the matters referred to in paragraph 1, clubs, associations, members and affiliates shall be required, in accordance with the provisions of the statutes and regulations of [the CONI] and of the sports federations, to bring such matters before the sports judicial bodies ……Article 3 – Rules of jurisdiction and transitional provisions1. Once the instances of sports justice have been exhausted and without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts to hear and determine matters concerning the economic relationships between clubs, associations and athletes, any other dispute concerning acts of [the CONI] or the sports federations not reserved for the sports judicial bodies pursuant to Article 2 shall be governed by the Code of Administrative Procedure, without prejudice, in all cases, to the provisions of any arbitration clauses included in the statutes and regulations of [the CONI] and the sports federations, within the meaning of Article 2(2) ……’
The FIGC Sports Justice Code
11The rules pursuant to which the sanctions at issue in the main proceedings were imposed is the codice di giustizia sportiva della FIGC (FIGC Sports Justice Code).
12Under Article 2(1) of that code, the code applies, inter alia, to ‘directors’ who carry on a professional activity in the area of sport.
13Article 4 of that code, entitled ‘Mandatory nature of the general provisions’, provides:1. The persons referred to in Article 2 shall be obliged to comply with the Statute, the Code and the Rules of Internal Organisation of the FIGC as well as with other federal standards, and shall abide by the principles of honesty, fairness and integrity in any relationship whatsoever related to sporting activity.2. In case of breach of the obligations provided for in paragraph 1, the sanctions laid down in Article 8(1)(a), (b), (c) and (g) and in Article 9(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (g) and (h) shall be applied.…’
14Article 9(1)(f) of that code, which provides for one of the sanctions referred to in Article 4(2), refers to ‘disqualification for a specified period within the FIGC, with a possible request for extension to the [Union of European Football Associations (UEFA)]’.
15Article 31 of the FIGC Sports Justice Code, entitled ‘Offences of an economic or managerial nature’, states, in paragraph 1:‘The failure to produce, the alteration, or the material or conceptual falsification, even in part, of documents required by the sports judicial bodies, the Commissione di Vigilanza sulle Società di Calcio Professionistiche [(Supervisory Board of Professional Football Clubs, Italy)] and the Federation’s other supervisory bodies, as well as by the bodies competent for issuing UEFA and FIGC licences, or the supply of false, unclear or incomplete information shall constitute an administrative offence. Any conduct seeking in one way or another to circumvent the federal regulations relating to management and economic matters, as well as failure to enforce decisions of the federal bodies competent in that regard, shall also constitute an administrative offence. Without prejudice to the application of the more severe sanctions laid down in the UEFA rules on licensing or of other special rules, as well as to the more severe sanctions that may be imposed on account of other acts covered by the present article, a company which commits the acts referred to in the present paragraph shall be subject to a fine together with a warning.’
The disputes in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
16ZD and MI are, respectively, a former chairman and a former member of the board of directors of Juventus Football Club SpA, which is a professional football club established in Italy (‘Juventus’). It is common ground that they were, on that basis, ‘directors’ carrying on a professional activity in the area of sport, within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the FIGC Sports Justice Code.
17The FIGC is an association governed by private law, headquartered in Italy. Its purpose is to promote and regulate professional and amateur football in that Member State. It is a member of the Fédération internationale de football association (FIFA) and of UEFA.
18The CONI, for its part, is a body governed by public law, headquartered in Italy. According to the referring court, it is responsible for coordinating the activities of the various Italian sports associations.
19On 1 April 2022, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office, which is the body of the FIGC competent for disciplinary proceedings, brought an action before the Tribunale federale nazionale presso la Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio, sezione disciplinare (National Federal Court at the FIGC, Disciplinary Section; ‘the Federal Court’) against a number of Italian professional football clubs, including Juventus, and against a number of their directors, alleging, inter alia, that they had failed to observe the principles of honesty, fairness and integrity referred to in Articles 4 and 31 of the FIGC Sports Justice Code. In particular, that body criticised ZD and MI, in essence, for having participated in the setting up of a system of artificial capital gains in excess of EUR 60 million, by making or approving declarations, in Juventus’ financial statements and balance sheets for 2020 and 2021, falsely presenting a set of transfers of players as independent transactions, whereas, according to that body, they were in fact exchange transactions, with the aim of evading the application of the international accounting standard applicable to such transactions and, ultimately, of declaring profits and assets greater than the actual profits and assets of the clubs participating in that system.
20By a decision of 22 April 2022, the Federal Court, which is the body within the FIGC competent, inter alia, in matters relating to disciplinary sanctions, acquitted all the natural and legal persons concerned by that action.
21The Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office lodged an appeal against that decision with the Federal Court of Appeal.
22By a decision of 27 May 2022, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Federal Court.
23On 24 November 2022, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office received from the procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Torino (public prosecutor at the District Court, Turin, Italy) a copy of the documents contained in the file pertaining to criminal proceedings initiated in parallel by the Public Prosecutor’s Office in relation to the facts set out in the action referred to in paragraph 19 above. Following the receipt of those documents, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office took the view that those documents justified the lodging of an action for revision with the Federal Court of Appeal.
24In January 2023, the Federal Court of Appeal adopted a decision by which it granted that action for revision. By that decision, the Federal Court of Appeal, inter alia, imposed on ZD and MI each a disciplinary sanction consisting in a prohibition on the pursuit of professional activities within the FIGC for a period of 24 months, together with a request for extension of that prohibition to UEFA and to FIFA. That prohibition, which covers, in practice, the pursuit of any professional activity in the sphere falling within the remit of the FIGC, namely, professional or amateur football in Italy, was subsequently extended globally by the FIFA Disciplinary Committee.
25That decision was challenged by ZD and by MI before the Sport Guarantee Board.
26By a decision of 8 May 2023, the Sport Guarantee Board dismissed the appeal lodged by ZD and that lodged by MI.
27On 25 May 2023, an order that there was no need to adjudicate was made in the criminal proceedings referred to in paragraph 23 above.
28Subsequently, ZD and MI brought before the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Lazio (Regional Administrative Court, Lazio, Italy), the referring court, an action against the decisions successively adopted by the Federal Court of Appeal and by the Sports Guarantee Board, in so far as those decisions concern them.
29In its orders for reference, the referring court states, in the first place, that, by their respective actions, ZD and MI claim, primarily, that it should suspend and annul the disciplinary sanction imposed on each of them by the Federal Court of Appeal and, in the alternative only, that it should order that they be awarded compensation for the harm caused to them by those sanctions. However, the referring court states that, pursuant to the Italian legislation in force, as interpreted by the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court, Italy), it is required to dismiss those two actions as ‘inadmissible on the ground of lack of jurisdiction’ in so far as they seek the suspension and annulment of those disciplinary sanctions.
30According to the referring court, in two judgments of 7 February 2011 and of 17 April 2019, the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court) took the view, in essence, that Articles 2 and 3 of Law No 280/2003 must be interpreted as conferring on the ‘sports judicial bodies’, including the Federal Court, the Federal Court of Appeal and the Sports Guarantee Board, exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine applications for suspension and for annulment of disciplinary sanctions imposed on natural or legal persons who are members of, or are affiliated with, the various Italian sports associations. For their part, the national administrative courts have exclusive jurisdiction, pursuant to Article 133(1)(z) of the Code of Administrative Procedure, to hear and determine disputes concerning acts of the CONI and of Italian sports associations that are not reserved for the sports judicial bodies, which include actions brought by persons subject to such disciplinary sanctions requesting those courts, once ‘the instances of sports justice have been exhausted’, indirectly to review the lawfulness of the sanctions in order to obtain judicial protection, which may only take the form of monetary compensation for the harm caused to those persons.
31The referring court states that, as is apparent from those judgments, the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court) bases that interpretation of the various provisions at issue of Law No 280/2003 and of the Code of Administrative Procedure on the finding that those provisions are the result of a ‘fair balance’ struck by the Italian legislature, in Article 1 of that law, between the principle of effective and full judicial protection enshrined in Articles 24, 103 and 113 of the Constitution, on the one hand, and the need to safeguard the autonomy of sports law, which is protected under Articles 2 and 18 of the Constitution, on the other hand. The judicial protection of the persons concerned is thus guaranteed effectively by ‘sports justice’, a special form of ‘associative justice’, as regards legal situations such as those arising from the imposition of disciplinary sanctions, which are relevant to the ‘sector-specific legal order’ to which ‘sports law’ amounts, but not to the ‘general legal order’. At the same time, effective judicial protection of the ‘individual legal position’ of those persons with respect to the ‘general legal order’ continues to be guaranteed by the national administrative courts.
32In the second place, the referring court considers it necessary to ask the Court of Justice about the interpretation of EU law in order to be able to rule both on the admissibility of the actions brought before it by ZD and MI and on the merits thereof.
33In the third and last place, the referring court states, in essence, that it is uncertain, for three sets of reasons, whether Law No 280/2003 complies with EU law.
34In that regard, first of all, it asks whether that law is contrary to the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and to Article 47 of the Charter. That law requires persons on whom national sports associations have imposed disciplinary sanctions liable to have a serious punitive effect, such as the prohibitions on the pursuit of professional activities at issue in the main proceedings, to seek their annulment before sports judicial bodies. Accordingly, it deprives those persons of any possibility of having recourse, to that end, to courts or tribunals, within the meaning of EU law, providing the requisite guarantees of independence and impartiality and having all the powers necessary to ensure the effective judicial protection of individuals, including on a provisional basis. According to the referring court, more fundamentally, it is perhaps the balancing exercise carried out by the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court), weighing the requirement of judicial protection laid down by the Constitution against the principle of the autonomy of sports law, that undermines the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. That balancing exercise could have the potential consequences of depriving individuals of part of the right to effective judicial protection guaranteed to them by EU law, and of depriving the national court having jurisdiction of part of the powers necessary to ensure compliance with EU law. Although such a balancing exercise is conceivable in matters that pertain purely to sport and do not come within the scope of EU law, the same is not necessarily the case as regards disciplinary sanctions that are imposed in connection with the pursuit of economic activities linked to sport and that, as such, come within the scope of EU law, which takes precedence over domestic law and over the interpretation that may be given to it by the national courts, including constitutional courts.
35Next, the referring court asks whether it is permissible to impose disciplinary sanctions such as those at issue in the main proceedings in the case of an offence consisting in a failure to observe the ‘principles of honesty, fairness and integrity’ referred to in Articles 4 and 31 of the FIGC Code of Sports Justice. The referring court is uncertain whether such an offence, which, in its view, must be regarded as ‘criminal’ within the meaning of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, meets the requirements stemming from the principle that offences and penalties must be defined by law, enshrined in Article 49 of the Charter.
36Lastly, the referring court asks whether such disciplinary sanctions, and, more broadly, the existence and exercise of the power to impose them on persons subject to the powers of a national sports association such as the FIGC, must be considered in the light of the freedoms of movement guaranteed by Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU and the competition rules laid down in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. At the request of the FIGC, those disciplinary sanctions are liable to be extended by UEFA and FIFA to cover Europe and the world. In addition, such sanctions have a proven impact on the pursuit of the professional activities of directors on whom they have been imposed and, consequently, on the economic activities of the undertakings directed by those persons, such as Juventus in the present case.
37In those circumstances, in Case C‑424/24, the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Lazio (Regional Administrative Court, Lazio) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:(1) Must EU law, and in particular Articles 6 and 19 TEU, in the light of Article 47 of [the Charter] and Article 6 of the [Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (“the ECHR”)], in relation to the principle of effective judicial protection, be interpreted as precluding a national provision of a Member State, such as Article 2 of [Law No 280/2003], as interpreted in Italian case-law, once the instances of national sports justice have been exhausted, from excluding recourse to judicial protection that confers a power on the national court (in this case, the administrative court) to annul disciplinary sanctions in sport and their future effects, and to suspend the effect of those sanctions as an interim measure, thereby limiting the national court to awarding equivalent compensatory protection, where it appears that the disciplinary power has been exercised unlawfully?(2) Must EU law, and in particular Articles 6 and 19 TEU, interpreted in the light of Articles 47, 48 and 49 of [the Charter] and Articles 6 and 7 [ECHR], be interpreted, so as to ensure observance of the principles of legality of criminal offences and penalties, of legal certainty and sufficient precision of offences, as well as of due process, as precluding a national provision, such as Article 2 of [Law No 280/2003] – as interpreted in Italian case-law – which, in accordance with the principle of autonomy of sports law as enshrined in national law and interpreted in Italian case-law, allows sports [judicial] bodies to impose a disciplinary sanction on a sports manager prohibiting him or her from undertaking professional activities on the ground that he or she infringed a provision of the [FIGC] rules (Article 4(1) of the [FIGC] Sports Justice Code), which establishes, by a general clause formulated in vague terms, that all members and managers are required to observe, in addition to the by-laws and other regulations of the federation, the principles of honesty, fairness and integrity?(3) Must EU law, and in particular Articles 45, 49, 56, 101 and 102 TFEU and Article 47 of [the Charter], be interpreted as precluding a national provision, such as Article 2 of [Law No 280/2003], from allowing sports bodies to impose a disciplinary sanction on a manger of a sports club operating at international level which prohibits him or her from undertaking professional activities for 24 months at national and supranational level?’
38In identical circumstances, in Case C‑425/24, the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Lazio (Regional Administrative Court, Lazio) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:(1) Must EU law, and in particular Articles 6 and 19 TEU, interpreted in the light of Article 47 of [the Charter] and [Article] 6 [ECHR], be interpreted, in order to ensure observance of the principles of full and effective judicial protection, as precluding a national provision, such as Article 2 of [Law No 280/2003], as interpreted in Italian case-law, which, once the instances of national sports [justice] have been exhausted, limits the jurisdiction of the national court (in this case, the administrative court) as regards sporting sanctions of a disciplinary nature to the award of equivalent compensation only, thus excluding the power to annul those sanctions or the possibility to suspend their effect by way of an interim measure?(2) Must EU law, and in particular [Articles] 6 and 19 TEU, interpreted in the light of Articles 47, 48 and 49 of [the Charter] and Articles 6 and 7 [ECHR], be interpreted, in order to ensure observance of the principles of the legality of criminal offences and penalties, of legal certainty and precision of offences, as well as of due process, as precluding a national provision, such as Article 2 of [Law 280/2003] – as interpreted in Italian case-law – which allows sports [judicial] bodies to impose a disciplinary sanction on a sports manager prohibiting him or her from undertaking professional activities on the ground that he or she infringed a provision of rules of the sporting federation (Article 4(1) of the [FGCI Sports Justice Code]), which establishes, by a general clause formulated in vague terms, that all members and sports managers are required to observe, in addition to the by-laws and other regulations of the federation, the principles of honesty, fairness and integrity?(3) Must EU law, and in particular Articles 101 and 102, 45, 49 and 56 TFEU and Article 47 of [the Charter], be interpreted as precluding a national provision, such as Article 2 of [Law No 280/2003], which allows sports bodies to impose a disciplinary sanction prohibiting a sports manager from undertaking professional activities for 24 months at national and supranational level?’
Consideration of the questions referred
39The first question which the referring court asks the Court of Justice in each of the present joined cases is intended to enable the referring court to rule on the compatibility with EU law of national legislation that lays down the remedies ensuring judicial protection for individuals against the sanctions which a national sports association may impose on them.
40The second and third questions which the referring court puts to the Court of Justice in each of these joined cases are intended to enable the referring court to rule on the compatibility with EU law of that national legislation inasmuch as that legislation allows a national sports association to impose such sanctions in the first place.
41Having regard to their respective subject matter, it is appropriate to answer, in the first place and together, those second and third questions, and then, in the second place, the first questions in those cases.
Second and third questions referred in Cases C‑424/24 and C‑425/24
42By its second and third questions in the present joined cases, the referring court asks, in essence, whether EU law, and, more specifically, Article 6 and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Articles 45, 49, 56, 101 and 102 TFEU and Article 47 of the Charter, read in the light of Articles 48 and 49 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, as interpreted by the national courts having jurisdiction, which allows a national sports association, in view of the legal autonomy which it has under national law, to impose on sporting directors a sanction consisting in a temporary prohibition on the pursuit of professional activities coming within the competence of that association, on account of false financial and accounting statements made in breach of the principles of honesty, fairness and integrity, observance of which is binding on those sporting directors pursuant to the body of rules which that association has competence to apply.
Admissibility
43Having regard to the provisions of EU law to which the referring court points and to the written and oral observations which have been submitted to the Court by the parties to the main proceedings, by the governments concerned and by the European Commission, it must be borne in mind, in the first place, that, as follows from the Court’s case-law, the national court is required, in the order for reference itself, to set out the factual and legislative context of the dispute in the main proceedings and to provide the necessary explanation of the reasons for the choice of the provisions of EU law which it seeks to have interpreted and of the link it establishes between those provisions and the national legislation applicable to the proceedings pending before it (judgment of 16 October 2025, Anesar-CV and Others, C‑718/23 to C‑721/23 and C‑60/24, EU:C:2025:797, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
44Those cumulative requirements concerning the content of an order for reference are expressly set out in Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, of which the referring court is supposed, in the context of the cooperation instituted by Article 267 TFEU, to be aware and which it is bound to observe scrupulously. They are also set out in paragraphs 13, 15 and 16 of the Recommendations of the Court of Justice of the European Union to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (OJ 2019 C 380, p. 1), which now appear in paragraphs 13, 15 and 16 of the Recommendations of the Court of Justice of the European Union to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (OJ C, C/2024/6008).
45Those requirements are of particular importance in those fields which are characterised by complex factual and legal situations, such as competition (judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited, and of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraph 63).
46In the present case, in its orders for reference, the referring court does not sufficiently explain either the reasons why it asks the Court to interpret Articles 49, 101 and 102 TFEU or the link which it establishes between, on the one hand, freedom of establishment, the prohibition of agreements, decisions and concerted practices and the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position, which are enshrined in those three articles, respectively, and, on the other hand, the disputes in the main proceedings and the national legislation applicable to those disputes on which it seeks clarification. In particular, those orders for reference do not make it possible to understand the reasons why the sanctions imposed on the directors who are the applicants in the main proceedings are liable to have an impact, first, on the ability of the football clubs within which those directors carried on or could carry on their professional activities to establish themselves in a Member State other than the Italian Republic, and second, on the possibility of those clubs competing with one other.
47Furthermore, the referring court does not set out with sufficient clarity and precision the reasons why it considers that the compatibility of Article 2 of Law No 280/2003 with Article 6 TEU, read in the light of Articles 47 to 49 of the Charter, should be examined. Moreover, that court does not explain the link which it seeks to establish between those provisions of EU law and the national legislation applicable to the disputes in the main proceedings.
48As regards those two aspects, its requests for a preliminary ruling therefore do not meet the requirements of Article 94(c) of the Rules of Procedure.
49Consequently, the second and third questions in the present joined cases are inadmissible inasmuch as they concern the interpretation of Articles 49, 101 and 102 TFEU and of Article 6 TEU, read in the light of Articles 47 to 49 of the Charter.
50In the second place, the FEU Treaty provisions on the freedom of movement of workers, the freedom of establishment, the freedom to provide services and the free movement of capital do not apply to a situation which is confined in all respects within a single Member State, subject to certain specific situations in which the order for reference reveals the existence of specific factors which establish that the preliminary ruling on interpretation sought is necessary for the resolution of the dispute due to a link between the subject or circumstances of that dispute and Article 45, 49, 56 or 63 TFEU, in accordance with what is required by Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure (judgment of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited).
51In the present case, the disputes in the main proceedings do not concern situations that are confined in all respects within a single Member State, within the meaning of that case-law, and that are, consequently, lacking a cross-border nature, contrary to what is claimed, in particular, by the defendants in the main proceedings, by the Italian Government and by the Commission. It follows clearly from the statements in the orders for reference set out in paragraphs 14 and 24 above that the sanctions imposed on the directors who are the applicants the main proceedings, consisting in a temporary prohibition on the pursuit of professional activities, in the area within the competence of the national sports association, namely the FIGC, were accompanied, by virtue of the powers held by that association, by requests for extension to UEFA and to FIFA. It follows from that that, having regard to their very content and nature, those sanctions were liable to affect the exercise, by those directors, of their freedom of movement, whether as workers benefiting from Article 45 TFEU or as service providers benefiting from Article 56 TFEU. Moreover, it is apparent from the case files before the Court that FIFA subsequently granted the request for extension submitted to it by that association.
52Consequently, the second and third questions in the present joined cases are admissible inasmuch as they concern the interpretation of Articles 45 and 56 TFEU.
53In the third and last place, having regard to the respective subject matter of those second and third questions, on the one hand, and of the first questions, on the other, as set out in paragraphs 39 and 40 above, it must be stated that the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, under which ‘Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law’, is relevant only to the answer to the first questions.
54It follows that, by those second and third questions, the referring court must be deemed to be asking, in essence, only whether Articles 45 and 56 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, as interpreted by the national courts having jurisdiction, which allows a national sports association, in view of the legal autonomy which it has under national law, to impose on sporting directors a sanction consisting in a temporary prohibition on the pursuit of professional activities coming within the competence of that association, on account of false financial and accounting statements made in breach of the principles of honesty, fairness and integrity, observance of which is binding on those sporting directors pursuant to the body of rules which that association has competence to apply.
Substance
–Whether the fundamental freedoms of movement apply to sports associations
55Having regard to the content of the second and third questions in the present joined cases and to the subject matter of the national legislation to which those questions refer, it must be borne in mind, in the first place, that respect for the fundamental freedoms of movement enshrined in the FEU Treaty is binding not only on national public authorities but also where a body, association or other legal person not governed by national public law has legal autonomy or a power which puts it in a position to impose on individuals conditions which adversely affect the exercise of those freedoms (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 October 2000, Ferlini, C‑411/98, EU:C:2000:530, paragraph 50, and of 13 June 2019, TopFit and Biffi, C‑22/18, EU:C:2019:497, paragraph 39). The abolition as between Member States of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons and to freedom to provide services would be compromised if the abolition of State barriers could be neutralised by obstacles resulting from the exercise of such legal autonomy or of such a power (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 December 1995, Bosman, C‑415/93, EU:C:1995:463, paragraph 83, and of 13 June 2019, TopFit and Biffi, C‑22/18, EU:C:2019:497, paragraph 38).
56In particular, national or international sports associations governed by private law must comply with Articles 45 and 56 TFEU where they adopt rules relating to paid work or the performance of services by professional or semi-professional players and, more broadly, rules which, whilst not formally governing that work or that performance of services, have a direct impact on that work or the provision of services (judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 85 and the case-law cited, and of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraph 77). Similarly, those associations must comply with Articles 45 and 56 TFEU when they adopt rules relating to paid work or the performance of services by categories of persons who are not players but carry on economic activities linked to sport, as is the case here with directors, such as the applicants in the main proceedings.
57The question whether national sports associations which have competence to adopt and apply, respectively, the arrangements at issue in the main proceedings come within the scope of national public law, as appears to be the case with CONI, or under national private law, as appears to be the case with the FIGC, therefore has no bearing either on the interpretation of Articles 45 and 56 TFEU sought by the referring court or on the application of those articles which will be for the referring court to do, in the light of that interpretation, in the disputes in the main proceedings.
58Similarly, the fact that the legal autonomy of those associations has been recognised by the national law of the Member State in which they are established, as is the case here, also has no bearing on that interpretation or on that application. Whatever legal significance that law attaches to such recognition, that recognition may not, under any circumstances, have the legal or practical effect of exempting those associations from observance of the fundamental freedoms of movement laid down by the FEU Treaty, in view of the rationale for the case-law referred to in paragraph 55 above.
59Consequently, whether or not there is such recognition, such national sports associations, whilst having legal autonomy allowing them to adopt and apply certain rules, such as rules on the organisation of competitions in their respective discipline, the proper functioning of those competitions and the participation of sportspersons therein, rules providing for recourse to imposed arbitration or rules intended to organise collectively the paid work and the performance of services by persons subject to their competence, may not, in so doing, limit the exercise of the rights and freedoms conferred by EU law on individuals (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited, and of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing, C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraph 95).
–Whether there is an obstacle to the freedoms of movement for workers and the freedom to provide services
60As regards, in the second place, the existence of a possible obstacle to the fundamental freedoms of movement laid down by the FEU Treaty, it follows from settled case-law, first, that Article 45 TFEU, which has direct effect, precludes any measure, whether it is based on nationality or is applicable without regard to nationality, which might place EU nationals at a disadvantage when they wish to pursue an economic activity in the territory of a Member State other than their Member State of origin, by preventing or deterring them from leaving the latter (judgments of 21 December 2023, Royal Antwerp Football Club, C‑680/21, EU:C:2023:1010, paragraph 136 and the case-law cited, and of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraph 86).
61Second, Article 56 TFEU, which enshrines the freedom to provide services for the benefit of both providers and recipients of such services, precludes any measures, even those which are applicable without distinction, which restrict the exercise of that freedom by prohibiting, impeding or rendering less attractive the activity of those providers in those Member States other than the one where they are established (judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 247 and the case-law cited).
62In the present case, the measures at issue in the main proceedings are, as is apparent from the wording of the questions put by the referring court and from the statements of that court set out in paragraph 51 above, two sanctions prohibiting the pursuit, for a period of 24 months, of professional activities falling within the competence of a national sports association whose purpose is the promotion and regulation of professional and amateur football, accompanied by requests for extension to FIFA and to UEFA, which have been imposed on two directors of a football club who, by making or approving false financial and accounting statements, failed to observe the principles of honesty, fairness and integrity, which are binding on them by virtue of the body of rules which that association has competence to apply.
63In that regard, it should be noted that, since the legal autonomy enjoyed by legal persons such as the national sports associations which are the defendants in the main proceedings allows those legal persons to adopt a certain number of rules, and in particular rules intended to organise collectively the paid work and the performance of services by persons coming within their competence, which are referred to in paragraph 59 above, those legal persons are also able to adopt ancillary provisions intended to ensure the effectiveness of those rules, and more specifically of the provisions providing for the imposition of sanctions in the event of infringement of those rules. Consequently, the adoption of such provisions cannot, in itself, be regarded as contrary to Articles 45 and 56 TFEU (see, by analogy, judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraphs 145 and 146 and the case-law cited).
64By contrast, the imposition of a sanction on an individual in a given case, under such provisions, is liable, depending on the legal and practical nature and scope of that sanction, to impede the fundamental freedom of movement enjoyed by that individual, whether it be the freedom of movement for workers enshrined in Article 45 TFEU or the freedom to provide services enshrined in Article 56 TFEU. That is so, in particular, in the case of a sanction such as the temporary prohibitions on the pursuit of certain professional activities that are at issue in the main proceedings, which may be applied by UEFA and FIFA at the level of all Member States, in the light of the request for extension to the European and global level submitted to those sports associations.
65Such a sanction does not merely have as its potential consequence but in fact has as its aim the prohibition of the pursuit by the person on whom it has been imposed of the professional activity concerned, and therefore of his or her economic activity, not only in his or her Member State of origin but also in other countries, including in all the other Member States.
66It follows, in the present case, that the sanctions at issue in the main proceedings are such as to hinder the freedom of movement for workers or the freedom to provide services of the directors on whom those sanctions were imposed, depending on the legal regime under which those directors are liable to carry on professional activities in Member States other than the Italian Republic.
–Whether there is any objective justification
67In the third and last place, it follows from settled case-law that measures of non-State origin may be permitted even though they are liable to impede a fundamental freedom of movement enshrined in the FEU Treaty, if it is proven, first, that their adoption pursues a legitimate objective in the public interest which is compatible with that Treaty and which is therefore other than of a purely economic nature, and second, that they observe the principle of proportionality, which entails that they are suitable for ensuring the achievement of that objective and do not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose. As regards, more specifically, the requirement relating to the suitability of such measures, it should be borne in mind that they can be held to be suitable for ensuring achievement of the objective relied on only if they genuinely reflect a concern to attain it in a consistent and systematic manner (judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 251, and of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraph 95).
68Similarly to situations involving a measure of State origin, it is for the party who introduced those measures of non-State origin to demonstrate that those two cumulative conditions are met (judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 252, and of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraph 96).
69In the present case, it will therefore be for the referring court to determine whether the sanctions at issue in the main proceedings meet those cumulative conditions, in the light of the arguments and evidence put forward by the parties. Having regard to those arguments and those factors, however, the Court is in a position to provide the referring court with the following guidance.
70As regards, first, the existence of one or more legitimate objectives in the public interest compatible with the FEU Treaty, it should be noted that that must be assessed by taking into account, where necessary, the specific characteristics of the sporting discipline falling within the responsibility of the association whose regulation or conduct is at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraphs 105 and 106), as well as the aims pursued by that association, as set out in its statutes or, as the case may be, of the particular tasks entrusted to it by the public authorities (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraphs 99 and 100).
71In the present case, it is apparent from the statements of the referring court that the sanctions at issue in the main proceedings were imposed on the directors who are the applicants in the main proceedings on the ground that those persons had failed to observe the principles of honesty, fairness and integrity, which they must do in their capacity as directors pursuing a professional activity in the area of football, inasmuch as they had participated in the establishment of an artificial capital gains system and, more specifically, had made or approved financial and accounting statements falsely presenting a set of transfers of players as independent transactions, whereas they were in fact exchange transactions, with the aim of evading the application of the international accounting standard applicable to such transactions, and, ultimately, of declaring profits and assets greater than the actual profits and assets of the club of which they were directors.
72In that regard, as the Advocate General observed, in essence, in points 67 and 68 of his Opinion, it must be accepted that rules which seek to ensure, by means of disciplinary sanctions, effective compliance with the financial and accounting standards applicable to football clubs and the accuracy and fairness of the financial and accounting statements made or approved by the directors of those clubs may be regarded as pursuing the legitimate objective in the public interest consisting of ensuring the proper conduct of sporting competitions such as football competitions (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraphs 100 and 101, and of 30 April 2026, CD Tondela and Others, C‑133/24, EU:C:2026:361, paragraph 96).
73Those competitions are characterised, inter alia, by the fact that, although participation therein is limited to teams which have achieved certain sporting results, with the conduct of those competitions being based on matches between and gradual elimination of those teams, and thus on sporting merit, the proper functioning, sustainability and success of those competitions depend on maintaining a certain sporting and financial balance and on preserving a certain equality of opportunity as between the participating professional football clubs, given the interdependence that binds them together (judgment of 30 April 2026, CD Tondela and Others, C‑133/24, EU:C:2026:361, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).
74That financial balance, and therefore, ultimately, the sporting balance, and the proper conduct of sporting competitions to which it contributes, would risk being disrupted or destroyed if it were open to directors who carry on a professional activity in the area of football to engage with impunity in accounting and financial conduct such as that described in paragraphs 19 and 71 above. That is all the more so where, as in the present case, such financial and accounting conduct relates to player exchange transactions, that is to say, transactions which have a direct impact on the composition of teams, which is one of the essential parameters of the competitions in which professional football clubs compete (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2023, Royal Antwerp Football Club, C‑680/21, EU:C:2023:1010, paragraph 61, and of 30 April 2026, CD Tondela and Others, C‑133/24, EU:C:2026:361, paragraph 33).
75As regards, second, observance of the principle of proportionality, it should be noted that the adoption of provisions allowing the imposition of sanctions such as those at issue in the main proceedings is, in itself, an appropriate means of ensuring the achievement of the objective referred to in paragraph 72 above.
76That is particularly the case with regard to the adoption of provisions allowing the imposition of sanctions such as prohibitions on the pursuit of professional activities within the FIGC for a specified period which may be imposed on directors such as the applicants in the main proceedings, which the rules of the CONI describe more specifically as a ‘disqualification for a specified period within the FIGC, with a possible request for extension to [UEFA]’, in the event of conduct such as that referred to in paragraphs 71 and 74 above, which those rules classify as an ‘administrative offence’ ‘relating to management and economic matters’, as follows from paragraphs 12 to 15 above.
77In that regard, it is for the referring court to ascertain whether the adoption of provisions allowing the imposition of sanctions such as those referred to in the two preceding paragraphs of the present judgment genuinely reflects a concern to attain in a consistent and systematic manner the objective referred to in paragraph 72 above. To that end, it must, in particular, ascertain whether the various sanctions which may be imposed in the case of such an ‘administrative offence relating to management and economic matters’ constitute a consistent and comprehensive system of means allowing not only the various categories of conduct liable to constitute that infringement, such as failure to produce documents, incomplete production of documents, production of unclear or misleading documents or production of falsified documents, to be brought to an end, but also the repetition of such conduct to be prevented.
78In addition, it is for the referring court to ascertain, first, whether the determination of those sanctions, in each individual case, is subject to transparent, objective and non-discriminatory criteria (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 257, and of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraph 111).
79Second, those criteria must ensure that account can be taken of all the relevant circumstances of each specific case and, in particular, of the nature, duration and gravity of the infringement found. The body responsible for applying those criteria on a case-by-case basis and for making that determination must therefore have a certain discretion, the use of which must itself be amenable to effective judicial review, by a national court, having regard to the same criteria and all the relevant circumstances of the case (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C‑333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, paragraph 151, and of 4 October 2024, FIFA, C‑650/22, EU:C:2024:824, paragraphs 106 and 111 and the case-law cited).
80In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the second and third questions in the present joined cases is that Articles 45 and 56 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, as interpreted by the national courts having jurisdiction, which allows a national sports association, in view of the legal autonomy which it has under national law, to impose on sporting directors a sanction consisting in a temporary prohibition on the pursuit of professional activities coming within the competence of that association, on account of false financial and accounting statements made in breach of the principles of honesty, fairness and integrity, observance of which is binding on those directors pursuant to the body of rules which that association has competence to apply, provided that:– the adoption of provisions which allow that association to impose such a sanction pursues one or more legitimate objectives in the public interest compatible with the FEU Treaty, other than an objective of a purely economic nature; and– those provisions observe the principle of proportionality, which means that they are appropriate for ensuring the achievement of that objective or of those objectives, in a consistent and systematic manner, and that the determination on a case-by-case basis of the sanctions that those provisions lay down is subject to transparent, objective and non-discriminatory criteria, which allow account to be taken of all the relevant circumstances and which are amenable to effective judicial review.
The first questions in Cases C‑424/24 and C‑425/24
81By its first questions in the present joined cases, the referring court asks, in essence, whether EU law, and, more specifically, Article 6 TEU and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, as interpreted by the national courts having jurisdiction, that limits the powers of the national court called upon to review a sanction imposed by a national sports association, ‘once the instances of national sports justice have been exhausted’, to that of awarding compensation where it considers that that sanction is unlawful, to the exclusion of powers consisting, first, in granting interim measures pending the decision to be given on the merits, and second, in annulling that sanction and bringing its effects to an end.
82As a preliminary point, it must be stated that, for reasons analogous to those set out in paragraphs 47 to 49 above, those questions are inadmissible inasmuch as they relate to Article 6 TEU. Consequently, those questions must be answered solely in the light of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, bearing in mind that the latter article must be duly taken into consideration for the purpose of interpreting the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU (see, to that effect, judgments of 20 April 2021, Repubblika, C‑896/19, EU:C:2021:311, paragraphs 44 and 45, and of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing, C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraph 70).
83To that end, it is necessary, as a first step, to clarify the scope of the Member States’ obligation, under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, generally to ensure effective judicial protection for individuals in the event that a body within their judicial system is called upon, in a case within its jurisdiction, to review, in the light of EU law and as a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of EU law, sanctions imposed on those individuals by sports associations. As a second step, it will be necessary to specify the criteria for identifying the national court or tribunal which has jurisdiction to carry out that review, in particular in the specific case where, as in the present case, such a national court or tribunal is called upon to carry out that review ‘once the instances of national sports justice have been exhausted’.
The scope of judicial review of sanctions imposed on individuals by sports associations
84The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU obliges Member States to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective judicial protection for individual parties in the fields covered by EU law. The principle of the effective judicial protection of individual parties’ rights and freedoms under EU law referred to in that provision is a general principle of EU law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, enshrined in particular in Article 47 of the Charter, from which it is clear that everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law are infringed has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in that article (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2021, Randstad Italia, C‑497/20, EU:C:2021:1037, paragraphs 56 and 57 and the case-law cited, and of 16 October 2025, PROFIL-COPY 2002, C‑510/24, EU:C:2025:795, paragraph 38).
85It follows from the Court’s case-law, in the first place, that, under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, individuals who claim, in the context of a dispute relating to the pursuit of an economic activity in the territory of the European Union, that an act, measure or behaviour has infringed their rights or freedoms under EU law must have a legal remedy enabling them to challenge that act, measure or behaviour in the light of EU law, whether directly or indirectly, and to obtain, from a national court, effective judicial review of that act, measure or behaviour in the light of that law (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing, C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraphs 75, 76 and 82 and the case-law cited).
86In the light of the case-law referred to in paragraphs 55 and 56 above, individuals must therefore have available such a remedy, in particular, where they submit, in a dispute relating to the pursuit of an economic activity in the territory of the European Union, that a sanction imposed on them by a sports association has infringed one or more fundamental freedoms of movement conferred on them by EU law, such as, in the present case, the freedom of movement for workers enshrined in Article 45 TFEU and the freedom to provide services enshrined in Article 56 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing, C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraphs 71 and 108).
87In the second place, the requirement of effective judicial review which is an integral part of the effective judicial protection which the Member States are required to ensure for individuals in the fields covered by EU law, in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, means, first of all, that, in principle, the national court before which individuals may challenge a sanction imposed by a sports association must have jurisdiction to consider all questions of fact and of law that are relevant for resolving the dispute before it, if necessary after having requested the Court of Justice to give a preliminary ruling on any question concerning the interpretation of EU law or the validity of an act of EU law, under the conditions laid down in Article 267 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing, C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraphs 75, 77 and 83 and the case-law cited).
88In particular, the national court having jurisdiction must be able to review the merits in the light of EU law, first, of the legal and factual reasons why such a sanction was imposed on such an individual (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing, C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraphs 86 and 101), and second, of that sanction in the strict sense, as follows from paragraph 79 above. That latter review may itself have to relate, in the light of the pleas in law to be examined by the national court having jurisdiction, to the conditions under which that sanction was imposed, to the reasons for it and to its determination.
89Next, the national court having jurisdiction cannot confine itself to finding, as the case may be, that there has been an infringement of EU law, but must, in principle, also be able to draw, in cases within its jurisdiction and in accordance with the applicable national provisions, all the appropriate legal conclusions where such a finding is made, so as not to allow that infringement to persist (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing, C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraphs 102 and 103).
90In particular, where an infringement of one or more of the fundamental freedoms of movement provided for by the FEU Treaty is at issue, that court must be able, at the request of the individual concerned, not only to find that that infringement exists and to order damages for the harm caused to that individual, but also, where necessary, to bring to an end the conduct amounting to that infringement or, in the case of an act, to annul that act (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing, C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited).
91That is especially the case where the measure which is vitiated by such an infringement of EU law is a sanction such as a prohibition on the pursuit of professional activities imposed on an individual. In such a case, the annulment of the act imposing that sanction, to the extent required to remove that sanction from the legal order and to bring its effects to an end, is necessary so as to ensure the effective judicial protection of the individual concerned, by allowing that person to recover the possibility of exercising his or her freedoms, and therefore his or her professional activities, of which he or she would be deprived in the absence of such annulment.
92Lastly, the national court having jurisdiction must be able to grant interim relief pending the decision on the substance of the case. In the absence of such a possibility, it would not be possible to ensure the full effectiveness of such a decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing, C‑600/23, EU:C:2025:617, paragraphs 105 and 106 and the case-law cited).
93It is true that, in a situation where the reconfiguration of a frequency band had to take place before a date determined in accordance with an act of secondary EU law and where the annulment of acts relating to the allocation of rights to use certain radio frequencies, adopted by the competent national authorities with a view to enabling that reconfiguration, was liable to undermine not only the objectives of general interest pursued by the EU legislature but also the rights of third parties acting in good faith, the Court held that EU law does not preclude national legislation which, first, limited the effects of actions brought by economic operators against such acts to the award of financial compensation, and second, limited the scope of interim measures which may be ordered pending consideration of such actions to the payment of a provision (judgment of 11 September 2025, Cairo Network and Others, C‑764/23 to C‑766/23, EU:C:2025:691, paragraphs 73 to 86).
94However, that is not the case with the situation of persons on whom a sports association has imposed a sanction that infringes the freedoms of movement conferred on them by EU law. The argument put forward by the Italian Government at the hearing that the possible annulment of the sanctions imposed on the applicants in the main proceedings could entail the annulment of sanctions in the form of penalty points in the national football championship, which were imposed on the football club employing the applicants in the main proceedings, and thus create a situation of long-term uncertainty as to the final ranking in that championship, cannot lead to a different conclusion. It is sufficient to note, in that regard, that the questions referred in the present joined cases relate exclusively to the situation of those applicants, and not to that of the football club within which they carried on their activities or to the lawfulness of any sanction that might have been imposed on that club.
Identification of the national court having jurisdiction to review the sanctions imposed on individuals by sports associations
95In the first place, it must be recalled that, although the organisation of justice in the Member States, in particular, the establishment, composition, powers and functioning of national courts, falls within the competence of those States, the fact remains that, when exercising that competence, the Member States are required to comply with their obligations deriving from EU law and, in particular, from Article 19 TEU (judgments of 5 June 2023, Commission v Poland (Independence and private life of judges), C‑204/21, EU:C:2023:442, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited, and of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 44).
96As has been recalled in paragraph 84 above, under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Member States are to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective judicial protection for individual parties in the fields covered by EU law. It is therefore for the Member States to establish a system of legal remedies and procedures ensuring effective judicial review in those fields (judgments of 26 March 2020, Miasto Łowicz and Prokurator Generalny, C‑558/18 and C‑563/18, EU:C:2020:234, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited, and of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 34).
97The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU is intended to apply to any national body which can rule, as a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of EU law, on questions concerning the application or interpretation of that law and which therefore fall within the fields covered by that law (judgments of 26 March 2020, Miasto Łowicz and Prokurator Generalny, C‑558/18 and C‑563/18, EU:C:2020:234, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited, and of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 36).
98The Member States must therefore, in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, ensure that all of the bodies which are called upon, as ‘courts or tribunals’ within the meaning of EU law, to rule on questions relating to the application or interpretation of EU law and thus come within its system of legal remedies in the fields covered by EU law, meet all the requirements inherent in effective judicial protection (see, to that effect, judgments of 22 February 2022, RS (Effect of the decisions of a constitutional court), C‑430/21, EU:C:2022:99, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited, and of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 47).
99Those requirements include, first, the requirement that courts be independent, which is inherent in the task of adjudication and which forms part of the essence of the right to effective judicial protection and the fundamental right to a fair hearing, which are of cardinal importance as a guarantee that all the rights which individuals derive from EU law will be protected and that the values common to the Member States set out in Article 2 TEU, in particular the value of the rule of law, will be safeguarded (judgments of 15 July 2021, Commission v Poland (Disciplinary regime for judges), C‑791/19, EU:C:2021:596, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited, and of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 49).
100That requirement that courts be independent has two aspects to it. The first aspect, which is external in nature, requires that the court concerned exercise its functions wholly autonomously, without being subject to any hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other body and without taking orders or instructions from any source whatsoever, thus being protected against external interventions or pressure liable to impair the independent judgement of its members and to influence their decisions (judgments of 19 November 2019, A.K. and Others (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court), C‑585/18, C‑624/18 and C‑625/18, EU:C:2019:982, paragraph 121, and of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 50).
101The second aspect, which is internal in nature, is linked to ‘impartiality’ and seeks to ensure that an equal distance is maintained from the parties to the proceedings and their respective interests with regard to the subject matter of those proceedings. That aspect requires objectivity and the absence of any interest in the outcome of the proceedings apart from the strict application of the rule of law (judgments of 19 November 2019, A.K. and Others (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court), C‑585/18, C‑624/18 and C‑625/18, EU:C:2019:982, paragraph 122, and of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 51).
102Those guarantees of independence and impartiality require rules as regards, inter alia, the composition of the body concerned, in order to dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the imperviousness of that body to external factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests before it (judgments of 19 November 2019, A.K. and Others (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court), C‑585/18, C‑624/18 and C‑625/18, EU:C:2019:982, paragraph 123, and of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 52).
103In that regard, it is necessary that judges are protected from external intervention or pressure liable to jeopardise their independence. The rules applicable to the status of judges and the performance of their duties must, in particular, be such as to preclude not only any direct influence, in the form of instructions, but also types of influence which are more indirect and which are liable to have an effect on the decisions of the judges concerned, and thus preclude a lack of appearance of independence or impartiality on their part likely to prejudice the trust which justice in a democratic society governed by the rule of law must inspire in individuals (judgments of 15 July 2021, Commission v Poland (Disciplinary regime for judges), C‑791/19, EU:C:2021:596, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited, and of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 53).
104Although the ‘external’ aspect of independence is intended essentially to preserve the independence of the courts from the legislature and the executive in accordance with the principle of the separation of powers which characterises the operation of the rule of law, that aspect must also be understood as aiming to safeguard judges against direct or more indirect intervention, pressure or influence, for example as regards their appointment or the handling of cases pending before them, which could originate from other external sources, such as, in the present case, the sports associations some of whose acts or activities the sports judicial bodies may be called upon to review.
105Second, bearing in mind the inextricable links which exist between the guarantees of judicial independence and judicial impartiality as well as that of access to a tribunal previously established by law, the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU also requires the existence of a tribunal previously established by law. That phrase, which reflects, inter alia, the principle of the rule of law, concerns not only the legal basis for the very existence of the court concerned, but also the composition of the bench in each case (judgment of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).
106The purpose of the phrase ‘previously established by law’ is to prevent the organisation of the judicial system from being left to the discretion of the executive and to ensure that that matter is governed by a law. Nor, moreover, in codified law countries, can the organisation of the judicial system be left to the discretion of the judicial authorities, which does not, however, rule out conferring on them a certain power to interpret the relevant national legislation (judgment 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).
107A fortiori, the organisation of the judicial system cannot be left to the discretion of professional bodies, including those governed by private law, even though the Court has, on several occasions, already held that such professional bodies may constitute ‘courts or tribunals’ within the meaning of EU law, provided that they meet the requirements laid down by the relevant case-law (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 October 1981, Broekmeulen, 246/80, EU:C:1981:218, paragraphs 3, 4, 9 and 17, and of 13 January 2022, Minister Sprawiedliwości, C‑55/20, EU:C:2022:6, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited). In order for such professional bodies or certain bodies established within them to be capable of being regarded as such, it is therefore necessary, inter alia, that their existence, composition and organisation be previously established by law.
108Furthermore, the concept of ‘a tribunal previously established by law’ refers to the existence of a body that is characterised by its judicial function, consisting in determining matters within its competence on the basis of rules of law and after proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner. Such a body must therefore, in addition to the independence and impartiality of its members, also satisfy other conditions, in particular that regarding the existence of guarantees offered by the procedure before it (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).
109Those guarantees include the principle that the parties should be heard, which is an integral part of the right to a fair hearing and to effective judicial protection. That principle means, in particular, that the parties must be able to debate and be heard on all matters of fact and of law which will determine the outcome of the proceedings (judgments of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).
110Third, the body concerned must, in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, be in a position to exercise effective judicial review over the acts, measures or behaviour which it is called on to examine in cases within its jurisdiction, as is apparent from paragraphs 87 to 92 above.
111In the second place, the principle of effective judicial protection, as now enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter, which, as has been noted in paragraph 82 above, must be duly taken into consideration for the purpose of interpreting the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, does not afford a right of access to a second level of jurisdiction but only to a court or tribunal (judgments of 28 July 2011, Samba Diouf, C‑69/10, EU:C:2011:524, paragraph 69; of 17 July 2014, Sánchez Morcillo and Abril García, C‑169/14, EU:C:2014:2099, paragraph 36, and of 21 December 2023, Scuola europea di Varese, C‑431/22, EU:C:2023:1021, paragraph 93).
112Consequently, although EU law does not preclude the Member States from creating a second level of jurisdiction, capable of enhancing the effective judicial protection of individuals, whether generally or in a specific area, it also does not require them to do so.
113In the light of the case-law recalled in paragraph 111 above, it must be noted, in the third and last place, that, in a situation such as those at issue in the main proceedings, it is only if it transpires that none of the bodies involved in the various ‘instances of national sports justice’, to which the referring court points in its questions, meets the cumulative requirements arising from the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, as set out in paragraphs 98 to 110 above, that that court should, under EU law, be able to exercise effective judicial review, within the meaning set out in paragraphs 87 to 92 above, of the sanctions which sports associations may impose on individuals.
114Were it to transpire that, at the very least, the judicial body of the sports association which gives a decision at last instance meets those cumulative requirements, that is to say, if it can be classified as a ‘court or tribunal’ providing the requisite guarantees of independence and impartiality, if its existence, composition and organisation are previously established by law, if it genuinely has a judicial function, if the procedure before it offers the requisite guarantees, in particular those relating to respect for the rights of the defence and observance of the principle that the parties should be heard, and if it is in a position to exercise effective judicial review, as the case may be by making a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court under Article 267 TFEU, there would already be a remedy ensuring effective judicial protection for individuals, in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, as the Advocate General observed, in essence, in point 101 of his Opinion.
115Consequently, it is for the referring court to determine whether, at the very least, the judicial body of the sports association which gives a decision at last instance actually meets those cumulative requirements, in the light of the following guidance.
116As regards, first, the requirements of independence and impartiality, it must be noted that, although the parties to the main proceedings and some of the governments concerned discussed them at length before the Court, the referring court, for its part, referred to them only incidentally and on an ad hoc basis in its orders for reference. Consequently, the referring court has not submitted to the Court of Justice sufficient information to enable it to provide it with guidance in that regard. It is therefore for the referring court to determine whether or not those requirements are satisfied, in the light of the Court’s case-law recalled in paragraphs 99 to 104 above.
117As regards, second, the requirement that the bodies in question must be previously established by law, it should be noted that it cannot be regarded as having been met solely on the ground that the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings states that the persons concerned are ‘required, in accordance with the provisions of the statutes and regulations of [the CONI] and of the sports federations, to bring such matters before the sports judicial bodies’. Such a general and broad reference to the statutes and regulations of the national sports associations concerned does not permit the inference that, beyond the mere legal basis for the existence of the bodies concerned, their composition, organisation, judicial function and the guarantees providing the framework for the procedure before them are provided for by law, so as not to be left to the discretion of the executive, the judiciary or, a fortiori, of the national sports associations themselves.
118It is therefore for the referring court to determine whether those various aspects are provided for by a law other than the national legislation in respect of which that court is uncertain. In that regard, it must be noted that, although arrangements adopted by a national sports association do not in themselves constitute such a law, given their origin and nature, that does not necessarily preclude them from being regarded as such in certain situations, such as where they are approved by a law, in the appropriate circumstances.
119Furthermore, provided that the requirement referred to in the two preceding paragraphs of the present judgment is met, it will be for the referring court to ascertain whether the bodies in question have a genuinely judicial function, as opposed, for example, to a disciplinary function. If that proves to be the case, it will be for the referring court to determine also whether that function is performed in the context of a procedure attended by all the guarantees listed in paragraphs 108 and 109 above.
120As regards, third, the judicial review which may be exercised by such bodies of sanctions such as those at issue in the main proceedings, it is again for the referring court alone, in the absence of any information in the case files before the Court or of any information in the orders for reference, to determine whether it meets the requirements recalled in paragraphs 87 to 92 above.
121In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first questions in the present joined cases is that the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, as interpreted by the national courts having jurisdiction, that limits the powers of the national court called upon to review a sanction imposed by a national sports association, ‘once the instances of national sports justice have been exhausted’, to that of awarding compensation where it considers that that sanction is unlawful, to the exclusion of powers consisting, first, in granting interim measures pending the decision to be given on the merits, and second, in annulling that sanction and bringing its effects to an end, provided that, at the very least, the body forming part of that ‘national sports justice’ that gives a decision at last instance:– is a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of EU law, providing the requisite guarantees of independence and impartiality;– is previously established by law, as regards its existence, composition and organisation;– has a judicial function;– the procedure before it offers the requisite guarantees, in particular those relating to respect for the rights of the defence and observance of the principle that the parties should be heard, and– is in a position to exercise prior effective judicial review of that sanction.
Costs
122Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.
Operative part
On those grounds, the Court (Fifth Chamber) hereby rules:
1.Articles 45 and 56 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, as interpreted by the national courts having jurisdiction, which allows a national sports association, in view of the legal autonomy which it has under national law, to impose on sporting directors a sanction consisting in a temporary prohibition on the pursuit of professional activities coming within the competence of that association, on account of false financial and accounting statements made in breach of the principles of honesty, fairness and integrity, observance of which is binding on those directors pursuant to the body of rules which that association has competence to apply, provided that:– the adoption of provisions which allow that association to impose such a sanction pursues one or more legitimate objectives in the public interest compatible with the FEU Treaty, other than an objective of a purely economic nature; and– those provisions observe the principle of proportionality, which means that they are appropriate for ensuring the achievement of that objective or of those objectives, in a consistent and systematic manner, and that the determination on a case-by-case basis of the sanctions that those provisions lay down is subject to transparent, objective and non-discriminatory criteria, which allow account to be taken of all the relevant circumstances and which are amenable to effective judicial review.
2.The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, as interpreted by the national courts having jurisdiction, that limits the powers of the national court called upon to review a sanction imposed by a national sports association, ‘once the instances of national sports justice have been exhausted’, to that of awarding compensation where it considers that that sanction is unlawful, to the exclusion of powers consisting, first, in granting interim measures pending the decision to be given on the merits, and second, in annulling that sanction and bringing its effects to an end, provided that, at the very least, the body forming part of that ‘national sports justice’ that gives a decision at last instance:– is a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of EU law, providing the requisite guarantees of independence and impartiality;– is previously established by law, as regards its existence, composition and organisation;– has a judicial function;– the procedure before it offers the requisite guarantees, in particular those relating to respect for the rights of the defence and observance of the principle that the parties should be heard, and– is in a position to exercise prior effective judicial review of that sanction.
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