XY and Others v Ministerul Finanţelor (C-606/24)

Contents

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber)3 September 2026^note(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU — Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Effective legal protection — Judicial independence — Tribunal previously established by law — Obligation of the national courts to refer a preliminary point of law to the supreme court — Article 267 TFEU)In Case C‑606/24,REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Tribunalul Bucureşti (Regional Court, Bucharest, Romania), made by decision of 12 September 2024, received at the Court on 17 September 2024, in the proceedingsXY and OthersvMinisterul Finanţelor,JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fourth Chamber),composed of I. Jarukaitis, President of the Chamber, M. Condinanzi (Rapporteur), N. Jääskinen, R. Frendo and A. Kornezov, Judges,Advocate General: R. Norkus,Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,having regard to the written procedure,after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:– the Romanian Government, by E. Gane, R. Antonie and M. Chicu, acting as Agents,– the European Commission, by F. Erlbacher, L. Nicolae and P.J.O. Van Nuffel, acting as Agents,after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 5 February 2026,gives the following

Judgment

1This request for a preliminary ruling concern the interpretation of Article 2 and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).

2The request has been made in a dispute between several natural persons and the Ministerul Finanțelor (Ministry of Finance, Romania) concerning the recalculation and payment of their salary entitlements as employees paid from public funds.

Legal context

The Code of Civil Procedure

3Legea nr. 134/2010 privind Codul de procedură civilă (Law No 134/2010 on the Code of Civil Procedure), of 1 July 2010, in the version applicable in the main proceedings (‘the Code of Civil Procedure’), contains Book II, entitled ‘Disputes procedure’, made up of four titles, Title III of which is entitled ‘Provisions seeking to ensure uniform case-law’. Title III contains two chapters, Chapter I, entitled ‘Appeal in the interests of the law’, consisting of Articles 514 to 518 of that code, and Chapter II, entitled ‘Referral to the [Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice, Romania)] for a preliminary decision on points of law’, consisting of Articles 519 to 521 of that code.

4Article 519 of the Code of Civil Procedure states:‘If, in the course of proceedings, an adjudicating panel of the [Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice)], of a court of appeal or of a regional court hearing a case at final instance, finding that a point of law the clarification of which is necessary in order to give a ruling on the merits of the case, is new and that the [Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice)] has not given a ruling thereon and that that point of law is also not the subject of a pending appeal in the interests of the law, that adjudicating panel may request that the [Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice)] give a ruling resolving in principle the point of law referred to it.’

5Article 520 of that code provides:(1) The referring of a case to the [Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice)] shall be done by the adjudicating panel following exchanges of views, if the conditions laid down in Article 519 are satisfied, by a decision which shall not be open to any form of appeal. If it is ordered in the decision that the case be referred, the reference shall include grounds in support of the admissibility of the reference pursuant to the provisions of Article 519, as well as the point of view of the adjudicating panel and of the parties.(2) By the decision provided for in paragraph 1, the proceedings shall be stayed pending the delivery of the preliminary decision resolving the point of law.…(7) After the panel has been composed in accordance with paragraph 6, its President shall appoint a judge responsible for drawing up a report on the point of law referred. The judge appointed as Rapporteur shall not, for that reason alone, be prevented from sitting.…(10) The report is notified to the parties, who may, within 15 days of its notification, submit, by way of their lawyer or, as the case may be, legal counsel, their written observations on the point of law referred.…(12) The reference shall be dealt with, without the parties being summoned, no later than three months from the date of the referral, and the decision shall be adopted by at least two thirds of the number of judges on the panel. Abstaining from voting shall not be permitted.…’

6Under Article 521 of that code:(1) The panel for resolving points of law shall make a ruling regarding the reference by way of a decision, only with regard to the point of law which is to be resolved.…(3) Any rulings given regarding issues of law shall be binding from the date of publication of the decision in the Monitorul Oficial al României, Part I, and, for the court that has requested resolution of the point of law concerned, from the date of delivery of the decision……’

OUG No 62/2024

7Ordonanța de urgență a Guvernului nr. 62/2024 privind unele măsuri pentru soluționarea proceselor privind salarizarea personalului plătit din fonduri publice, precum și a proceselor privind prestații de asigurări sociale (Government Emergency Order No 62/2024 laying down measures for resolving proceedings concerning the remuneration of staff paid from public funds, as well as proceedings concerning social security benefits), of 13 June 2024 (Monitorul Oficial al României, Part I, No 559 of 14 June 2024; ‘OUG No 62/2024’), entered into force on 14 June 2024.

8The preamble to OUG No 62/2024 states:‘Taking into account the need to ensure, as a matter of urgency, uniform and consistent case-law – eliminating differences concerning the establishment and payment of salary entitlements of staff paid from public funds – which results in benefits, both as regards the administration of justice on an equal basis and ensuring equality before the law, and in terms of socio-economic relations,having regard to the fact that justice represents an essential factor for balance and social stability in a State governed by the rule of law and that the full realisation of that role requires case-law to be harmonised and the stability of legal relations to be ensured, including in the sphere of establishing the salary entitlements of staff paid from public funds,in view of the constitutional role of the [Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice)], enshrined in Article 126(3) of the Romanian Constitution, republished, of ensuring the uniform application and interpretation of the law by all the courts,finding that there is a widespread phenomenon, which is becoming entrenched, of inconsistent case-law at the level of courts ruling in proceedings concerning the establishment and/or payment of salary entitlements or salary-related entitlements of staff paid from public funds, as well as disputes relating to the establishment and/or payment of pension entitlements and other social security benefits of such staff,considering the need to identify effective procedural remedies that will ensure fulfilment of the desire for uniform case-law in the area subject to regulation, but, at the same time, will not interfere with the proper functioning of the judicial system as a whole,taking account of the current configuration of the mechanism of the preliminary decision for resolving points of law and the binding effect of that decision, delivered by the [Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice)], in full conformity with its constitutional duty to ensure the uniform application and interpretation of the law by all the Romanian courts,in view of the need for the envisioned legislative solutions to be incorporated easily into the current machinery of civil procedure and justice, without a significant impact on the volume of activity of the supreme court,in view of the fact that it is imperative that due priority be given to the principle of ensuring uniform case-law – which is the manifestation of the principles that justice is to be administered in a single, impartial and equal manner, and, in general, of equality before the law [–],taking account of the fact that the proposed legislative measures may have a positive influence on the activity of the courts, in so far as, from an early stage, they may ensure clarification of difficult points of law,whereas rulings given in these categories of disputes have a direct and considerable impact on the consolidated general budget, an effect which is increased by the need to guarantee equal legal treatment, a requirement confirmed by the case-law of the [Curtea Constituțională (Constitutional Court, Romania)] with regard to the principle of equality before the law,given the need to address, and, as the case may be, to prevent the occurrence of, the negative consequences set out above,according to Article 115(4) of the Romanian Constitution, republished,the Romanian Government adopts the following emergency order.’

9Article 1 of OUG No 62/2024 provides:(1) This emergency order shall apply to proceedings concerning the establishment and/or payment of salary entitlements or salary-related entitlements of staff paid from public funds, including those concerning the obligation to adopt administrative measures or concerning the annulment of administrative measures which have been adopted in respect of such staff and/or those concerning the employment and service relationships of such staff.(2) This emergency order shall also apply to proceedings concerning the establishment and/or payment of pension entitlements, including those resulting from the updating/recalculation/revision of pension entitlements and/or those concerning other social security benefits of the staff referred to in paragraph 1.(3) This emergency order shall apply regardless of the nature and subject matter of the proceedings referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, the status of the parties, or the court having jurisdiction to hear and determine the case.’

10Article 2 of OUG No 62/2024 provides:(1) If, in the course of the proceedings referred to in Article 1, the adjudicating panel hearing the case at first instance or on appeal, verifies and establishes that the [Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice)] has not given a ruling on a point of law the clarification of which is necessary in order to give a ruling on the merits of the case, and that that point of law is also not the subject of a pending appeal in the interests of the law, it shall request that the [Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice)] give a ruling resolving in principle the point of law referred to it.(2) A copy of the decision to refer the case shall also be sent, together with the communication to the [Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice)], by email, by the court referring the case, to the other courts having jurisdiction to hear and determine, either at first instance or on appeal, proceedings of the same nature as the proceedings in which that decision was formulated. The presidents of the competent courts, as soon as they receive the copy of the decision to refer the case, shall take the necessary measures to inform the judges of the corresponding divisions of those courts.(3) Similar cases before the courts shall be suspended pending the delivery of the preliminary decision resolving the point of law.(4) Referrals as referred to in paragraph 1 which have the same subject matter, or the subject matter of which is closely connected, shall be joined.(5) Referrals as referred to in paragraph 1 shall be ruled on as a matter of priority, no later than 60 days from the date of the [Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice)] being entrusted with the case.(6) The reasons for the decision shall be given no later than 15 days after the date of delivery and the decision shall be published, at the latest 5 days after the reasons are given, in the Monitorul Oficial al României, Part I.’

11Article 3 of OUG No 62/2024 reads as follows:‘The provisions of Articles 1 and 2 shall also apply to proceedings which are ongoing on the date of the entry into force of this emergency order.’

12As set out in Article 4 of OUG No 62/2024:‘The provisions of this emergency order shall be supplemented by those of the [Code of Civil Procedure], republished, as subsequently amended and supplemented, as well as by other relevant applicable regulations.’

The dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling

13By application of 20 November 2023, XY and Others brought an action before the Tribunalul București (Regional Court, Bucharest, Romania), which is the referring court, seeking an order that the Ministry of Finance pay them, in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination, compensation corresponding to the difference between salary entitlements actually received and the maximum salary entitlements paid to employees of other public authorities performing similar duties.

14The referring court states that, in the course of the proceedings, OUG No 62/2024 entered into force and that it also applies to pending cases, including the dispute in the main proceedings.

15When asked by the Court of Justice, the referring court stated that, if it had not stayed that dispute in order to make the present request for a preliminary ruling, it would have been required to suspend it pursuant to Article 2(3) of OUG No 62/2024, since that dispute concerns points of law which are the subject of proceedings currently pending before the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice), brought on the basis of OUG No 62/2024.

16OUG No 62/2024 provides that, where a court finds that the outcome of the case before it depends on the clarification of a point of law on which the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice) has not yet ruled and which is not the subject of an appeal in the interests of the law, it is required to stay the proceedings pending before it and to submit to the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice) a request for a preliminary decision resolving in principle that point of law. Similar cases pending before the courts have been stayed pending the preliminary decision of the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice).

17The referring court asks whether such an obligation is compatible with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 TEU and Article 47 of the Charter.

18First, that court states that Article 519 of the Code of Civil Procedure already provides for the possibility for a court adjudicating at last instance to ask the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice) for a preliminary decision providing a ruling in principle on a point of law. That option is, however, subject to strict conditions of admissibility relating, in particular, to the fact that the resolution of the point of law is necessary for the outcome of the dispute and that the court sets out, in its request, the doubts justifying the referral.

19By contrast, OUG No 62/2024 sets out that option as an obligation for any Romanian court, in certain categories of cases concerning, in essence, the remuneration of staff paid from public funds and certain social security benefits.

20Thus, the mandatory nature of the procedure established by OUG No 62/2024 deprives the court of the possibility of determining itself, according to its own assessment, the ruling to be given to the point of law before it.

21Secondly, the referring court considers that OUG No 62/2024 constitutes an interference on the part of the executive with the judiciary and therefore infringes the rule of law and the principle of separation of powers. In particular, OUG No 62/2024 does not specify the reasons why the obligation to use that procedure applies only to certain categories of disputes and has the effect of conferring on the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice) the role of a special court.

22According to the referring court, the independence of judges in the application of the law should be ensured by the exercise of their judicial function within the framework of a system of courts whose jurisdiction is established by law. The obligation to submit a request for a preliminary decision to the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice) infringes the principle of judicial independence, in that, first, it limits the ability of the court having jurisdiction to rule independently on the cases before it, without external intervention, and, second, it establishes an internal relationship of subordination between judges, contrary to the case-law of the Court of Justice and several documents of the European Commission for Democracy through Law, known as the ‘Venice Commission’.

23Furthermore, the referring court notes that it is apparent from the preamble to OUG No 62/2024 that the unification of case-law pursued by that emergency order is justified by the favourable effects that it might have on the consolidated general budget and on socio-economic stability. That court infers from that that the adoption of that order pursues, inter alia, an objective of aligning judicial decisions with the financial interests of the State.

24Thirdly, that court considers that OUG No 62/2024 undermines the fairness of proceedings, since subjects of the law could assume that, as a result of the procedure governed by that order, disputes will be resolved in the administration’s favour. Moreover, that procedure creates a precedent of excessive centralisation of the case-law and forced standardisation of the interpretation of the law in certain categories of disputes. The suspension of a large number of cases would, moreover, be liable to undermine the sound administration of justice and lead to an extension of the duration of proceedings.

25Fourthly, that court considers that the existence of conflicts in case-law cannot, in itself, justify the adoption of such a procedure, since such conflicts are inherent in any judicial system and, in any event, the Romanian system contains sufficient mechanisms for unifying the case-law.

26Fifthly, the referring court states that the procedure in question was introduced by way of an emergency order, even though the Curtea Constituțională (Constitutional Court) validated the results of a referendum concerning the prohibition on the Government’s adopting such orders in the field of judicial organisation. Even though such a referendum is merely consultative, the Government should, by virtue of the obligation of constitutional loyalty, have confined itself to proposing to the Parliament the adoption of such a legislative act.

27In the light of the foregoing, the Tribunalul București (Regional Court, Bucharest) stayed the proceedings and decided to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:‘Is the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU (read in conjunction with Article 2 TEU and Article 47 of [the Charter]) of Fundamental Rights) to be interpreted as meaning that the principle of the independence of judges precludes national legislation introducing an obligation for adjudicating panels, which hear and determine cases concerning the establishment and/or payment of the salary entitlements or salary-related entitlements of staff paid from public funds, to request that the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice), in all cases which they are called to decide, give a preliminary [decision] on points of law not previously dealt with by that court, thereby diminishing the ability of the judges hearing the cases in question to decide those cases independently, solely on the ground that inconsistent judicial practice may have a negative impact on the consolidated general budget and the socio-economic stability of the country?’

Procedure before the Court

28By its request for a preliminary ruling, the referring court requested that the present case be determined pursuant to the expedited procedure provided for in Article 105 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. By order of 12 February 2025, Ministerul Finanţelor (C‑606/24, EU:C:2025:101), the President of the Court, in the absence, in the present case, of the exceptional circumstances required by that provision, rejected that request.

29By document of 30 September 2025, the Court requested the Romanian Government to produce the text of Articles 514 to 521 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in the version applicable to the facts at issue in the main proceedings. That Government produced the information requested.

The jurisdiction of the Court

30The Romanian Government expresses doubts as to whether the Court has jurisdiction to interpret, in the present case, Article 47 of the Charter, on the ground that that provision does not apply to the dispute in the main proceedings.

31In that regard, it should be noted, in the first place, that, in the context of a request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, the Court may interpret EU law only within the limits of the powers conferred upon it (judgment of 4 September 2025, AW ‘T’, C‑225/22, EU:C:2025:649, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

32The scope of the Charter regarding the action of the Member States is defined in Article 51(1) thereof, which provides that the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States ‘when they are implementing EU law’ (judgment of 4 September 2025, AW ‘T’, C‑225/22, EU:C:2025:649, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

33In the present case, as regards Article 47 of the Charter, the referring court has not provided any indication that the dispute in the main proceedings concern the interpretation or application of a rule of EU law which is implemented at national level.

34Therefore, in accordance with Article 51(1) thereof, Article 47 of the Charter is not, as such, applicable to that dispute.

35However, since the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU requires all Member States to establish such legal remedies as are necessary to ensure effective judicial protection in the fields covered by EU law, in particular within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter, that provision must be duly taken into account for the purposes of interpreting the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU (judgment of 4 September 2025, AW ‘T’, C‑225/22, EU:C:2025:649, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

36In the second place, it should be recalled that, under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Member States are to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective judicial protection for individual parties in the fields covered by EU law. It is therefore for the Member States to establish a system of legal remedies and procedures ensuring effective judicial review in those fields (judgment of 4 September 2025, AW ‘T’, C‑225/22, EU:C:2025:649, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

37As regards the scope ratione materiae of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, that provision refers to ‘the fields covered by Union law’, irrespective of whether the Member States are implementing Union law (judgment of 4 September 2025, AW ‘T’, C‑225/22, EU:C:2025:649, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).

38The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU is intended, inter alia, to apply to any national body which can rule, as a court or tribunal, on questions concerning the interpretation or application of EU law and which therefore fall within the fields covered by that law (judgment of 4 September 2025, AW ‘T’, C‑225/22, EU:C:2025:649, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

39That is true of the referring court, which may be called upon to rule on questions relating to the application or interpretation of EU law and, as a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of EU law, comes under the Romanian judicial system in the ‘fields covered by Union law’, within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, so that that court must meet the requirements of effective judicial protection (judgment of 4 September 2025, AW ‘T’, C‑225/22, EU:C:2025:649, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).

40Therefore, in the present case, the Court has jurisdiction to interpret the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter.

Consideration of the question referred

Preliminary observations

41By its question, the referring court asks the Court to rule on the interpretation not only of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, but also of Article 2 TEU.

42However, it is apparent from the grounds of the order for reference that those questions relate, in essence, to the principle of judicial independence, which follows from the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU.

43In this respect, it must be noted that Article 19 TEU, which gives concrete expression to the value of the rule of law affirmed in Article 2 TEU, entrusts the responsibility for ensuring the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection that individuals derive from EU law to national courts and tribunals and to the Court of Justice (judgment of 1 August 2025, Daka and Others, C‑422/23, C‑455/23, C‑459/23, C‑486/23 and C‑493/23, EU:C:2025:592, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

44In those circumstances, it does not appear to be necessary to interpret Article 2 TEU in order to answer the question referred by the referring court or in order to provide it with the information necessary to resolve the dispute before it.

The Court’s reply

45By its question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that, where a national court is responsible for hearing a dispute concerning a specific matter, in the context of which dispute it finds that a point of law which has not yet been decided by the supreme court arises, that national court is required to stay the proceedings pending before it and either refer the matter to the supreme court for a preliminary decision on that point of law, or, where that point of law is already the subject of a referral made by another court, await the decision of the supreme court.

46At the outset, it should be recalled that, although the organisation of justice in the Member States, in particular, the establishment, composition, powers and functioning of national courts, falls within the competence of those States, the fact remains that, when exercising that competence, the Member States are required to comply with their obligations deriving from EU law and, in particular, from Article 19 TEU (judgment of 4 September 2025, AW ‘T’, C‑225/22, EU:C:2025:649, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

47Accordingly, any national measure or practice intended to avoid or resolve conflicts in case-law and thus to ensure legal certainty must comply with the requirements stemming from the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 48).

48In accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, it is for every Member State to ensure that the bodies which are called upon, as a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of EU law, to rule on questions relating to the application or interpretation of EU law and which thus come within its judicial system meet the requirements of effective judicial protection, including that of independence (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 September 2025, AW ‘T’, C‑225/22, EU:C:2025:649, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).

49In that regard, it should be recalled, first, that the requirement of the independence of the courts, which is inherent in the task of passing judgment, forms part of the essential content of the right to effective judicial protection and of the fundamental right to a fair trial, which are of cardinal importance as a guarantee that all the rights which individuals derive from EU law will be protected (judgment of 1 August 2025, Daka and Others, C‑422/23, C‑455/23, C‑459/23, C‑486/23 and C‑493/23, EU:C:2025:592, paragraph 74 and the case-law cited).

50That requirement of independence has two aspects. The first aspect, which is external, requires that the court concerned exercise its functions wholly autonomously, without being subject to any hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other body and without taking orders or instructions from any source whatsoever, being thus protected against external interventions or pressure liable to impair the independent judgement of its members and to influence their decisions. The second aspect, which is internal in nature, is linked to ‘impartiality’ and seeks to ensure that an equal distance is maintained from the parties to the proceedings and their respective interests with regard to the subject matter of those proceedings. That aspect requires objectivity and the absence of any interest in the outcome of the proceedings apart from the strict application of the rule of law (judgment of 1 August 2025, Daka and Others, C‑422/23, C‑455/23, C‑459/23, C‑486/23 and C‑493/23, EU:C:2025:592, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited).

51In that regard, it is necessary that judges are protected from external intervention or pressure liable to jeopardise their independence. The rules applicable to the status of judges and the performance of their duties must, in particular, be such as to preclude not only direct influence, in the form of instructions, but also influences which are more indirect and which are liable to have an effect on their decisions, and thus preclude a lack of appearance of independence on their part likely to prejudice the trust which justice in a democratic society governed by the rule of law must inspire in individuals (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 53).

52In the second place, the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU also implies that individuals have access to a tribunal ‘previously established by law’, that requirement being inseparable from the guarantees of independence and impartiality of judges (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 August 2025, Daka and Others, C‑422/23, C‑455/23, C‑459/23, C‑486/23 and C‑493/23, EU:C:2025:592, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited).

53The requirement that a tribunal be ‘previously established by law’ is intended, inter alia, to prevent the organisation of the judicial system from being left to the discretion of the executive and to ensure that that matter is determined by the law (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).

54A ‘tribunal established by law’ is characterised by its judicial function, which consists in determining matters within its competence on the basis of rules of law and after proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner. It must, in that regard, also satisfy, in addition to the requirements of independence and impartiality of its members, guarantees relating to the procedure before it (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).

55In the third place, the principle that the parties should be heard, which is an integral part of the right to a fair hearing and to effective judicial protection, means that the parties must be able to debate and be heard on all the matters of fact and of law which will determine the outcome of the proceedings (judgment of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).

56Although it is for the referring court to apply the principles referred to in paragraphs 46 to 55 of the present judgment, the Court may, however, in the framework of the judicial cooperation provided for in Article 267 TFEU, provide it, on the basis of the material in the case file, with an interpretation of EU law which may be useful to it in resolving the dispute pending before it (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 September 2025, AW ‘T’, C‑225/22, EU:C:2025:649, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).

57In the present case, it should be noted, first, that the referring court does not call into question its own independence or impartiality, or the independence, or the impartiality of the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice). Similarly, that court does not call into question whether the procedure governed by Articles 519 to 521 of the Code of Civil Procedure is compatible with EU law.

58The referring court’s questions concern only the procedure introduced by OUG No 62/2024, in so far as, pursuant to that order, a court before which a point of law arises which has not yet been decided by the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice) is required to stay the proceedings pending before it and either to refer that point of law to that supreme court or, where that point of law has already been referred to it by another court, await the decision of that supreme court.

59Secondly, it is apparent from the case file before the Court that, although the procedure provided for by OUG No 62/2024 is of a special nature, it nevertheless forms part of the ordinary procedure provided for in Articles 519 to 521 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provisions of those articles apply to that special procedure, in so far as the rules of that procedure do not derogate from them.

60That appears to be the case, in particular, with regard to the conditions of admissibility of the request made to the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice). Those conditions relate, in particular, first, to the very existence of a point of law which has not yet been settled by that supreme court and, second, to the need to resolve that point of law in order to resolve the dispute pending before the court concerned.

61It is true that, unlike the optional procedure provided for in Article 519 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Article 2(1) of OUG No 62/2024 requires the matter to be referred to the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice) where the court concerned ‘verifies and establishes’ the existence of a point of law the interpretation of which is relevant to the resolution of the dispute pending before it.

62However, that obligation to refer does not arise solely from the abstract existence of a point of law. It is for the court concerned to ‘verify’ and ‘establish’ itself the existence of such a point of law, and then to state the reasons for its request in order to make clear its prior assessment of the novelty of that point of law and the reasons why its resolution is necessary for the outcome of the dispute pending before it. Those requirements preclude any automatic link between the existence of a point of law and the obligation to refer the matter to the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice).

63Thirdly, as the Advocate General also observed in point 43 of his Opinion, the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice), in the exercise of its high judicial functions, appears to be called upon, in accordance with Article 521(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, applicable by virtue of Article 4 of OUG No 62/2024, to resolve a question of interpretation of the law applicable to the matter governed by that order, while the application of the provision thus interpreted remains within the jurisdiction of the court which brought the matter before the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice). Thus, the outcome of the dispute before that court remains within the exclusive jurisdiction of that court.

64In those circumstances, the binding answer given by the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice) to a question of law identified by the court concerned, which itself assesses its relevance to the outcome of the dispute pending before it, cannot be regarded as an interference in the exercise, by that court, of its task of settling, with complete independence, the dispute before it by applying the legal rule which is the subject of that question.

65Fourthly, the mandatory nature of the referral to the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice) does not call that assessment into question. Where the requirements resulting from the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, relating to independence, impartiality and the fact of being previously established by law, are met, that provision does not preclude, in principle, a Member State from providing, in order to ensure legal certainty, mechanisms for ensuring the consistency and harmonisation of case-law, in particular by conferring on a supreme court exclusive jurisdiction to address, at a preliminary stage, any new point of law in a specific matter, raised before a national court and the resolution of which is necessary for the outcome of the dispute pending before it.

66It is true, as the referring court observes, that the risk of conflicts in case-law is inherent in any judicial system. However, the means of reducing that risk, in order to ensure effective judicial protection and equal treatment of individuals, may differ depending on the circumstances, which is for the Member States to assess.

67Furthermore, as the Advocate General observed, in essence, in point 45 of his Opinion, the mandatory suspension of cases before lower courts pending the resolution of a point of law by supreme court is justified by the objective of preventing those lower courts from adopting decisions which could conflict with the interpretation that that supreme court is called upon to give to that point of law.

68In the present case, by establishing the procedure at issue, the Romanian legislature specifically intended to prevent, in the matter concerned, the emergence of conflicts in case-law.

69There is nothing in the case file before the Court to suggest that such a procedure exceeds the limits within which the Member States may exercise their competence in matters of the organisation of justice, subject to compliance with the requirements set out in paragraph 47 of the present judgment.

70The fact that a general procedure enabling the matter to be referred to the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice) for a preliminary decision is already provided for in Articles 519 to 521 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not sufficient, in itself, to deprive a Member State of the power to establish an exceptional procedure adapted to the requirements specific to certain categories of disputes. In the present case, since the Romanian legislature identified, in the matter referred to in Article 1 of OUG No 62/2024, a specific risk of conflicts in case-law, it was for that legislature, in the exercise of its power concerning the organisation of justice, to determine the rules appropriate for preventing that risk.

71Fifthly, the referring court considers that the preliminary intervention of the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice) affects the ability of the court hearing the case to exercise its jurisdiction and deprives subjects of the law of their tribunal previously established by law.

72It should first of all be noted, in that regard, that the intervention of the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice) is circumscribed by objective criteria, relating in particular to the conditions for admissibility of the request for a preliminary decision laid down in Article 519 of the Code of Civil Procedure, applicable to the proceedings in question under Article 4 of OUG No 62/2024. The applicable national law thus appears to define clearly and in advance the jurisdiction of the national courts and of the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice) respectively in the context of that procedure. The former courts retain exclusive jurisdiction to apply the law and to resolve the dispute before them, whereas the latter rules on the abstract interpretation of the rule of law which is the subject of the preliminary question raised by the court concerned.

73Next, unlike the situation at issue in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others (C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594), the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice) is seised by the court concerned before that court adopts a decision closing the proceedings pending before it. The same applies to courts required to stay cases pending before them on the ground that they raise the same point of law as that already submitted, by another court, to the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice) under OUG No 62/2024.

74The right of the parties to be heard also appears to be fully observed. In accordance with Article 520(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, applicable to the procedure in question pursuant to Article 4 of OUG No 62/2024, the court concerned makes a referral to the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice) by an order adopted after both sides have been heard. That order sets out, where appropriate, the grounds in support of the referral in the light of Article 519 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the opinion of the adjudicating panel and that of the parties. In addition, Article 520(10) of that code provides that the report drawn up by the Judge-Rapporteur on the point of law referred is to be communicated to the parties, who may, within 15 days of that communication, submit, through a lawyer or, as the case may be, legal counsel, their written observations on that point of law.

75Lastly, as regards the referring court’s questions relating to possible breaches of the principle of the sound administration of justice, it should be noted that the procedure at issue in the main proceedings does not appear to infringe the requirement that proceedings be carried out swiftly. On the one hand, as the Advocate General observed in point 44 of his Opinion, the procedure provided for by OUG No 62/2024 is such as to prevent the emergence of a contradictory body of case-law of the lower courts the outcome of which could take considerable time to resolve through the ordinary appeal procedure. On the other hand, the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice) has, in accordance with Article 2(5) of OUG No 62/2024, a period of 60 days in which to give a decision, that is to say, a period shorter than the three-month period laid down in Article 520(12) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

76Sixthly, in so far as the referring court is uncertain as to the compatibility of OUG No 62/2024 with the Romanian Constitution, it is sufficient to recall that, under the procedure laid down in Article 267 TFEU, the Court has no jurisdiction to interpret national law, that being exclusively for the national court (judgment of 26 October 2023, EDP – Energias de Portugal and Others, C‑331/21, EU:C:2023:812, paragraph 40, and the case-law cited).

77Finally, and seventhly, it should be noted that the procedure governed by OUG No 62/2024 is compatible with Article 267 TFEU only if it does not undermine the broadest power, or, as the case may be, the obligation, of national courts to refer a matter to the Court of Justice where they consider that a case pending before them raises questions of interpretation of the provisions of EU law or consideration of their validity, necessitating a decision on their part (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 February 2026, Petlichev, C‑56/25, EU:C:2026:87, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited), or the discretion conferred on them to assess at what stage of the proceedings such a request to the Court must be made (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 May 2023, BK and ZhP (Partial stay of the main proceedings), C‑176/22, EU:C:2023:416, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

78On the one hand, that procedure must not have the effect of preventing all the other national courts from exercising their right or fulfilling their obligation to refer questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, both before the proceedings are brought before the supreme court and after the decision of that court on the question of law referred to it (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 June 2010, Melki and Abdeli, C‑188/10 and C‑189/10, EU:C:2010:363, paragraphs 47 and 57).

79In particular, a court not called upon to rule at last instance must remain free if it considers that a higher court’s legal ruling could lead it to give a judgment contrary to EU law, to refer to the Court questions which are of concern to it. Thus, a national court, which is called upon to give a ruling following the preliminary decision delivered by the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice) under OUG No 62/2024, cannot be bound, in accordance with national procedural law, by legal rulings made by that higher court, if it considers, in the light of the interpretation given by the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU, that those rulings are not consistent with EU law (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 5 October 2010, Elchinov, C‑173/09, EU:C:2010:581, paragraphs 27 and 32 and the case-law cited).

80On the other hand, it should be noted that, even though it is not clear from the case file before the Court whether the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice) is empowered to stay the proceedings initiated before it under OUG No 62/2024 in order to refer a question for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU, the principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with EU law requires national courts and tribunals, subject to the prohibition on interpreting national law contra legem, to take the whole body of domestic law into consideration and to apply the interpretative methods recognised by domestic law, with a view to ensuring that the provisions of EU law in question are fully effective, in the present case Article 267 TFEU and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, and to achieve an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by those provisions (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 October 2024, KUBERA, C‑144/23, EU:C:2024:881, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, the procedure established by OUG No 62/2024 must be interpreted, subject to that reservation, as allowing the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice) itself to stay the proceedings and refer questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU.

81In addition, it is settled case-law that, where it is proved that the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU has been infringed, the principle of the primacy of EU law requires national courts that are called upon to apply EU law, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, to disapply, of their own motion, the provisions of national law that fail to meet the requirements arising from the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and it is not necessary for those courts to request or await the prior setting aside, repeal or withdrawal of such provisions by legislative or other constitutional means (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 March 2026, Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich (Recusal of a judge of an ordinary court), C‑521/21, EU:C:2026:242, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).

82In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the question referred is that the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which provides that, where a national court is responsible for hearing a dispute concerning a specific matter, in the context of which it finds that a point of law which has not yet been decided by the supreme court arises, that court is required to stay the proceedings pending before it and either refer the matter to the supreme court for a preliminary decision on that point of law, or, where that point of law is already the subject of a referral made by another court, await the decision of the supreme court.

Costs

83Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

Operative part

On those grounds, the Court (Fourth Chamber) hereby rules: The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which provides that, where a national court is responsible for hearing a dispute concerning a specific matter, in the context of which it finds that a point of law which has not yet been decided by the supreme court arises, that court is required to stay the proceedings pending before it and either refer the matter to the supreme court for a preliminary decision on that point of law, or, where that point of law is already the subject of a referral made by another court, await the decision of the supreme court.