Malacalza Investimenti Srl and Vittorio Malacalza v European Central Bank (C-557/24 P)

Contents

Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber)21 May 2026^note(Appeal — Non-contractual liability — Economic and monetary policy — Prudential supervision of credit institutions — Decisions taken by the European Central Bank (ECB) concerning Banca Carige SpA — Sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law conferring rights on individuals — Principle of the protection of legitimate expectations — Conflict of interest — Proportionality — Equal treatment — Right to property — Grounds of the General Court’s judgment)In Case C‑557/24 P,APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 14 August 2024,Malacalza Investimenti Srl, established in Genoa (Italy),Vittorio Malacalza, residing in Genoa (Italy),represented by L. Boggio, S.M. Carbone, and A. D’Angelo, avvocati,the other parties to the proceedings being:European Central Bank (ECB), represented by G. Marafioti, A. Pizzolla and E. Yoo, acting as Agents,European Commission, represented by P.A. Messina, A. Steiblytė and D. Triantafyllou, acting as Agents,THE COURT (Fifth Chamber),composed of M.L. Arastey Sahún, President of the Chamber, J. Passer, E. Regan, D. Gratsias (Rapporteur) and B. Smulders, Judges,Advocate General: M. Campos Sánchez-Bordona,Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,having regard to the written procedure,after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 13 November 2025,gives the following

Judgment

1By their appeal, Malacalza Investimenti Srl and Mr Vittoria Malacalza seek to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 5 June 2024, Malacalza Investimenti and Malacalza v ECB (T‑134/21, EU:T:2024:362; ‘the judgment under appeal’), by which the General Court dismissed their action seeking compensation in respect of the harm which they claim to have suffered as a result of the unlawful conduct of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the exercise of its prudential supervisory function of Banca Carige SpA between 2014 and 2019.

I.Legal context

A.European Union law

1.Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

2Under the first paragraph of Article 1 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 1):‘This Regulation lays down uniform rules concerning general prudential requirements that institutions supervised under Directive 2013/36/EU [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 338)] shall comply with in relation to the following items:(a) own funds requirements relating to entirely quantifiable, uniform and standardised elements of credit risk, market risk, operational risk and settlement risk;(b) requirements limiting large exposures;(c) after the delegated act referred to in Article 460 has entered into force, liquidity requirements relating to entirely quantifiable, uniform and standardised elements of liquidity risk;(d) reporting requirements related to points (a), (b) and (c) and to leverage;(e) public disclosure requirements.’

2.Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013

3Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ 2013 L 287, p. 63) defines, in Article 2(9) thereof, the single supervisory mechanism (SSM) as ‘the system of financial supervision composed by the ECB and national competent authorities of participating Member States as described in Article 6 of this Regulation’.

4Article 4 of that regulation provides:1.Within the framework of Article 6, the ECB shall, in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article, be exclusively competent to carry out, for prudential supervisory purposes, the following tasks in relation to all credit institutions established in the participating Member States:…(d) to ensure compliance with the acts referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3), which impose prudential requirements on credit institutions in the areas of own funds requirements, securitisation, large exposure limits, liquidity, leverage, and reporting and public disclosure of information on those matters;(e) to ensure compliance with the acts referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3), which impose requirements on credit institutions to have in place robust governance arrangements, including the fit and proper requirements for the persons responsible for the management of credit institutions, risk management processes, internal control mechanisms, remuneration policies and practices and effective internal capital adequacy assessment processes, including Internal Ratings Based models;(f) to carry out supervisory reviews, including where appropriate in coordination with [the European Banking Authority (EBA)], stress tests and their possible publication, in order to determine whether the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms put in place by credit institutions and the own funds held by these institutions ensure a sound management and coverage of their risks, and on the basis of that supervisory review to impose on credit institutions specific additional own funds requirements, specific publication requirements, specific liquidity requirements and other measures, where specifically made available to competent authorities by relevant Union law’.…3. For the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation, and with the objective of ensuring high standards of supervision, the ECB shall apply all relevant Union law, and where this Union law is composed of Directives, the national legislation transposing those Directives. Where the relevant Union law is composed of Regulations and where currently those Regulations explicitly grant options for Member States, the ECB shall apply also the national legislation exercising those options.…’

5Article 9(1) and (2) of that regulation provides as follows:1. For the exclusive purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred on it by Articles 4(1), 4(2) and 5(2), the ECB shall be considered, as appropriate, the competent authority or the designated authority in the participating Member States as established by the relevant Union law.For the same exclusive purpose, the ECB shall have all the powers and obligations set out in this Regulation. It shall also have all the powers and obligations, which competent and designated authorities shall have under the relevant Union law, unless otherwise provided for by this Regulation. In particular, the ECB shall have the powers listed in Sections 1 and 2 of this Chapter.…2. The ECB shall exercise the powers referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article in accordance with the acts referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3). In the exercise of their respective supervisory and investigatory powers, the ECB and national competent authorities shall cooperate closely.’

6Article 16 of that regulation is worded as follows:1.For the purpose of carrying out its tasks referred to in Article 4(1) and without prejudice to other powers conferred on the ECB, the ECB shall have the powers set out in paragraph 2 of this Article to require any credit institution, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company in participating Member States to take the necessary measures at an early stage to address relevant problems in any of the following circumstances:(a) the credit institution does not meet the requirements of the acts referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3);(b) the ECB has evidence that the credit institution is likely to breach the requirements of the acts referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) within the next 12 months;(c) based on a determination, in the framework of a supervisory review in accordance with point (f) of Article 4(1), that the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by the credit institution and the own funds and liquidity held by it do not ensure a sound management and coverage of its risks.2.For the purposes of Article 9(1), the ECB shall have, in particular, the following powers:(a) to require institutions to hold own funds in excess of the capital requirements laid down in the acts referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) related to elements of risks and risks not covered by the relevant [European] Union acts;(b) to require the reinforcement of the arrangements, processes, mechanisms and strategies;(c) to require institutions to present a plan to restore compliance with supervisory requirements pursuant to the acts referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) and set a deadline for its implementation, including improvements to that plan regarding scope and deadline;(d) to require institutions to apply a specific provisioning policy or treatment of assets in terms of own funds requirements;(e) to restrict or limit the business, operations or network of institutions or to request the divestment of activities that pose excessive risks to the soundness of an institution;(f) to require the reduction of the risk inherent in the activities, products and systems of institutions;(g) to require institutions to limit variable remuneration as a percentage of net revenues when it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base;(h) to require institutions to use net profits to strengthen own funds;(i) to restrict or prohibit distributions by the institution to shareholders, members or holders of Additional Tier 1 instruments where the prohibition does not constitute an event of default of the institution;(j) to impose additional or more frequent reporting requirements, including reporting on capital and liquidity positions;(k) to impose specific liquidity requirements, including restrictions on maturity mismatches between assets and liabilities;(l) to require additional disclosures;(m) to remove at any time members from the management body of credit institutions who do not fulfil the requirements set out in the acts referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3).’

3.Directive 2013/36

7According to Article 1 of Directive 2013/36:‘This Directive lays down rules concerning:(a) access to the activity of credit institutions and investment firms (collectively referred to as “institutions”);(b) supervisory powers and tools for the prudential supervision of institutions by competent authorities;(c) the prudential supervision of institutions by competent authorities in a manner that is consistent with the rules set out in Regulation [No 575/2013];(d) publication requirements for competent authorities in the field of prudential regulation and supervision of institutions.’

8Article 142 of that directive provides:1. Where an institution fails to meet its combined buffer requirement, it shall prepare a capital conservation plan and submit it to the competent authority no later than five working days after it identified that it was failing to meet that requirement, unless the competent authority authorises a longer delay up to 10 days.…3. The competent authority shall assess the capital conservation plan, and shall approve the plan only if it considers that the plan, if implemented, would be reasonably likely to conserve or raise sufficient capital to enable the institution to meet its combined buffer requirements within a period which the competent authority considers appropriate.…’

4.Directive 2014/59/EU

9Point 21 of Article 2(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2014 L 173, p. 190) defines the ECB as a ‘competent authority’, for the purposes of Directive 2014/59, ‘with regard to specific tasks conferred on it by Regulation [No 1024/2013]’.

10Article 27 of that directive, headed ‘Early intervention measures’, provides, in paragraph 1 thereof:‘1. Where [a credit institution or investment firm] infringes or, due, inter alia, to a rapidly deteriorating financial condition, including deteriorating liquidity situation, increasing level of leverage, non-performing loans or concentration of exposures, as assessed on the basis of a set of triggers, which may include the institution’s own funds requirement plus 1.5 percentage points, is likely in the near future to infringe the requirements of Regulation [No 575/2013], Directive [2013/36], Title II of Directive 2014/65/EU [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (OJ 2014 L 173, p. 349)] or any of Articles 3 to 7, 14 to 17, and 24, 25 and 26 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ 2014 L 173, p. 84)], Member States shall ensure that competent authorities have at their disposal … at least the following measures:…’

11Article 28 of Directive 2014/59, entitled ‘Removal of senior management and management body’, provides:‘Where there is a significant deterioration in the financial situation of an institution or where there are serious infringements of law, of regulations or of the statutes of the institution, or serious administrative irregularities, and other measures taken in accordance with Article 27 are not sufficient to reverse that deterioration, Member States shall ensure that competent authorities may require the removal of the senior management or management body of the institution, in its entirety or with regard to individuals. The appointment of the new senior management or management body shall be done in accordance with national and Union law and be subject to the approval or consent of the competent authority.’

12Paragraph 1 of Article 29 of that directive, headed ‘Temporary administrator’, is worded as follows:‘Where replacement of the senior management or management body as referred to in Article 28 is deemed to be insufficient by the competent authority to remedy the situation, Member States shall ensure that competent authorities may appoint one or more temporary administrators to the institution. Competent authorities may, based on what is proportionate in the circumstances, appoint any temporary administrator either to replace the management body of the institution temporarily or to work temporarily with the management body of the institution and the competent authority shall specify its decision at the time of appointment. If the competent authority appoints a temporary administrator to work with the management body of the institution, the competent authority shall further specify at the time of such an appointment the role, duties and powers of the temporary administrator and any requirements for the management body of the institution to consult or to obtain the consent of the temporary administrator prior to taking specific decisions or actions. The competent authority shall be required to make public the appointment of any temporary administrator except where the temporary administrator does not have the power to represent the institution. Member States shall further ensure that any temporary administrator has the qualifications, ability and knowledge required to carry out his or her functions and is free of any conflict of interests.’

5.Directive (EU) 2017/1132

13Article 72(1) and (4) of Directive (EU) 2017/1132 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 relating to certain aspects of company law (OJ 2017 L 169, p. 46) provides:1. Whenever the capital is increased by consideration in cash, the shares shall be offered on a pre-emptive basis to shareholders in proportion to the capital represented by their shares.…4. The right of pre-emption may not be restricted or withdrawn by the statutes or instrument of incorporation. This may, however, be done by decision of the general meeting. ……’

B.Italian law

14Article 53(1)(da) of the decreto legislativo n. 385 – Testo unico delle leggi in materia bancaria e creditizia (Legislative Decree No 385 consolidating the laws on banking and credit) of 1 September 1993 (GURI No 230 of 30 September 1993, Ordinary Supplement No 92; ‘the Consolidated Law on Banking’) entrusts the Banca d’Italia (Bank of Italy), which is the supervisory authority in that Member State, within the meaning of EU legislation, with the task of publishing information concerning credit institutions, in particular information on capital adequacy, risk limitation, shareholdings that may be held, governance and administrative or accounting organisation.

15Article 53a(1)(d) of that law provides that, where the situation so requires, the supervisory authority may adopt specific measures in respect of one or more banks or the banking system as a whole. Those measures may include:– restricting the bank’s activities or geographical structure;– prohibiting it from engaging in certain transactions, including corporate transactions, and from distributing profits or other elements of capital, as well as – in the case of financial instruments that could be included in capital for supervisory purposes – prohibiting the bank from paying interest;– setting limits on the total amount of the variable part of remuneration within the bank, where this is necessary to maintain a sound capital base, and, in the case of banks that have been granted emergency public funding interventions, setting limits on the total remuneration of corporate officers.

16Article 56 of that law provides:1. The Bank of Italy shall ensure that amendments to the statutes of banks do not conflict with sound and prudent management.2. The procedure for registration in the companies’ register may be initiated only if the verification provided for in paragraph 1 is established.’

17Article 67(1)(e) of the Consolidated Law on Banking provides that, for the exercise of consolidated supervision, the supervisory authority is to issue to the parent company, by means of general measures, information concerning the banking group as a whole or its components, on capital adequacy, risk limitation in its various configurations, shareholdings, corporate governance, administrative and accounting organisation, internal controls and remuneration and incentive schemes.

18In accordance with Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) of that law, the Bank of Italy may implement the early intervention measures referred to in that text where, as a result of a rapid deterioration in the situation of the bank concerned or of the group of which it forms part, it finds there to be or foresees, inter alia, an infringement of Regulation No 575/2013 and of Title II of Directive 2014/65.

19In accordance with Article 69octiesdecies(1)(b) and Article 70 of that law, the supervisory authority may place an institution under temporary administration in the event of serious infringements of laws or regulations, of serious irregularities in the management of the credit institution, where the deterioration in the situation of the bank or banking group is particularly significant, when serious losses of assets are foreseeable, or where temporary administration is requested by reasoned application from the administrative bodies or by the extraordinary general meeting of the credit institution.

20Article 69noviesdecies of the Consolidated Law on Banking confers on the supervisory authority the power to request, where the conditions laid down in Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) of that law are satisfied, that a credit institution or the parent company of a banking group implement, even in part, the restructuring plan adopted, prepare a plan to negotiate debt restructuring with all or some of the creditors or, where appropriate, modify their corporate form.

21It follows from Article 71(6) of the Consolidated Law on Banking that in order to be able to perform their duties, temporary administrators must have a number of characteristics, one of which being that they must be free from conflicts of interest.

22In accordance with Article 72(5) of that law, the company action for damages against the administrative and supervisory bodies that have been dissolved, is to be brought, for the duration of the temporary administration, by the temporary administrators.

II.Background to the dispute

23The background to the dispute, which is set out in paragraphs 2 to 25 of the judgment under appeal, may, for the purposes of the present proceedings, be summarised as follows.

24Banca Carige was a credit institution established in Italy, which was listed on the stock exchange and was subject to direct prudential supervision by the ECB from 2014 onwards, in accordance with Regulation No 1024/2013. The appellants held shares in Banca Carige and Mr Malacalza was also a member and vice-president of its board of directors from 31 March 2016 to 3 August 2018.

25On 23 April 2015, in order to remedy the capital shortfall that had been identified by the full assessment carried out by the ECB in the course of 2014, the extraordinary general meeting of Banca Carige’s shareholders approved a capital increase of EUR 850 million.

26By Decision ECB/SSM/2016-F1T87K3OQ2OV1UORLH26/26 of 9 December 2016, the ECB adopted an early intervention measure in respect of Banca Carige (‘the early intervention measure’). That measure consisted of requesting that the bank submit, by 28 February 2017, a strategic plan and an operational plan to reduce the issue of non-performing loans, with a clear indication of the measures to be taken and the schedule to be followed in order to achieve that objective.

27In September 2017, in order to meet the objectives set by the early intervention measure, Banca Carige’s board of directors approved a recapitalisation plan which included, inter alia, a capital increase of EUR 560 million to be implemented by the end of 2017. Following the approval of the prospectus by the Commissione nazionale per le società e la borsa (National Companies and Stock Exchange Commission, Italy), the capital increase was completed on 21 December 2017, for an amount of EUR 544 million.

28On 28 December 2017, the ECB notified Banca Carige of its decision establishing the prudential requirements in its respect for 2018. Subsequently, Banca Carige tried unsuccessfully to increase its own funds in order to meet the applicable requirements.

29Those failures exacerbated tensions within Banca Carige’s board of directors over how to remedy non-compliance with own funds requirements and how to implement the recapitalisation plan approved in September 2017. Those disagreements led to a number of resignations, including that of Mr Malacalza, which made it necessary to appoint a new board of directors. Thus, at the extraordinary general meeting of 20 September 2018, Banca Carige’s shareholders appointed new directors and appointed Mr Modiano to the post of chairman of the board of directors and Mr Innocenzi to that of managing director.

30In view of Banca Carige’s failures in its attempt to place its capital instruments on the market, by Decision ECB-SSM-2018-ITCAR-6 of 14 September 2018 (‘the own funds decision’), the ECB refused to approve the capital conservation plan drawn up by Banca Carige and asked it to submit and obtain approval from its board of directors, by 30 November 2018 at the latest, of a new plan to restore and ensure sustainable compliance with the financial requirements by 31 December 2018 at the latest.

31In order to respond to that request, Banca Carige’s board of directors adopted, on 12 November 2018, a capital strengthening plan involving two stages, namely, first, the issue of Class 2 subordinated bonds and, next, an increase in capital subject to shareholder approval.

32The first stage was carried out by means of a bond subscription in the amount, first, of EUR 318.2 million by the Fondo interbancario di tutela dei depositi (Interbank Deposit Protection Fund, Italy) (‘the FITD’) through its Voluntary Intervention Fund and, second, of EUR 1.8 million by Banco di Desio e della Brianza, a bank established in Italy.

33As part of the second stage, an extraordinary general meeting of Banca Carige’s shareholders was convened on 22 December 2018 to approve a capital increase by exchange of subordinated bonds for newly issued shares, the objective being to strengthen Tier 1 capital. However, the latter proposal was not accepted following the opposition expressed at that meeting by shareholders holding 70% of the capital. Before taking their decision, those shareholders wished to receive communication of, first, the business plan and, second, the balance sheet relating to the business activities carried out by Banca Carige in the course of 2018.

34Following those events, on 23 December 2018, Banca Carige announced in a press release that the vice-chair of its board of directors and another member of that board had resigned with immediate effect. On 2 January 2019, in another press release, it announced the resignation, with effect from that date, of five other members of the board of directors including the chair, Mr Modiano, and the managing director, Mr Innocenzi. Those resignations resulted in the disqualification of the board of directors, in accordance with Banca Carige’s statutes and Italian law. In accordance with those statutes, the four members of the board of directors who had not resigned remained in office to ensure the day-to-day management of Banca Carige.

35In the meantime, on 1 January 2019, the ECB had decided to place Banca Carige under temporary administration (‘the decision to place Banca Carige under temporary administration’) in accordance with the provisions of the Consolidated Law on Banking. That decision led to, first, the dissolution of Banca Carige’s board of directors and the replacement of the former members of that board by three temporary administrators, including Mr Modiano and Mr Innocenzi; second, the dissolution of Banca Carige’s supervisory committee and the replacement of the former members of that board by three other individuals; third, the assignment to the new bodies of a task consisting of taking the necessary steps to ensure that the bank once again complies with asset requirements on a sustainable basis.

36On 2 January 2019, the adoption of the decision to place Banca Carige under temporary administration was announced by means of a press release, and the trading of securities issued or guaranteed by Banca Carige was suspended by the Italian National Companies and Stock Exchange Commission during the period of application of that decision or until the restoration, in particular as a result of the competent authorities’ new initiatives in the field of prudential supervision, of a comprehensive disclosure framework for securities issued or guaranteed by Banca Carige.

37Following a reassessment of the conditions on the basis of which the decision to place Banca Carige under temporary administration had been taken, that measure was extended three times – on 29 March, 30 September and 20 December 2019 – in order to stabilise Banca Carige’s situation and to allow for conclusion of the operation to strengthen the capital base.

38On 9 August 2019, Banca Carige, Cassa Centrale Banca – Credito Cooperativo Italiano SpA, the parent company of a group of Italian credit institutions, the FITD and the FITD’s voluntary intervention fund signed a framework agreement defining the characteristics of a business plan which provided, in particular, for an increase in the capital of Banca Carige of EUR 700 million and the issue of new Class 2 subordinated bonds. By letter of 18 September 2019, the ECB considered, on the basis of Article 56 of the Consolidated Law on Banking, that the proposed capital increase was not contrary to the sound and prudent management of the bank.

39On 20 September 2019, an extraordinary general meeting of Banca Carige’s shareholders approved that capital increase. Malacalza Investimenti did not attend that meeting.

40On 31 January 2020, after the implementation of that capital increase, a new board of directors and a new supervisory board were elected at the ordinary general meeting of Banca Carige’s shareholders and the temporary directors and the supervisory committee transferred, on the same date, the management of Banca Carige to the newly elected bodies.

III.The procedure before the General Court and the judgment under appeal

41By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 3 March 2021, the applicants brought an action seeking (i) that the ECB be ordered to pay, first, Malacalza Investimenti the sum of EUR 870525670 and, second, Mr Malacalza the sum of EUR 9544022, or any other greater or lesser amount which is deemed fair, to be determined, if necessary ex aequo et bono, by way of compensation for the harm allegedly suffered by them as a result of the ECB’s unlawful conduct in the performance of its supervisory function in respect of Banca Carige between 2014 and 2019, and (ii) a declaration, ‘in so far as necessary’, to the effect that the measures alleged to be unlawful were invalid.

42By decision of 21 July 2021, the European Commission was granted leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the ECB.

43In paragraph 28 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court found that the appellants called into question the non-contractual liability of the ECB in respect of the following eight alleged instances of unlawful conduct:– first, the sufficiently serious breach by the ECB of Italian law when it failed to intervene to rectify the allegedly misleading statements about the soundness of Banca Carige, made by directors of that bank;– second, the sufficiently serious breach by the ECB of EU rules in its relations with Banca Carige’s board of directors;– third, the sufficiently serious breach by the ECB of Italian law as regards the approval, on 18 September 2019, of an increase in capital contrary to the pre-emption rights provided for in Banca Carige’s statutes;– fourth, the sufficiently serious breach by the ECB of Italian law in relation to the appointment of temporary administrators who allegedly had a conflict of interest;– fifth, the sufficiently serious breach by the ECB, when adopting the early intervention measure, of various rules and principles;– sixth, the sufficiently serious breach by the ECB, in the own funds decision, of the principle of proportionality as a result of the imposition on Banca Carige of a period of time that was too short to allow it to comply with the own funds requirements imposed on it;– seventh, the sufficiently serious breach by the ECB of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations as a result of the assurances given to shareholders as to the situation of Banca Carige;– eighth, the sufficiently serious breach by the ECB of the shareholders’ right to property as a result of the significant reduction in the value of their shareholdings in Banca Carige.

44After recalling, in paragraph 34 of the judgment under appeal, the case-law according to which, in order for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability towards individuals, three cumulative conditions must be satisfied relating to (i) the unlawfulness of the conduct attributable to the EU institution concerned, or to its servants in the performance of their duties, (ii) the fact of damage, and (iii) the existence of a causal link between the alleged conduct and the damage complained of, the General Court noted, in paragraph 35 of that judgment, that it considered it appropriate to examine whether the first of those conditions was satisfied. It was recalled, in that regard, that, according to the case-law, such is the case where the contested conduct involves a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals and where the breach alleged against the institution is sufficiently serious.

45As regards the nature of the rules which may give rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the European Union, the General Court recalled, in paragraphs 36 and 37 of the judgment under appeal, that, according to its case-law, a rule of law is intended to confer rights on individuals where it creates an advantage for individuals which could be defined as a vested right, is designed for the protection of their interests or entails the grant of rights to individuals, the content of those rights being sufficiently identifiable, and that, in order for the European Union to incur liability, the protection afforded by the rule invoked must be effective vis-à-vis the individual relying on it. It added that a rule cannot be taken into account if it does not confer any right on the individual who invoked it, even if it confers a right on other persons.

46As regards the type of infringement required in order for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability, the General Court reviewed, in paragraphs 38 to 45 of the judgment under appeal, the relevant case-law and concluded, in paragraph 46 of that judgment, that it followed therefrom that, in order to establish such liability on the part of the ECB, the appellants had to prove to the requisite legal standard that the ECB had seriously and manifestly disregarded, beyond the discretion conferred on it, a rule of EU law conferring rights on individuals. The General Court added, in paragraph 47 of that judgment, that in order to determine whether such an infringement had been committed, the Courts of the European Union must take into account, in the light of the information put forward by the appellants, the broad discretion conferred on the ECB in the exercise of its prudential supervision tasks.

47The General Court examined in turn the eight instances of unlawful conduct raised by the appellants and recalled in paragraph 43 of the present judgment.

48As regards the first instance of unlawful conduct, the General Court noted, in paragraph 59 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellants claimed that, by failing to rectify the allegedly misleading statements concerning the soundness of Banca Carige made by directors of that bank, the ECB infringed, in a sufficiently serious manner, Article 53(1)(da), Article 53a(1)(d) and Article 67(1)(e) of the Consolidated Law on Banking.

49In that regard, the General Court observed, in paragraph 68 of the judgment under appeal, that the first and third of those provisions impose on the ECB a general obligation to publish categories of information in the public interest, namely to ensure the smooth functioning and stability of the markets, and do not impose an obligation to react in a specific way when certain stakeholders make statements on the market concerning the soundness of certain institutions, that are construed as misleading by other stakeholders. The General Court therefore held that it cannot be inferred from those provisions that investors have a right to have the ECB intervene in each Member State whenever comments are made there about the institutions subject to its supervision which might be judged by such investors to be wholly or partly unfounded. It is apparent from paragraphs 69 and 70 of that judgment that the General Court considered that the fact that such statements had been made by Banca Carige’s directors could not lead to a different conclusion.

50As regards Article 53a(1)(d) of the Consolidated Law on Banking, the General Court held, in paragraph 74 of the judgment under appeal, that it appeared, in the light of its wording, that that provision was irrelevant when determining whether the ECB was under the obligation to correct statements on the financial stability of a bank, attributed to certain stakeholders and deemed incorrect by others. Thus, the General Court held, in paragraph 75 of that judgment, that the appellants’ arguments concerning the first instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB had to be rejected.

51As regards the second instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB, the General Court noted, in paragraph 76 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellants claimed that the ECB had infringed Articles 4 and 16 of Regulation No 1024/2013:– by conferring with Mr Modiano and Mr Innocenzi with a view to their resigning, with effect as from 2 January 2019, which had caused Banca Carige’s board of directors to be disqualified and thus paved the way for that institution to be placed under temporary administration,– by seeking to limit the powers of Banca Carige’s board of directors to those of ratifying the decisions taken by the managing director at the meeting of 16 February 2018 and during successive exchanges between Mr Malacalza, Ms Nouy, the Chair of the ECB’s Supervisory Board, and Mr Quintana, a member of the ECB’s Directorate-General for Micro-Prudential Supervision, and– by concealing from the board of directors for several months the extent of the difficulty faced by Banca Carige in terms of capital, and by informing it only, on 21 June 2018, of the content of a letter which the ECB had nonetheless sent on 4 June 2018 to the managing director.

52After having analysed, in paragraphs 79 to 84 of the judgment under appeal, Articles 4 and 16 of Regulation No 1024/2013, the General Court held, in paragraphs 85 and 86 of that judgment, that, since they are not intended to confer rights on individuals, those provisions cannot form the basis of a claim of unlawful conduct such as to give rise to liability on the part of the European Union because of the conduct which the ECB was alleged to have engaged in in the context of the prudential supervision which it had carried out on Banca Carige and that, consequently, the appellants’ arguments concerning the second instance of unlawful conduct had to be rejected.

53As regards the third instance of unlawful conduct, the General Court noted, in paragraph 87 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellants alleged that the ECB had infringed, in a sufficiently serious manner, Article 56 of the Consolidated Law on Banking by having approved, on 18 September 2019, a capital increase contrary to the right of pre-emption granted to shareholders by Banca Carige’s articles of association.

54In that regard, it is apparent from paragraphs 92 and 93 of the judgment under appeal that the General Court considered that the verification to be carried out pursuant to Article 56 of the Consolidated Law on Banking must not relate to the compatibility of the proposed amendment to the statutes with the shareholders’ pre-emption rights, but with that of the requirement of sound and prudent management, and that, therefore, the objective to be taken into account when carrying out that verification is the stability of the credit institution concerned and, more broadly, of the financial system as a whole. The General Court inferred therefrom, in paragraph 94 of that judgment, that Article 56 of the Consolidated Law on Banking does not in itself confer rights on individuals; accordingly, the appellants’ arguments concerning the third instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB had to be rejected.

55As for the fourth instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB, the General Court noted, in paragraph 95 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellants submitted that the ECB had infringed, in a sufficiently serious manner, Article 71(6) of the Consolidated Law on Banking by appointing, as temporary administrators, Mr Modiano and Mr Innocenzi, the former chair of the board of directors and the former managing director of Banca Carige, respectively, since it would have been difficult for those two individuals to bring a company action against the administrative and supervisory bodies of Banca Carige, or some of their members. Thus, those two individuals were protected, by reason of their appointment as temporary administrators, from an action for damages which could have been brought against them for the decisions taken in the exercise of their previous functions.

56In that regard, the General Court held, in paragraph 104 of the judgment under appeal, that Article 71(6) of the Consolidated Law on Banking was intended to confer rights on individuals.

57Nevertheless, the General Court found, in paragraphs 108 and 109 of the judgment under appeal, that the decision to place the bank under temporary administration had not been based on ‘serious irregularities’ -allegedly- committed by the former management bodies of Banca Carige, but had been based on the ‘significant deterioration in the situation of the bank’, within the meaning of Articles 69octiesdecies and 70 of the Consolidated Law on Banking; that deterioration stemmed from the financial difficulties which had preceded their appointment. In that regard, the General Court considered, in paragraphs 112 to 116 of that judgment, that the ECB had exercised its discretion in a reasonable manner by appointing as temporary administrators Mr Modiano and Mr Innocenzi, who were sufficiently well acquainted with Banca Carige’s affairs as to be able to act expeditiously when faced with the crisis situation experienced by it, particularly because, as soon as the ordinary management of Banca Carige was resumed, the shareholders’ meeting and the shareholders who individually or jointly held one fifth of the share capital or the different amount provided for in its statutes, had the possibility of bringing an action for damages against Mr Modiano and Mr Innocenzi, within a period of five years from the date on which they ceased to perform their duties as members of the board of directors. The General Court therefore held, in paragraph 117 of the judgment under appeal, that, since no sufficiently serious breach had been established, the line of argument concerning the fourth instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB had to be rejected.

58As regards the fifth instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB, the General Court found, in paragraph 118 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellants raised six complaints in that regard. It is apparent from paragraph 119 of that judgment that, by the first complaint, the appellants claimed that the ECB had infringed, in a sufficiently serious manner, Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) of the Consolidated Law on Banking by adopting the early intervention measure in a situation in which there was a mere risk of infringement of the applicable regulatory framework, whereas, in their view, the application of that provision required evidence of a foreseeable infringement of that regulatory framework to be adduced. The General Court rejected that first complaint in paragraph 129 of that judgment, on the ground that, since Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) of the Consolidated Law on Banking pursued an objective in the public interest, that provision was not intended to confer rights on individuals, and that it was indeed in order to achieve that objective that it had been implemented by the ECB in the present case.

59It is apparent from paragraph 130 of the judgment under appeal that, by the second complaint, the appellants claimed that the ECB had infringed, in a sufficiently serious manner, Article 69noviesdecies of the Consolidated Law on Banking by imposing on Banca Carige, in the early intervention measure, the obligation to dispose, on less favourable terms, of allegedly non-performing loans, whereas, in their view, that provision did not permit the imposition of such an obligation.

60In that regard, it follows from paragraphs 134 and 138 of the judgment under appeal that the General Court held that Article 69noviesdecies of the Consolidated Law on Banking merely gave the supervisory authority the power to request that credit institutions prepare or implement a plan to negotiate a restructuring of their debts and did not, in itself, confer rights on individuals, but pursued an objective of public interest and that it was indeed in order to achieve that objective that that power had been implemented by the ECB by means of the early intervention measure. Moreover, after having summarised, in paragraph 135 of that judgment, the essential content of that measure, the General Court found, in paragraph 136 of that judgment, that, contrary to what the appellants maintained, that measure had not required Banca Carige to give up non-performing loans, let alone to do so at defined prices over a given period. The General Court added, in paragraph 137 of that judgment, that Article 69noviesdecies of the Consolidated Law on Banking did not preclude the early intervention measure from indicating minimum objectives and setting deadlines for the reduction of non-performing loans. In those circumstances, the General Court held, in paragraph 139 of the judgment under appeal, that the second complaint had to be rejected.

61It is apparent from paragraphs 140 and 141 of the judgment under appeal that the third complaint alleged, in essence, that the early intervention measure was adopted in serious infringement of Article 16(1)(b) of Regulation No 1024/2013. The General Court noted, in paragraphs 142 and 143 of that judgment, that that provision conferred on the ECB powers in the field of prudential supervision by pursuing an objective of public interest without conferring rights on individuals and that, therefore, the third complaint had to be rejected.

62In paragraph 144 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court noted that, by the fourth complaint, the appellants claimed that the ECB had infringed, in a sufficiently serious manner, the principle of equal treatment by imposing on Banca Carige, in the context of the early intervention measure, more stringent measures than those adopted in respect of other credit institutions which were in a similar situation. In that regard, in paragraph 146 of that judgment, the General Court recalled that that principle is capable of conferring rights on individuals. However, it follows from paragraph 151 of that judgment that the General Court held that, in order to demonstrate a sufficiently serious breach of that principle, the appellants had to establish that other Italian credit institutions, which were in a situation comparable to that of Banca Carige, had been treated differently from Banca Carige. The General Court found, in paragraph 152 of that judgment, that while the appellants had produced a report comparing the volume of non-performing loans held by Banca Carige with those held by other Italian credit institutions, they had not linked that particular situation with the decisions taken by the ECB in such a way as to establish the existence of a genuine difference. Consequently, the General Court also rejected the fourth complaint.

63As regards the fifth complaint, the General Court noted, in paragraph 154 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellants claimed that the ECB had infringed, in a sufficiently serious manner, the principle of proportionality by imposing on Banca Carige an obligation that causes an immediate write-down of the loans that it had granted and gave rise to considerable losses for the bank, even though less radical measures were conceivable.

64In that regard, the General Court recalled, in paragraph 155 of the judgment under appeal, that the principle of proportionality was capable of conferring rights on individuals. However, on the basis of an analysis, carried out in paragraphs 160 to 164 of that judgment, of the reasons justifying the adoption of the early intervention measure, the General Court held, in paragraphs 165 to 167 of that judgment, that the ECB had been entitled to take the view, in view of the risk faced by Banca Carige, that it was appropriate and necessary to adopt that intervention measure without there being alternatives to put a satisfactory end to the difficulties which Banca Carige was experiencing and that the appellants had failed to identify factors to the effect that, by adopting the early intervention measure, the ECB had seriously and manifestly infringed the principle of proportionality, with the result that the fifth complaint had to be rejected, as had the line of argument concerning the fifth instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB in its entirety.

65Furthermore, in paragraphs 168 to 174 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court examined and rejected the sixth complaint raised by the appellants in the context of the fifth instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB, by which the appellants requested the General Court to find, incidentally, on the basis of Article 277 TFEU, that the early intervention measure was inapplicable on account of its alleged unlawfulness. The General Court rejected that plea of illegality, holding that such a plea applied only to acts of general application, failing which it would be inadmissible, and that the early intervention measure was not such an act.

66It is apparent from paragraph 175 of the judgment under appeal that, in the context of the sixth instance of unlawful conduct, the appellants complained that the ECB had imposed on Banca Carige, in the own funds decision, a period of time that was too short to enable Banca Carige to comply with the requirements imposed on it by that decision. More specifically, the appellants claimed it was unreasonable to ask Banca Carige to comply with those requirements by 31 December 2018, that is to say, only 19 working days after the date set by the ECB for the submission and approval by the Banca Carige’s board of directors of a capital conservation plan.

67The General Court reviewed, in paragraphs 181 to 183 of the judgment under appeal, the grounds of the own funds decision and concluded, in paragraphs 184 to 186 of that judgment, that, first, the ECB had been entitled to consider, in view of the real risk that Banca Carige would not be able to restore its capital immediately, that it was appropriate and necessary to ask it to submit and have approved by its board of directors, by 30 November 2018 at the latest, a new plan aimed at restoring and ensuring lasting compliance with the asset requirements by 31 December 2018 at the latest, and that, second, the appellants had failed to identify factors to the effect that, by adopting the own funds decision, the ECB had infringed the principle of proportionality in a sufficiently serious manner and that, therefore, the appellants’ line of argument concerning the sixth instance of unlawful conduct had to be rejected.

68In paragraph 187 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court noted that, in the context of the seventh instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB, the appellants put forward three complaints relating to the alleged sufficiently serious breach by the ECB of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations.

69As a preliminary point, the General Court recalled, in paragraphs 189 to 191 of the judgment under appeal, the case-law according to which (i) the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations is a general principle of EU law intended to confer rights on individuals, (ii) the possibility of relying on that principle is subject to three cumulative conditions, according to which precise, unconditional and consistent assurances originating from authorised and reliable sources must have been given to the person concerned by the EU authorities; those assurances must be such as to give rise to a legitimate expectation in the mind of the person to whom they are addressed and must comply with the applicable rules, and (iii) that principle may be relied on by any economic operator on whose part an authority has created reasonable expectations; however, it must be borne in mind that where a prudent and circumspect economic operator could have foreseen the adoption of a measure likely to affect his, her or its interests, he, she or it cannot plead that principle.

70It is in the light of those considerations that the General Court assessed the three complaints put forward by the appellants. As is apparent from paragraph 193 of the judgment under appeal, by the first of those complaints, the appellants complained that the ECB had failed to intervene in order to correct allegedly misleading statements made by Banca Carige’s directors concerning the financial soundness of that bank.

71In that regard, the General Court noted, in paragraph 196 of the judgment under appeal, first, that the ECB’s failure to intervene to correct allegedly misleading statements could not be regarded as the provision by the ECB of assurances as to the conduct which it intended to adopt vis-à-vis Banca Carige and, second, and in any event, that such a failure clearly did not satisfy the requirement that assurances must be precise, unconditional and consistent in order to give rise to legitimate expectations. Accordingly, the General Court rejected the first complaint.

72As is apparent from paragraphs 198 to 202 of the judgment under appeal, the second complaint, by which the appellants claimed that the ECB had infringed, in a sufficiently serious manner, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations by making positive assessments of the capital increases made by Banca Carige before 2019, was rejected by the General Court as inadmissible. The General Court held that, while it is necessary that the basic particulars relied on be stated, at least in summary form, coherently and intelligibly in the documents submitted by the appellants, in the present case the appellants had referred in a generic manner to the capital increases made by the bank between 2015 and 2018, without identifying precisely which were specifically concerned by the second complaint, and, moreover, they had failed to provide any information to show that positive assessments had actually been made by the ECB and that those assessments satisfied the requirements referred to in the case-law in order to be able legitimately to give rise to a specific expectation on their part as to the conduct which the ECB would adopt.

73For the reasons set out in paragraphs 203 to 207 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court also rejected as inadmissible the third complaint, by which the appellants claimed that the ECB had infringed, in a sufficiently serious manner, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations by giving assurances to Banca Carige’s shareholders as to its soundness, which led those shareholders to make significant investments in it. The General Court found, in that regard, that the appellants had not provided any evidence that would make it possible to identify the assurances given by the ECB or the circumstances in which those assurances had been given. Thus, after rejecting all the complaints put forward in the context of the alleged seventh instance of unlawful conduct, the General Court rejected in its entirety the appellants’ arguments concerning that unlawfulness.

74Last, the General Court analysed, in paragraphs 208 to 215, the appellants’ arguments relating to the eighth instance of unlawful conduct, alleging that the ECB had infringed their right to property, in that it had caused, by its acts and omissions, a significant reduction in the value of their shareholdings in Banca Carige. While recognising that the right to property laid down in Article 17(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) constitutes a rule of law conferring rights on individuals, the General Court found that the appellants had merely stated that the value of their shareholdings had fallen and that they had attributed that development to the decisions adopted by Banca Carige following the measures taken by the ECB, without, however, establishing that those measures had caused that result and without having submitted an analysis to show that that result had not been caused, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by other facts or other circumstances. In those circumstances, the General Court held that the arguments concerning the eighth instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB was inadmissible.

75Therefore, the General Court concluded, in paragraphs 216 and 217 of the judgment under appeal, that none of the instances of unlawful conduct raised by the appellants was capable of giving rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the ECB within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 340 TFEU and that, consequently, the action had to be dismissed without it being necessary either to assess whether the other conditions compliance with which is required by the case-law in order for an EU institution to incur liability were satisfied or to rule on the measures of inquiry requested by the appellants.

IV.Forms of order sought

76The appellants claim that the Court should:– set aside the judgment under appeal;– refer the case back to the General Court; and– in the alternative, give judgment itself on the action and uphold their claims made therein; and– order the ECB and the Commission to pay the costs.

77The ECB contends that the Court should dismiss the appeal as inadmissible or, in the alternative, as unfounded and, in both cases, order the appellants to pay the costs. In the further alternative, should the appeal be upheld and the judgment under appeal set aside, the ECB requests the Court of Justice to refer the case back to the General Court.

78The Commission contends that the Court should dismiss the appeal on the ground that it is in part inadmissible or ineffective and entirely without foundation and order the appellants to pay the costs.

V.The application for the proceedings to be stayed

79By letter lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 9 December 2025, the appellants requested the Court, should it intend to depart from the Opinion of the Advocate General who had proposed that the judgment under appeal be set aside and the case referred back to the General Court, to stay the proceedings in the present case, in accordance with Article 55 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, until such time as the General Court or, as the case may be, the Court of Justice, in the event of an appeal, rule on the action brought in Case T‑612/20, Malacalza Investimenti v ECB – which is pending before the General Court – seeking annulment of the decision to place Banca Carige under temporary administration.

80The Court, after hearing the Advocate General, considers that there is no need to stay the proceedings in the present case, with the result that the request for a stay of proceedings must be dismissed.

VI.The appeal

A.Admissibility

1.Arguments of the parties

81The ECB contends that the appeal is inadmissible. It submits that the appellants do not specify the errors of law which they complain that the General Court made, do not identify with sufficient precision the elements which the General Court allegedly distorted, merely repeat their arguments put forward at first instance and rely on new pleas in law, not raised before the General Court, which alter the subject matter of the dispute.

82The appellants dispute the ECB’s arguments and consider that their appeal is admissible.

2.Findings of the Court

83It follows from the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and Article 168(1)(d) and Article 169(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested paragraphs of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal, failing which the appeal or the ground of appeal concerned is to be inadmissible (judgment of 12 December 2024, DD v FRA, C‑680/22 P, EU:C:2024:1019, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited).

84In particular, a ground of appeal supported by an argument that is not sufficiently clear and precise to enable the Court to exercise its powers of judicial review, in particular because essential elements on which the ground of appeal relies are not indicated sufficiently coherently and intelligibly in the text of the appeal, which is worded in a vague and ambiguous manner in that regard, does not satisfy those requirements and must be declared inadmissible. The Court of Justice has also held that an appeal lacking any coherent structure which simply makes general statements and contains no specific indications as to the points of the decision under appeal which may be vitiated by an error of law must be dismissed as clearly inadmissible (judgment of 12 December 2024, DD v FRA, C‑680/22 P, EU:C:2024:1019, paragraph 100 and the case-law cited).

85Furthermore, it follows from the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union that the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction, first, to establish the facts, except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it, and, second, to assess those facts. By contrast, when the General Court has found or assessed the facts, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the General Court and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them (judgment of 12 June 2025, ZR v EUIPO, C‑364/23 P, EU:C:2025:428, paragraph 32).

86In the present case, it should be noted that, as a general rule and subject to the individual analysis of the grounds and arguments put forward by the appellants, the arguments developed in the appeal allow the grounds of the judgment under appeal covered and the errors alleged against the General Court to be identified, with the result that that appeal cannot be rejected from the outset as inadmissible.

87As for the ECB’s argument that the appellants repeat arguments which they have already put forward before the General Court, it is sufficient to bear in mind that, in accordance with settled case-law, where an appellant challenges the interpretation or application of EU law by the General Court, the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal. Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his or her appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the General Court, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (judgment of 12 June 2025, ZR v EUIPO, C‑364/23 P, EU:C:2025:428, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

88Consequently, the pleas of inadmissibility raised by the ECB against the appeal as a whole must be rejected.

B.Substance

89In support of their appeal, the appellants rely on seven grounds alleging (i) breach of the general principles of the protection of legitimate expectations, proportionality, equal treatment, prohibition of abuse of rights and protection of property, infringement or distortion of Article 53(1)(da) and Article 53a(1)(d) of the Consolidated Law on Banking, infringement of the third paragraph of Article 340 TFEU and failure to state reasons; (ii) infringement of Articles 69octiesdecies and 69noviesdecies of the Consolidated Law on Banking, read in conjunction with Articles 4 and 16 of Regulation No 1024/2013 and breach of the principles of the protection of legitimate expectations, equal treatment, proportionality, protection of property, prohibition of abuse of rights and of the burden of proof and failure to state reasons; (iii) breach of the principles of the protection of legitimate expectations, proportionality and effectiveness of the protection of rights and failure to state reasons; (iv) infringement of the principle of conferral and of Articles 4 and 16 of Regulation No 1024/2013, of Italian law and of the principle of the protection of property, and failure to state reasons; (v) infringement of Articles 41 and 47 of the Charter, Article 29(1) of Directive 2014/59, the general principle of impartiality and Article 72(6) of the Consolidated Law on Banking and failure to state reasons; (vi) infringement of the right to property, Article 72(4) of Directive 2017/1132 and Article 9 of Regulation No 1024/2013, infringement or, in any event, distortion of Italian law, distortion of their claims and failure to state reasons, and (vii) failure to examine their arguments and failure to state reasons.

1.The first ground of appeal

90The first ground of appeal is divided into five parts.

(a)The first part

(1)Arguments of the parties

91The appellants contest paragraphs 187 to 207 of the judgment under appeal, relating to the seventh instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB. They claim that, before the General Court, they had argued that, because of its regulatory characteristics and its implementation in the present case, the ECB’s supervisory activity had given rise to a legitimate expectation on their part as to the sound and prudent management of Banca Carige as from 2015. Because they had confidence in the effectiveness of the ECB’s supervisory activities, they invested in Banca Carige and had an incentive to maintain their investments. The breach of their legitimate expectations also resulted in a breach of their right to property, since the placing of Banca Carige under temporary administration, followed by the increase in its capital, ‘orchestrated’ by the temporary directors of Banca Carige – who were appointed, supervised and authorised by the ECB – led to the expropriation of the appellants.

92Their action is thus, inter alia, based on the infringement, by the ECB, contrary to the general principles of the protection of legitimate expectations and property, of the expectations which it had created on the part of investors as to the ability of the significant increases in Banca Carige’s capital in 2015 and 2017 to ensure the soundness of its assets and finances. The appellants argued before the General Court that the conduct amounting to that infringement consisted of the ECB’s verifications of Banca Carige’s situation and of the requirements as to the measures to be adopted by the ECB, which were communicated to its shareholders by its directors. The General Court ‘fractured’, in the judgment under appeal, the ‘cohesion of factual and legal elements’ of their line of argument by dividing it into four different instances of unlawful conduct, examined in paragraphs 59 to 75, 87 to 93, 118 to 174 and 187 to 207 of the judgment under appeal, respectively; this amounts to a distortion of their line of argument.

93In the same context, the appellants claim, in essence, that the General Court erred in law in relying on the case-law cited, incompletely, in paragraph 191 of the judgment under appeal, when that case-law does not concern a case such as the case at hand.

94The ECB and the Commission contend that the applicants’ arguments must be rejected.

(2)Findings of the Court

95It should be recalled that, in accordance with settled case-law, the right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations presupposes that precise, unconditional and consistent assurances originating from authorised, reliable sources have been given to the person concerned by the competent authorities of the European Union (judgment of 30 September 2021, Court of Auditors v Pinxten, C‑130/19, EU:C:2021:782, paragraph 365 and the case-law cited).

96It is apparent from that case-law that measures adopted by the authority responsible for supervising the banking sector, or the conduct of that authority in that context, cannot, in themselves, and in the absence of assurances such as those required by the case-law cited in the preceding paragraph of this judgment, be regarded as capable of giving rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of the persons concerned.

97In particular, the mere fact that the competent authority has imposed on a credit institution subject to its prudential supervision the adoption of certain measures which have actually been adopted cannot, in the absence of precise, unconditional and consistent assurances from that authority in that regard, be regarded as having given rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of the shareholders of that institution as to the persistence of the financial stability of that institution or as to the fact that no additional measure will be adopted in the future in respect of that institution.

98In those circumstances, the General Court, in the first place, did not err in law in finding that the appellants’ arguments, based, first, on the ECB’s alleged failure to intervene – in infringement of the applicable Italian legislation – in order to rectify the allegedly misleading statements made regarding Banca Carige’s soundness, second, on the ECB’s alleged approval, contrary to that legislation, of Banca Carige’s capital increase and, third, on the adoption of the early intervention measure by the ECB, allegedly in breach of various rules and principles, were not capable of demonstrating that the ECB had infringed the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, and, in the second place, analysed those arguments separately in paragraphs 59 to 75, 87 to 93 and 118 to 174 of the judgment under appeal as the first, third and fifth instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB, respectively.

99As regards the appellants’ arguments directed against paragraph 191 of the judgment under appeal, they are ineffective. The case-law recalled in that paragraph is not included in the grounds which justified the General Court’s rejection of one or other of the three complaints into which the General Court had subdivided the seventh instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB.

100In particular, it is apparent from paragraph 196 of the judgment under appeal that the first of those three complaints was rejected by the General Court on the ground – not vitiated by an error of law – that the ECB’s failure to intervene to correct allegedly misleading statements about Banca Carige’s situation cannot be regarded as the provision, by the ECB, of assurances as to the conduct which it intended to adopt vis-à-vis Banca Carige and that, in any event, such a failure clearly did not satisfy the requirement that assurances must be precise, unconditional and consistent in order to give rise to legitimate expectations.

101As regards the second and third complaints, it is apparent, from paragraphs 199 to 202 and 204 to 206 of the judgment under appeal, respectively, that the General Court rejected them as inadmissible, since the appellants had failed to set out coherently and intelligibly the basic legal and factual particulars relied on.

102As regards the alleged breach of the appellants’ right to property, it is apparent from their line of argument, summarised in paragraph 91 of the present judgment, that, in their view, that breach was the direct consequence of the sufficiently serious breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations by the ECB. Since the General Court held, without erring in law, that the line of argument put forward before it by the appellants did not make it possible to establish a breach of that principle, the appellants’ argument based on the alleged infringement of their right to property cannot succeed either.

103It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the first part of the first ground of appeal must be rejected as, in part, unfounded and, in part, ineffective.

(b)The second part

(1)Arguments of the parties

104The appellants contest paragraphs 193 to 197 of the judgment under appeal, in which the General Court examined and rejected the first complaint raised in the context of the seventh instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB. They claim, in that regard, that the ECB’s assurances which gave them a legitimate expectation consisted of measures concerning Banca Carige’s situation which the ECB had adopted and disclosed by means of press releases, and not of the lack of response of the ECB, which merely confirmed those announcements.

105The appellants add that the reference made by the General Court, in paragraph 196 of the judgment under appeal, to the ‘form’ of the ECB’s measures means that the assurances necessary to create a legitimate expectation form part of a contractual relationship, whereas the principle of the protection of such expectations applies specifically in the field of non-contractual liability of the EU institutions and entails a ‘non-contractual penalty’.

106Furthermore, the General Court distorted their arguments by stating, in paragraph 196 of the judgment under appeal, that they ‘might have hoped that [Banca Carige’s] situation would improve’. They note, in that regard, that it was not the lack of improvement in Banca Carige’s situation which they had raised before the General Court, but the fact that, first, the ECB had adopted, only a few months after the 2015 capital increase, the early intervention measure and, second, that the ECB had stated, in the own funds decision, that the own funds requirements were already no longer met by Banca Carige on 1 January 2018, just a few days after its new capital increase, carried out in accordance with the ECB’s instructions and approved under Article 56 of the Consolidated Law on Banking.

107The ECB and the Commission contend that the applicants’ arguments must be rejected.

(2)Findings of the Court

108In the first place, the appellants’ argument that the ECB’s assurances giving rise to a legitimate expectation result from the measures adopted by the ECB with regard to Banca Carige must be rejected for the reason set out in paragraph 96 of the present judgment.

109In the second place, contrary to what the appellants claim by their argument summarised in paragraph 105 of the present judgment, the reference, in paragraph 196 of the judgment under appeal, to the ‘form’ of the ECB’s failure to intervene in order to correct allegedly misleading statements concerning Banca Carige’s situation does not mean that the General Court considered that the assurances necessary to give rise to a legitimate expectation had to be part of a contractual framework. By using the word ‘form’, the General Court clearly intended to point out that a mere omission on the part of the ECB does not constitute a precise and unconditional assurance capable, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 95 of the present judgment, of giving rise to a legitimate expectation worthy of protection. That finding, consistent with that case-law, is not vitiated by an error of law.

110In the third place, as regards the reference, in paragraph 196 of the judgment under appeal, to the ‘possibility that the [appellants] might have hoped that [Banca Carige’s] situation would improve’, it is sufficient to note that the General Court envisaged thereby a mere hypothesis which, moreover, bore no consequence for the reasoning set out in that paragraph, as is apparent from a reading of that paragraph as a whole.

111In the fourth and final place, it is apparent from a reading of paragraphs 193 to 197 of the judgment under appeal as a whole that the General Court correctly understood that the unlawfulness raised by the appellants, alleging breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, consisted, inter alia, in the ECB’s failure to intervene to correct statements made by third parties concerning Banca Carige, which were considered to be misleading. Moreover, as is apparent from paragraph 98 of the present judgment, the General Court also took account of the appellants’ other arguments and examined them as separate instances of unlawful conduct, having found, without erring in law, that they were not capable of establishing that the ECB had infringed the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. Accordingly, the appellants’ argument alleging distortion of their line of argument by the General Court must be rejected.

112In the light of the foregoing, the second part of the first ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.

(c)The third part

(1)Arguments of the parties

113The appellants contest paragraphs 198 to 207 of the judgment under appeal, relating to the examination of the second and third complaints raised in the context of the seventh instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB. In their opinion, the General Court completely ignored their arguments relating to the existence, in their favour, of a legitimate expectation as a result of the ECB’s measures, which amounts to a failure to state reasons in the judgment under appeal. They add that the statement, in paragraph 199 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellants referred ‘in a generic manner to the capital increases made by the bank in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018, without identifying precisely which were specifically concerned by the [second] complaint’ shows that the General Court did not read the documents in the case file correctly, given that there were no increases in Banca Carige’s capital in 2016 and 2018.

114The ECB and the Commission contend that the applicants’ arguments must be rejected.

(2)Findings of the Court

115The appellants’ arguments directed against paragraphs 198 to 207 of the judgment under appeal, relating to the second and third complaints raised in the context of the seventh instance of unlawfulness alleged against the ECB, must be rejected as unfounded. The General Court set out to the requisite legal standard, in paragraphs 199 to 202 and 204 to 207 of that judgment, respectively, the reasons why those two complaints had to be rejected as inadmissible, with the result that, contrary to what the appellants claim, that part of that judgment is not vitiated by a failure to state reasons.

116In addition, it is apparent from paragraph 111 of the present judgment that the General Court did not disregard the appellants’ line of argument concerning the ECB’s measures, but examined it in other parts of the judgment under appeal.

117Last, the appellants’ argument alleging that the incorrect reference, in paragraph 199 of the judgment under appeal, to the increases in the capital of Banca Carige in 2016 and 2018, even though there had been no increase in those years, must be rejected as ineffective.

118It should be noted, in that regard, that the General Court stated, in paragraph 199 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellants themselves referred, in their written pleadings, to such increases. Even if, in so doing, the General Court had misread those pleadings, such an error cannot call into question the assessment that the second complaint relating to the seventh instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB was inadmissible.

119That conclusion is based to the requisite legal standard on the finding, in paragraph 200 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellants had failed to provide any information to show that positive assessments, capable legitimately of giving rise to a specific expectation on their part as to the conduct which the ECB would adopt, had been made by the ECB in relation to the capital increases made by Banca Carige before 2019.

120In the light of the foregoing, the third part of the first ground of appeal must be rejected as in part unfounded and in part ineffective.

(d)The fourth part

(1)Arguments of the parties

121The appellants dispute the grounds set out in paragraphs 118 to 174 of the judgment under appeal, relating to the fifth instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB. They claim that their complaints included ‘critical comments based on the relevant provisions of the Consolidated Law on Banking’, which were additional to the alleged breach not only of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, but also of the principles of proportionality, equal treatment, protection of property and prohibition of abuse.

122The ECB and the Commission contend that the applicants’ arguments must be rejected.

(2)Findings of the Court

123The fourth part of the first ground of appeal must be rejected as inadmissible, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraphs 83 and 84 of the present judgment.

124The appellants merely state that their complaints included ‘critical comments’ based on the Consolidated Law on Banking, without specifying either the content of those comments or the error of law they claim the General Court to have made.

(e)The fifth part

(1)Arguments of the parties

125The appellants contest paragraphs 68 to 74 of the judgment under appeal. They submit that the General Court relied on an incorrect interpretation, or even a distortion, of Article 53a(1)(d) of the Consolidated Law on Banking. In their view, because of its extent, that provision confers on the supervisory authority ‘any appropriate powers and duties’.

126The ECB and the Commission contend that the applicants’ arguments must be rejected.

(2)Findings of the Court

127It should be noted that paragraphs 68 to 74 of the judgment under appeal are included in the part of that judgment devoted to the examination of the first instance of unlawful conduct alleging that the ECB had failed to intervene in order to correct allegedly misleading statements concerning Banca Carige’s soundness, in breach of the applicable Italian legislation. After having summarised, in paragraphs 72 and 73 of that judgment, the content of Article 53a(1)(d) of the Consolidated Law on Banking, referred to in paragraph 15 of the present judgment, the General Court found, in paragraph 74 of the judgment under appeal, that that provision does not require the ECB to correct statements attributed to certain stakeholders, and deemed incorrect by others, concerning the financial stability of a credit institution.

128Contrary to what the appellants claim, in so doing, the General Court correctly read that provision.

129Therefore, the fifth part of the first ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.

130In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the first ground of appeal must be rejected.

2.The second ground of appeal

131The second ground of appeal concerns the grounds of the judgment under appeal relating to the examination of the fifth instance of unlawful conduct, alleging breach, by the ECB, when adopting the early intervention measure, of various rules and principles. That ground of appeal is divided into six parts.

(a)The first and third parts

(1)Arguments of the parties

132By the first part, the appellants dispute the rejection, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 119 to 129 of the judgment under appeal, of the first complaint put forward in the context of the fifth instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB, based on a sufficiently serious breach, by the ECB, of Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) of the Consolidated Law on Banking, when adopting the early intervention measure. According to the appellants, the General Court erred in law in holding, in paragraphs 125, 126 and 129 of that judgment, that that provision does not confer rights on individuals. The appellants observe, in that regard, first, that, before the General Court, they had relied on breach of several general principles of EU law which confer rights on individuals, including the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. Second, they assert that Article 69octiesdecies of the Consolidated Law on Banking refers, among the conditions for the adoption of the measures which it lays down, to infringement of the requirements set out in Regulation No 575/2013.

133By the third part, the appellants complain, in essence, that the General Court, in paragraphs 126 to 128 of the judgment under appeal, made an incorrect reading of the early intervention measure.

134According to the ECB, in that judgment, the General Court analysed in detail the appellants’ line of argument, both with regard to Article 69octiesdecies of the Consolidated Law on Banking and with regard to the alleged breach of the general principles of EU law, such as the principle of equal treatment and the principle of proportionality. In their appeal, the appellants do not put forward any evidence capable of demonstrating that the General Court erred in law in finding that Article 69octiesdecies does not confer rights on individuals. Furthermore, Regulation No 575/2013, referred to by the appellants, is irrelevant, since the appellants did not claim infringement of that regulation before the General Court.

135Without putting forward any specific arguments in response to the first part of the second ground of appeal, the Commission submits that the appeal should be dismissed in its entirety.

(2)Findings of the Court

136According to the Court’s case-law, the European Union or one of its institutions such as the ECB may incur non-contractual liability under the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU only if a number of conditions are fulfilled, namely the existence of a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals, the fact of damage and the existence of a causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the author of the act and the damage sustained by the injured parties (judgment of 5 March 2024, Kočner v Europol, C‑755/21 P, EU:C:2024:202, paragraph 117 and the case-law cited).

137It follows from that case-law that the first condition for such liability, which concerns the unlawfulness of the conduct alleged against the EU institution, body, office or agency concerned, comprises two parts, namely that it is necessary (i) that a breach of a rule of EU law intended to confer rights on individuals has occurred and (ii) that that breach is sufficiently serious (judgment of 5 March 2024, Kočner v Europol, C‑755/21 P, EU:C:2024:202, paragraph 118 and the case-law cited).

138As regards the first part of that condition, according to well-established case-law, the rights of individuals arise not only where they are expressly conferred on them by provisions of EU law, but also by reason of positive or negative obligations which those provisions impose in a clearly defined manner, whether on individuals, on the Member States or on the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies (judgment of 5 March 2024, Kočner v Europol, C‑755/21 P, EU:C:2024:202, paragraph 119 and the case-law cited).

139The failure to meet such obligations is liable to affect adversely the rights implicitly conferred on individuals under the provisions of EU law in question. The full effectiveness of those rules of EU law and the protection of the rights which they are intended to confer require that individuals have the possibility of obtaining redress (judgment of 5 March 2024, Kočner v Europol, C‑755/21 P, EU:C:2024:202, paragraph 120 and the case-law cited).

140In the present case, as is apparent from paragraph 119 of the judgment under appeal, by the first complaint raised in the context of the fifth instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB, the appellants claimed that the ECB had infringed Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) of the Consolidated Law on Banking in a sufficiently serious manner by adopting the early intervention measure in a situation in which there was a mere risk of infringement of the applicable regulatory framework, whereas the application of that provision requires evidence of a foreseeable infringement of that framework to be adduced.

141In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, under Article 4(1) of Regulation No 1024/2013, the ECB alone is competent to carry out, for prudential supervisory purposes, the tasks listed in that paragraph in relation to all credit institutions established in the participating Member States, including the Italian Republic. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 4(3), for the purpose of carrying out those tasks, the ECB is to apply all relevant EU law and, where that EU law is composed of directives, the national legislation transposing those directives.

142Article 69octiesdecies of the Consolidated Law on Banking is one of the provisions transposing Article 27 of Directive 2014/59 into Italian law. Pursuant to the second sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 9(1) of Regulation No 1024/2013, for the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred on it by Article 4(1) of that regulation, the ECB is to have the powers which Article 69octiesdecies confers on the Bank of Italy.

143Having made those points, it should be noted, as the Advocate General observed in points 70 to 72 of his Opinion, that the measures provided for in Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) of the Consolidated Law on Banking are capable of affecting the rights and legal situation of the credit institution concerned and of its shareholders, in particular where those measures alter the decisions taken by that institution or prevent the distribution of dividends to those shareholders.

144Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) of the Consolidated Law on Banking does not allow the ECB to adopt the measures which that provision sets out so long as the conditions laid down by that provision are not satisfied, since the credit institution concerned and its shareholders have the right to require compliance with that obligation.

145In accordance with the case-law cited in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the present judgment, it follows that Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) of the Consolidated Law on Banking confers rights on individuals, with the result that they may obtain compensation for the damage which they have allegedly suffered in the event of a sufficiently serious breach of that provision.

146In that regard, it should be recalled that, in the judgment of 15 July 2025, ECB and Commission v Corneli (C‑777/22 P and C‑789/22 P, EU:C:2025:580, paragraphs 100 to 105), the Court of Justice held that, despite the fact that the appellant in those cases had in the meantime sold the shares which it held in the capital of Banca Carige, her interest in the annulment of the decision to place Banca Carige under temporary administration continued, since that appellant intended to bring an action against the ECB in order to obtain compensation for the damage allegedly suffered as a result of the adoption of that decision.

147That assessment supports the conclusion that provisions, such as Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) of the Consolidated Law on Banking, which confer on the ECB, as supervisory authority, the power to adopt, in respect of credit institutions subject to its prudential supervision, measures which affect the legal situation of those institutions and their shareholders, are intended to confer rights on individuals, since they define the circumstances in which those measures may be adopted.

148It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the General Court erred in law in holding, in paragraph 129 of the judgment under appeal, that in pursuit of an objective in the public interest, Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) of the Consolidated Law on Banking is not intended to confer rights on individuals.

149Therefore, the first part of the second ground of appeal must be upheld and, without it being necessary to examine the third part, which concerns the same part of the judgment under appeal, that judgment must be set aside in so far as it dismissed the appellants’ action inasmuch as it concerned the alleged infringement, by the ECB, of Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) of the Consolidated Law on Banking, when the early intervention measure was adopted.

(b)The second part

(1)Arguments of the parties

150The appellants claim that the General Court contradicted itself by stating, first, in the second indent of paragraph 135 of the judgment under appeal, that the strategic plan that Banca Carige was required to submit in accordance with the early intervention measure had to ‘include quantitative objectives for the reduction of non-performing loans’ and, second, in paragraph 136 of that judgment, that that measure ‘[had] not required [Banca Carige to] give up non-performing loans, let alone do so at defined prices during a given period’. The appellants acknowledge that the ECB did not determine the transfer price of the non-performing loans to be transferred, but they take the view that the General Court should have taken into consideration the fact that the mandatory transfer of such loans could only lead to their transfer at very reduced prices.

151The ECB and the Commission contend that the second part must be rejected.

(2)Findings of the Court

152It must be stated that there is no contradiction between paragraphs 135 and 136 of the judgment under appeal.

153The fact that, in the early intervention measure, the ECB requested Banca Carige to submit a strategic plan and an operational plan which had, inter alia, to include objectives for the reduction of non-performing loans, as stated in the second indent of paragraph 135 of the judgment under appeal, does not mean, as the General Court rightly noted in paragraph 136 of that judgment, that the ECB required Banca Carige to give up those loans, let alone to do so on unfavourable terms. It was for Banca Carige to determine the means by which it could achieve the reduction of such loans.

154Accordingly, the second part of the second ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.

(c)The fourth part

(1)Arguments of the parties

155The appellants criticise the ground set out in paragraph 152 of the judgment under appeal to justify the rejection of the fourth complaint relating to the fifth instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB, based on breach of the principle of equal treatment when adopting the early intervention measure. They claim that the General Court’s statement according to which ‘they did not link [Banca Carige’s] particular situation with the decisions taken by the ECB in such a way as to establish the existence of a genuine difference in treatment between [Banca Carige] and other Italian credit institutions’ is not based on any evidence, runs counter to the documents which they had produced at first instance and infringes the obligation to state reasons.

156In addition, they complain that the General Court did not grant their request to order the preparation of ‘a technical expert’s report designed to establish and compare the situation of other banks in relation to the difference in treatment adopted by the ECB’ and that it disregarded the judgment of 23 May 1996, Hedley Lomas (C‑5/94, EU:C:1996:205, paragraph 29), from which it is apparent, according to the appellants, that the burden of ‘proving the basis of the reasons which justify in law the acts of the institutions’ lies with the latter.

157The appellants add that, in the present case, it was necessary, in compliance with Article 47 of the Charter, to apply the ‘rule of proximity of evidence’, according to which, where only one party has knowledge of the facts ‘which amount to the necessary evidence’, while the other party is unable to access them, the burden of proof lies with the first of those parties and not with the latter. According to the appellants, it was clear that only the ECB had knowledge of the situation of the credit institutions subject to its supervision.

158The ECB and the Commission contend that the fourth part must be rejected.

(2)Findings of the Court

159According to settled case-law, the general principle of equal treatment, as a general principle of EU law, requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified. A breach of that principle as a result of different treatment is based on the premiss that the situations concerned are comparable, having regard to all the elements which characterise them (judgment of 16 December 2020, Council v K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others, C‑597/18 P, C‑598/18 P, C‑603/18 P and C‑604/18 P, EU:C:2020:1028, paragraphs 191 and 192 and the case-law cited).

160In the present case, it is apparent from paragraph 144 of the judgment under appeal that, by the fourth complaint relating to the fifth instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB, the appellants claimed that the ECB had infringed, in a sufficiently serious manner, the principle of equal treatment by imposing on Banca Carige, in the context of the early intervention measure, more stringent measures than those adopted in respect of other credit institutions which were in a similar situation.

161In that regard, in paragraph 151 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court noted, in essence, that, in order for the fourth complaint to succeed, the appellants would have had to establish that other Italian credit institutions in a situation comparable to that of Banca Carige had been treated differently by the ECB.

162It added, in paragraph 152 of that judgment, which is criticised by the appellants, that while the appellants had produced a report comparing the number of non-performing loans held by Banca Carige with those held by other Italian credit institutions, they did not however link that particular situation with the decisions taken by the ECB in such a way as to establish the existence of a genuine difference in treatment between Banca Carige and those other institutions. The General Court therefore stated, in paragraph 153 of that judgment, that the fourth complaint relating to the fifth instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB had to be rejected.

163In the first place, it should be noted that paragraphs 151 to 153 of the judgment under appeal clearly and coherently show the reasons justifying the rejection of the abovementioned complaint, with the result that the appellants’ argument alleging failure to state reasons in that part of the judgment under appeal must be rejected.

164In the second place, in so far as the appellants complain that the General Court, in essence, erred in law as regards the allocation of the burden of proof, it must be borne in mind that, according to the case-law of the Court, it is in principle for the person who alleges facts in support of a claim or argument to provide proof of their reality (judgment of 7 November 2024, Ryanair v Commission, C‑588/22 P, EU:C:2024:935, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).

165In the present case, the General Court did not err in law in finding, in essence, that, since the appellants had not adduced any evidence capable of establishing that other Italian credit institutions in a situation comparable to that of Banca Carige had been treated differently in ECB decisions, the fourth complaint relating to the fifth unlawfulness, according to which, by adopting the early intervention measure, the ECB had committed a sufficiently serious breach of the principle of equal treatment by imposing on Banca Carige more stringent measures than those imposed on other credit institutions in a similar situation, had to be rejected.

166In the third place, as regards the appellants’ argument that the General Court did not grant their request to order the preparation of a technical expert’s report, it must be borne in mind that, in the light of Article 92(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, under which it is to prescribe the measures of inquiry which it considers appropriate, the Court also has exclusive jurisdiction to assess the usefulness of measures of inquiry, including that of an expert’s report, for the purposes of resolving the dispute. It is therefore for the General Court to assess the relevance of the request for a measure of inquiry to the subject matter of the dispute, although the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to verify that the General Court did not err in law in refusing to grant such a request (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 March 2013, Viega v Commission, C‑276/11 P, EU:C:2013:163, paragraphs 39 and 40, and order of 30 January 2019, Verein Deutsche Sprache v Commission, C‑440/18 P, EU:C:2019:77, paragraph 9).

167In that regard, the General Court’s obligation to order, at the request of a party, a measure of inquiry concerning facts which it is for that party to prove, presupposes, first, the existence of an exceptional situation in which that party is encountering difficulty or refusal in accessing the evidence which it needs to support its statements and, second, the production, by that party, of prima facie evidence of those claims at the very least (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 December 2025, Hamoudi v Frontex, C‑136/24 P, EU:C:2025:977, paragraphs 81, 82 and 148).

168In the present case, the appellants asked the Court to order not the production, by the ECB, of evidence in its possession which it allegedly refused to provide to the appellants, but a technical expertise in order to compare the situation of Banca Carige with that of other credit institutions subject to prudential supervision by the ECB for the purpose of establishing, where appropriate, the existence of different treatment.

169However, it is apparent, in essence, from paragraph 152 of the judgment under appeal that the appellants had not provided prima facie evidence of such unjustified different treatment, nor had they argued facing difficulties in accessing the evidence necessary to make a link between Banca Carige’s particular situation and that of other credit institutions subject to the ECB’s supervision.

170Since those findings of the General Court are not called into question by the appellants’ line of argument put forward in the fourth part, it must be held that the General Court did not err in law in rejecting the appellants’ request that a technical expert’s report be ordered.

171In the light of all the considerations set out in paragraphs 159 to 170 of the present judgment, the fourth part of the second ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.

(d)The fifth part

(1)Arguments of the parties

172By the fifth part, the appellants criticise the General Court for having rejected, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 154 to 167 of the judgment under appeal, the fifth complaint relating to the fifth instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB, based on breach of the principle of proportionality when adopting the early intervention measure, without examining their argument that, instead of requiring Banca Carige to give up non-performing loans, the ECB should have adopted a less onerous measure, namely a requirement that provisions be made.

173The ECB and the Commission contend that the fifth part must be rejected.

(2)Findings of the Court

174Given that, by the fifth part, the appellants criticise the General Court for having failed to rule on an argument they raised before it, it should be noted that the General Court’s failure to rule on a plea or argument raised before it constitutes a breach of the obligation to state reasons (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 February 2023, Spain and Others v Commission, C‑649/20 P, C‑658/20 P and C‑662/20 P, EU:C:2023:60, paragraph 118 and the case-law cited).

175However, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court that the obligation on the General Court to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU and Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union requires it to disclose in a clear and unequivocal manner the reasoning that it has followed, in a way that allows the interested parties to understand the justification for the decision taken and permits the Court of Justice to exercise its powers of review. That obligation does not require the General Court to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments articulated by the parties to the case. The reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to understand the grounds of the General Court’s judgment and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient information to exercise its powers of review when examining an appeal (judgment of 2 February 2023, Spain and Others v Commission, C‑649/20 P, C‑658/20 P and C‑662/20 P, EU:C:2023:60, paragraph 113 and the case-law cited).

176In the present case, the appellant’s argument that, instead of requiring Banca Carige to transfer non-performing loans, the ECB should, in compliance with the principle of proportionality, have required Banca Carige to constitute provisions, was based on the premiss that the ECB had imposed such a transfer on Banca Carige.

177As has already been noted in paragraph 153 of the present judgment, in paragraph 136 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court found that, in the early intervention measure, the ECB had not required Banca Carige to give up non-performing loans. That finding enabled the appellants to understand the reasons why their argument that, in order to comply with the principle of proportionality, the ECB should have required that provisions be constituted had been rejected.

178Accordingly, the General Court cannot be criticised for having infringed the obligation to state reasons and the fifth part must be rejected as unfounded.

(e)The sixth part

(1)Arguments of the parties

179By the sixth part, the appellants criticise the rejection, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 168 to 174 of the judgment under appeal, of the plea of illegality in respect of the early intervention measure which they had raised before the General Court. They claim that they had put forward the unlawfulness of that measure as a ‘ground of unlawfulness of the ECB’s conduct’ and therefore as the basis of their claim for damages. They did not, as the General Court wrongly considered, rely on the unlawfulness of that measure in order to avoid its application. Therefore, they take the view that the General Court vitiated the judgment under appeal by a failure to state reasons, by failing to examine their arguments.

180The ECB and the Commission contend that the sixth part must be rejected.

(2)Findings of the Court

181In so far as the appellants claim, in essence, that the General Court infringed the obligation to state reasons, it should be noted that, admittedly, as is apparent from paragraph 174 of the present judgment, the General Court’s failure to rule on a plea or argument put forward before it amounts to an infringement of that obligation.

182However, the obligation to state reasons is an essential procedural requirement that must be distinguished from the question whether the reasoning is well founded, which goes to the substantive legality of the measure at issue (judgment of 10 September 2024, Commission v Ireland and Others, C‑465/20 P, EU:C:2024:724, paragraph 389 and the case-law cited).

183In the present case, in paragraphs 169 to 173 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court set out the reasons why it considered, in paragraph 174 of that judgment, that the plea of illegality raised by the appellants in respect of the early intervention measure had to be rejected. Therefore, irrespective of whether those grounds are well founded, it cannot be criticised for having vitiated the judgment under appeal by a failure to state reasons.

184In so far as the appellants’ line of argument must be understood as seeking to criticise the General Court for erring in law by rejecting that plea of illegality, such a line of argument cannot succeed.

185As the General Court held, in essence, in paragraphs 169 to 173 of the judgment under appeal, Article 277 TFEU, which, according to its wording, refers to acts of general application, does not apply to the early intervention measure, which is not such an act. Accordingly, those paragraphs of the judgment under appeal are not vitiated by an error of law.

186It is true that neither the fact that the early intervention measure cannot be the subject of a plea of illegality under Article 277 TFEU, nor the fact that it was not the subject of an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU prevented the applicants from pursuing, by an action for damages, compensation for the damage which they claimed to have suffered as a result of the allegedly unlawful nature of that measure (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 February 1986, Krohn Import-Export v Commission, 175/84, EU:C:1986:85, paragraph 32).

187The General Court examined the appellants’ line of argument based on the alleged unlawfulness of the early intervention measure as the first to fifth complaints relating to the fifth instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB. It should also be noted that, contrary to what the appellants claim, it is not apparent from the judgment under appeal that the General Court considered that, by raising a plea of illegality in respect of the early intervention measure, the appellants were attempting to avoid the application of that measure, which, moreover, since it was aimed at Banca Carige, was not applicable to them.

188In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the sixth part of the second ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.

3.The third plea in law

189The third ground of appeal relates to paragraphs 175 to 186 of the judgment under appeal, relating to the examination of the sixth instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB; it is divided into three parts.

(a)The first part

(1)Arguments of the appellants

190The appellants complain, in essence, that the General Court failed to examine their argument that the adoption of the own funds decision had adversely affected their legitimate expectation that the increase in capital of Banca Carige carried out in 2017 would ensure its asset and financial soundness. According to the appellants, that increase had received the ECB’s prior approval, pursuant to Article 56 of the Consolidated Law on Banking, and had been implemented in accordance with the ECB’s requirements. However, the ECB took the view, in the own funds decision, that Banca Carige did not meet the own funds requirements as from 1 January 2018.

191The ECB and the Commission contend that the first part must be rejected.

(2)Findings of the Court

192As is apparent from the sixth indent of paragraph 28 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court classified as ‘sixth instance of unlawful conduct’ the appellants’ line of argument that the ECB had committed a sufficiently serious breach of the principle of proportionality by imposing on Banca Carige, in the own funds decision, too short a period of time to allow it to comply with the own funds requirements imposed on it. That sixth instance of unlawful conduct was subsequently examined in paragraphs 175 to 186 of the judgment under appeal.

193The appellants’ argument in the present part does not relate to observance of the principle of proportionality, but of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, the infringement of which was classified by the General Court as ‘seventh instance of unlawful conduct’ alleged against the ECB and was examined in paragraphs 187 to 207 of the judgment under appeal.

194More specifically, the General Court classified the appellants’ claims regarding the ECB’s assessments concerning the capital increases made by Banca Carige before 2019 as a ‘second complaint’ relating to the seventh instance of unlawful conduct. That complaint was examined in paragraphs 199 to 202 of the judgment under appeal and was rejected as inadmissible, as has already been pointed out in paragraph 101 of the present judgment.

195In those circumstances, the General Court cannot be criticised for having failed to examine the appellants’ argument alleging breach, by the ECB, of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations arising from the approval and proper implementation of Banca Carige’s capital increase carried out at the end of 2017.

196Furthermore, as is apparent from paragraphs 95 and 96 of the present judgment, the alleged approval by the ECB of Banca Carige’s capital increase, even if it were established, does not amount to the provision of precise, unconditional and consistent assurances, originating from authorised and reliable sources, capable of giving rise to a legitimate expectation which must be protected.

197Accordingly, the General Court did not err in law in finding, in paragraph 200 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellants had failed to provide any information to show that positive assessments had been made by the ECB concerning the capital increases made by Banca Carige before 2019 and in rejecting, on that ground, the second complaint relating to the seventh instance of unlawful conduct as inadmissible.

198Consequently, the first part must be rejected as unfounded.

(b)The second part

(1)Arguments of the parties

199The appellants criticise the General Court for having confined itself to examining only one of the grounds of unlawfulness of the own funds decision – namely the ground based on the unreasonableness of the period of time for implementing the recovery plan required by that decision – failing to examine the other grounds set out in paragraphs 132, 135 and 136 of their application before the General Court, alleging, first, that the period set for the approval, by Banca Carige’s board of directors, of the own funds recovery plan for Banca Carige was unreasonable, second, that the ECB was responsible for the situation in which Banca Carige found itself and, third, that several other errors vitiated the grounds of that decision.

200The ECB observes that all the arguments put forward by the appellants with regard to the own funds decision sought, in essence, to demonstrate a breach of the principle of proportionality. The General Court examined those arguments in the context of the analysis of the sixth instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB. The ECB recalls, in that regard, the case-law cited in paragraph 175 of the present judgment, according to which the obligation to state reasons does not require the General Court to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case.

201Without putting forward any specific line of argument in response to the second part, the Commission submits that the appeal should be dismissed in its entirety.

(2)Findings of the Court

202It should be noted that, in paragraph 184 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court examined and rejected the appellants’ argument, set out in particular in paragraph 136 of their application, that the period laid down in the own funds decision for the approval of Banca Carige’s own funds recovery plan by Banca Carige’s board of directors was allegedly unreasonable.

203Therefore, contrary to what the appellants claim, it must be held that the General Court ruled on that argument.

204By contrast, it is apparent from a reading of paragraphs 132 to 135 of the application before the General Court that the appellants had in fact put forward other arguments alleging, first, that the ECB was responsible for the situation in which Banca Carige found itself and, second, that several errors, other than that referred to in paragraph 184 of the judgment under appeal, vitiated the grounds of the own funds decision. However, the General Court did not refer to or examine those arguments in the judgment under appeal.

205Contrary to the ECB’s claims, those arguments cannot be regarded as seeking to demonstrate a breach of the principle of proportionality and, therefore, as being concerned by the grounds set out in paragraphs 175 to 186 of the judgment under appeal.

206It must therefore be concluded that the General Court failed to rule on those arguments, which, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 174 of the present judgment, constitutes a breach of the obligation to state reasons.

207Accordingly, it is necessary to uphold, in part, the second part of the third ground of appeal and to set aside the judgment under appeal, in so far as the General Court rejected, without examining them, the appellants’ arguments, set out in paragraphs 132 to 135 of their application, alleging that the ECB was responsible for the situation in which Banca Carige found itself, and that several errors vitiated the grounds of the own funds decision.

(c)The third part

(1)Arguments of the parties

208By the third part, the appellants claim that the General Court did not provide, in the judgment under appeal, any reasoning to justify the rejection of their complaint alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality. They claim that, instead of examining their arguments, the General Court merely recalled the grounds of the own funds decision, without reviewing their merits.

209The ECB and the Commission contend that the third part of the plea must be rejected.

(2)Findings of the Court

210It should be noted that, after having summarised, in paragraphs 181 to 183 of the judgment under appeal, the grounds of the own funds decision, and then stated, in paragraph 184 of that judgment, that the ECB was entitled to consider, in view of the real risk that the bank would not be able to restore its capital immediately, that it was appropriate and necessary to ask it to submit and have approved by its board of directors, by 30 November 2018 at the latest, a new plan aimed at restoring and ensuring lasting compliance with the asset requirements by 31 December 2018 at the latest based on those grounds, the General Court asserted, in paragraph 185 of that judgment, that the appellants had failed to identify factors to the effect that, by adopting the own funds decision, the ECB infringed the principle of proportionality in a sufficiently serious manner.

211It is apparent from those grounds of the judgment under appeal that, contrary to what the appellants claim, the General Court did not merely recall the grounds of the own funds decision, but examined the appellants’ arguments and held that, in the light of Banca Carige’s situation, as set out in that decision, those arguments were not sufficient to establish a sufficiently serious breach of the principle of proportionality on the part of the ECB concerning the time limits fixed in that decision.

212It should also be noted that the appellants have not put forward any arguments to show that, in so ruling, the General Court erred in law.

213Accordingly, the third part of the third ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.

4.The fourth ground of appeal

(a)Arguments of the parties

214The appellants dispute the grounds set out by the General Court in paragraphs 78 to 86 of the judgment under appeal to justify the rejection of the arguments relating to the second instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB, alleging that the ECB had infringed EU rules so far as concerns its relationship with the bank’s board of directors. They complain, in essence, that the General Court confined itself to examining the second instance of unlawful conduct in the light of Articles 4 and 16 of Regulation No 1024/2013, which, in their view, amounts to a distortion of their line of argument. Thus, the General Court relied on a misconception of the ECB’s powers by holding that the ECB could perform any act not expressly and specifically prohibited by EU law. Such a consideration is contrary to the ‘fundamental principle of conferral’, as enshrined in several provisions of the EU and FEU Treaties.

215The appellants add that the alleged conduct of the ECB was contrary to Articles 3 and 17 of the Charter. In addition, the grounds set out in paragraphs 82 to 85 of the judgment under appeal concern the early intervention measure, and not the ECB’s interference with Banca Carige’s governance, which is the subject of the appellants’ arguments referred to by the General Court as the ‘second instance of unlawful conduct’.

216Last, in their reply, the appellants observe that, on 18 December 2024, Mr P.F., the former managing director of Banca Carige, was convicted in proceedings before the Tribunale penale di Milano (Criminal Court, Milan, Italy).

217The ECB and the Commission contend that the fourth ground must be rejected.

(b)Findings of the Court

218In paragraph 76 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court noted that, in the context of what it referred to as the ‘second instance of unlawful conduct’ alleged against the ECB, the appellants claimed that the ECB had infringed, in a sufficiently serious manner, Articles 4 and 16 of Regulation No 1024/2013, first, in that the ECB had conferred with Mr Modiano and Mr Innocenzi with a view to their resigning from Banca Carige’s board of directors, with effect as from 2 January 2019, causing the bank’s board of directors to be disqualified and thus paving the way for that institution to be placed under temporary administration; second, in that the ECB had sought to limit the powers of that board of directors to a simple power to ratify the decisions taken by the managing director, at the meeting of 16 February 2018 and during successive exchanges between Mr Malacalza, Ms Nouy, Chair of the ECB’s Supervisory Board, and Mr Quintana, member of the ECB’s Directorate-General for Micro-Prudential Supervision; and, third, in that the ECB had concealed from the board of directors for several months the extent of the difficulty faced by Banca Carige in terms of capital, and by informing it only on 21 June 2018 of the content of a letter which the ECB had sent on 4 June 2018 to Banca Carige’s managing director.

219In paragraphs 79 to 84 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court carried out an analysis of the provisions of Article 4 and Article 16(1) and (2) of Regulation No 1024/2013, which led it to consider that those provisions were not intended to confer rights on individuals. In paragraph 85 of that judgment, it added that ‘since they are not intended to confer rights on individuals, Article 4 and Article 16(1) and (2) of Regulation No 1024/2013 cannot form the basis of a claim of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB in the context of the prudential supervision which it carried out on [Banca Carige] such as to give rise to liability on the part of the European Union in respect of that conduct’. The General Court therefore rejected, in paragraph 86 of that judgment, the appellants’ arguments concerning the second instance of unlawful conduct.

220It must be stated that the grounds of the judgment under appeal summarised in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment were not sufficient to justify the appellants’ arguments relating to the second instance of unlawful conduct being rejected, irrespective of whether, as the appellants claim, they had also relied on other provisions or principles of EU law that the alleged conduct of the ECB, summarised in paragraph 76 of that judgment, had infringed.

221Although the EU judicature must rule only on the heads of claim put forward by the parties, whose role it is to define the framework of the dispute, it cannot confine itself to the arguments put forward by the parties in support of their claims, or it might be forced, in some circumstances, to base its decisions on erroneous legal considerations (judgments of 21 September 2010, Sweden and Others v API and Commission, C‑514/07 P, C‑528/07 P and C‑532/07 P, EU:C:2010:541, paragraph 65, and of 20 January 2021, Commission v Printeos, C‑301/19 P, EU:C:2021:39, paragraph 58).

222Thus, in accordance with the principle that the courts are required to resolve the dispute in accordance with the legal rules applicable to that dispute, it is for the General Court, on the basis of the facts put forward in the application, to characterise, without however altering the subject matter of the dispute, the legal bases on which the applicants have based their claims, even if that characterisation is different from that put to them by those applicants (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 January 2021, Commission v Printeos, C‑301/19 P, EU:C:2021:39, paragraphs 54, 57 and 58).

223Therefore, in the present case, the General Court could not reject the appellants’ arguments based on the alleged conduct of the ECB, summarised in paragraph 76 of the judgment under appeal, on the sole ground that Articles 4 and 16 of Regulation No 1024/2013, which, according to the General Court, the appellants complained that the ECB had infringed, were not intended to confer rights on individuals.

224That being pointed out, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, if the grounds of a judgment of the General Court disclose an infringement of EU law but the operative part of that judgment is shown to be well founded on other legal grounds, such an infringement cannot lead to the setting aside of that judgment, and a substitution of grounds must be made (judgment of 11 September 2025, Austria v Commission (Paks II Nuclear Power Plant), C‑59/23 P, EU:C:2025:686, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).

225That is the case here.

226First, as regards the alleged consultation between the ECB and the two directors of Banca Carige who had resigned with effect as from 2 January 2019, it should be noted that no rule or principle of EU law prohibits the ECB from having contacts and discussions with the directors of a credit institution subject to its prudential supervision, it being specified that the decision of the administrator of such an institution to resign from his or her position is, in principle, a matter for its own volition. It should also be borne in mind that it is apparent from paragraph 108 of the judgment under appeal that the ECB adopted the decision to place the bank under temporary administration, based on the ‘significant deterioration’ of Banca Carige’s situation, within the meaning of Articles 69octiesdecies and 70 of the Consolidated Law on Banking, and not on the resignation of certain members of its board of directors.

227Second, the ECB may, where appropriate, by duly reasoned decisions, require such an institution to adopt certain measures or, if the circumstances so warrant, place that institution under temporary administration. That said, as is apparent from the preceding paragraph of the present judgment, the ECB’s representatives could, during exchanges with the second appellant, express their views, without it amounting to an attempt to restrict the powers of Banca Carige’s board of directors.

228Third and last, no rule or principle of EU law requires the ECB to specifically inform the board of directors of a credit institution of the own funds difficulties faced by that institution, where it has already informed the managing director of that institution of those difficulties. In any event, the bodies of such an institution are best placed to be informed, even before the ECB, of any difficulties which their institution may face.

229It follows that the error of law committed by the General Court, identified in paragraph 223 of the present judgment, has no bearing on the validity of the rejection of the appellants’ arguments summarised in paragraph 76 of the judgment under appeal and, therefore, on the operative part of that judgment, with the result that the fourth ground of appeal is ineffective.

230As regards the appellants’ reliance, in their reply before the Court of Justice, on the conviction of Mr P.F. by the Tribunale penale di Milano (Criminal Court, Milan), it is sufficient it to note that that circumstance is of no relevance for the present appeal proceedings, the subject matter of which, in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, is limited to points of law and lies only on grounds of lack of competence of the General Court, a breach of procedure before it which adversely affects the interests of the appellant as well as the infringement of EU law by the General Court. In such proceedings, it is not possible to take into consideration new facts subsequent to the delivery of the judgment under appeal.

231In the light of the foregoing considerations, the fourth ground of appeal must be rejected.

5.The fifth ground of appeal

(a)Arguments of the parties

232The appellants dispute the grounds set out in paragraphs 97 to 117 of the judgment under appeal relating to the fourth instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB, based on the ECB’s appointment, as temporary directors of Banca Carige, of persons who had a conflict of interest. They recall that, in accordance with Article 29(1) of Directive 2014/59 and the general principle of impartiality, enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter, Article 71(6) of the Consolidated Law on Banking prohibits the appointment, as temporary administrators of a credit institution, of persons with a conflict of interest. The words ‘free of any conflict of interests’, used in Article 29(1) of Directive 2014/59, support a broad perception of the concept of ‘conflict of interest’, which the General Court unduly restricted.

233The appellants add that the ECB cannot exercise its discretion in the matter to the detriment of fundamental rights and without providing an adequate statement of reasons. They claim that the General Court provided, in the judgment under appeal, its own reasoning to remedy the failure to state reasons for the decision to place Banca Carige under temporary administration. In that regard, they submit that the fact, referred to in paragraph 115 of the judgment under appeal, that the meeting of shareholders of a credit institution, or certain shareholders of that institution, may, after the end of the temporary administration, bring an action for damages against the members of the administrative and supervisory bodies does not preclude the existence of a conflict of interest. It is possible that the composition of the capital of such an institution was altered following the decisions taken while it was under temporary administration, which was indeed the case here.

234The appellants also complain that the General Court failed to examine other grounds of unlawfulness of the decision to place Banca Carige under temporary administration, both that which it itself acknowledged in the judgment of 12 October 2022, Corneli v ECB (T‑502/19, EU:T:2022:627), which they relied on in the alternative in their action, and that concerning the resignation – from the board of directors of Banca Carige – of the individuals subsequently appointed as temporary directors of that bank; that resignation was decided in consultation with the ECB and led to the adoption of that decision.

235The ECB and the Commission contend that the fifth ground of appeal must be rejected.

(b)Findings of the Court

236It is apparent from paragraph 95 of the judgment under appeal that, in the context of what the General Court referred to as the ‘fourth instance of unlawful conduct’ alleged against the ECB, the appellants claimed, in essence, that the ECB had infringed, in a sufficiently serious manner, Article 71(6) of the Consolidated Law on Banking by appointing, as temporary administrators of Banca Carige, the former chair of its board of directors, Mr Modiano, and its former managing director, Mr Innocenzi. According to the appellants, once the latter became temporary administrators, they were protected from an action for damages which could have been brought against them by Banca Carige in respect of the decisions taken when they were chair of its board of directors and its managing director, respectively. As long as Banca Carige was placed under temporary administration, those two individuals were the only persons empowered to take the decision to bring such an action.

237It is apparent from paragraphs 107 to 109 of the judgment under appeal that the General Court rejected those arguments on the ground, in essence, that the decision to place Banca Carige under temporary administration had been based not on the existence of ‘serious irregularities’ in the management of Banca Carige, committed by the members of its former administrative bodies, but on the ‘significant deterioration in [its] situation’ and that, in addition, the financial difficulties affecting Banca Carige had preceded the appointment of the individuals referred to in the preceding paragraph as chair of the board of directors and managing director of Banca Carige.

238In the first place, in so far as the appellants complain that the General Court infringed Article 71(6) of the Consolidated Law on Banking, interpreted in a manner consistent with Article 29(1) of Directive 2014/59, it should be noted, as the General Court did in paragraph 101 of the judgment under appeal, that Article 71(6) provides, inter alia, that the temporary directors of a banking institution must be free from conflicts of interest.

239It is not apparent from the judgment under appeal, and the appellants do not claim that, they had relied, before the General Court, on the existence of specific circumstances, known to the ECB, from which it is apparent that the two temporary directors of Banca Carige were in a conflict-of-interest situation.

240Contrary to what appears to be the appellants’ position, a conflict of interest cannot be inferred from the mere fact that those temporary directors had previously been members of Banca Carige’s administrative bodies. Such a conflict can only be found to exist on the basis of specific evidence capable of demonstrating that the bringing, in the name of Banca Carige, of an action against its own temporary directors for their actions during the time when they were members of those bodies was reasonably conceivable.

241To accept that any individual who has, in the past, been a member of the administrative bodies of a credit institution placed under temporary administration is, for that reason alone, in a situation of conflict of interest with such an institution would mean that it would be impossible to appoint such persons as temporary directors of that institution, when, thanks to their knowledge of that institution, they may be best placed to perform those functions.

242It follows that the General Court cannot be found to have infringed Article 71(6) of the Consolidated Law on Banking – interpreted in a manner consistent with Article 29(1) of Directive 2014/59 – in so far as it held, in paragraphs 107 to 109 of the judgment under appeal, in essence, that the mere fact that Banca Carige’s temporary directors had, in the past, performed administrative functions for that bank was not sufficient for it to be held that they were in a conflict of interest situation which precluded their appointment as temporary directors of that credit institution.

243In the second place, the appellants’ argument that the General Court provided its own reasoning to remedy a failure to state reasons for the decision to place Banca Carige under temporary administration cannot succeed either.

244As has been pointed out in paragraph 240 of the present judgment, the mere fact that Banca Carige’s temporary directors had, in the past, been members of its board of directors was not sufficient to establish the existence, in their regard, of a conflict of interest. In those circumstances, the ECB was not required to provide, in the decision to place Banca Carige under temporary administration, a specific statement of reasons to justify the absence of such a conflict of interest.

245As regards the grounds set out in paragraphs 107 to 109 of the judgment under appeal, they do not seek to supplement the statement of reasons for that decision, but set out the reason why the General Court considered that the appellants’ arguments put forward in the context of the fourth instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB could not be upheld.

246In the third place, concerning the appellants’ argument directed against paragraph 115 of the judgment under appeal, it should be noted that that paragraph forms part of a passage of the judgment under appeal which begins with paragraph 110. Given that, as is apparent from paragraphs 238 to 245 of the present judgment, the grounds set out in paragraphs 101 to 109 of the judgment under appeal are sufficient to justify the fourth instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB being rejected, it must be held that paragraphs 110 to 116 of that judgment set out grounds included for the sake of completeness, particularly since paragraph 110 begins with the word ‘moreover’. Therefore, the appellants argument directed against paragraph 115 of the judgment under appeal must be rejected as ineffective since it concerns a ground included for the sake of completeness in that judgment, the operative part of which is substantiated to the requisite legal standard by other grounds of the judgment (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 July 2025, ECB and Commission v Corneli, C‑777/22 P and C‑789/22 P, EU:C:2025:580, paragraph 85 and the case-law cited).

247In the fourth place, the appellants’ argument that, in essence, the General Court should have found that the decision to place Banca Carige under temporary administration was unlawful, first, on the ground relied on by the General Court in order to annul that decision by the judgment of 12 October 2022, Corneli v ECB (T‑502/19, EU:T:2022:627), and, second, on the ground that the individuals appointed as temporary directors of Banca Carige by that decision decided to resign from their previous duties on the board of directors of that credit institution in consultation with the ECB, is also ineffective.

248Irrespective of whether the appellants had indeed relied before the General Court on those grounds of unlawfulness of the decision to place Banca Carige under temporary administration, which the ECB disputes, those grounds were not, in any event, capable of establishing any unlawfulness vitiating that decision.

249First, the judgment of 12 October 2022, Corneli v ECB (T‑502/19, EU:T:2022:627), was set aside by the appeal of 15 July 2025, ECB and Commission v Corneli (C‑777/22 P and C‑789/22 P, EU:C:2025:580), and, in that appeal, the Court of Justice rejected the plea which the General Court had accepted to annul the decision to place Banca Carige under temporary administration as unfounded.

250Second, for the reasons set out in paragraph 226 of the present judgment, the alleged consultation between the future temporary directors of Banca Carige and the ECB also cannot be regarded as constituting an illegality vitiating the decision to place Banca Carige under temporary administration.

251For all those reasons, the fifth ground of appeal must be rejected as in part unfounded and in part ineffective.

6.The sixth ground of appeal

252The sixth ground of appeal is divided into two parts, the first of which covers paragraphs 89 to 94 of the judgment under appeal, and the second concerns paragraphs 208 to 215 of that judgment.

(a)The first part

(1)Arguments of the parties

253The appellants criticise the General Court for having examined their arguments relating to the approval, by the ECB, of the increase in Banca Carige’s capital in breach of the right of pre-emption provided for in its statutes solely from the point of view of Article 56 of the Consolidated Law on Banking, without taking account of the right to property, enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter, or of other applicable provisions of Italian law.

254Furthermore, the General Court distorted Article 56 of the Consolidated Law on Banking by holding, in paragraph 94 of the judgment under appeal, that that article does not, in itself, confer rights on individuals. According to the appellants, in so far as the amendment of the statutes of a credit institution may also concern the relationship between that institution and its shareholders, that article also seeks to protect those shareholders’ right to property.

255The ECB and the Commission contend that the first part must be rejected.

(2)Findings of the Court

256As the General Court noted in paragraph 91 of the judgment under appeal, it is apparent from Article 56 of the Consolidated Law on Banking, applicable to the ECB by virtue of the provisions referred to in paragraphs 141 and 142 of the present judgment as regards credit institutions such as Banca Carige, that, in carrying out the tasks entrusted to it, the supervisory authority is to ascertain whether the amendments made to the statutes of credit institutions are compatible with the constraints arising from sound and prudent management before those amendments can be entered in the register of companies.

257It follows that the General Court did not misread Article 56 of the Consolidated Law on Banking in finding, in paragraph 92 of the judgment under appeal, in essence, that the verification provided for in that provision must relate solely to the compatibility of the proposed amendment to the statutes with the requirement of sound and prudent management of the institution concerned.

258It is not apparent from the judgment under appeal, and the appellants do not claim that, they had put forward, before the General Court, sufficiently developed arguments to demonstrate that the increase in Banca Carige’s capital approved by the ECB was contrary to the sound and prudent management of that credit institution.

259The circumstance, relied on by the appellants, that an increase in the capital of a credit institution which does not take account of the right of pre-emption, as provided for in Article 72(1) and (4) of Directive 2017/1132, may be contrary to the right to property of the shareholders of that institution, or to the provisions which transposed that directive into the law of the Member State in which that institution has its seat, cannot lead to a different conclusion. It is indeed not for the ECB but for the national authorities and courts to ensure compliance with the applicable provisions of national law, including those intended to protect the right to property of the shareholders of a credit institution.

260It should be borne in mind, moreover, that the second sentence of Article 72(4) of Directive 2017/1132 provides that the right of pre-emption, within the meaning of that provision, may be restricted or withdrawn by decision of the general meeting of the company concerned, which was the case here.

261In those circumstances, it is irrelevant that Article 56 of the Consolidated Law on Banking confers rights on individuals, since, in any event, the grounds set out in paragraphs 91 and 92 of the judgment under appeal are already sufficient to justify the General Court’s rejection of the line of argument concerning the fourth instance of unlawful conduct.

262Accordingly, the appellants’ arguments directed against paragraph 94 of the judgment under appeal, in which the General Court held that Article 56 does not, ‘in itself’, confer rights on individuals, must be rejected as ineffective.

263It follows that the first part must be rejected as in part unfounded and in part ineffective.

(b)The second part

(1)Arguments of the parties

264The appellants claim that, in paragraphs 208 to 215 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court distorted their line of argument concerning the eighth instance of unlawful conduct alleged against the ECB and rejected it on the basis of an incomplete reasoning. They state that they had maintained that they had made significant investments in Banca Carige’s capital because of the confidence that the ECB’s conduct instilled in them and that they lost most of those investments following Banca Carige’s capital increase excluding pre-emption rights.

265The appellants dispute, in particular, paragraph 214 of the judgment under appeal, noting that in order for an EU institution to incur non-contractual liability it is necessary to prove that the conduct of that institution was not the exclusive but the determining cause of the damage suffered. They complain that the General Court infringed the rules on the burden of proof and infringed the obligation to state reasons.

266The appellants add that they relied before the General Court on the fact that the placing of Banca Carige under temporary administration, which in their opinion was unlawful, had been decisive for the approval of the increase in its capital by its shareholders.

267The ECB and the Commission contend that the second part should be rejected.

(2)Findings of the Court

268It is apparent from paragraphs 214 and 215 of the judgment under appeal that the General Court rejected as inadmissible the appellants’ line of argument which it referred to as the ‘eighth instance of unlawful conduct’ alleged against the ECB, on the ground that, although they had indicated that the value of their shareholdings in Banca Carige had fallen and that they had attributed that development to the decisions adopted by that bank following the measures taken by the ECB, they had not established that those measures had caused that outcome and had not produced any analysis to show that that outcome had not been caused, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by other facts or other circumstances.

269The appellants criticise the General Court for having carried out an incomplete examination of their line of argument and for having distorted it, since it failed to take account of the arguments raised before it, according to which, in essence, first, they had taken the decision to invest in Banca Carige’s capital because of the confidence instilled in them by the ECB’s previous conduct towards that bank and, second, had Banca Carige not been placed under temporary administration, its general meeting of shareholders would not have approved the increase which had deprived them of enjoying the right of pre-emption to shares in the course of a future capital increase.

270First, the appellants’ arguments relating, in essence, to the breach of the confidence that the ECB’s conduct had instilled in them fall within their line of argument alleging breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, which the General Court referred to as the ‘seventh instance of unlawful conduct’ alleged against the ECB and rejected for the reasons contested in the first ground of appeal, which has been rejected, as is apparent from paragraph 130 of the present judgment.

271Second, in so far as the increase in Banca Carige’s capital without any right of pre-emption for its former shareholders was decided, as is apparent from paragraph 24 of the judgment under appeal and paragraph 39 of the present judgment, not by Banca Carige’s temporary directors but by the general meeting of Banca Carige, the General Court did not err in law in finding, in essence, in paragraph 214 of the judgment under appeal, that it was for the appellants to explain how the ECB’s conduct, including the adoption of the decision to place Banca Carige under temporary administration, had led to the approval, by Banca Carige’s shareholders at a general meeting, of the proposal to increase Banca Carige’s capital without any right of pre-emption, a proposal which those shareholders were free to reject.

272It is not apparent from the arguments put forward by the appellants in the second part of the sixth ground of appeal that they had indeed put forward such an explanation before the General Court. The General Court therefore did not err in law in rejecting as inadmissible the appellants’ line of argument which it referred to as the ‘seventh instance of unlawful conduct’ alleged against the ECB.

273It follows from the foregoing considerations that the second part of the sixth ground of appeal must be rejected, as must the sixth ground of appeal in its entirety.

7.The seventh ground of appeal

274The seventh ground is divided into two parts.

(a)The first part

(1)Arguments of the parties

275The appellants complain that the General Court infringed the obligation to state reasons, since it failed to examine their line of argument alleging breach, by the ECB, of its prudential supervision obligations, with regard to alleged anomalies which occurred during Banca Carige’s capital increase performed at the end of 2017.

276The ECB and the Commission contend that the first part should be rejected.

(2)Findings of the Court

277It is apparent from reading the appellants’ application in the case file before the General Court sent to the Court of Justice that the appellants had referred, in paragraphs 100 to 107 of that application, to what they considered irregularities which occurred at the time of the increase in the capital of Banca Carige performed at the end of 2017. The alleged irregularities concerned acts or omissions by Banca Carige’s managing director who was in post at the time of that increase. As for the ECB, the appellants criticised it, in essence, for not having taken any action when faced with those irregularities.

278It is true that, in the context of the eight instances of unlawful conduct in which the General Court grouped together the appellants’ various claims regarding the allegedly unlawful conduct of the ECB, on which they had relied in support of their action, the General Court did not specifically mention the ECB’s failure to intervene at the time of Banca Carige’s capital increase performed at the end of 2017.

279However, even if that omission could be characterised, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 174 of the present judgment, as a breach of the obligation to state reasons by the General Court, it cannot justify setting aside the judgment under appeal.

280As noted in paragraph 277 of the present judgment, the appellants claimed, before the General Court, that the alleged irregularities had been committed by Banca Carige’s managing director in office at the end of 2017. Admittedly, they criticised the ECB, in essence, for not having intervened, but they did not explain in any way what specific measures the ECB should have taken, and on the basis of which provisions, assuming that it was aware of those irregularities.

281In those circumstances, the appellants’ arguments relating to the alleged instances of unlawful conduct which occurred at the time of Banca Carige’s capital increase performed at the end of 2017 could only have been rejected as inadmissible, since the appellants had failed to specify the unlawful acts or omission which they alleged against the ECB.

282In the light of the foregoing considerations, the first part of the seventh ground of appeal must be rejected as ineffective.

(b)The second part

(1)Arguments of the parties

283The appellants state that they had relied, before the General Court, on the existence of an agreement, between the ECB and two members of Banca Carige’s board of directors, concerning their resignation which resulted in the termination of the duties of that board as a whole and justified the adoption of the decision to place Banca Carige under temporary administration. The General Court failed to examine that line of argument in the judgment under appeal.

284The ECB and the Commission contend that the second part should be rejected.

(2)Findings of the Court

285As is apparent from paragraph 76 of the judgment under appeal, referred to in paragraph 218 of the present judgment, the General Court analysed, in the judgment under appeal, the appellants’ argument alleging the existence of consultation between the ECB and two members of Banca Carige’s board of directors.

286It follows that the second part, by which the appellants complain that the General Court did not examine that line of argument, must be rejected as unfounded.

287Accordingly, the seventh ground of appeal must be rejected as in part ineffective and in part unfounded.

288It is apparent from the examination of the grounds of appeal put forward by the appellants that the judgment under appeal must be set aside in so far as the General Court dismissed the appellants’ action inasmuch as it concerned, first, the infringement by the ECB of Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) of the Consolidated Law on Banking when it adopted the early intervention measure and, second, the fact that the ECB was responsible for the situation in which Banca Carige found itself, and the errors vitiating the grounds of the own funds decision.

289The remainder of the appeal must be dismissed.

VII.The action before the General Court

290In accordance with the first paragraph of Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, if the decision of the General Court is set aside, the Court of Justice may itself give final judgment in the matter, where the state of the proceedings so permits.

291Such is the case here.

A.Infringement of Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) of the Consolidated Law on Banking when adopting the early intervention measure

1.Arguments of the parties

292The appellants claim that the ECB infringed, in a sufficiently serious manner, Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) of the Consolidated Law on Banking by adopting the early intervention measure when confronted with a situation in which there was a mere risk of infringement of the applicable regulatory framework, whereas, in their view, for that provision to apply, evidence of a foreseeable infringement of that framework was required.

293The ECB, supported by the Commission, disputes the applicants’ arguments.

2.Findings of the Court

294It should be borne in mind that, as is apparent from paragraphs 141 and 142 of the present judgment, the ECB is entitled to exercise, with regard to credit institutions subject to its supervision, inter alia, the powers conferred on the Bank of Italy by Articles 69octiesdecies and 69noviesdecies of the Consolidated Law on Banking, which transpose Article 27 of Directive 2014/59 into Italian law.

295Thus, Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) of the Consolidated Law on Banking confers on the supervisory authority the power necessary to adopt the early intervention measures referred to therein where, as a result of a rapid deterioration in the situation of the bank concerned or of its group, it finds there to be or foresees, inter alia, an infringement of Regulation No 575/2013 and of Title II of Directive 2014/65.

296Moreover, under Article 69noviesdecies of the Consolidated Law on Banking, that authority may request, where the conditions laid down in Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) of that law are satisfied, that a credit institution or the parent company of a banking group implement, even in part, the restructuring plan adopted, prepare a plan to negotiate debt restructuring with all or some of the creditors be prepared or, where appropriate, modify their corporate form.

297In the present case, in point 1.1.1 of the early intervention measure, included in Section 1.1, headed ‘Capital adequacy’, of Part 1, itself entitled ‘Facts on which the decision is based’, of that measure, the ECB stated that, while, in June 2016, Banca Carige’s Common Equity Tier 1 ratio (CET 1) and Tier 2 capital ratio (TCR) were 12.29% and 14.37%, respectively, the expected development of those two ratios in 2017 would lead them to lower values, namely 10.35% for the CET 1 and 12.19% for the TCR in breach of the overall own funds requirement of 12.50%.

298In points 1.1.2 and 1.1.3 of the early intervention measure, the ECB noted that Banca Carige’s capital ratios were likely to decrease even beyond the values set out in point 1.1.1 of that measure, with even more significant asset losses in view of Banca Carige’s constant and insufficient performance in terms of its profitability in recent years, the high credit risk stemming from the level of non-performing loans, which jeopardised its ability to generate profits, and the uncertainties related to the cost-saving measures provided for in the strategic plan adopted by Banca Carige.

299In point 2.1 of that measure, the ECB noted that, on the basis of the facts described in Part 1 of that measure, it had established that the conditions for the application of Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) and Article 69noviesdecies of the Consolidated Law on Banking were satisfied and that it could exercise the powers provided for in those provisions.

300In point 2.2 of that measure, the ECB added that, in particular, the facts described in Section 1.1 thereof ‘indicate a likely breach of asset requirements in the near future’.

301It follows that the ECB adopted the early intervention measure after having satisfied itself that the conditions for the application of Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) and Article 69noviesdecies of the Consolidated Law on Banking were met in the case of Banca Carige, in particular after having considered that it was likely, in the near future, that Banca Carige would be in breach of its prudential requirements. Thus, contrary to what the appellants claim, the ECB did not simply find that there was a mere risk of such an infringement.

302Accordingly, the applicants’ argument that the ECB infringed Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) of the Consolidated Law on Banking in a sufficiently serious manner when adopting the early intervention measure must be rejected as unfounded.

B.The fact that the ECB was responsible for the situation in which Banca Carige found itself, and the errors, other than that examined in paragraph 184 of the judgment under appeal, which vitiate the grounds of the own funds decision

1.Arguments of the parties

303The appellants claim, in the first place, that the own funds decision appears to be ‘wholly unreasonable’, since no account was taken of the situation resulting from the outcome of the ECB’s review of Banca Carige’s liabilities. The results of that review considerably increased the ‘asset consolidation’ which Banca Carige was to carry out and made a further increase in its capital necessary.

304In the second place, the appellants claim that the own funds decision was vitiated by illegality on several grounds. First, the ECB did not open an investigation into a press release issued on 16 November 2017, under the responsibility of Banca Carige’s managing director at the time, which caused a loss of confidence in Banca Carige and led to significant withdrawals of deposits. In any event, Banca Carige’s liquidity ratio was far removed from the risk threshold.

305Second, Banca Carige’s failure to issue EUR 350 million of Tier 2 own funds instruments, referred to in the own funds decision, is linked to ‘an inexplicable and disconcerting individual initiative’ of Banca Carige’s managing director at the time, while the ECB conducted discussions exclusively with ‘the management’ of Banca Carige, without the involvement of the board of directors.

306Third, the own funds decision refers to governance problems concerning Banca Carige, ignoring the ECB’s own responsibility for the occurrence of those problems. In addition, it refers to uncertainties as to the outcome of the general meeting which was to be held on 20 September 2018, such an allusion being ‘inappropriate and insignificant’, especially since the decisions taken at that meeting largely refute the ECB’s concerns.

307The ECB, supported by the Commission, disputes the appellants’ arguments.

2.Findings of the Court

308The appellants’ arguments summarised in paragraphs 303 to 306 of the present judgment are not capable of demonstrating that the own funds decision was vitiated by illegality.

309In the first place, even if, as the appellants claim, the ECB failed to take into consideration, when adopting the own funds decision, the results of the review which it had carried out of Banca Carige’s liabilities, that omission cannot demonstrate that the adoption of that decision was vitiated by illegality. The appellants themselves submit that, if those results had been taken into consideration, a more significant increase in the capital and, therefore, in Banca Carige’s own funds would have been necessary.

310Therefore, the ECB cannot be criticised for having committed an unlawful act in so far as it adopted the own funds decision, it being specified that that decision did not mention a specific amount of own funds that Banca Carige had to reach, but merely required Banca Carige’s board of directors to submit to the ECB, by 30 November 2018, a plan ‘to restore and ensure compliance with the own funds requirements on a lasting basis by 31 December 2018’. It was thus not for the ECB but for Banca Carige’s board of directors, which is responsible for its management, to assess Banca Carige’s exact capital needs and the measures to be adopted in order to restore and ensure compliance with the requirements concerning that capital.

311In the second place, the appellants’ arguments summarised in paragraphs 304 to 306 of the present judgment seek, in essence, to claim that the ECB is itself partly responsible for the difficulties which Banca Carige faced in terms of capital on the date of the adoption of the own funds decision.

312Irrespective of whether such claims are well founded, it is sufficient to note that they cannot, in any event, demonstrate that the adoption of the own funds decision was vitiated by illegality. Banca Carige was indeed able to claim compensation for damage which it allegedly suffered as a result of conduct on the part of the ECB which adversely affected own funds. On the other hand, such conduct, even if it were established, cannot justify that the ECB refrain from adopting, in the exercise of its powers in the field of prudential supervision, a decision requesting Banca Carige to remedy the capital shortfall from which it was suffering, irrespective of the cause of that shortfall.

313As regards the argument that, when the own funds decision was adopted, Banca Carige’s liquidity ratio was not below the risk threshold, it should be noted that the ECB did not rely on a shortfall in Banca Carige’s liquidity ratio in order to justify the adoption of that decision, with the result that that argument is ineffective.

314It should be noted that, in that decision, the ECB referred in point 2.1.1, under the heading ‘Liquidity and financing situation’, to the fact that Banca Carige had had to face two major liquidity crises, in November 2015 and November 2017, and to the fact that, shortly before the adoption of that decision, its position had been further weakened by negative net liquidity flows. In the light of those findings, which are not disputed by the appellants, the ECB cannot be criticised for having taken into account, as one ground among others which justified the adoption of the own funds decision, the deterioration in Banca Carige’s liquidity situation, even if its liquidity ratio were to remain above the risk threshold.

315It follows from all of the foregoing considerations that the appellants’ line of argument alleging that the ECB is responsible for the situation in which Banca Carige found itself, and that errors, other than that examined in paragraph 184 of the judgment under appeal, vitiate the grounds of the own funds decision, must be rejected as being, in part, ineffective and, in part, unfounded.

316It follows, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 294 to 302 and 308 to 315 of the present judgment, that one of the conditions laid down by the case-law cited in paragraph 136 of the present judgment for the non-contractual liability of the European Union or one of its institutions to be incurred – namely the condition relating to the existence of a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals – is not satisfied as regards the present action, in so far as it concerns, first, the ECB’s infringement of Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) of the Consolidated Law on Banking, when adopting the early intervention measure, and, second, the fact that the ECB is allegedly responsible for the situation in which Banca Carige found itself, and the errors, other than that examined in paragraph 184 of the judgment under appeal, which allegedly vitiate the grounds of the own funds decision.

317Since the three conditions giving rise to liability laid down in the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU must be satisfied cumulatively, the fact that one of them has not been satisfied is a sufficient basis on which to dismiss an action for damages (judgment of 18 March 2010, Trubowest Handel and Makarov v Council and Commission, C‑419/08 P, EU:C:2010:147, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

318Accordingly, the action must be dismissed as unfounded in so far as it concerns, first, the ECB’s infringement of Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) of the Consolidated Law on Banking when adopting the early intervention measure and, second, the fact that the ECB is allegedly responsible for the situation in which Banca Carige found itself, and the errors, other than that examined in paragraph 184 of the judgment under appeal, which allegedly vitiate the grounds of the own funds decision.

VIII.Costs

319Under Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is unfounded or where the appeal is well founded and the Court itself gives final judgment in the case, the Court is to make a decision as to the costs.

320Under Article 138(1) of those rules, which apply to the procedure on appeal by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

321Since the appellants have been unsuccessful and the ECB and the Commission have applied for costs, the appellants must be ordered to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the ECB and the Commission.

Operative part

On those grounds, the Court (Fifth Chamber) hereby:

1.Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 5 June 2024, Malacalza Investimenti and Malacalza v ECB (T‑134/21, EU:T:2024:362), in so far as the General Court dismissed Malacalza Investimenti Srl and Mr Vittorio Malacalza’s action inasmuch as it concerned (i) the infringement by the European Central Bank (ECB), when adopting Decision ECB/SSM/2016-F1T87K3OQ2OV1UORLH26/26 of 9 December 2016 relating to an early intervention measure, of Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) of decreto legislativo n. 385 – Testo unico delle leggi in materia bancaria e creditizia (Legislative Decree No 385 consolidating the laws on banking and credit) of 1 September 1993, applicable pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 9(1) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, and (ii) the fact that the ECB is allegedly responsible for the situation in which Banca Carige SpA found itself, and the errors, other than that examined by the General Court in paragraph 184 of the judgment under appeal, vitiating the grounds of Decision ECB-SSM-2018-ITCAR-6 of 14 September 2018 concerning own funds;

2.Dismisses the appeal as to the remainder;

3.Dismisses the action inasmuch as it concerns (i) the infringement by the European Central Bank (ECB), when adopting Decision ECB/SSM/2016-F1T87K3OQ2OV1UORLH26/26 of 9 December 2016 relating to an early intervention measure, of Article 69octiesdecies(1)(a) of decreto legislativo n. 385 – Testo unico delle leggi in materia bancaria e creditizia (Legislative Decree No 385 consolidating the laws on banking and credit) of 1 September 1993, applicable pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 9(1) of Regulation No 1024/2013, and (ii) the fact that the ECB is allegedly responsible for the situation in which Banca Carige SpA found itself, and the other errors vitiating the grounds of Decision ECB-SSM-2018-ITCAR-6 of 14 September 2018 concerning own funds;

4.Orders Malacalza Investimenti Srl and Mr Vittorio Malacalza to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Commission.