Mr Tasca states that the considerations in the judgment in Galli apply equally in the present case notwithstanding the fact that the national measures then at issue related to the production and wholesale stages whereas in the present case the rules at issue apply to all the marketing stages. The main thing is that the price system introduced by Regulation No 1009/67 is identical in essence with that enshrined in Regulation No 120/67. In support of this statement Mr Tasca gives a detailed analysis of the points which are common to the two systems, stressing in particular that they aim at guaranteeing to traders a minimum profit without preventing a larger profit being obtained in a case — theoretical at the time when the said regulations were adopted but real in the present situation where there is a sugar shortage and an increase in prices on the world market — where the prices which are formed freely on the market are higher than the threshold price laid down by the Community.The Italian rules in question are incompatible with the Community rule (a) because the Member States have lost all power to intervene in the particular sector and (b) in any event because it would adversely affect the objectives and would disturb the functioning of the common organization of the markets in sugar.(a) Having replaced national organizations, every common organization of the market must be regarded as self-sufficient.As regards sugar in particular Article 16 of Regulation No 1009/67, as amended by Regulation No 607/72 of the Council of 23 March 1972 (OJ English Special Edition 1972, p. 236), provides the Community with the instruments necessary to avoid price rises, that is to say, an export levy and import subsidies.The judgment in Galli has confirmed, it is true, that Member States have in principle retained the power ‘to take the appropriate measures relating to price formation at the retail and consumption stages’ as distinct from the production and wholesale stages. It is possible, however, to take the view that the Court did not intend to give a definite ruling in this respect and that the passage quoted is explained by reason of the fact that the national rule in question in the Galli case related only to the production and wholesale stages. In reality the following factors support the argument that there is no reason to distinguish between the different marketing stages:
— Article 39 (1) (e) of the Treaty requires the Community ‘to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices’.
— Article 3 (3) of Regulation No 2931/74 of the Council of 18 November 1974 (OJ L 311, 1974 p. 8) on the introduction of a subsidy on imports of white and raw sugar requires a tenderer to abide by a maximum price fixed by the Community at the consumption stage.
— A pricing system established within the framework of a common organization cannot be identified solely with prices fixed by the Community. The Court has repeatedly rejected the argument that Member States were free to regulate any matter which is not expressly subject to a Community rule.
(b) The Community rules aim at maintaining the income of producers whereas the orders of the CIP are calculated to reduce them. In thus pursuing unilaterally only one of the objectives laid down in Article 39 of the Treaty the Italian State has placed itself in conflict with the action taken by the Community which is based on a different concept of the priorities to be made among these objectives which are not wholly compatible. It is significant that the system of import subsidies established by Regulation No 2931/74 had not been operated so as to reduce the cost of all sugar imported to the level of the Community threshold price which thus continues to act as a kind of minimum price. The liberal philosophy of the Community rules with regard to sugar is the result of a number of factors and in particular of Article 3 (2) of Regulation No 1009/67 according to which ‘derived intervention prices shall be fixed for other areas, account being taken of the regional variations which, given a normal harvest and free movement of sugar, might be expected to occur in the price of sugar under natural conditions of price formation.’
The fixing of maximum prices for the last marketing stage necessarily affects the prices at the previous stages; these prices can therefore no longer be freely formed, as the Community rules assume.
The Italian Government considers that this question must be answered in the negative.
It cannot be inferred from the judgment in Galli, and it is not correct, that the Member States have lost their power unilaterally to fix maximum consumer prices. The objective of the national rules in question in the case of Galli was a freezing of prices at the production and wholesale marketing stages, whereas the present case is concerned with rules relating to prices to be applied at the retail and consumer stages, in respect of which the judgment in Galli confirmed the principle of maintaining the power of Member States ‘to take the appropriate measures relating to price formation’.
The common organization of the market in sugar is in substance no different from that of the market in cereals which was the subject of the judgment in Galli. In particular the price system which it established also concerns only the production and wholesale stages; its main objective is likewise ‘to ensure that the necessary guarantees in respect of employment and standards of living are maintained for Community growers’ (2nd recital to Regulation No 1009/67).
National rules on prices applicable to the retail and consumer stages is therefore incompatible with Regulation No 1009/67 only if it indirectly affects the prices fixed by the latter, for example by laying down a maximum consumer price lower than the intervention price or, in a more general manner, by fixing a maximum price in such a way as to affect the Community prices. This is not so in the present case since the maximum price fixed by Order No 28/1974 of the CIP assumes a price ex-factory appreciably higher than the Community threshold price and therefore than the target and intervention prices.
The United Kingdom Government gives a detailed analysis of the judgments of the Court concerned with the compatibility or incompatibility with the Community system of national interventions in the priceformation of products subject to a common organization of the market One lesson which can be drawn from all these judgments is that:
— In the first place the scope and purpose of the Community regulation in question must be looked at, having regard to the provisions of the Treaty and in particular Articles 38 to 40.
— It seems that, according to the Court, both the effects and the objectives of the national rules relevant to a particular case must be compatible with the Community objectives.
A national measure comprising the fixing of maximum selling prices could well be in accordance with the objectives of Regulation No 1009/67, namely to achieve a stable market and to guarantee to growers security of employment and a fair standard of living whilst avoiding over-production. This regulation merely prevents such prices from being fixed at a level the object or effect of which would be to prevent these objectives from being attained.
According to the Commission the principle confirmed by the judgment in Galli that Member States can no longer take action unilaterally affecting the machinery of price formation as established under the common organization of the market in cereals and the market in fats likewise applies to sugar. This arises from the nature and function of the price system of Regulation No 1009/67 which aims at the complete liberalization of intra-Community trade and at the consequential regulation of trade with countries outside the Community.
On the other hand the judgment in Galli recognized that national measures relating to prices at the retail and consumption stages are compatible with the Community rules ‘on condition that they do not jeopardize the aims or functioning of the common organization of the market in question’. In order to consider whether this is so in the present case it is necessary to deduct from the maximum consumer prices fixed by the CIP all the factors contributing to the cost of the goods from the time when they left the factory to when they are sold to the consumer (marketing costs, dudes and taxes, transport costs etc.); the price ex-factory is then obtained. The Commission does this; it arrives at the conclusions that at the time when the facts in question took place the price ex-factory so calculated was higher than the threshold price laid down by the Community and therefore a fortiori to the target and intervention prices. Accordingly the maximum prices in question do not jeopardize either the aims or functioning of the common organization.
Apart from these considerations it may nevertheless be asked whether the judgment in Galli does not lead to the denial of any power vested in the Member States with regard to the fixing of agricultural prices. Such a conclusion would, however, be hasty since the Community has never claimed an exclusive power in this field, a power the exercise of which would have serious implications in the political and economic spheres.
According to the Council the reply should be sought partly ‘in the philosophy of the system of prices of the organizations of the markets’ and more particularly the common organization of the market in sugar and partly in the division of powers between the Community and the Member States with regard to “general economic policy”.
(a)The first aim of Regulation No 1009/67 is not the formation of prices of current transactions about the target price but rather the protection of employment and the standard of living of Community growers and free movement within the Community. As for the aim “to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices” (Article 39 (1) (e) of the Treaty) it was taken account of in the proper fixing of the target and threshold prices.Of the prices provided for in the said regulation only the threshold and intervention prices are capable of involving legal consequences: with regard to the threshold price, payment of a variable differential levy on goods with an import price less than it; with regard to the intervention price, guarantee of obtaining it from the intervention agency in the event of the delivery of the goods to the agency. On the other hand since the basic function of the target price is to regulate production it plays a lesser role in the later stages. Regulation No 1009/67 transferred only limited powers to the Community relating solely to frontier transactions and to intervention. The Community was not able to establish a too restrictive organization for agriculture and trade in agricultural products since it had not done so for the industrial sector, especially in view of the fictitious nature of the distinction between agricultural and industrial products. Moreover, since the Community is not principally responsible in this sphere of “general economic policy” in particular with regard to retail prices and consumer selling prices, it would have risked extending the effect of its regulation of prices, if this had been too rigid, to that of the system of retail prices. Finally, the differences between the economic systems of the Member States and the surplus or deficit nature of their respective productions stand in the way of any set of Community rules which is harmonized down to the finest details.These considerations lead to the conclusion that national measures on prices are in any event unlawful when they affect the intervention or threshold prices whereas if they are capable of affecting only the target price they are not incompatible with the Community rules unless they obstruct the functioning of the common organization of the market in sugar. The statement in the judgment in Galli that Member States are free “to take the appropriate measures relating to price formation at the retail and consumption stages, on condition that they do not jeopardize the aims or functioning of the common organization of the market in question” must also apply to the previous stages.
(b)Article 145 of the Treaty gives the Council only the task of coordinating “the general economic policies of the Member States”. This shows that with the exception of those spheres in which the Treaty expressly gives the Council a power to take “decisions” (2nd indent of Article 145), numerous powers, in particular those relating to prices in general, to currency, to conjunctural policy and to expansion remain the responsibility of the Member States. For this reason again it is not possible to say that the common organization of the market rules out any national intervention in the abovementioned spheres.The statement in the judgment in Galli that “Article 103, which refers to Member States” conjunctural policies, does not relate to those areas already subject to common rules such as the organization of agricultural markets involves a serious restriction of the scope of Article 103. Moreover it implies excessive reliance on Articles 39 and 43 of the Treaty since the Community can no longer in the agricultural sphere, even where there are conjunctural difficulties intervene except on the basis of these articles. The function of Article 39 would therefore be exceeded, since that provision does not place conjunctural policy among the aims of the common agricultural policy and recognizes on the other hand that ‘in the Member States agriculture constitutes a sector closely linked with the economy as a whole’.So long as there has been no progress towards economic and monetary union there will be a problem of distinguishing between the general economic policy which will remain within the power of the Member States and the common agricultural policy. This problem must be resolved by reconciling the necessary respect for the Community mechanisms of the organization of the market and the necessity, no less imperative, of not depriving Member States of the instruments which they need in order to carry out their responsibilities in the sphere of the general economic equilibrium. This is particularly important in a period of crisis.If the solution advocated by the defendant in the main proceedings were accepted, the Community would be obliged to supplement its price rules, for example with the aim of fighting inflation, which would create considerable difficulties.