Contents
In Case 223/78REFERENCE to the Court under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty by the Pretore, Padua, for a preliminary ruling in the criminal proceedings pending before that court againstADRIANO GROSOLITHE COURTcomposed of: J. Mertens de Wilmars, President of the First Chamber, Acting as President, Lord Mackenzie Stuart (President of the Second Chamber), P. Pescatore, M. Sørensen, A. O'Keeffe, G. Bosco and A. Touffait, Judges,Advocate General: F. CapotortiRegistrar: J. A. Pompe, Deputy Registrargives the following
Judgment
Facts and Issues
The facts, the procedure and the observations submitted under Article 20 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EEC may be summarized as follows:
I —Facts and procedure
II —Observations lodged by the parties under Article 20 of the Statute of the Court
A —Observations of Mr Grosoli
Mr Grosoli first of all summarizes the judgment of the Court of 23 January 1975 in Case 31/74 relating to criminal proceedings brought against Filippo Galli ([1975] 1 ECR 47) and the judgments of 26 February 1976 in Case 65/75 relating to criminal proceedings brought against Riccardo Tasca ([1976] 1 ECR 291) and in Joined Cases 88 to 90/75 Società SADAM and Others v Comitato Interministeriale dei Prezzi and Others ([1976] 1 ECR 323).In his view the answer to the question posed for a preliminary ruling in the present case must be that in sectors covered by a common organization of the market, when that organization is based on a common system of prices, the Member States cannot unilaterally intervene in the process of price formation. The only means compatible with Community law allowing anion in such a sphere against the rise in prices is therefore, in his opinion, for the Member States to cause measures to be taken by the competent Community authority. In this connexion Mr Grosoli refers to paragraph 32 of the judgment in Case 31/74 Galli, but he adds that the principle must be extended to all stages of production and marketing and not be limited to certain stages as a perusal of paragraph 34 of the aforementioned judgment may seem to suggest.In Mr Grosoli's view the Italian measure in question breaches both the fundamental principles of the Treaty and those contained in the regulations establishing a system of prices for beef and veal inasmuch as it faces traders in this sector with the alternative of either selling at a loss or not selling and therefore not buying.In his view the measure in question infringes the second paragraph of Article 5 and Article 30 of the Treaty since the fixing of a price lower than that fixed by the Community institutions is both a quantitative restriction on import and a measure having equivalent effect.He alleges that in any event it compromises in a wide sense the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. Whatever the particular case the incompatible nature of -unilateral intervention by States is apparent both from the general principles as defined in the second paragraph of Article 5 and in Articles 39 and 40 of the Treaty and from the regulations on the common organizations of the market.Mr Grosoli then considers the regulations which have implemented the price system in relation to beef and veal and in particular Regulation No 805/68 of the Council of 27 June 1968 on the common organization of the market in beef and veal (Official Journal, English Special Edition 1968 (I), p. 187) and Council Regulation No 425/77 of 14 February 1977 amending Regulation No 805/68 and adapting Regulation No 827/68, and Regulation No 950/68 on the Common Customs Tariff (Official Journal, English Special Edition 1968 (I), p. 275). This examination leads him to conclude that any intervention by a Member State at the production or marketing stage of products subject to a price system can have no effect other than disturbing the machinery set up by the Community: if the objective of the intervention is to correct any one of the marketing stages it has repercussions on the whole organization and is therefore likely to endanger its objectives or functioning.Further Mr Grosoli claims that the fixing of retail prices has no effect upon the production or wholesale stages because increases usually occur at the initial and not the final stage, which is why producers and wholesalers who cannot subsequently pass on increases find themselves forced, in order not to incur losses, not to produce or not to buy anymore with the ultimate result in general that the Community market is distorted and therefore its objectives compromised.Mr Grosoli is therefore of the opinion that the question put by the Pretore, Padua, should be answered as follows:‘A price system established unilaterally by a Member State constitutes in every case and from every point of view, even at the retail stage, an infringement of the Community rules on the common organ ization of the markets and of prices of the kind applicable to beef and veal, which, as has been said, are based on a price and trade system.’In Grosoli's view the same conclusion must be drawn even if the general principles must be accepted as including those laid down by the Court in paragraph 11 of the judgment in Case 65/75, namely that it is for the national court to decide whether the maximum prices which it is called upon to consider are incompatible with Community provisions. Mr Grosoli supports this view by stating that such principles presuppose that there is a mandatory rule in a sector which is no longer within the responsibility of the Member States. The Italian courts are given powers which the constitution and Italian laws do not provide for. There is a prospect of an endless succession of contradictory judgments resulting in inequality among traders even though they have charged the same prices for the same goods. In the absence of any agreement with the Community authorities any unilateral intervention by States at the production or marketing stage of products subject to the common organization and to a system of prices conflicts with the principles of equality and free competition governing the Common Market.Consideration of Regulation No 805/68 and in particular Articles 7, 21 and 22 thereof as amended by Regulation No 425/77 confirms in Mr Grosoli's view the unlawful nature of unilateral intervention measures taken by Member States. If this were not so those regulations would not provide for the prohibition of quantitative restrictions or measures having equivalent effect or require the Member States to notify the Commission where they take measures aimed at restricting or prohibiting import or export of meat in general in case of events likely to endanger the objectives of Article 39 of the Treaty nor would they require intervention agencies to sell the products in such conditions as to avoid any disturbance of the market and to ensure equal access to goods and equal treatment of purchasers.Accordingly the contested order of the Price Committee infringes, in Grosoli's view, the aforementioned principles and in particular Article 7 of Regulation No 805/68 and must therefore be considered unlawful.
B —Observations of the Italian Government
After referring to the case-law of the Court and the observations which it made in Cases 65/75 Tasca -and 88 to 90/75 SADAM, the Italian Government observes that this case-law does not affect the principle that the existence of a common organization of the market does not necessarily mean that Member States have lost all power to regulate agricultural prices at a particular marketing stage, subject to the national court's being able to review in each case whether or not there is a conflict.In the view of the Italian Government the courts have a difficult task but it is not impossible as the Pretore, Padua, claims.It states that according to Italian case-law the lawfulness of a mandatory price depends in the first place on its ‘remunerative nature’, which means that prices which do not take account of the costs and profit margins of traders are unlawful. Following the establishment of the common agricultural policy the Italian courts must also, in the view of the Italian Government, consider the ‘remunerative nature’ of the price in the light of Community law. Recourse should not be had on the ground of the difficulties mentioned to solutions different from those adopted so far in relation to the question of the division of powers in agriculture between the Community and the Member States.The Italian Government does not understand the basis of the misgivings of the Pretore, Padua, who fears that the application of the procedure mentioned by the Court in Case 65/75 Tasca might give rise to inequality between traders who decide to observe the national price rules and those who decide to ignore them. What is important in the view of the Italian Government is that the legal system should allow parties to have access to the necessary courts to review the lawfulness of the price rules both from the Community point of view and from that of municipal law.The Italian Government observes that the Pretore is referring to municipal laws and to Article 3 of the Italian Constitution in suggesting that there may be a breach of the principle of equality because the price fixing affects only the consumer stage. In these circumstances, in the view of the Italian Government, this aspect does not fall within the ambit of the question put to the Court. In any event the Italian Government refers in this connexion to paragraph 10 of the judgment in Case 65/75 Tasca.Finally the Italian Government points out that according to the procedural documents in the main action there are the following additional questions at issue-: Does the officially fixed price also apply to wholesale transactions and does such price also apply to the sale of frozen beef and veal not included in the consignment made available to the Italian intervention agency by Regulation No 2453/76?The Italian Government considers that it is for the national court to resolve these questions in the context of the main action.
C —Observations of the Commission
After summarizing the case-law of the Court and explaining the structure of the common organization in beef and veal the Commission observes that national measures determining maximum consumer prices for frozen beef and veal may interfere both directly and indirectly with the functioning of the common organization in question and with the system of intra-Community trade.The Commission analyses the conditions under which such interference occurs in order to showa contrario whether and in what circumstances national measures such as those in the present case may be regarded as compatible with Community law. It recalls that such measures must be compatible both with the common organization of the markets and with the system of intra-Community trade.The Commission first of all considers the possibility of interference regarding the objectives and the functioning of the system of the disposal of intervention products for domestic consumption.In this respect it observes that if the national measure is confined to fixing the maximum consumer prices of intervention products only, the sale of which has already been decided upon and in respect of which the prices to be charged by the national agencies have been laid down, and if the level of maximum consumer prices leaves at all subsequent marketing stages until sale to the domestic consumer a sufficient profit margin to the traders, the national measure does not hinder execution of the Community measures for disposal. The Commission adds that otherwise traders would be forced to work at a loss in respect of that part of the products already bought or they would refrain from buying from intervention. The measures of disposal would therefore not produce the desired effect.If these two conditions are fulfilled, the national measure may be regarded as compatible with the organization of markets even if it may appear to conflict with the system of prices or the system of trade with non-member countries. In the Commission's view the conflict has its origin not in the national measure but in the Community measure for the determination of prices.If the national measure extends to all frozen beef or veal marketed in the national territory or in a part of it, it is, in the Commission's view, incompatible with the system of disposal of intervention products because the result will be either to distort the formation of tender prices in the context of Community operations of disposal already decided upon, but the prices of which have not yet been fixed, or to force the Commission to forego disposal or to fix in advance prices lower than those which it would have been able to obtain in a normal market situation.The Commission then considers the possibility of interference as regards the Community price system. It observes in this context that generally speaking every national measure freezing consumer prices is incompatible with the objectives and good functioning of the common organization of the markets if the direct or indirect result is to make it more difficult to bring market prices into line with the guide price. The Commission maintains that national measures freezing the prices of frozen beef and veal act as a partial brake on the increase in the market prices of fresh refrigerated beef and veal in view of the fact that the tendency of the latter to rise in price causes consumers to turn in preference to frozen beef and veal. The Commission adds that if the prices of fresh or refrigerated meat are less than the guide price, which is the normal situation on the Community markets, these measures, by making it more difficult to bring the market prices into line with the guide price, must be regarded as hindering the objectives of the common organization.As regards the intervention system the Commission observes that the result of freezing consumer prices of frozen meat is to prevent the market prices of fresh meat, where at the beginning they are close to or less than the intervention prices, from rising above the intervention level, so that producers will have more recourse to intervention than if the market conditions had not been adversely affected.The Commission moreover stresses that in view of the interdependence of guide prices, market prices and the levels of levies and refunds, in certain circumstances the national measure ultimately also influences indirectly the determination of the latter. It follows not only that trade with non-member countries is subjected to artificial conditions but also that the natural levels of one of the Community's own resources and in part of an expense to the Community budget, namely levies and refunds, are affected simply by the unilateral decision of a Member State.As regards the system of intra-Community trade the Commission observes that the consumer price fixed for frozen meat might be at a level such that having regard to the general situation of imported products in relation to that of national products imports would be prevented unless traders were to work at a loss.As for exports, the consumer prices laid down by the State might in the Commission's view appear so unattractive to national traders that they would be led to seek more profitable outlets in other Member States.These two phenomena might, in the Commission's view, occur both in respect of frozen meat and fresh and refrigerated meat and live animals.Although the Pretore might have contented himself with finding that the Price Committee measure extends without distinction to all frozen meat marketed in the national territory, the Commission has put before the Court the most important facts relating to the concrete situation of the markets when the measure was adopted and after it entered into force. Those facts are as follows: the Community measures for sale of consumer products in the process of implementation; the levels of guide prices and market prices; the figures relating to the Italian imports and exports of adult cattle.
III —Oral procedure
At the hearing on 29 May 1979 Mr Grosoli, represented by F. Capelli and G. M. Ubertazzi (in substitution for Mr Castellini), the Italian Government, represented by I. M. Braguglia, Avvocato dello Stato, and the Commission represented by G. Campogrande, a member of its Legal Department, acting as Agent, made oral observations.The Advocate General delivered his opinion at the hearing on 27 June 1979.
Decision
Costs
Operative part
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