Commission of the European Communities v French Republic (26/69) · GlobalLawDB
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic (26/69)
law://eu/cjeu/1969/c-26-69/hd_1_1_4_2@2026-11-22
Key facts
Court
Court of Justice · Full Court
Case
26/69 · ECLI:EU:C:1970:67
Decided
9 Jul 1970
Procedure
Infringement action
Applicant
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, represented by its Legal Adviser, Georges Le Tallec, acting as Agent, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the offices of its Legal Adviser, Émile Reuter, 4 boulevard Royal
Defendant
FRENCH REPUBLIC, represented by Renaud Sivan, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Guy de Lacharrière, Minister Plenipotentiary, Director of Legal Services at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, acting as Agents, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the Embassy of the French Republic
Rapporteur
P. Pescatore
Advocate General
Roemer
Bench
6 judgesR. Monaco, P. Pescatore, A. M. Donner, A. Trabucchi, W. Strauß, J. Mertens de Wilmars
The Commission argues that the French Republic is wrong in thinking that it can justify its refusal to apply to imports of olive oil from Tunisia the levies provided for, under Regulation No 136/66/EEC by recourse to Protocol I.7 relating to goods originating in and coming from certain countries and enjoying special treatment when imported into a Member State.Under this Protocol which, it is claimed, does not in any event confer upon third countries the right to retain a system of preferential treatment and which amounts to no more than a facility granted to the Member State concerned, the application of the EEC Treaty requires no alteration in the customs treatment applicable at the time of the entry into force of the Treaty, in particular as regards imports into France of goods originating in an dcoming from Tunisia.In the Commission's view the Protocol's sole purpose is to relieve Member States concerned, including France, of the obligation to bring the customs duties which they apply to certain third countries into line with the Common Customs Tariff. Since the levies instituted by the agricultural market arrangements are not customs duties they therefore fall outside the range of this Protocol.The view that Protocol I.7 is not applicable to the levies is justified by the following arguments :(a) Any exempting provision must be strictly interpreted and applied; a restrictive interpretation of the Protocol is particularly called for where there exists a single market, which is the case with olive oil ;(b) The definition given by the Customs Cooperation Council to the concept of ‘customs treatment’ has no mandatory effect; it has moreover been further developed and permits of no definite conclusion.GATT practice confirms the thesis under which the ‘customs treatment’ concerns only customs duty and not other charges.For the purpose of applying the EEC Treaty and Protocol I.7 one cannot give to the term ‘customs treatment’ the scope which the French Republic contends that it has; it certainly does not include ‘all the elements of the system of imports known at the time when the Treaty, was negotiated’; it is for example evident that it does not include quantitative restrictions.It follows particularly from the Implementing Convention on the Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories with the Community, annexed to the EEC Treaty, that the concept of ‘customs treatment’ refers only to the customs duties and excludes even charges having equivalent effect. Protocol I.7 does not confer any wider meaning on that concept; nothing would justify giving third countries listed in this Protocol, in whose favour the Treaty contains only a simple declaration of intent as regards an ultimate association, more favourable treatment than that given to the overseas countries and territories for whom the Treaty had already instituted a genuine association.
(c) Any measure adopted by the Community for putting into operation the common agricultural policy must be looked at in the light of its function and of its specific purpose within the framework of that policy. The levies fit into it as elements of a common price system in the common agricultural policy and thus become essential instruments thereof :
— the levies vis-à-vis third countries are determined by reference to a ‘political’ price (as a general rule the threshold price, based on the target price) fixed in line with the objectives of the Common Market, in particular that of assuring a fair standard of living to procedure without neglecting the need to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. (Article 39 (1));
— as a flexible protective measure, liable to variation in accordance with the vagaries of market conditions, the levy constitutes a ‘common machinery for stabilizing imports’ within the meaning of Article 40 (3); it fulfils a market-regulating function, avoiding massive imports at a price lower, than that in force within the Community;
— the ‘political’ price of agricultural products applies to the whole Community; it is the consequence of the need for a single Community market similar to that of a national market in which goods move freely (Article 43 (3) (b));
— a corollary of this principle is the exclusion expressly laid down in Article 40 (3) of any discrimination between producers and consumers within the Community;
— Under Article 11 of Regulation No 130/66/EEC on the financing of the common agricultural policy, each Member State is bound to make to the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund a contribution equal to 90 % of the total amount of the levies in relation to third countries collected by Member States, the remainder of the Fund's expenses being covered by contributions calculated on the basis of a fixed scale.
(d) It is by reason of this specific function of the system of levies — which is moreover established by the Court's case-law — that during the transitional period the application of levies becomes necessary even in trade between Member States notwithstanding the reduction of customs duties provided for by the Treaty for as long as price differences remain. There is thus all the more reason to apply them to third countries which do not participate in the common agricultural policy, whatever the tariff treatment which they enjoy.
(e) The levies, which are essential elements of the common agricultural policy, require a non-discriminatory application. Any unjustified derogation from the system of levies can only hinder the realization of the common agricultural policy. That is why only the Community is in a position to judge whether and under what conditions exemptions may be granted.
(f) The existence of this very clear principle is moreover confirmed by the attitude of the Community and of the Member States on previous occasions, in particular within the framework of the Association Agreements with the African and Malagasy States and with Greece. This attitude establishes in an eloquent manner the Community doctrine in the field of levies: by reason of their specific function within the framework of the common agricultural policy they cannot be equated with other tariff measures nor, a fortiori, can they be brought within the term ‘customs treatment’.
In conclusion the Commission considers that the levies cannot fall within the field of Protocol I.7. Quite apart from its actual wording, the ratio legis of the Protocol prevents this.
The Protocol only exempts Member States from the obligation under Article 23 of the Treaty progressively to introduce the Common Customs Tariff; the Member States remain on the other hand subject to all other obligations of the Treaty, in particular in matters of the common agricultural policy. Protocol I.7 had as its one and only purpose to derogate in certain cases from the automatic effect of the introduction of the Common Customs Tariff.
The French Republic points out that in the case of the independent countries in the Franc Area, Protocol I.7 was intended to be applied only temporarily and that the definitive trading arrangements between those countries and the Community were to be settled in the Association Agreements. In particular this was so in the case of Tunisia, ever since the agreement establishing an association between the EEC and the Tunisian Republic, which was signed in Tunis on 28 March 1969 and which entered into force on 1 September 1969.
As to the substance, the French Republic takes the view that in the present case, over and above semantic arguments, the problem is one of good faith in the relationship between the Community or one of its Member States and a developing country. The Community and, before it existed, certain of its Member States assumed a responsibility towards the developing countries. The Community undertook to maintain and intensify the traditional patterns of trade between the Member States of the EEC and the independent countries of the Franc Area and to contribute towards their economic and social development. In anticipation of the conclusions of an Association Agreement the transitional system set up by Protocol I.7 provided in particular a specific system for the importation of certain goods originating in and coming from those countries. The essential purpose of the Protocol was therefore to ensure that the establishment of the EEC did not cause major damage to the economy of certain developing third countries which before the entry into force of the Treaty had had privileged relationships with their former mother country. In the relationships between certain Member States and certain third countries it permitted suspending the application of those Treaty provisions which would have required a modification of the customs treatment applicable at the time of the entry into force of the Treaty to imports from those third countries and thus permitted the special import systems to remain in force, except in case of any damage resulting therefrom to the other Member States. The Protocol in no way intended to exclude agricultural products; on the contrary, it is essentially in their favour that this exception to Community rules was made.
The claim on the part of the Commission to be entitled to exclude levies from the ambit of the Protocol and to limit this to customs duties proper cannot really be maintained. Since the levies were unknown at the time when the Protocol entered into force one must in replying to the question whether they ought to be included in or excluded from the customs system look to the spirit of the Protocol and the intention of its authors.
(a) The authors of the Treaty and of the Protocol desired to safeguard a continuity between the already existing bilateral advantages and the Association Agreements which would one day be concluded. They certainly did not intend to allow Tunisia to benefit from a preferential system so long as the common organization of the markets, with the system of levies, had not been set up for the product in question, then, as soon as it had been, to take away all preference and then after the conclusion of the Association Agreement again to confer upon it advantages equivalent to those from which it had benefited on a bilateral basis.
The purpose of Protocol I.7, that is to say the continuation of a system of privileged exports, would be misunderstood if it were possible whilst keeping in force a preferential customs system to limit or in an extreme case even to prohibit any importation by using the device of the levy.
(b) To exclude the levies from Protocol I.7 would, as regards olive oil, and more generally all the agricultural products falling within a common organization of the market, have the result of depriving the Protocol of any substance, since the levies would have taken the place of all the protective devices previously in operation.
(c) Without claiming that the levies can immediately be assimilated to customs duties it is right to place on record that the collection of the levies has the effect of modifying the ‘customs treatment’ within the meaning of the Protocol.
— The expression ‘customs treatment’ used in the Protocol includes all the elements of treatment on importation known at the time when the Treaty was negotiated, since the Protocol undoubtedly provides the Member States with an opportunity of totally avoiding the Treaty obligations in their relationships with some of their former colonies.
The Protocol refers not only to the concept of ‘customs treatment’ since the preamble includes the expression ‘special treatment when imported’ which is referred to again in Article 3 of the body of the Protocol.
— It is hardly to be denied that the levy collected upon the entry of a product into the territory of a Member State is one of the elements of the import regime.
— The introduction of levies has enlarged the concept of ‘customs treatment’ within the meaning of the Protocol by the new element of treatment on importation.
(d) As regards the criticism of excessively wide interpretation of the Protocol, the French Republic points out that, since the Protocol does not confer any right on third countries and since it does not impose any obligation on Member States, it provides in itself the possibility of a restrictive application of those exceptions which it authorizes and leaves discretion in this respect to the Member States. Besides France has always kept within limits in the application of the Protocol, seeking to maintain a certain equilibrium between the essential interests of the third States in question and the requirements for the construction of Europe.
(e) International terminology and practice in no way assimilate customs treatment and tariff treatment; the terminolgies used in particular by the Customs Cooperation Council and by GATT allow the term ‘customs treatment’ to include various measures .which, at, the frontiers, may obstruct trade by the levy thereon of sums calculated according to varying rules but which all have the effect of influencing the consumers' choice by a deliberate increase in the price of products ultimately imported.
(f) It would be inaccurate to claim that only the Community is in a position to assess whether and on what condition exemptions from levy may be granted.
The examples of certain Association Agreements cited in support of this thesis lack relevance; they refer to situations altogether different from that envisaged by Protocol I.7: the Treaty itself distinguishes them and since these concern agreements entered into with the Community, any derogation naturally is a matter for the Community.
The system provided by the Protocol is altogether different; it requires no modification of the customs treatment applicable to certain bilateral commercial relations; pending the ultimate conclusion of Association Agreements with the Community it only imposes upon the Member States involved an obligation to supply information; the Commission may not intervene except in case of damage caused to a Member State.