law://eu/cjeu/1971/c-7-71/hd_1_1_3_2_4@2026-11-22The Commission states that although, in view of the delicate issues raised by the future activities of Euratom, it has a more finely judged opinion than the French Government in respect of any failure to act on the part of the Council, nevertheless it agrees that exceeding the time-limits set out in Article 76 established a situation which does not represent a correct application of the Treaty. However it cannot concur with the conclusions the defendant draws from this circumstance.(i) The situation thus created is not equivocal within the meaning of the judgment given by the Court of Justice on 9 July 1970 in Case 26/69. In this case there is only a divergence of interpretation on the legal consequences of the Council's failure to take a decision. The Commission clearly defined its position on this point as from 28 November 1964. For its part as from November 1965 the French Government adopted a clear position by unilaterally deciding to refuse to be subject to the application of Chapter VI, thus taking the law into its own hands.(ii) The absence of any decision by the Council cannot, in the opinion of the Commission, mean an implied decision of non-confirmation.— legal fiction of an implied decision as a consequence of a reasonable period in such an important matter as this is not acceptable. The alternative decisions set out in the second paragraph of Article 76 require in any event an express and formal measure of the Council.— The defendant is wrong in arguing that if the authors of the Treaty had intended that the former provisions of Chapter VI should continue to apply after the expiry of the time-limit set out in Article 76, they would have inserted this expressly. The argument rebounds on the defendant. If the authors of the Treaty had intended that the initial provisions should cease to be applicable on 1 January 1965 or upon the expiry of any time-limit, they would have provided this expressly.— Only the idea of provisional applicability ensures sufficient legal continuity for the principle stated in Article 2 of the Treaty and for the logic of the supply scheme which the authors of the Treaty intended to bring closely under Community supervision. The initial provisions set out in Article 222 of the Treaty for the period preceding the entry into service of the Agency confirm that this interpretation is well founded.— The scheme of the procedural system set out in the second paragraph of Article 76 also requires the concept of provisional applicability. Indeed the fact that any confirmation may be made by a simple majority decision of the Council in contrast with the requirement of unanimity for the adoption of new rules shows that this confirmation can only, ratione materiae, relate to provisions which have provisionally remained in force and not to re-enacting a body of law which had earlier lapsed at the end of a time-limit.— The defendant s objection that the provisional applicability defended by the Commission is comparable to an implied decision of ratification must be rejected.As from 1 January 1965 the provisional application of the provisions of Chapter VI is essentially of a precarious nature, liable to be altered at any moment, while confirmation would exclude any subsequent alteration. Moreover, in order not to prejudge decisions of the Council, the provisional supply scheme should be applied in such a way that the future developments may be left open as far as possible.
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