Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/2195

Contents

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 28 thereof,Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,Whereas:

(1)Given the strategic nature of space, it is necessary to address, as Europeans, current and upcoming challenges in the space domain.

(2)Space technology, data and services have become indispensable for European societies and economies and in the daily lives of Europeans. Space technology, data and services are drivers of research, technological development and innovation, creating job opportunities and economic growth, increasing European competitiveness, supporting the green and digital transition, protecting and safeguarding the Union and its citizens, and enhancing Union resilience and security.

(3)Outer space is an increasingly congested and contested domain where the international order based on international law and on the rule of law has been increasingly challenged in recent years which has increased the risk of spillover effects on European citizens, organisations, industries and businesses.

(4)Irresponsible and hostile behaviours in space, including attempts to deploy, interfere with, manipulate, disrupt, or destroy space infrastructure, systems and services, may hamper essential space services. Irresponsible and hostile behaviours in space have the potential to undermine the safety and security of the Union, its Member States and citizens, its economic security, and to affect essential services, including services that support democratic institutions and processes, as well as to put international security and stability at risk.

(5)Drawing from the experience acquired in recent years in implementing Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/698^note, it is therefore necessary to reinforce the European Union Space Threat Response Architecture (STRA) with additional responses and to expand its scope to address new threats in the space domain.

(6)When defining space threats, it is necessary to consider threats caused by space systems including space systems operated by third States or commercial companies as well as threats to essential space services delivered within the Union.

(7)When addressing threats in the space domain, it is necessary to consider all aspects relevant for the functioning of space systems and the delivery of space-based services in the Union and its Member States, for example, the outer space environment, the various relevant orbits and spacecraft, and to consider related information on the wider systems to which the space systems belong, the ground and launch infrastructure, radio frequency links, user terminals and cyber. It is also necessary to take the underlying industrial space sector into account.

(8)The classified Space Threat Landscape Analysis provided by the Single Intelligence Analysis Capability (SIAC) serves as a reference for identifying the typology of space threats. The Space Threat Landscape Analysis is complemented by near real-time space domain awareness information provided on a voluntary basis by Member State space commands, and by the relevant security monitoring centres of the Union Space Programme.

(9)Information and expertise concerning whether an event related to a space-related system or service constitutes a space threat to the Union or to the Member States, including to space related systems and services, should be provided to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) by the relevant Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) entities and agencies, including SIAC, by the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (the ‘Agency’) or by the relevant structure designated to monitor the security of a system set up, or a service provided, under a component of the Union Space Programme pursuant to Article 34(4) of Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council^note (the ‘appointed security monitoring structure’), by Member States or by the Commission. In addition, third States and international organisations, such as NATO, should also be encouraged to support risk analysis by the Union.

(10)The respective roles of the Council, the High Representative, the relevant CFSP entities and agencies, the Agency, any appointed security monitoring structure and the Member States should be clarified within the chain of operational responsibilities to be set up in order to react to a space threat.

(11)It is the sovereign and voluntary decision of each Member State or of a group of Member States acting jointly, to propose to activate STRA in the case of a threat to its or their security, including to its or their territory or to space systems and services or other relevant capacities under its or their authority or under its or their direct control.

(12)It is necessary to coordinate the Union’s response to space threats with the Member States, while respecting the Member States’ national competences and without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.

(13)In urgent cases, a first response might be required within a few hours of the High Representative having been made aware of a space threat. If the circumstances do not allow for the Council to take a decision on such a response, the High Representative should be empowered to decide on one or several provisional responses. In such circumstances, the Council should be informed immediately and review the High Representative’s decision on the provisional response as soon as possible and no later than four weeks after the provisional response has been adopted.

(14)Clearly signalling the likely consequences of a Union response to space threats influences the behaviour of potential aggressors, thereby reinforcing the security of the Union and its Member States.

(15)This Decision establishes a dedicated space security toolbox for a Union response to irresponsible and hostile behaviour in the space domain, in close coordination with the Member States.

(16)The space security toolbox complements the security frameworks already established in other strategic domains and, in particular, the cyber diplomacy toolbox and the hybrid toolbox, and draws on the experience gained from the establishment of those toolboxes.

(17)A range of potential threats to the security and the essential interests of the Union and of its Member States might arise from the deployment, operation and use of each of the components of the Union Space Programme and from the Union Secure Connectivity Programme. It is therefore appropriate to specifically respond to the threats to the systems and services set up under those programmes and programmes’ components and that have been determined to be security sensitive by the security configuration of the committee established under Article 107(1), point (e), of Regulation (EU) 2021/696 and taking into account the differences between the components of the programmes, in particular as regards Member States’ authority and control over sensors, systems or other capacities relevant to the programmes.

(18)This Decision should set out the responsibilities of the Council and of the High Representative to avert threats arising from the deployment, operation and use of space-related systems and services, or in the event of a threat to those systems or services. Those responsibilities should be implemented without affecting the overall responsibility of the Commission for the implementation of programmes, including in the field of security, as set out in Article 28 of Regulation (EU) 2021/696 and Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2023/588 of the European Parliament and of the Council^note.

(19)In accordance with Article 34(5), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2021/696, the Agency, within its area of responsibility, is to ensure the operation of the Galileo Security Monitoring Centre (GSMC) in accordance with the requirements referred to in paragraph 2 of that Article and is to ensure the operation of the GSMC in accordance with the instructions developed under the scope of this Decision. In accordance with Article 79(1), point (j), of Regulation (EU) 2021/696, the Agency’s Executive Director is to ensure that the Agency, as the operator of the GSMC, is able to respond to instructions provided under this Decision.

(20)The relevant appointed security monitoring structures are to operate in accordance with the security requirements referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 34(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/696 and should operate in accordance with the instructions developed under this Decision.

(21)Space threats can have a direct impact on the conduct of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations and missions. Where relevant, the Force Commander, Mission Commander or Head of Mission should be able to take necessary action within the mandate of the operation or mission to mitigate space threats originating from the area of operation of that operation or mission in accordance with the relevant concepts. The Force Commander, Mission Commander or Head of Mission might also benefit from the space security toolbox. To that end, it is necessary to establish a proper interaction between the missions and operations and the relevant actors in STRA.

(22)In order to enable a swift, coherent and effective Union response to a space threat, in particular in an urgent situation requiring immediate action, it is necessary to establish pre-agreed operational procedures for the practical implementation of this Decision, including, where appropriate, predefined instructions to support a provisional Union response adopted in accordance with this Decision.

(23)External partnerships are essential in promoting a common vision for peaceful and responsible behaviours in space and in improving the response to space threats.

(24)STRA should benefit from increased space cooperation between the Union and NATO in full respect of the agreed guiding principles, namely mutual openness and transparency, reciprocity and inclusiveness, as well as the decision-making autonomy of both organisations, and taking into account the need to avoid unnecessary duplication and maintain adequate coherence and interoperability between the two organisations,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1Subject matter#

1.This Decision establishes the European Union Space Threat Response Architecture (STRA) as a mechanism to respond to space threats. This Decision sets out the responsibilities to be performed by the Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) with regard to space threats.

2.For the purpose of this Decision, ‘space threat’ means:

(a)a threat to the security of the Union or of one or more of its Member States, arising from the deployment, operation or use of any space system; or

(b)a threat to the operation of any space system or to the provision of any space service, the denial or interruption of which would harm the fundamental interests of the Union or of one or more of its Member States.

3.STRA may be used to respond to:

(a)a threat to the security of an individual Member State or of a group of Member States, including to the territory, to space systems and services or to other relevant capacities under the authority or control of a Member State or a group of Member States; or

(b)a threat arising from the deployment, operation or use of the system set up and services provided under the components of the Union Space Programme or of the Union Secure Connectivity Programme, or a threat to the operation of any of those systems or to the provision of those services.

Section 1 · Stra mechanism

Article 2Awareness#

1.In the event of a space threat, the Member States, the Commission, the relevant Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) entities and agencies, the relevant Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations and missions, the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (the ‘Agency’) or any security monitoring structure appointed in accordance with Article 34(4) of Regulation (EU) 2021/696 (the ‘appointed security monitoring structure’), as appropriate, shall immediately inform the High Representative of all the information at its or their disposal which it or they consider relevant.

2.The High Representative shall immediately inform the Council of the space threat and of its potential impact on the security of the Union or of one or more of its Member States and on the operation of the systems or the provision of the services concerned.

Article 3Initiating a response#

1.In the event of a space threat as set out in Article 1(3), point (a), the Member State or group of Member States concerned acting jointly, may ask the High Representative to submit a proposal for a Union response to the Council. The Member State or group of Member States concerned shall provide the High Representative with the relevant information, including its or their intended response and measures taken to address the space threat, and information on the expected impact of those measures. The High Representative may submit a proposal for a Union response to the Council, in close cooperation with the Member State or group of Member States concerned.

2.In the event of a space threat as set out in Article 1(3), point (b), the High Representative shall submit to the Council a proposal for a Union response. The Union response may consist of one or more of the measures from the space security toolbox set out in Articles 5 to 9 (‘space security toolbox’).

3.The proposal from the High Representative referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall include an impact assessment of the proposed Union response.

4.The Council, acting unanimously upon a proposal from the High Representative, shall decide on the proposed Union response.

5.The Political and Security Committee (PSC) shall provide an opinion to the Council on the proposed Union response, as appropriate.

Article 4Urgent situation#

1.If the urgency of the situation requires immediate action to be taken before the Council has taken a decision under Article 3(4), the High Representative is authorised to adopt a provisional Union response. The High Representative may direct the Secretary-General of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to issue instructions to the Agency or take other appropriate measures.

2.The High Representative shall immediately inform the Council and the Commission of any provisional Union response adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 and provide the Council with the relevant information related to the urgency of the situation.

3.The High Representative shall keep the provisional Union response under constant review, shall amend it as necessary or shall revoke it if such urgent action is no longer required.

4.The Council shall confirm, modify or revoke the provisional Union response as soon as possible, and not later than within four weeks after the provisional Union response has been adopted.

Section 2 · Space security toolbox

Article 5Diplomatic responses#

1.In the event of a space threat, the High Representative may propose to adopt a Union response which may include, inter alia, engaging in contact with third States or international organisations, delivering a demarche to one or several third States, issuing a statement on behalf of the Union or launching a diplomatic campaign.

2.The EEAS shall assess the likely wider impact of the response which the High Representative intends to propose to the Council pursuant to paragraph 1.

Article 6Technical responses linked to the Union Space Programme and the Union Secure Connectivity Programme#

1.In the event of a space threat arising from or linked to the deployment, operation or use of the systems set up and services provided under the components of the Union Space Programme or of the Union Secure Connectivity Programme, the High Representative may propose a technical measure through an instruction to the Agency or the relevant appointed security monitoring structure.

2.The Agency or the relevant appointed security monitoring structure and the Commission shall provide advice to the High Representative on the likely wider impact on the systems set up and services provided under the Union Space Programme and its components and the Union Secure Connectivity Programme of any instructions which the High Representative intends to propose to the Council pursuant to paragraph 1.

3.The High Representative shall invite Member States to provide advice, through the STRA network, on the likely effects of the technical measures that the High Representative intends to propose on Member States’ governmental users.

4.Where appropriate, as part of the technical measure referred to in paragraph 1, relevant information shall be provided to users who may be impacted.

Article 7Strategic communication actions#

1.In the event of a space threat, the High Representative may, as part of the Union response, propose a strategic communication action plan in support of the objectives of this Decision.

2.Such a strategic communication action plan shall be implemented in a timely, coherent and proportionate manner, consistent with the objectives of the Union response and in close coordination with the Member States, the EEAS, the Commission, the Agency and, where relevant, the appointed security monitoring structures.

3.The EEAS shall assess the likely wider impact of the strategic communication action plan which the High Representative intends to propose to the Council pursuant to paragraph 1.

Article 8Restrictive measures#

1.In the event of a space threat, the High Representative may propose to the Council to adopt restrictive measures targeting relevant persons and entities with a view to addressing such a threat and safeguarding the fundamental interests of the Union.

2.The EEAS shall assess the impact of the envisaged response which the High Representative intends to propose to the Council pursuant to paragraph 1.

Article 9Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations#

1.In the event of a space threat originating from a third country territory, the High Representative may propose to the Council to modify the mandate of relevant CSDP mission or operation or to establish a new CSDP mission or operation.

2.The modified mandate may include civilian or military advice and civilian or military assistance tasks, prevention, training or executive tasks, as required.

3.The EEAS shall assess the impact of the envisaged response which the High Representative intends to propose to the Council pursuant to paragraph 1.

Section 3 · Preparedness

Article 10Operational procedures#

1.The High Representative shall prepare, and submit for approval to the PSC, the necessary operational procedures for the practical implementation of the provisions set out in this Decision as regards a Union response referred to in Articles 5 to 9. For that purpose, the High Representative shall be supported by experts from Member States, the Commission, the Agency and the relevant appointed security monitoring structure, as appropriate.

2.The operational procedures referred to in paragraph 1 may include predefined instructions to be implemented by the EEAS, the Agency or any relevant appointed security monitoring structure, as appropriate.

3.Within a year after the security configuration of the committee established under Article 107(1), point (e), of Regulation (EU) 2021/696 has determined, on the basis of the risk and threat analysis performed by the Commission pursuant to Article 34(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/696, under the procedure referred to in Article 107(3) thereof, whether a system set up or a service provided, or both, under a particular component of the Union Programme is security sensitive, the Agency shall prepare and submit to the High Representative, the necessary procedures for the practical implementation of the provisions set out in Article 6 in this Decision as regards the system or service concerned, or both. For that purpose, the Agency shall be supported by experts from Member States, the Commission, the EEAS and the relevant appointed security monitoring structure, as appropriate.

4.The operational procedures shall be reviewed by the High Representative at least every two years, in particular as a result of a lessons-learned review process following a yearly exercise on the implementation of this Decision, or at the request of a Member State, and shall be submitted to the PSC for approval.

5.The High Representative shall inform the PSC at least once a year of the ongoing activities carried out for the practical implementation of this Decision.

Article 11Cooperation with third States and international organisations#

1.In order to maximise the impact of the responses set out in this Decision, the Union shall, inter alia, encourage third States and relevant international organisations to share information on space threats, coordinate responses to space threats with the Union, and encourage the mutual participation in activities and space exercises.

2.The High Representative shall have the authority to conclude administrative arrangements with the competent authorities of third States and relevant international organisations concerning their cooperation for the purpose of implementing this Decision. Such arrangements shall be subject to approval by the Council acting unanimously.

3.Where cooperation with third States or international organisations requires access by them to EU classified information, such access may only take place pursuant to agreements or arrangements concluded in accordance with the Council security rules.

Article 12STRA network#

1.The Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure the implementation of this Decision in their respective area of responsibility in a manner consistent with, inter alia, Article 34(6), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2021/696.

2.For the purpose of paragraph 1, the Member States shall designate points of contact. Those points of contact may be natural or legal persons.

3.Each designated point of contact shall have access to a secure videoconferencing system to be determined by the Council.

Article 13Review#

The Council shall review and, as necessary, amend the rules and procedures set out in this Decision no later than five years from the date of its entry into force, or at the request of a Member State.

Article 14Transitional provisions#

Decision (CFSP) 2021/698 is hereby repealed.The operational procedures developed under Decision (CFSP) 2021/698 shall remain applicable until they are updated under this Decision.

Article 15Entry into force#

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.