Decision (EU) 2023/2530 (ECB/2023/24)

In forceThis text since 14 Dec 2023law://eu/dec/2023/2530/art_5@2026-11-11

Article 5Criteria for the adoption of delegated decisions not to object to intended macroprudential measures for setting a G-SII buffer#

Decisions not to object to intended macroprudential measures for setting a G-SII buffer shall be adopted in accordance with Article 3, paragraphs 1 and 2, where those intended macroprudential measures by NCAs or NDAs concerning the G-SII buffer rates are in line with the ECB’s annual Assessment of SSM Area G-SIBs-G-SIIs and with the global agreement reached by the members of the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision and the Financial Stability Board.

Source: EUR-Lex, © European Union, 1998-2026. Reuse authorised under Decision 2011/833/EU.

Key facts

Type: Decision · (EU) 2023/2530
Adopted: 28 Sept 2023
In force: 14 Dec 2023
Made by: European Central Bank
Official: EUR-Lex 32023D2530 · ELI

Topics

banking supervision credit institution EU banking union financial legislation financial requirements financial risk national competent authority transfer of competence Freedom of establishment Organisational principles

History · 1 version

14 Dec 2023Reading

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Cited by 2: Decision (EU) 2023/2531 (ECB/2023/26); this act
Cites 1: this act

Defined terms · 2

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intended macroprudential measures
means the measures that national competent authorities (NCAs) and national designated authorities (NDAs) intend to apply to require banks to maintain O-SII or G-SII buffers, in accordance with Article 131 of Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, as formally notified to the ECB for decision whether or not to object;
sensitive
means a characteristic or factor that may have a negative impact on the ECB’s reputation and/or on the effective and consistent functioning of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, including but not limited to any of the following: (a) substantial concerns expressed in the relevant committee and the relevant internal structure in their deliberations not included in the ECB’s technical assessment;