Contents
Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber)1 October 2026note(Appeal — Competition — Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 — Article 11(6) — European Commission initiating proceedings in a case on which a national competition authority is already acting — Request from that national authority for the Commission to relieve it of competence — Principle of subsidiarity — Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Principle of good administration — Reasonable time period for dealing with a case — Commission Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities — That institution itself deciding to limit its discretion — Obligation to state reasons)In Case C‑855/24 P,APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 11 December 2024,Crown Holdings Inc., established in Yardley, Pennsylvania (United States of America),Crown Cork & Seal Deutschland Holdings GmbH, established in Seesen (Germany),represented by A. Burnside, C. Graf York von Wartenburg, D. Strohl and T. von Döhren, avocats,the other parties to the proceedings being:European Commission, represented by B. Ernst, A. Keidel and L. Wildpanner, acting as Agents,Federal Republic of Germany, represented by J. Möller and R. Kanitz, acting as Agents,THE COURT (Third Chamber),composed of C. Lycourgos (Rapporteur), President of the Chamber, O. Spineanu-Matei, S. Rodin, N. Piçarra and N. Fenger, Judges,Advocate General: A. Biondi,Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,having regard to the written procedure,after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 26 March 2026,gives the following
Judgment
1By their appeal, the appellants seek the annulment of the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 2 October 2024, Crown Holdings and Crown Cork & Seal Deutschland v Commission, T‑587/22, EU:T:2024:661 (‘the judgment under appeal’), by which the General Court dismissed their action for annulment of Commission Decision C(2022) 4761 final of 12 July 2022 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU (Case AT.40522 – Metal packaging) (‘the decision at issue’), in so far as that decision concerns them.
Legal context
The EU Treaty
2Article 5(3) TEU provides:‘Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the [European] Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of subsidiarity as laid down in the Protocol [(No 2)] on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. National Parliaments ensure compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in accordance with the procedure set out in that Protocol.’
The Charter
3Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), entitled ‘Right to good administration', provides, in paragraph 1 thereof, that:‘Every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union.’
Regulation (EC) No 1/2003
4Recitals 17, 34 and 38 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles [101 and 102 TFEU] (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1) state that:(17) If the competition rules are to be applied consistently and, at the same time, the network is to be managed in the best possible way, it is essential to retain the rule that the competition authorities of the Member States are automatically relieved of their competence if the [European] Commission initiates its own proceedings. Where a competition authority of a Member State is already acting on a case and the Commission intends to initiate proceedings, it should endeavour to do so as soon as possible. Before initiating proceedings, the Commission should consult the national authority concerned.…(34) The principles laid down in Articles [101 and 102 TFEU] … have given a central role to the Community bodies. This central role should be retained, whilst associating the Member States more closely with the application of the Community competition rules. In accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality as set out in Article 5 [TEU], this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve its objective, which is to allow the Community competition rules to be applied effectively.…(38) Legal certainty for undertakings operating under the Community competition rules contributes to the promotion of innovation and investment. Where cases give rise to genuine uncertainty because they present novel or unresolved questions for the application of these rules, individual undertakings may wish to seek informal guidance from the Commission. This Regulation is without prejudice to the ability of the Commission to issue such informal guidance’.
5Article 7 of that regulation, entitled ‘Finding and termination of an infringement’, falls within Chapter III of that regulation, entitled ‘Commission Decisions’. That article provides, in paragraph 1 thereof:‘Where the Commission, acting on a complaint or on its own initiative, finds that there is an infringement of Article [101 or of Article 102 TFEU], it may by decision require the undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned to bring such infringement to an end. For this purpose, it may impose on them any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an end. …’
6Article 11 of that regulation, entitled ‘Cooperation between the Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States’, falls within Chapter IV thereof, entitled ‘Cooperation’. That article provides:1. The Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States shall apply the Community competition rules in close cooperation.…3. The competition authorities of the Member States shall, when acting under Article [101 or Article 102 TFEU], inform the Commission in writing before or without delay after commencing the first formal investigative measure. ……6. The initiation by the Commission of proceedings for the adoption of a decision under Chapter III shall relieve the competition authorities of the Member States of their competence to apply Articles [101 and 102 TFEU]. If a competition authority of a Member State is already acting on a case, the Commission shall only initiate proceedings after consulting with that national competition authority.’
The cooperation notice
7The Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities (OJ 2004 C 101, p.43; ‘the cooperation notice’) states:‘…3. The network formed by the competition authorities should ensure both an efficient division of work and an effective and consistent application of EC competition rules. ……6. In most instances the authority that receives a complaint or starts an ex-officio procedure will remain in charge of the case. Re-allocation of a case would only be envisaged at the outset of a procedure (see paragraph 18 below) where either that authority considered that it was not well placed to act or where other authorities also considered themselves well placed to act (see paragraphs 8 to 15 below).7. Where re-allocation is found to be necessary for an effective protection of competition and of the Community interest, network members will endeavour to re-allocate cases to a single well placed competition authority as often as possible. In any event, re-allocation should be a quick and efficient process and not hold up ongoing investigations.…9. … A material link between the infringement and the territory of a Member State must exist in order for that Member State’s competition authority to be considered well placed. It can be expected that in most cases the authorities of those Member States where competition is substantially affected by an infringement will be well placed provided they are capable of effectively bringing the infringement to an end through either single or parallel action unless the Commission is better placed to act (see below paragraphs 14 and 15).…14. The Commission is particularly well placed if one or several agreement(s) or practice(s), including networks of similar agreements or practices, have effects on competition in more than three Member States (cross-border markets covering more than three Member States or several national markets).…15. … the Commission is particularly well placed to deal with a case[, in particular,] if the Community interest requires the adoption of a Commission decision in order to develop Community competition policy when a new competition issue arises or to ensure effective enforcement.…16. In order to detect multiple procedures and to ensure that cases are dealt with by a well placed competition authority, the members of the network have to be informed at an early stage of the cases pending before the various competition authorities. If a case is to be re-allocated, it is indeed in the best interest both of the network and of the undertakings concerned that the re-allocation takes place quickly.17. [Regulation No 1/2003] creates a mechanism for the competition authorities to inform each other in order to ensure an efficient and quick re-allocation of cases. Article 11(3) of [that r]egulation lays down an obligation for NCAs to inform the Commission when acting under Article [101 or 102 TFEU] before or without delay after commencing the first formal investigative measure. It also states that the information may be made available to other NCAs. The rationale of Article 11(3) of th[at r]egulation is to allow the network to detect multiple procedures and address possible case re-allocation issues as soon as an authority starts investigating a case. …18. Where case re-allocation issues arise, they should be resolved swiftly, normally within a period of two months, starting from the date of the first information sent to the network pursuant to Article 11 of [Regulation No 1/2003]. During this period, competition authorities will endeavour to reach an agreement on a possible re-allocation and, where relevant, on the modalities for parallel action.19. In general, the competition authority or authorities that is/are dealing with a case at the end of the re-allocation period should continue to deal with the case until the completion of the proceedings. Re-allocation of a case after the initial allocation period of two months should only occur where the facts known about the case change materially during the course of the proceedings.…31. All network members will endeavour to make the allocation of cases a quick and efficient process. Given the fact that [Regulation No 1/2003] has created a system of parallel competences, the allocation of cases between members of the network constitutes a mere division of labour where some authorities abstain from acting. The allocation of cases therefore does not create individual rights for the companies involved in or affected by an infringement to have the case dealt with by a particular authority.…52. The initiation of proceedings by the Commission is a formal act by which the Commission indicates its intention to adopt a decision under Chapter III of [Regulation No 1/2003]. …53. Two situations can arise. First, where the Commission is the first competition authority to initiate proceedings in a case for the adoption of a decision under [Regulation No 1/2003], national competition authorities may no longer deal with the case. Article 11(6) of [Regulation No 1/2003] provides that once the Commission has initiated proceedings, the NCAs can no longer start their own procedure with a view to applying Articles [101 and 102 TFEU] to the same agreement(s) or practice(s) by the same undertaking(s) on the same relevant geographic and product market.54. The second situation is where one or more NCAs have informed the network pursuant to Article 11(3) of [Regulation No 1/2003] that they are acting on a given case. During the initial allocation period (indicative time period of two months, see paragraph 18 above), the Commission can initiate proceedings with the effects of Article 11(6) of [Regulation No 1/2003] after having consulted the authorities concerned. After the allocation phase, the Commission will in principle only apply Article 11(6) of [Regulation No 1/2003] if one of the following situations arises:(a) Network members envisage conflicting decisions in the same case[;](b) Network members envisage a decision which is obviously in conflict with consolidated case-law; the standards defined in the [judgments] of the Community courts and in previous decisions and regulations of the Commission should serve as a yardstick; concerning the assessment of the facts (e.g. market definition), only a significant divergence will trigger an intervention of the Commission;(c) Network member(s) is (are) unduly drawing out proceedings in the case;(d) There is a need to adopt a Commission decision to develop Community competition policy in particular when a similar competition issue arises in several Member States or to ensure effective enforcement;(e) The NCA(s) concerned do not object.…’
The background to the dispute and the decision at issue
8The background to the dispute, as described, in essence, in paragraphs 2 to 11 of the judgment under appeal, may be summarised as set out below.
9The appellants are part of the Crown group, which is active in the metal packaging sector.
10In March 2015, the Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office, Germany) opened an investigation into several companies in the sector, including the appellants.
11Following a request of 14 June 2017 by the Federal Cartel Office to investigate the present case, on 19 April 2018 the Commission adopted Decision C(2018) 2466 final on the initiation of proceedings in Case AT. 40522 – Pandora (‘the decision to initiate proceedings’). Those proceedings were brought against the appellants and against Silgan Holdings Inc., Silgan White Cap Manufacturing GmbH, Silgan Metal Packaging Distribution GmbH, Silgan Holdings Austria GmbH and Silgan International Holdings BV, which are part of the Silgan group, which is also active in the metal packaging sector.
12On 25 April 2018, the appellants addressed an application to the Commission under its Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ 2006 C 298, p.11)
13By decision of 1 October 2021, the proceedings were closed in respect of all the territories of the European Economic Area (EEA), with the exception of Germany.
14Both the Crown group companies and the Silgan group companies acknowledged the existence of an infringement in Germany and indicated the maximum amount of the fine they expected to be imposed on them by the Commission and which they would accept in the framework of a settlement procedure.
15On 12 July 2022 the Commission adopted the decision at issue. It found that companies in the Crown and Silgan groups had participated in a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 TFEU in the sector of metal packaging in Germany from 11 March 2011 to 18 September 2014, thereby affecting competition between those two groups on a substantial part of the internal market, and imposed on the appellants, jointly and severally, a fine of EUR 7670000.
The procedure before the General Court and the judgment under appeal
16By their action before the General Court, the appellants sought the annulment of the decision at issue in so far as it concerned them and sought to have the Commission be ordered to pay the costs.
17They put forward six pleas in law in support of their action. The first and second pleas, which the General Court examined together, alleged infringement of the cooperation notice and of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations as well as infringement of the obligation to state reasons. The third plea alleged infringement of the principle of subsidiarity, the fourth infringement of the rights of the defence, the fifth infringement of the principle of proportionality and the sixth infringement of the principle of good administration.
18The Commission requested the General Court to dismiss the action and to order the appellants to pay the costs. It also brought a counterclaim seeking to have the amount of the fine set at a higher level, of up to EUR 9588000.
19The Federal Republic of Germany intervened in support of the forms of order sought by the Commission.
20By the judgment under appeal, the General Court dismissed both the appellants’ action and the Commission’s counterclaim. It ordered the appellants to bear their own costs and to pay 90% of the costs incurred by the Commission, the latter therefore bearing 10% of its own costs, while the Federal Republic of Germany was to bear its own costs.
Forms of order sought by the parties
21The appellants claim that the Court should:– set aside the judgment under appeal in so far as their action was dismissed and in so far as they were ordered to pay 90% of the costs incurred by the Commission;– annul the decision at issue in so far as it applies to them or, in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court; and– order the Commission to pay the appellants’ costs and expenses in connection with the present proceedings and the proceedings before the General Court, or, in the event that the case is referred back to the General Court, to reserve the costs.
22The Commission and the Federal Republic of Germany contend that the Court should:– dismiss the appeal and– order the appellants to pay the costs.
The appeal
23The appellants put forward four grounds in support of their appeal. By the first ground of appeal, they allege an error of law in the interpretation of the cooperation notice. The second, third and fourth grounds of appeal allege, respectively, failure to comply with the requirement to state reasons laid down in the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU, infringement of the principle of subsidiarity and breaches of procedure before the General Court.
The first ground of appeal: error of law in the interpretation of the cooperation notice
Arguments of the parties
24The appellants state that, in the judgment under appeal, the General Court agreed with their view that the cooperation notice contains rules of conduct which limit the Commission’s discretion with regard to undertakings whose activities are the subject of an investigation, such that a failure by the Commission to comply with those rules of conduct might lead to a breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations.
25However, the General Court misinterpreted the scope of those rules of conduct, which led it to conclude, incorrectly, in paragraph 63 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission had not, in the present case, departed from them.
26In that regard, in the view of the appellants, the interpretation of paragraphs 18 and 19 of the cooperation notice in paragraph 51 of the judgment under appeal amounts to permitting cases to be re-allocated within the network without any meaningful limitation. That approach would undermine undertakings’ legal certainty, which that notice nevertheless aims to provide, and threaten the clear and effective allocation of work which Regulation No 1/2003 strives to establish.
27The appellants are of the view that they could legitimately expect, in the circumstances of the present case, that the Commission would not accept a re-allocation of the case, since the Federal Cartel Office’s investigation had been ongoing for three years. The General Court’s finding that paragraph 18 of the cooperation notice, which lays down a period of two months, did not provide precise assurances in that regard, is incorrect. Paragraph 18 thereof applies to all situations in which a re-allocation issue has arisen and requires that any action to address that issue take place quickly.
28That requirement of speed is, moreover, also referred to in paragraphs 7, 16, 17, 18 and 31 of that notice. That requirement also follows from recital 17 of Regulation No 1/2003 and from Article 41 of the Charter, which confers on every person the right, inter alia, to have his or her affairs handled within a reasonable time.
29In the appellants’ view, that notice must therefore to be interpreted to mean that case re-allocation issues should be resolved within an indicative time period of two months or a period of time which is reasonably close to two months. That interpretation is supported by paragraphs 25 to 29 of the judgment of 9 February 2022, Sped-Pro v Commission (T‑791/19, EU:T:2022:67), in which the General Court held that the fact that a time period was merely indicative did not permit the Commission to far exceed it.
30However, by inferring, in paragraph 51 of the judgment under appeal, from a combined reading of paragraphs 19 and 54 of the cooperation notice that the words ‘the facts known about the case change materially during the course of the proceedings’ in paragraph 19 cover ‘any relevant fact that comes to light during the proceedings’, the General Court considered, in reality, that a re-allocation of a case is justified in virtually any case, including, as the case may be, where the time period far exceeds the indicative period laid down in paragraph 18 of that notice.
31In that regard, the appellants criticise the General Court for having confined itself to carrying out a contextual interpretation of paragraph 19 of that notice, taking paragraph 54 thereof as a basis, even though the interpretation of a provision of EU law requires account also to be taken of its wording, the purpose pursued by the act of which that provision forms part and the legislative history of that provision.
32The appellants’ view is that, first, as regards the literal interpretation of paragraph 19 of the cooperation notice, the General Court ought to have found that paragraph 19 provides for an exception to the principle that the authority which receives a complaint or starts ex-officio proceedings will remain, in accordance with paragraph 6 of that notice, in charge of the case, unless the case is re-allocated within a period of two months pursuant to paragraph 18 of that notice. On that basis, the General Court ought to have found that, as an exception, paragraph 19 should be interpreted strictly.
33It follows that the ‘facts known about the case’, within the meaning of paragraph 19, include only facts which may constitute an infringement of the competition rules, and not developments during subsequent administrative proceedings. A restructuring of an undertaking’s operations, during the course of the proceedings, therefore does not constitute a ‘[fact] known about the case’.
34In addition, paragraph 19 of the cooperation notice requires that the change in the facts known about the case be material. It is also for that reason incorrect to interpret that paragraph as covering ‘any relevant fact’.
35According to the appellants, the General Court could not consider, in paragraph 51 of the judgment under appeal, that the situations set out in paragraph 54 of the cooperation notice go ‘beyond the facts which are relevant for assessing whether an infringement of competition rules has taken place’. In that regard, they maintain that, unlike paragraph 19 of that notice, which relates to developments concerning the facts of the case, paragraph 54 of that notice concerns situations where re-allocation of a case to the Commission is warranted for reasons relating to competition policy. The situation in which the Commission adopts a decision to take over a case in order to remedy a perceived shortcoming of the applicable national law is not one of those situations.
36Second, as regards the teleological interpretation of paragraph 19 of the cooperation notice, the General Court ought to have taken account of the purpose, set out in paragraph 3 of that notice, of ensuring an efficient division of work and an effective and consistent application of the EU competition rules. The General Court’s interpretation of that paragraph 19 would run counter to that objective, since it would allow re-allocation in an unlimited number of situations and at any time during the process.
37The General Court ought, moreover, to have taken account of the objective, stated in recital 38 of Regulation No 1/2003 and which is also apparent from the preparatory work preceding the adoption of that regulation, of providing legal certainty to undertakings. An excessively broad interpretation of paragraph 19, such as that adopted by the General Court, would undermine that objective.
38In the view of the appellants, the General Court’s broad interpretation of paragraph 19 also runs counter to the principle of procedural autonomy, under which, in the absence of EU rules, it is necessary to rely, subject to compliance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, on the rules of the domestic legal system of each Member State. According to the appellants, the principle of procedural autonomy precluded, in the present case, the conclusion that the restructuring of the undertakings concerned justified re-allocating the case. Indeed, until the adoption of Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market (OJ 2019 L 11, p. 3), the rules relating to the application of Article 101 TFEU, including those relating to the liability of parent companies and successors, were not harmonised. The proceedings ought therefore to have been conducted on the basis of the German legislation.
39In that regard, the appellants state that, in so far as the Federal Cartel Office took the view that that national legislation did not comply with the principle of effectiveness, it could have brought that issue before the German courts, which could then have made a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. By contrast, a dangerous precedent would be created if paragraph 19 of the cooperation notice were interpreted as permitting a case to be re-allocated where a national competition authority and the Commission considered that national legislation did not allow for effective implementation of EU competition law. It is for the courts to determine whether national legislation complies with the principle of effectiveness, and not for the Commission to make up for a perceived shortcoming in the procedural rules of a Member State. Ruling otherwise would be contrary to fundamental EU principles, including the rule of law and separation of powers.
40As regards the latter, the appellants observe that one of the hallmarks of the rule of law, compliance with which is a value of the European Union as provided for in Article 2 TEU, is the principle of the separation of powers which, in the context of the European Union, is reflected in the principle of institutional balance, enshrined in Article 13 TEU. The interpretation provided by the General Court would allow the Commission to circumvent the national legislation. That would amount to allowing administrative authorities to substitute their own assessment of a situation for the democratically legitimate assessment of a national parliament; and to circumvent the EU Courts’ exclusive competence to interpret EU law.
41Third, as regards the historical interpretation of paragraph 19 of the cooperation notice, the appellants submit that the goal of that notice was to supplement Regulation No 1/2003, including in relation to the way the Commission would exercise its power to relieve a national competition authority of a case by opening its own proceedings. They refer, in that regard, to the positions expressed by a number of Member States during the legislative procedure which led to the adoption of Article 11 of that regulation, which revealed concerns as to the overly unilateral nature of that provision, which would impose obligations and deadlines on the authorities in the Member States without binding the Commission in the same way. Given the legislative history of that provision, it is clear that paragraph 19 of the cooperation notice cannot be understood as allowing re-allocation when ‘any relevant fact’ comes to light during the proceedings.
42In any event, even if, in the present case, there were evidence justifying a re-allocation, the Commission failed to comply with the cooperation notice by accepting the request from the Federal Cartel Office at a late stage. By waiting for more than 10 months before accepting that request, the Commission failed to comply with the requirement of speed. In that regard, the appellants state that the Commission, by means of the information which had to be communicated to it in accordance with Article 11(3) of Regulation No 1/2003 and paragraph 17 of the cooperation notice, was aware that the investigation carried out by that national authority had already been ongoing for a number of years.
43According to the Commission, the first ground of appeal is ineffective since, in the present case, the proceedings for the adoption of a decision, within the meaning of Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003, were initiated at the request of a national competition authority. In such a situation, paragraph 18 of the cooperation notice is, as the General Court observed in paragraph 48 of the judgment under appeal, irrelevant. Paragraph 19 of that notice is also irrelevant, since Article 11(6) of that regulation was applied at the request of a public authority and the Member States are not bound by the rules of conduct contained in that notice.
44According to the German Government, the appellants cannot reasonably rely on the cooperation notice since it does not concern administrative action of the European Union and does not establish rights which may be relied on by individuals before the courts.
45The Commission and the German Government add that, in any event, that ground of appeal is unfounded.
Findings of the Court
46Pursuant to the first sentence of Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003, the initiation by the Commission of proceedings for the adoption of a decision for the purposes of applying Article 101 TFEU or Article 102 TFEU has the effect of relieving the national competition authorities of their competence to apply those articles 101 and 102.
47As is apparent from the second sentence of Article 11(6) of that regulation, the fact of relieving the national competition authorities of competence resulting from that decision to initiate proceedings extends to situations in which the case in question is already the subject of proceedings before such authorities. In that situation, the initiation of proceedings by the Commission has the effect of re-allocating the case to that institution, since the national authority already acting on the case is, like the other national competition authorities, relieved of its competence.
48According to its wording, that provision requires only, for the purposes of relieving the national competition authority already acting on the case of its competence, that the Commission consult that national authority, in order to ascertain its opinion on a possible re-allocation of the case.
49In the present case, the General Court was correct in finding, in paragraph 80 of the judgment under appeal, that that requirement had been complied with. Since the Federal Cartel Office itself had requested the Commission to relieve it of competence, by that request it had expressed its opinion on a possible re-allocation of the case to that institution, in the same way as it could have expressed that opinion after receiving a formal request in that regard from the Commission.
50However, the compatibility with EU law of the initiation of proceedings for the adoption of a decision for the purposes of applying Article 101 TFEU or Article 102 TFEU, which has the effect of relieving a national competition authority which is already examining the case of its competence, cannot be dependent solely on compliance with the consultation requirement referred to in Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003.
51When adopting a decision to initiate proceedings, the Commission is also required to comply with, inter alia, Article 41 of the Charter, which enshrines the right to good administration. It is true that the act of initiating a procedure for the adoption of a decision is only preparatory in character and therefore may not itself be the subject of an action for annulment. However, any legal defects in that act may be relied on in an action directed against the definitive act for which that act represents a preparatory step (judgments of 11 November 1981, IBM v Commission, 60/81, EU:C:1981:264, paragraph 12, and of 22 April 2021, thyssenkrupp Electrical Steel and thyssenkrupp Electrical Steel Ugo v Commission, C‑572/18 P, EU:C:2021:317, paragraph 50).
52The right to good administration implies, inter alia, that the case must be dealt with within a reasonable time. In cases concerning suspected infringements of Article 101 TFEU or Article 102 TFEU, that obligation constitutes, for all members of the network, a general principle of EU law and is, so far as the Commission is concerned, set out in Article 41(1) of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 September 2006, Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission, C‑105/04 P, EU:C:2006:592, paragraph 35, and of 15 January 2026, Imballaggi Piemontesi, C‑588/24, EU:C:2026:14, paragraphs 44 and 45).
53As regards the re-allocation of cases within the network, the requirement to act within a reasonable time is, in essence, recalled in recital 17 of Regulation No 1/2003 and in paragraphs 7 and 16 of the cooperation notice, from which it is apparent that such a re-allocation must, in the interests not only of the network but also of the undertakings in question, take place ‘as soon as possible’ and be ‘quick’.
54That requirement for speed applied to the re-allocation of the case at issue to the Commission. That re-allocation took the form of the initiation by the Commission of proceedings for the adoption of a decision, within the meaning of Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003, and therefore falls within the scope of the administrative action of the European Union, notwithstanding the fact that it was requested by a national competition authority. It follows that the undertakings concerned by such a re-allocation may rely, inter alia, on their right to good administration, enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter and the general principles of EU law, which may be relevant in the context of EU administrative action, such as the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations.
55In that regard, the rules of conduct which the Commission set out, in the cooperation notice, in relation to case re-allocation within the network are relevant. Therefore, contrary to the assertions of the Commission and the German Government, it cannot be held that the first ground of appeal is ineffective or that the appellants could not reasonably refer to those rules in support of that ground of appeal.
56Furthermore, it should be noted that the requirement of speed referred to in recital 17 of Regulation No 1/2003 and in paragraphs 7 and 16 of the cooperation notice is given concrete expression in paragraph 18 of that notice, according to which ‘case re-allocation issues’ should, in principle, be resolved ‘within a period of two months, starting from the date of the first information sent to the network’.
57As stated in paragraph 54 of that notice, where a national competition authority is already acting on a case, the ‘first information sent to the network’ is that by which that national authority informs the network, pursuant to Article 11(3) of Regulation No 1/2003, that it is acting on that case.
58It is also apparent from that paragraph 54 that, after the expiry of the indicative time period of two months referred to in paragraph 18 of that notice, the Commission refrains, in principle, from applying Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003.
59That rule of conduct is, however, subject to five exceptions, which are listed in paragraph 54(a) to (e) of the cooperation notice and concern, respectively, the possibility of conflicting decisions in the same case, the possibility of a decision which is obviously in conflict with consolidated case-law, the proceedings being unduly drawn out, the need to develop EU competition policy, in particular when a similar competition issue arises in several Member States or to ensure effective enforcement, and, lastly, the situation in which the national competition authority already acting on the case does not object to that case being re-allocated to the Commission.
60Announcing, by publishing the cooperation notice, that the rules set out therein will apply to the cases to which that notice relates, the Commission, as correctly observed in paragraphs 42 and 43 of the judgment under appeal, imposed a limit on the exercise of its discretion and cannot, as a general rule, depart from those rules, at the risk of being found to be in breach of general principles of law, such as equal treatment or the protection of legitimate expectations (see, by analogy, judgments of 28 June 2005, Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P, EU:C:2005:408, paragraph 211; of 11 September 2008, Germany and Others v Kronofrance, C‑75/05 P and C‑80/05 P, EU:C:2008:482, paragraph 60; and of 14 March 2024, D & A Pharma v Commission and EMA, C‑291/22 P, EU:C:2024:228, paragraph 143).
61In the present case, it is not disputed that the re-allocation of the case to the Commission took place after the indicative time period of two months provided for in paragraph 18 of the cooperation notice had expired.
62It is also common ground that the Federal Cartel Office did not object to that re-allocation. In those circumstances, the exception provided for in paragraph 54(e) of that notice, by which the Commission reserves the possibility to apply, after that indicative period has expired, Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003 on the sole ground that ‘the [national competition authority or authorities] concerned do not object’, could, a priori, apply.
63The appellants maintain, however, that if the application of an exception such as that provided for in paragraph 54(e) of the cooperation notice were sufficient to re-allocate to the Commission a case on which a national competition authority were already acting, that would amount to permitting the Commission to relieve national competition authorities of competence without any meaningful limitation. The appellants are of the view, moreover, that applying the exceptions referred to in paragraph 54(a) to (e) of that notice on the basis of a discretion risks emptying the requirement of speed of its substance and affecting the legal certainty of the undertakings concerned. Only a period which is close to that indicative time period of two months provided for in paragraph 18 of that notice could be classified as reasonable and only a material change in the ‘facts known about the case’, in the strict sense of those words found in paragraph 19 of that notice, could lead to the application of paragraph 54(a) to (e) of that notice.
64In that regard, and there being no need to determine whether, as the appellants maintain, the application of paragraph 54(a) to (e) of the cooperation notice is subject to the criterion set out in paragraph 19 of that notice being met, according to which criterion re-allocation of a case after the indicative time period of two months ‘should only occur where the facts known about the case change materially during the course of the proceedings’, it must be stated that the General Court did not err in law in finding that the change during the proceedings before the Federal Cartel Office which, in the present case, led to the case being re-allocated to the Commission, namely the restructuring of undertakings belonging to the appellants and the resulting difficulties for that national authority in ensuring effective application of the EU competition rules, could be regarded as ‘material’ and as relating to the ‘facts known about the case’.
65The words ‘facts known about the case’ cannot, as the Advocate General observed in point 41 of his Opinion, be interpreted as covering solely the facts relating to the possible infringement which is the subject of the investigation. In addition to examining whether there has been, and the scope of, an infringement, the cases covered by Regulation No 1/2003 and by the cooperation notice may require an examination of other factual circumstances, such as those which make it possible to identify the undertakings responsible for the infringement and to impose penalties on them. Therefore, a restructuring of undertakings in the course of proceedings before the national competition authority may, for the purposes of applying the rules on the imposition of penalties, constitute a material change in the facts known about the case and may, depending on the circumstances, mean that the Commission is better placed to adopt a decision.
66That conclusion is not invalidated by the rules of EU primary law on the distribution of competences between the Member States and the European Union relating to the application of competition law, on which the appellants rely in order to allege an infringement of the principles of the separation of powers and the rule of law. Where an infringement of Article 101 TFEU or Article 102 TFEU is suspected, Article 11(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 provides that it is for the Commission and the national competition authorities to apply the EU competition rules in close cooperation. It is true that where it appears that a national competition authority, which in principle is well placed to deal with the case, risks being unable, because of a loophole in the national legislation, to ensure the effective application of those rules, the result might be that the Member State concerned amends that legislation. However, where there is no such amendment, the requirement for the EU competition law rules to be applied effectively to the case in question makes it necessary that the case is dealt with by the best placed member of the network. The fact that in those circumstances the case is re-allocated to the Commission in no way prejudices the distribution of competences between the European Union and that Member State.
67Consequently, even assuming the General Court had erred in law by presenting, in paragraph 51 of the judgment under appeal, paragraph 54 of the cooperation notice as being an element of the context of paragraph 19 of that notice and that it had, moreover, given paragraph 19 an excessively broad scope by interpreting the words ‘the facts known about the case change materially during the course of the proceedings’ as covering ‘any relevant fact that comes to light during the proceedings’, the fact remains that it was fully entitled to conclude in paragraphs 56 to 58, 62 and 63 of the judgment under appeal that the restructuring of certain undertakings belonging to the Crown group, during the proceedings before the Federal Cartel Office, was a change capable of justifying the re-allocation of the case to the Commission.
68It should also be noted that a circumstance which justifies, in accordance with the rules of conduct set out in the cooperation notice, a re-allocation of the case to the Commission may arise at a time in the proceedings before the national competition authority which is very far removed from the time when that national authority, pursuant to Article 11(3) of Regulation No 1/2003, informed the network that it was starting to act on the case. The reasonable time period which the Commission must observe when applying Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003 runs from the moment when the Commission becomes aware of the circumstance justifying the re-allocation and not from the communication referred to in Article 11(3) of that regulation. Consequently, contrary to the appellants’ assertions, the reference in the cooperation notice to an indicative time period of two months and a requirement of speed cannot, as the Advocate General stated in points 31 and 32 of his Opinion, constitute precise assurances given to the undertakings concerned that any re-allocation of the case concerning them will take place within a period close to that indicative period.
69In the present case, since the General Court found, in its definitive assessment of the facts, that the difficulties caused by the restructuring of the undertakings concerned were brought to the Commission’s attention on 14 June 2017, the question whether the Commission applied Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003 within a reasonable time period came down to whether the period of approximately 10 months between that date and the date of the decision to initiate proceedings was reasonable in the light of the particular circumstances of the case. The General Court’s assessment of that duration, which is found in paragraphs 101 to 108 of the judgment under appeal, cannot be regarded as incorrect in law on the ground, relied on by the appellants, that the proceedings before the Federal Cartel Office had already been ongoing for a number of years. That time element is in fact irrelevant, since the reasonableness of the time period within which the Commission took the decision to apply Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003 must, as set out in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment, be assessed as from the time when the Commission became aware of the element capable of justifying the re-allocation of the case.
70It follows from all of the foregoing that the General Court did not err in law in holding that the Commission had not, in the present case, departed from the rules of conduct set out in the cooperation notice and which must be applied in the light, inter alia, of the right to good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter.
71Consequently, the first ground of appeal must be rejected.
The second ground of appeal: failure to comply with the requirement to state reasons laid down in the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU
Arguments of the parties
72The appellants submit that the General Court erred in law, first of all, in considering in paragraph 66 of the judgment under appeal that the circumstances of the case did not reinforce the need for a statement of reasons. Where the two-month period laid down in paragraph 18 of the cooperation notice is not complied with and the Commission has thereby departed from that notice, there is an increased onus on the Commission to state reasons regarding its application of Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003.
73Next, in the view of the appellants, the General Court, in any event, erred in law in considering, in paragraphs 67 to 72 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission had provided an adequate statement of reasons for its decision to apply Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003. A mere reference in the decision at issue to the fact that the investigation proceedings were initiated at the request of the Federal Cartel Office does not constitute an appropriate statement of reasons. That reference does not provide any information as to the reasons which led the Commission to accept that request, nor does it make it possible to ascertain the paragraph of the cooperation notice relied on by the Commission. The question whether the Commission relied on paragraph 19 or paragraph 54 of that notice remains unclear.
74The press releases issued by the Federal Cartel Office on 24 April 2018 and by the Commission, respectively, after the adoption of the decision at issue cannot make up for those lacunae in the statement of reasons for that decision. In the view of the appellants, since the obligation to state reasons is incumbent on the Commission, a press release issued by that national authority cannot be relevant for the purpose of determining whether the Commission has fulfilled its obligation. As regards the Commission’s press release, that post-dates the decision at issue. Furthermore, those press releases were not consistent.
75The appellants add that, in the present case, the decision adversely affecting their interests was, above all, the decision to initiate proceedings, which was taken on 19 April 2018. The Commission ought therefore to have provided a statement of reasons in 2018, and not years later when the decision at issue was adopted. It was only in its press release dated 22 July 2022, announcing the adoption of that decision, that the Commission for the first time referred to the restructuring of the undertakings concerned in order to justify the re-allocation of the case.
76The Commission maintains that the second ground of appeal is in part inadmissible, in that certain arguments put forward in support of that ground of appeal were not raised at first instance. That ground of appeal is, in any event, unfounded, as the German Government also submits.
Findings of the Court
77As is apparent from paragraph 70 of the present judgment, the General Court’s finding that the Commission did not depart from the cooperation notice is free of any error of law. Therefore, in so far as the appellants submit that the Commission was subject to an increased obligation to state reasons since it had departed from that notice, that argument is based on an incorrect premiss and must – like the part of the second ground of their appeal devoted to that allegedly increased obligation to state reasons, as summarised in paragraph 64 of the judgment under appeal and examined in paragraph 66 of that judgment – be rejected as being unfounded.
78As regards the assessment in paragraphs 67 to 72 of that judgment, whereby, first, the statement, in recital 11 of the decision at issue, that the proceedings had been initiated at the request of the Federal Cartel Office and, second, the reference, in a number of press releases, including the press release published on 24 April 2018 by that national authority, to difficulties arising, for the effective application of the EU competition rules, from the restructuring of certain undertakings belonging to the Crown group, had enabled (i) the appellants to ascertain the reasons why the Commission relieved that national authority of its competence and (ii) the General Court to exercise its power to review the lawfulness of that decision, it must be held that that assessment is included in the judgment under appeal for the sake of completeness, since it relates to the second ground of the appeal, which is based on the premiss that the Commission departed from the cooperation notice. Since that premiss was found to be incorrect in paragraph 66 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court was entitled to infer, without further analysis, that all the parts of the second plea in that action, all of which appear to be based on that premiss, were unfounded.
79However, even if certain elements of the second plea in that action were to be understood as referring to the general obligation to state reasons on which acts having an adverse effect are based, it must be stated that the General Court did not err in law in considering, in paragraphs 67 to 72 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission had provided an adequate statement of reasons for its decision to apply Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003.
80In that regard, it should be recalled that the phrase ‘initiation by the Commission of proceedings’ in Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003 concerns an act of the Commission by which it announces to an undertaking its intention to bring proceedings in order to adopt one of the decisions referred to in Chapter III of that regulation. That act determines the extent to which the Commission relieves the national competition authorities of their competence. Therefore, in order for the application of Article 11(6) to be clear, the act initiating the investigation proceedings must specify the infringement allegedly committed by one or more undertakings during one or more periods on one or more product markets and one or more geographic markets which that act concerns (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 February 2021, Slovak Telekom, C‑857/19, EU:C:2021:139, paragraphs 27 to 29).
81Where, as in the present case, the Commission initiates proceedings in a case on which a national competition authority is already acting, the lawfulness of that step depends, moreover, as has been stated in paragraphs 48 to 60 of the present judgment, on compliance with a number of other requirements, including those relating to prior consultation with that national authority and the application of the rules of conduct set out in the cooperation notice.
82However, the Commission cannot be expected to set out, in a decision to initiate proceedings, the reasons why it takes the view that those requirements are met. As has been recalled in paragraph 51 of the present judgment, such a decision is only preparatory in character and therefore does not constitute, in itself, a challengeable act.
83The decision at issue, which constitutes an act having an adverse effect, must, for its part, enable the persons concerned to ascertain the justifications for the measure and enable the court having jurisdiction to exercise its power of review. Under settled case-law, the requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular, the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to specify all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (judgments of 13 March 1985, Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek v Commission, 296/82 and 318/82, EU:C:1985:113, paragraph 19, and of 23 April 2026, Deutsche Lufthansa v Ryanair and Condor Flugdienst, C‑457/23 P, EU:C:2026:331, paragraph 151), and in particular by reference to the interest which the addressees of the act may have in obtaining explanations. Consequently, the reasons given for a measure adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that measure was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables him or her to understand the scope of the measure concerning him or her (see judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 122 and the case-law cited).
84In the present case, the measure taken by the Commission in the decision at issue consists, in essence, in finding an infringement of Article 101 TFEU, and imposing a penalty. Nevertheless, it must be held, in the light of the relevant legal rules, which include Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003 and the right to good administration, that it is essential, in order to enable the appellants to exercise their right to a remedy and to enable the EU Courts to exercise their power of review, that the reasons why the case was re-allocated to the Commission, notwithstanding the indicative time period of two months provided for in paragraph 18 of the cooperation notice having expired, are ascertained.
85In the light of that consideration, and of the case-law referred to in paragraph 83 of the present judgment, it must be held that the General Court did not err in law in interpreting and applying the requirement to state reasons laid down in the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU. Indeed, in paragraphs 67 to 70 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held that recital 11 of the decision at issue, assessed in the light of the context, known to the appellants, which led the Federal Cartel Office to submit its request and the Commission to take over the case, was sufficient to satisfy that requirement to state reasons. That assessment complies with the case-law referred to above.
86It should also be pointed out, in that regard, that the press releases, although referred to in that assessment by the General Court in order to support the fact that the appellants were aware of the context of the re-allocation of the case to the Commission, must not, however, be regarded as having been necessary for that purpose. The Federal Cartel Office press release dated 24 April 2018, which followed the Commission’s decision to initiate proceedings, indicated to the public a contextual matter which was necessarily already known to the appellants themselves when the proceedings concerning them were pending before that national authority.
87It follows from the foregoing that the second ground of appeal must be rejected as being unfounded.
The third ground of appeal: infringement of the principle of subsidiarity
Arguments of the parties
88The appellants maintain that the cooperation notice is the concrete embodiment of the principle of subsidiarity in the enforcement of the EU competition rules, which the General Court acknowledged in its judgment of 8 March 2007, France Télécom v Commission (T‑339/04, EU:T:2007:80, paragraph 79). Even though that notice does not make express reference to that principle, paragraph 9 thereof, according to the appellants, reflects its substance.
89In the view of the appellants, an infringement of the rules of conduct set out in that notice therefore amounts to an infringement of that principle. It follows that the General Court erred in law in considering that the decision at issue, which disregarded the cooperation notice, did not infringe that principle.
90According to the Commission, the third ground of appeal does not clearly identify the paragraphs of the judgment under appeal which are allegedly vitiated by an error of law and which may therefore be regarded as being inadmissible. It is, in any event, unfounded.
91The German Government, while supporting the Commission’s position that the third ground of appeal must be rejected, is of the view that that ground is ineffective, since the principle of subsidiarity, which concerns the limits of competences between the European Union and the Member States, cannot form the basis of rights which may be relied on by individuals concerned by the application of EU law in a particular case. Indeed, the beneficiaries of Article 5(1) and (3) TEU are not individuals but the Member States. That is reflected in Article 8 of Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
Findings of the Court
92In paragraph 18 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court recalled its case-law whereby Regulation No 1/2003 puts an end to the previous centralised regime and, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, establishes a wider association of national competition authorities, authorising them to implement EU competition law for that purpose.
93It is true that the General Court subsequently pointed out, in paragraphs 19, 20, 78 and 79 of the judgment under appeal, that it is apparent from Article 11(6) of that regulation that the Commission retains a leading role in investigating and finding infringements of the EU competition rules and that Article 11(6) requires only, for the Commission to relieve a national competition authority which is already acting on the case of its competence, that that authority be consulted.
94It is apparent, however, from paragraphs 42, 43 and 51 of the judgment under appeal that the General Court also held that the re-allocation to the Commission of a case acted on by a national competition authority requires the Commission to apply the rules of conduct set out in the cooperation notice. Those rules of conduct lay down requirements in addition to the requirement referred to in Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003 and are intended, as is apparent in particular from paragraphs 9 and 14 to 16 of that notice, to ensure that cases are dealt with by a competition authority which is ‘well placed’. According to those rules of conduct, a national competition authority is ‘well placed’ where there is a material link between the suspected infringement and the territory of the Member State for which that authority is responsible, whereas the Commission is ‘particularly well’ placed and therefore ‘better’ placed, in particular where the EU interest requires the Commission to adopt a decision in order to ensure the effective application of EU competition law rules.
95As is apparent from examining the other grounds of appeal, the General Court held, without erring in law, that the application of Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003 in the present case was based, in a manner which was duly examined and reasoned, on circumstances which are provided for in the rules of conduct by which the Commission limited its own discretion, and from which it follows that the Commission was better placed than the Federal Cartel Office to apply the EU competition rules.
96Therefore, even assuming the principle of subsidiarity enshrined in Article 5(3) TEU, which the Council, as is apparent from recital 34 of Regulation No 1/2003, took into account for the purpose of adopting that regulation, is reflected, as the appellants maintain, in the rules of conduct set out in the cooperation notice and that compliance with that principle must be verified where Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003 is applied, by examining whether the Commission could duly conclude that it was better placed than the national competition authority which was already acting on the case, it would be clear that the General Court did in fact verify whether the Commission could duly consider that it was better placed than the Federal Cartel Office.
97Consequently, and there being no need to examine whether paragraph 80 of the judgment under appeal – in which the General Court concluded, solely on the basis of compliance with the consultation requirement laid down in Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003, that any infringement of the principle of subsidiarity was necessarily ruled out – is vitiated by an error of law, it must be held that the General Court cannot be criticised for having disregarded any infringement of that principle by the Commission in the decision at issue.
98In those circumstances, the third ground of appeal is unfounded.
The fourth ground of appeal: breaches of procedure before the General Court
Arguments of the parties
99The appellants assert that holding a joint hearing in Cases T‑587/22 and T‑589/22 – which cases were closed by the judgment under appeal and by the judgment of 2 October 2024, Silgan Holdings and Others v Commission (T‑589/22, EU:T:2024:662), respectively – led to the General Court conflating certain arguments put forward by the various parties in those cases and, thereby, misinterpreting them. Such conflation adversely affected the appellants’ rights of defence, since the General Court was not in a position to assess properly their pleas put forward at first instance.
100Accordingly, the statement in paragraph 147 of the judgment under appeal whereby the appellants dispute ‘the competence of the Commission in place of the Federal Cartel Office’s competence’ is incorrect, since the appellants stated in their reply before the General Court that, by their action, they did not dispute that the Commission was competent to initiate the proceedings. They did, however, submit that the Commission failed to observe its own rules of conduct. That statement by the General Court rather reflects an argument of the applicants in Case T‑589/22 whereby the criteria giving rise to the Commission’s competence were not met.
101In the view of the appellants, the General Court also misinterpreted the appellants’ arguments relating to the changes made to the German legislation. In paragraphs 56 to 58 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court appears to state that the appellants had argued that they would have been subject to the new rules of German law intended to close the loopholes which had led to the case being re-allocated to the Commission. However, the appellants never made such an argument.
102The statement, in paragraph 120 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellants had raised a plea of inadmissibility in response to the Commission’s counterclaim is also incorrect, since the appellants did not raise such a plea of inadmissibility, unlike the applicants in Case T‑589/22.
103According to the appellants, those errors constitute procedural defects which justify the setting aside of the judgment under appeal and re-assessment of their pleas in law.
104According to the Commission, the fourth ground of appeal is, at least in part, ineffective. It is, in any event, unfounded, as the German Government also submits.
Findings of the Court
105In so far as the appellants complain that the General Court incorrectly classified some of their arguments in paragraphs 120 and 147 of the judgment under appeal, it must be held that those paragraphs appear in the part of the judgment under appeal which deals with the assessment of the Commission’s counterclaim, by which the Commission requested the General Court to increase the amount of the fine. However, the General Court rejected that request and that part of the judgment under appeal is not covered by the present appeal.
106Therefore, the fourth ground of appeal is ineffective in so far as it relates to paragraphs 120 and 147 of the judgment under appeal.
107As regards paragraphs 56 to 58 of that judgment, it must be stated that the appellants’ allegation that the General Court appears to state that they had asserted that they would have been subject to the new rules of German law intended to close the loopholes which had led to the case being re-allocated to the Commission is based on a misreading of those paragraphs. In that regard, it is sufficient to state, first, that paragraphs 56 and 58 of the judgment under appeal do not contain any description of the appellants’ arguments and, second, that paragraph 57 of that judgment, which does contain such a description, merely reiterates what the appellants had alleged before the General Court in the context of one of their pleas in law.
108Consequently, in so far as it criticises paragraphs 56 to 58 of the judgment under appeal, the fourth ground of appeal is unfounded.
109That ground of appeal must therefore be rejected.
110Since none of the grounds of appeal has been upheld, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.
Costs
111In accordance with Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to the costs.
112Under Article 138(1) of those rules, which is applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
113Since the Commission has applied for costs to be awarded against the appellants and they have been unsuccessful in all their grounds of appeal, the appellants must be ordered to bear their own costs relating to the appeal proceedings and to pay those incurred by the Commission relating to those proceedings.
114Under Article 140(1) of the Rules of Procedure, which is applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the Member States and EU institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. The Federal Republic of Germany must, therefore, be ordered to bear its own costs.
Operative part
On those grounds, the Court (Third Chamber) hereby:
1.Dismisses the appeal;
2.Orders Crown Holdings Inc. and Crown Cork & Seal Deutschland Holdings GmbH to pay, in addition to their own costs relating to the appeal proceedings, those incurred by the European Commission relating to those proceedings;
3.Orders the Federal Republic of Germany to bear its own costs.
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 1 October 2026.
Source: EUR-Lex, © European Union, 1998-2026. Reuse authorised under Decision 2011/833/EU.