Belaruskali AAT v Council of the European Union (T-528/22)

Contents

Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition)18 September 2024^note(Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine — Freezing of funds — List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources — Inclusion of the applicant’s name on the list — Support for the regime — Financial support — State-owned undertaking — Benefiting from the regime — Repression of civil society — Error of assessment)In Case T‑528/22,Belaruskali AAT, established in Soligorsk (Belarus), represented by V. Ostrovskis and E. Anevlavi, lawyers,vCouncil of the European Union, represented by J. Rurarz, B. Driessen and A. Boggio-Tomasaz, acting as Agents,supported byKingdom of Belgium, represented by C. Pochet, L. Van den Broeck and M. Van Regemorter, acting as Agents,and byRepublic of Latvia, represented by K. Pommere and J. Davidoviča, acting as Agents,THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition),composed of R. da Silva Passos, President, S. Gervasoni, N. Półtorak (Rapporteur), I. Reine and T. Pynnä, Judges,Registrar: M. Zwozdziak-Carbonne, Administrator,having regard to the order of 11 November 2022, Belaruskali v Council (T‑528/22 R, not published, EU:T:2022:709), by which the President of the General Court dismissed the application for interim measures and reserved the costs,having regard to the written part of the procedure,further to the hearing on 10 April 2024,gives the following

Judgment

1By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Belaruskali AAT, seeks annulment of (i) Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2022/881 of 3 June 2022 implementing Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 153, p. 77) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/876 of 3 June 2022 implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 153, p. 1) (together, ‘the initial acts’), and (ii) Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/421 of 24 February 2023 amending Decision 2012/642 (OJ 2023 L 61, p. 41) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/419 of 24 February 2023 implementing Article 8a of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 61, p. 20) (together, ‘the maintaining acts’), in so far as those acts concern the applicant.

Background to the dispute and events subsequent to the bringing of the action

2The applicant is the sole producer of potassium fertilisers in Belarus and one of the largest producers of potash fertilisers in the world.

3The present case has been brought in the context of the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union since 2004 in view of the situation in Belarus with regard to democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

4On 18 May 2006, the Council of the European Union adopted, pursuant to Articles [75 and 215 TFEU], Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures against President Lukashenko and certain officials of Belarus (OJ 2006 L 134, p. 1) and, on 15 October 2012, it adopted, pursuant to Article 29 TEU, Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Belarus (OJ 2012 L 285, p. 1).

5In the versions applicable when the initial acts were adopted, Article 4(1)(b) of Decision 2012/642 and Article 2(1) and (5) of Regulation No 765/2006 provide for the freezing of all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by, inter alia, natural or legal persons, entities or bodies benefiting from or supporting the Lukashenko regime.

6Moreover, according to Article 4(1)(a) of Decision 2012/642 and Article 2(4) of Regulation No 765/2006, all funds and economic resources owned, held or controlled by, inter alia, persons, entities or bodies responsible for serious violations of human rights or the repression of civil society and democratic opposition, or whose activities otherwise seriously undermine democracy or the rule of law in Belarus, are also to be frozen.

7On 24 June 2021, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2021/1031 amending Decision 2012/642 (OJ 2021 L 224I, p. 15), and Regulation (EU) 2021/1030 amending Regulation No 765/2006 (OJ 2021 L 224I, p. 1).

8According to Article 2g of Decision 2012/642, as amended by Decision 2021/1031, the purchase, import or transfer from Belarus of potassium chloride (potash) products is to be prohibited. Under Article 1i of Regulation No 765/2006, as amended by Regulation 2021/1030, it is to be prohibited to import, purchase or transfer, directly or indirectly, potash products as listed in Annex VIII to that regulation, from Belarus, whether or not originating in Belarus (together, ‘the sectoral restrictive measures’).

9On 24 February 2022, the President of the Russian Federation announced a military operation in Ukraine and, on the same day, Russian armed forces attacked Ukraine at a number of places in the country.

10On 24 February 2022, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy published a declaration on behalf of the European Union condemning the ‘unprovoked invasion’ of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation and stated that ‘the price to be paid for the involvement of Belarus in the unjustified and unprovoked military aggression [then] being conducted against Ukraine will be high’ and that ‘those who, in Belarus, collaborate[d] in these attacks against Ukraine [were to be targeted by restrictive measures] and trade in a certain number of key sectors [was to be restricted]’.

11As is apparent from the second recital and the citations of the initial acts, those acts were adopted in view of the gravity of the situation in Belarus and in reaction to the persistent human rights violations and systematic repression of civil society and democratic opposition. The citations of the initial acts also refer to the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

12By the initial acts, the applicant was listed under entry No 28 in Table B of the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to the restrictive measures contained in the annex to Decision 2012/642 and in Annex I to Regulation No 765/2006 (together, ‘the lists at issue’).

13In the initial acts, the Council justified including the applicant on the lists at issue on the following grounds:‘OJSC Belaruskali is a state-owned enterprise and one of the biggest potash producers in the world, providing 20% of global potash exports. As such, it is a major source of revenue and foreign currency for the [Lukashenko] regime. Al[ex]and[e]r [Lukashenko] described it as “a national treasure, pride, one of the pillars of Belarusian exports”. Therefore, Belaruskali benefits from and supports the [Lukashenko] regime.Employees of Belaruskali who took part in strikes and peaceful protests in the aftermath of the fraudulent August 2020 presidential elections in Belarus were intimidated and dismissed by the company’s management. [Lukashenko] himself personally threatened to replace the strikers with miners from Ukraine. Therefore, Belaruskali is responsible for the repression of civil society in Belarus and supports the [Lukashenko] regime.’

14On 7 June 2022, the Council published a Notice for the attention of persons subject to the restrictive measures provided for in the initial acts (OJ 2022 C 221, p. 2) in the Official Journal of the European Union. The natural and legal persons concerned by that notice had the possibility, pursuant to that notice, of submitting to the Council, by 30 November 2022, a request for reconsideration of the decision to include them on the lists at issue.

15By letter of 22 June 2022, the applicant requested access to the information and evidence supporting that inclusion.

16On 22 July 2022, the Council sent to the applicant the working documents bearing the references WK 5532/2022 INIT, WK 5532/2022 ADD 1 and WK 6656/2022 INIT containing the facts taken into account when it was included on the lists at issue.

17By letter of 30 November 2022, the applicant lodged a request with the Council for reconsideration of its inclusion on the lists at issue by the initial acts (‘the request for reconsideration’).

18By letter of 21 December 2022, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to maintain the restrictive measures against it, and sent to it the additional working document with the reference 17500/2022 INIT and dated 13 December 2022.

19On 12 January 2023, the applicant submitted its observations to the Council.

20On 24 February 2023, in response to the request for reconsideration, the Council sent the applicant an official letter in which it reiterated the allegations made in the initial statement of reasons. In the same letter, the Council informed the applicant that it had decided to continue to include the applicant on the lists at issue.

21By way of the maintaining acts, the restrictive measures taken against the applicant were extended to 28 February 2024, on the same grounds as those set out in the initial acts (see paragraph 13 above).

22The sectoral restrictive measures were amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/356 of 2 March 2022 amending Decision 2012/642 (OJ 2022 L 67, p. 103) and by Council Regulation (EU) 2022/355 of 2 March amending Regulation No 765/2006 (OJ 2022 L 67, p. 1), and extended by the maintaining acts.

Forms of order sought

23The applicant claims, in essence, that the Court should:– annul the initial and maintaining acts in so far as they concern it;– order the Council to pay the costs.

24The Council contends that the Court should:– dismiss the action;– order the applicant to pay the costs.

25The Kingdom of Belgium and the Republic of Latvia submit that the Court should dismiss the action.

Law

The admissibility of the documents produced after the closure of the written part of the procedure

26By separate document, lodged on 8 April 2024, the applicant produced new items of evidence, reproducing its observations of 29 November 2023 on the extension of the maintaining acts, seeking, in essence, to rebut the arguments submitted in the Council’s rejoinder.

27The Council, supported by the Kingdom of Belgium and the Republic of Latvia, disputes the admissibility of the new items of evidence referred to in paragraph 26 above, since these were lodged out of time under Article 85(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

28Article 85(1) of the Rules of Procedure provides that evidence produced or offered is to be submitted in the first exchange of pleadings. Under Article 85(2) of those rules, the main parties are allowed to produce or offer further evidence in the reply and in the rejoinder in support of their arguments, provided that the delay in the submission of such evidence is justified. Under Article 85(3) of those rules, the main parties may, exceptionally, produce or offer further evidence before the oral part of the procedure is closed or before the decision of the General Court to rule without an oral part of the procedure, provided that the delay in the submission of such evidence is justified.

29According to the case-law, the Court has jurisdiction to reject the evidence concerned if it considers that, first, that belated submission is not justified to the requisite legal standard or is not substantiated and that, second, the application of Article 85(3) of the Rules of Procedure requires that exceptional circumstances be shown to exist (judgment of 23 November 2023, Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services, C‑758/21 P, EU:C:2023:917, paragraph 49). In the present case, the applicant has failed to adduce evidence capable of justifying the belated production, on 8 April 2024 – that is, two days before the hearing – of the further evidence at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 September 2021, Ryanair and Others v Commission, T‑448/18, not published, EU:T:2021:626, paragraph 58).

30In those circumstances, it must be held that the applicant has failed to justify to the requisite legal standard, for the purposes of Article 85(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the belated production of the items of evidence lodged on 8 April 2024. Consequently, that evidence is inadmissible and will not be taken into account by the Court in the examination of the present action (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 September 2021, Ryanair and Others v Commission, T‑448/18, not published, EU:T:2021:626, paragraph 63).

31It is appropriate to examine, in the first place, the application for partial annulment of the initial acts and then, in the second place, the application for partial annulment of the maintaining acts.

The application for partial annulment of the initial acts

32In support of its application for partial annulment of the initial acts, the applicant raises five pleas in law. The first plea in law alleges infringement of the principle of legality and is subdivided into five parts alleging (i) infringement of fundamental human rights; (ii) infringement of acts of international law; (iii) infringement of the objectives set forth by the European Union’s legal foundations; (iv) infringement of the principle that the measures must be targeted; and (v) infringement of the principle of legal certainty. The second plea in law alleges error of assessment. The third plea in law alleges infringement of the principle of non-discrimination. The fourth plea in law alleges infringement of the principle of proportionality. The fifth plea in law alleges infringement of the obligation to state reasons.

33It is appropriate to examine, first, the fifth plea; the fifth part of the first plea; the second plea; the second part of the first plea; the first, third and fourth parts of the first plea together with the fourth plea; and, finally, the third plea.

The fifth plea, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons

34The applicant claims that the reasons given by the Council in the annex to Decision 2022/881 merely reproduce the criteria applied to justify inclusion on the list and do not specify in any way the manner in which the company supports the Lukashenko regime, benefits from it, or is responsible for the repression of civil society in Belarus. It is argued that it is established case-law that, without any other information to support it, such reproduction cannot serve as a sufficient statement of reasons on the part of the Council.

35The Council, supported by the Republic of Latvia, disputes that line of argument.

36It should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the purpose of the obligation to state the reasons on which an act adversely affecting an individual is based, which is a corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence, is, first, to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to ascertain whether the act is well founded or whether it is vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to be contested before the Courts of the European Union and, second, to enable those courts to review the legality of that act (see judgment of 23 September 2014, Ipatau v Council, T‑646/11, not published, EU:T:2014:800, paragraph 92 and the case-law cited).

37The statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measures in such a way as to enable the person concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measures and to enable the court having jurisdiction to exercise its power of review (see judgment of 23 September 2014, Ipatau v Council, T‑646/11, not published, EU:T:2014:800, paragraph 93 and the case-law cited).

38The statement of reasons for an act of the Council which imposes a restrictive measure must not only identify the legal basis of that act but also the actual and specific reasons why the Council considers, in the exercise of its discretion, that such a measure must be adopted in respect of the party concerned (see judgment of 24 May 2023, Lyubetskaya v Council, T‑556/21, not published, EU:T:2023:283, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).

39The statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must, however, be appropriate to the act at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The requirement to state reasons must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case, in particular the content of the act, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees or other persons affected by the act within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU may have in receiving explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 23 September 2014, Ipatau v Council, T‑646/11, not published, EU:T:2014:800, paragraph 95 and the case-law cited).

40In particular, the reasons given for a measure adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that measure was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables him or her to understand the scope of the measure concerning him or her (see judgment of 23 September 2014, Ipatau v Council, T‑646/11, not published, EU:T:2014:800, paragraph 96 and the case-law cited).

41In that connection, the use, in that statement, of the wording ‘benefits from and supports the [Lukashenko] regime’ and ‘repression of civil society’ refers explicitly to the listing criteria at issue mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 6 above, from which it is apparent that natural or legal persons, entities or bodies identified as benefiting from or supporting the Lukashenko regime or who are responsible for serious violations of human rights or the repression of civil society and democratic opposition, or whose activities otherwise seriously undermine democracy or the rule of law in Belarus, are to be included on the lists at issue. The applicant could thus readily understand the criteria on which its inclusion on the lists at issue was based.

42As is clear from the statement, recalled in paragraph 13 above, of reasons justifying the inclusion of the applicant on the lists at issue, the latter was included on those lists because it is a public enterprise and one of the biggest potash producers in the world, which supplies 20% of global potash exports. As such, it is a major source of revenue and foreign currency for the regime of Lukashenko, who described it as ‘a national treasure, pride, one of the pillars of Belarusian exports’. Consequently, the applicant benefits from and supports the Lukashenko regime. Moreover, the applicant’s workers who took part in strikes and peaceful protests in the aftermath of the fraudulent August 2020 presidential elections in Belarus were intimidated and dismissed by the company’s management. President Lukashenko himself personally threatened to replace the strikers with miners from Ukraine. Thus, the initial acts refer to the ‘actual and specific reasons’, within the meaning of the case-law recalled in paragraph 38 above, why the applicant is regarded as responsible for the repression of civil society in Belarus and as supporting the Lukashenko regime, namely the reasons why the applicant is subject to restrictive measures.

43Consequently, in the light of the foregoing considerations, it must be found that the initial acts are sufficiently reasoned, and the fifth plea must be rejected as unfounded.

The fifth part of the first plea, alleging breach of the principle of legal certainty

44The applicant claims that the reference to the condition of legality in Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union presupposes the existence of precise and predictable legal norms. However, the terms employed in the relevant criteria on the basis of which it was included on the lists at issue are unclear. More specifically, the following terms are unclear: the ‘Lukashenko regime’, ‘support’, ‘benefit’, ‘civil society’ and ‘repression’.

45The Council, supported by the Kingdom of Belgium and the Republic of Latvia, disputes that line of argument.

46It should be recalled that the criteria for inclusion on the lists at issue cover ‘persons, entities or bodies responsible for serious violations of human rights or the repression of civil society’ and ‘benefiting from or supporting the [Lukashenko] regime’; these criteria are laid down by Article 4(1)(a) and (b) of Decision 2012/642. The applicant’s claim essentially relates, therefore, to that provision of Decision 2012/642.

47In that connection, the case-law makes it possible to consider that a plea of illegality may be raised implicitly in so far as it is sufficiently clear from the application that the applicant intended to raise such a plea (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 September 2016, Yanukovych v Council, T‑346/14, EU:T:2016:497, paragraph 56; of 15 September 2016, Yanukovych v Council, T‑348/14, EU:T:2016:508, paragraph 57; and of 22 September 2021, Al-Imam v Council, T‑203/20, EU:T:2021:605, paragraph 39 (not published)).

48It is apparent from an examination of the application, in particular paragraph 104 thereof, that the applicant, without formally raising a plea of illegality under Article 277 TFEU, relies on the unlawfulness of the aforementioned criteria, laid down by Article 4(1)(a) and (b) of Decision 2012/642, in the context of the claim for annulment of the initial acts.

49In that connection, it should be recalled that according to settled case-law, the principle of legal certainty – which is one of the general principles of EU law – requires, particularly, that rules of law be clear, precise and predictable in their effects, in particular where they may have negative consequences on individuals and undertakings. A penalty, even of a non-criminal nature, cannot be imposed unless it rests on a clear and unambiguous legal basis. The principle of legal certainty means, in particular, that any EU legislation, in particular when it imposes or permits the imposition of sanctions, must be clear and precise so that the persons concerned may know without ambiguity what rights and obligations flow from it and may take steps accordingly. That requirement of a clear and precise legal basis has also been enshrined in the field of restrictive measures (see judgment of 4 September 2015, NIOC and Others v Council, T‑577/12, not published, EU:T:2015:596, paragraphs 131 and 132 and the case-law cited).

50In accordance with settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part. The legislative history of a provision of EU law may also reveal elements that are relevant to its interpretation (see judgment of 2 September 2021, CRCAM, C‑337/20, EU:C:2021:671, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

51Furthermore, the Courts of the European Union must, in their judicial review of restrictive measures, allow the Council a broad discretion in establishing the general criteria defining the category of persons that could be made subject to restrictive measures (judgment of 13 September 2018, Vnesheconombank v Council, T‑737/14, not published, EU:T:2018:543, paragraph 94).

52The existence of vague terms in a provision does not necessarily entail an infringement of fundamental rights, and the fact that a law confers a discretion is not in itself inconsistent with the requirement of foreseeability, provided that the scope of the discretion and the manner of its exercise are indicated with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim in question, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference. Moreover, the requirement of foreseeability which accompanies the principle that penalties must have a proper legal basis – which requires that legislation must clearly define offences and penalties – does not preclude the law from conferring discretion the scope and manner of exercise of which are indicated with sufficient clarity. Those principles of case-law are also applicable with regard to restrictive measures which, although they are not aimed in principle at penalising infringements, but constitute preventive measures, have a considerable impact on the rights and freedoms of the persons concerned (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 July 2014, National Iranian Oil Company v Council, T‑578/12, not published, EU:T:2014:678, paragraphs 116 and 117, and of 4 September 2015, NIOC and Others v Council, T‑577/12, not published, EU:T:2015:596, paragraphs 135 and 136 and the case-law cited).

53In the light of the foregoing, it should be held, first, that the broad wording of the criteria at issue conferring a discretion on the Council can be compatible with the principles of proportionality and legal certainty (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 September 2016, Tose’e Ta’avon Bank v Council, T‑435/14, not published, EU:T:2016:531, paragraph 39).

54Second, it should be observed that the meaning and scope of the terms in question must be determined by considering their usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they are part, it being noted that the interpretation of a provision of EU law cannot have the result of depriving the clear and precise wording of that provision of all effectiveness (judgment of 18 October 2023, MAZ-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belavtomaz v Council, T‑532/21, not published, EU:T:2023:656, paragraph 52).

55It should also be borne in mind that a regulation providing for restrictive measures must be interpreted in the light not only of the decision adopted in the framework of the common foreign and security policy referred to in Article 215(2) TFEU, but also of the historical context in which the provisions were adopted by the European Union, that regulation being one such provision. The same applies to a decision adopted in the area of the common foreign and security policy, which must be interpreted taking into account the context in which it is adopted (judgment of 18 October 2023, MAZ-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belavtomaz v Council, T‑532/21, not published, EU:T:2023:656, paragraph 53).

56In the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 55 above, it should be observed that, in the context of the restrictive measures taken against Belarus since 2004, the criteria of ‘benefiting’ from the Lukashenko regime and ‘supporting’ that regime were introduced by Article 1(1) and (2) of Council Decision 2012/36/CFSP of 23 January 2012 amending Decision 2010/639/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Belarus (OJ 2012 L 19, p. 31).

57It was apparent from recitals 3 and 4 of Decision 2012/36 that, in view of the gravity of the situation in Belarus, additional restrictive measures against that country had to be adopted, including with respect to persons and entities benefiting from or supporting the Lukashenko regime, in particular persons and entities providing financial or material support to the regime.

58Article 2 of Regulation No 765/2006 was consequently amended by Article 1 of Council Regulation (EU) No 114/2012 of 10 February 2012 amending Regulation No 765/2006 (OJ 2012 L 38, p. 3).

59On 1 November 2012, Council Decision 2010/639/CFSP of 25 October 2010 concerning restrictive measures against certain officials of Belarus (OJ 2010 L 280, p. 18) was repealed and replaced by Decision 2012/642.

60As is apparent from recitals 1 to 5 and 8 of Decision 2012/642, the restrictive measures against Belarus were taken and extended as a result of the continued lack of respect in that country for human rights, democracy and the rule of law and were, therefore, directed, in particular, against those responsible for fraud and violations of international electoral standards in connection with certain election or referendum procedures in Belarus, and against those responsible for serious human rights violations and the repression of peaceful demonstrators in the aftermath of those procedures.

61Furthermore, in that regard, it should be recalled that it is apparent from recital 6 of Decision 2012/642 that, in so far as concerns persons and entities benefiting from or supporting the Lukashenko regime, the objective is to target any person or entity supporting that regime, in particular – but not exclusively – persons and entities providing financial or material support thereto.

62It follows from the foregoing that, by introducing the act of benefiting from or supporting the Lukashenko regime as criteria justifying the inclusion of a name on the lists at issue, the Council, in view of the serious and persistent nature of the breach of human rights, democracy and the rule of law and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus, sought to increase pressure on that regime by broadening the circle of persons and entities subject to EU restrictive measures. In that respect, the Council has provided for the possibility of applying measures freezing funds and economic resources to, inter alia, persons and entities benefiting from or supporting the Lukashenko regime and in particular – but not exclusively – those providing financial support to it (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 October 2023, MAZ-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belavtomaz v Council, T‑532/21, not published, EU:T:2023:656, paragraph 60).

63As regards persons, entities or bodies responsible for serious violations of human rights or the repression of civil society and democratic opposition, it is apparent from the context in which the terms ‘responsible for the repression’ are used, in particular from the use, in Article 4(1)(a) of Decision 2012/642 and Article 2(4) of Regulation No 765/2006, of the wording ‘persons, entities or bodies responsible for … the repression of civil society and democratic opposition, or whose activities otherwise seriously undermine democracy or the rule of law in Belarus’, that the legislative intent was to target, by that criterion, in general, any person, entity or body whose activities seriously undermine democracy or the rule of law in Belarus. Furthermore, the use of the term ‘otherwise’ in the second part of those provisions demonstrates the legislative intent to regard the repression of civil society and democratic opposition as a type of activity seriously undermining democracy or the rule of law in Belarus. Lastly, the use of the term ‘activities’ is an indication of the legislative intent to target persons, entities or bodies whose activities seriously undermine democracy or the rule of law in Belarus because those activities contribute to that undermining, irrespective of whether or not there is an intentional element in that regard (judgment of 15 February 2023, Belaeronavigatsia v Council, T‑536/21, EU:T:2023:66, paragraph 27).

64Third, the applicant’s claims as to the comprehension of the wording used in the listing criteria – namely, in the present case, of the phrase ‘[Lukashenko] regime’, the word ‘support’, the act of ‘benefiting’, the phrase ‘civil society’ and the word ‘repression’ – do not relate to compliance with the principle of legal certainty, but rather to the application of those criteria by the Council, which is the subject of the second plea in law.

65Thus, the arguments put forward by the applicant do not call into question the lawfulness of the criteria established by Article 4(1)(a) and (b) of Decision 2012/642, which are sufficiently clear and precise. Consequently, they comply with the principle of legal certainty.

66Accordingly, the fifth part of the first plea must be rejected.

The second plea, alleging error of assessment

67The second plea in law is divided into two parts. The first part alleges failure to demonstrate that the applicant benefits from or supports the Lukashenko regime. The second part alleges failure to demonstrate that the applicant is responsible for the repression of civil society in Belarus.

68As a preliminary point, it should be pointed out that the second plea in law must be regarded as alleging error of assessment, and not manifest error of assessment. Whilst it is, admittedly, true that the Council has a degree of discretion to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the legal criteria on which the restrictive measures at issue are based are satisfied, the fact remains that the Courts of the European Union must ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all EU acts (see judgment of 6 September 2023, Pumpyanskiy v Council, T‑291/22, not published, EU:T:2023:499, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

69Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights requires inter alia that, as part of the review of the lawfulness of the grounds which are the basis of the decision to list or to maintain the name of a person or entity on the lists of persons subject to restrictive measures, the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that that decision, which affects that person or entity individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern the question whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgment of 13 September 2023, Synesis v Council, T‑97/21 and T‑215/22, not published, EU:T:2023:531, paragraph 35).

70That is because it is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person or entity concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person or entity to adduce evidence of the negative, namely that those reasons are not well founded (see judgment of 13 September 2023, Synesis v Council, T‑97/21 and T‑215/22, not published, EU:T:2023:531, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

71If the competent EU authority provides relevant information or evidence, the Courts of the European Union must then determine whether the facts alleged are made out in the light of that information or evidence and assess the probative value of that information or evidence in the circumstances of the particular case and in the light of any observations submitted in relation to them by, among others, the person or entity concerned (see judgment of 13 September 2023, Synesis v Council, T‑97/21 and T‑215/22, not published, EU:T:2023:531, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).

72It should be recalled that the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue has been justified by the reasons set out in paragraph 13 above. It is therefore necessary to examine, first, whether the facts put forward in the statement of reasons for the decision to include the applicant on the lists at issue are established and, second, whether they fall within the scope of Article 4(1)(a) and (b) of Decision 2012/642.

–The first part of the plea, alleging failure to demonstrate that the applicant benefits from or supports the Lukashenko regime

73The applicant disputes the grounds for its inclusion on the lists at issue justified by the fact that it benefits from or supports the Lukashenko regime.

74In the first place, in so far as concerns the statement that it ‘is a state-owned enterprise’, the applicant confirms that its shares are owned by the Republic of Belarus. However, the Government of the Republic of Belarus is not the subject of any restrictive measure and does not appear to come under the Lukashenko regime. Moreover, the mere fact that the shares in the applicant are owned by the Republic of Belarus does not indicate that the applicant supported the Lukashenko regime and/or benefited from it.

75In the second place, as regards the statement that the applicant is ‘one of the biggest potash producers in the world, providing 20% of global potash exports. As such, it is a major source of revenue and foreign currency for the [Lukashenko] regime’, this merely confirms that the applicant is one of the biggest potash producers in the world.

76The applicant states that, like any other company in Belarus, it is obliged to make payments to the State budget as required by Belarusian law, as a consequence of its economic activities. Tax payments do not amount to a form of financial support for the regime, as is clear from the case-law. The same conclusion applies to contributions to the State target budget fund for national development and to dividend distributions.

77In the third place, as regards the ground that ‘Lukashenko described it as “a national treasure, pride, one of the pillars of Belarusian exports”’, the applicant observes that this is just a figure of speech and not an indicator that it has special status.

78The Council, supported by the Kingdom of Belgium and the Republic of Latvia, disputes that line of argument.

79In the first place, first of all, it is common ground that the applicant is State-owned, since all of its shares are held by the Republic of Belarus. The applicant has stated, moreover, that the State Committee on Property of the Republic of Belarus is its ultimate beneficial owner.

80Furthermore, the applicant itself acknowledges, as is apparent from the information before the Court, that it is ‘indeed one of the biggest potash producers in the world[, which] produced 12045920 tonnes of potash in 2019, 12479064 tonnes in 2020, and 13798 250.39 tonnes in 2021’, that ‘the share of potash fertilisers produced by [the applicant] in the global market is about 20%’, that ‘Belarusian potash fertilisers were exported to more than 110 countries around the world’ and that it is ‘one of the largest employers in the country [and] employs 17622 workers’. Moreover, the applicant does not dispute the fact, reported by the Council, that President Lukashenko described it as ‘a national treasure, pride, one of the pillars of Belarusian exports’.

81Next, the applicant does not dispute that its Director-General is appointed by President Lukashenko, or that the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus appointed the First Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance as representatives of the State on the applicant’s management board.

82Lastly, the applicant also does not dispute the information reported by the Council that, in 2019, it made a net profit of more than 4.797 billion Belarusian roubles (BYN) (approximately EUR 1.8 billion). Furthermore, it confirms that (i) it pays dividends to the State, as a shareholder, and (ii) it paid, in addition to taxes, compulsory contributions to the State target budget fund for national development.

83Accordingly, the Council did not err in finding that the applicant was a public undertaking and one of the biggest potash producers in the world, which provided 20% of global potash exports and which, as such, was a major source of revenue and foreign currency for the Lukashenko regime.

84In the second place, the applicant claims that the factors set out above reveal neither ‘support for the regime’ nor that it benefits from that regime within the meaning of Article 4(1)(b) of Decision 2012/642.

85In accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 54 above, the meaning and scope of the terms in question must be determined by considering their usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account, in particular, the purposes of the rules of which they are part and the need to preserve the effectiveness of their clear and precise wording.

86As a preliminary point, it should be observed that it is apparent both from the clear and precise wording of Article 4(1)(b) of Decision 2012/642, which refers to persons and entities ‘benefiting from or supporting the [Lukashenko] regime’, and from the objective pursued by that provision, which is to increase pressure on that regime, that it is the relationship that certain persons and entities have with that regime which justifies the adoption of restrictive measures, where that relationship takes the form of support, in particular financial support (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 October 2023, MAZ-upravljajusaja kompanija holdinga Belavtomaz v Council, T‑532/21, not published, EU:T:2023:656, paragraph 65).

87First, in so far as concerns support to the regime, the Council contends that the applicant provides support in the form of revenue, including dividends, income taxes, value added tax (VAT) and excise duties paid on its products by final consumers, and income taxes and social security contributions of its employees.

88It is in fact apparent from the information before the Court that financial support from the applicant’s taxes and export duties represents 8 to 10% of the total budget of Belarus. Its revenue in 2019 amounted to BYN 4.797 billion (approximately EUR 1.8 billion). Dividends received by Belarus in that same year were estimated at BYN 64.03 (approximately EUR 24) per share.

89The Council also found, in particular, that the applicant was one of the biggest potash producers in the world, providing 20% of global potash exports, that it represented one of the main sources of revenue and foreign currency for the Lukashenko regime, and that President Lukashenko had stated that the government would always support that undertaking, which he had described as ‘a national treasure, pride, one of the pillars of Belarusian exports’, which the applicant does not dispute.

90Moreover, the applicant claims that, in accordance with Belarusian legislation, it is required to contribute financially to the State budget on account of its economic activities, and that the funds levied are thus used in strict compliant with Belarusian law.

91In that connection, according to the Resolution No 772 of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus of 18 November 2019, the applicant had, for the first half of 2019, to transfer more than BYN 46 million (approximately EUR 17.6 million) to the State target budget fund for national development from its excess profits, in accordance with subparagraph 3-2 of Edict No 637 of the President of the Republic of Belarus of 28 December 2005 on the procedure for entry in the budget of part of the profits of State enterprises, State associations which are commercial organisations, as well as income from shares (stakes in the share capital) of business entities owned by the State or municipalities, and on the formation of a State special-purpose budget fund for national development (National Register of Legal Acts of the Republic of Belarus No 1/7075 of 29 December 2005) (‘Edict No 637’).

92It should be noted that the wording itself of Article 4(1)(b) of Decision 2012/642, to which Article 2(5) of Regulation No 765/2012 refers, makes reference to ‘supporting’ the Lukashenko regime. Thus, the mere fact that the applicant pays dividends to the Belarusian State – which are therefore at the disposal of the Lukashenko regime – along with compulsory contributions to the State target budget fund for national development is sufficient to establish the existence of financial support.

93It is true that the Court held, in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 6 October 2015, Chyzh and Others v Council (T‑276/12, not published, EU:T:2015:748, paragraph 169), that the Council cannot infer from the payment of taxes ‘support for the regime’, since such a payment constitutes a legal obligation applicable to all Belarusian taxpayers.

94However, in the present case, the applicant’s argument assimilating dividends to taxes for the purposes of the case-law cited in paragraph 93 above cannot be accepted.

95It is apparent from subparagraph 1-1 of Edict No 637 that the undertakings that are required to pay a part of their profits to the State or to infra-State bodies are those whose decisions the State or those bodies determine. Thus, that obligation concerns only a defined category of economic operators and not all Belarusian taxpayers.

96In addition, under subparagraph 1-2 of Edict No 637, the part of the profits of the undertakings concerned which must compulsorily be paid to the Belarusian public authorities is to be calculated on the basis of the difference between the profit received and, inter alia, the charges relating to taxes and duties. As a result, the payment in question is formally separate from taxes and are additional thereto. The fact that, as is apparent from subparagraph 3-1 of Edict No 637, the collection of that part of the profits comes within the competence of the tax authorities, following the relevant tax procedures, is not capable of calling that finding into question.

97Accordingly, it should be observed that the fact that the applicant is required to pay part of its profits to the State pursuant to Edict No 637 bears out the assessment that the applicant is financially supporting the Lukashenko regime since, by way of that edict, that regime increased the control that it already had, as sole shareholder, over the applicant’s resources by ensuring that the regime regularly has at its disposal part of the profits that the applicant makes.

98Moreover, the applicant claims that President Lukashenko’s words to the effect that it is ‘a national treasure, pride, one of the pillars of Belarusian exports’ do not indicate that the company has special status.

99In that connection, on the one hand, it should be observed that the applicant does not dispute the fact that the words referred to in paragraph 98 above were uttered by President Lukashenko. On the other hand, even though they do not, in themselves, establish the applicant’s support for the regime of President Lukashenko, they do constitute evidence of the key role that it plays in the Belarusian economy.

100Second, as regards the act of ‘benefiting’ from the Lukashenko regime, it is common ground that the applicant is the sole producer of potassium fertilisers in Belarus.

101As regards the potassium fertiliser sector, aside from the fact that it is a highly regulated sector in Belarus – as the applicant itself accepts – it is apparent from the evidence submitted by the Council that that sector is a source of significant revenue. In that connection, suffice it to recall that, in 2019, the applicant made a net profit of over BYN 4.797 billion (approximately EUR 1.8 billion) (see paragraph 88 above).

102Indeed, a number of items of evidence submitted by the Council relating to the economic situation in Belarus – in particular, the article published on the website ‘cepa.org’ on 8 December 2021, the article published on the website ‘naviny.belsat.eu’ on 15 October 2015, the article published on the website ‘news.tut.by’ on 13 December 2016, the article published on the website ‘en.belapan.by’ on 9 July 2020, and the article published on the website ‘russian.rt.com’ on 22 March 2016 – demonstrate that, under the regime of President Lukashenko, the Belarusian economy is characterised by the regime’s control over both the public and private sectors and by a system that rewards loyalty to the regime.

103Thus, the items of evidence referred to in paragraph 102 above, together with the existence of the monopoly exercised by the applicant, as a State-owned enterprise, on a market as important, from the perspective of the Belarusian economy, as the potassium fertiliser market, enabled the Council to find that the applicant was benefiting from the Lukashenko regime.

104It follows from the foregoing that the Council did not err in considering, when the initial acts were adopted, that the applicant was benefiting from and supporting the regime within the meaning of Article 4(1)(b) of Decision 2012/642.

–The second part of the plea, alleging failure to demonstrate that the applicant is responsible for the repression of civil society

105The applicant disputes the grounds for its inclusion on the lists at issue in so far as these state that it is responsible for the repression of civil society in Belarus and supports the Lukashenko regime.

106In the first place, as regards the statement that ‘employees of [the applicant] who took part in strikes and peaceful protests in the aftermath of the fraudulent August 2020 presidential elections in Belarus were intimidated and dismissed by the company’s management’, the applicant claims that the right to strike is not an absolute right. It may be limited under certain legal conditions. In particular, the Labour Code of Belarus provides for certain procedural requirements concerning the call for a strike. In the case of the strike that took place on the applicant’s premises in August 2021, none of those requirements was fulfilled.

107Moreover, the overwhelming majority of the demands put forward by the self-proclaimed 14-member ‘stachcom’ (strike committee) were of a political nature.

108Furthermore, most of the disciplinary sanctions imposed on workers were for absenteeism, but none of the workers were dismissed. It is also important to note that, between 30 November 2020 and 20 January 2021, the applicant cancelled all such disciplinary sanctions against the workers concerned. Therefore, the claim that workers were dismissed ‘because they participated in protests’ is untrue.

109Finally, the Council’s allegation that the workers that took part in the ‘strike’ were ‘intimidated’ is unsubstantiated by any evidence.

110In the second place, as regards the statement that ‘[Lukashenko] himself personally threatened to replace the strikers with miners from Ukraine’, the applicant states that it seems to be drawn word for word from a BBC article. In that regard, it is argued, the Court has confirmed that producing a single document to prove a fact is not sufficient.

111Moreover, that statement by President Lukashenko does not contain any threat.

112The Council, supported by the Kingdom of Belgium and the Republic of Latvia, disputes that line of argument.

113In the present case, it should be observed that the parties are in agreement on the fact that the strikes and peaceful protests took place in the aftermath of the August 2020 presidential elections in Belarus.

114In that connection, although the applicant does not dispute the accuracy of the facts relating to the strikes and protests that took place in the aftermath of the August 2020 presidential elections, its interpretation thereof differs to that put forward by the Council. It refutes the statement that those events led to the intimidation or dismissal of its workers, as the Council reports.

115It is apparent from the items of evidence produced by the Council that, on 17 and 18 August 2020, 6300 persons gathered peacefully on the applicant’s premises to protest against police brutality. The applicant responded by dismissing the striking workers, demanding explanations and depriving those workers of premiums, often for a full year. Following the presidential elections of 9 September 2020, the workers of a number of State-owned enterprises, including the applicant, organised a strike in support of the protestors’ demands calling for Lukashenko’s resignation, fresh and fair elections, and justice for the victims of police brutality. The strike lasted two days before it was declared unlawful, leading to immediate repression. According to the representatives of the strike committee, formed at the beginning of the strike, the applicant’s management board and the security forces used ‘unprecedented repression’ against those who opposed Lukashenko: they were allegedly tortured, beaten, imprisoned for a day and threatened with the removal of their children. Some members of the strike committee faced long prison sentences. The majority of the members of the strike committee were dismissed.

116Those items of evidence cannot be called into question by the applicant’s arguments alleging, first, the irrelevance thereof and the subjective nature of the manner in which the Belarusian authorities treated their striking workers; second, that the allegation that the applicant’s Director-General is the godfather of the child of a political figure is not proven; third, that certain articles refer to cigarette smuggling involving train wagons belonging to the applicant; fourth, that certain articles describe working conditions on the applicant’s premises too negatively; and, fifth, that the allegations of electoral fraud are neither relevant nor proven. The applicant’s claims do not amount to grounds forming the basis for its inclusion on the lists at issue, with the result that they are irrelevant to the examination of the merits of those grounds, but instead relate to the inclusion of other persons and entities.

117In the first place, as regards measures to intimidate its workers, the applicant claims that it merely applied Belarusian labour law in refusing to grant the right to strike. Furthermore, the alleged ‘intimidation’ of the applicant’s workers manifested itself, from the perspective of those workers, in statements from the applicant’s management putting the workers on notice that the strike was unlawful and that participation therein might result in dismissal for absence from work.

118In that regard, it should be noted that the alleged intimidation emanated from both the applicant itself and the public authorities. On the one hand, in so far as concerns the intimidation on the part of the applicant, the scale of the dismissals, which were linked to worker participation in a peaceful protest, quite reasonably spawned a climate of fear among those workers. In that sense, the applicant used dismissal as a tool in deterring its workers from taking part in any form of challenge.

119On the other hand, in so far as concerns the intimidation brought to bear by the public authorities, it should be observed that participation in the strike gave rise to numerous instances of violence against and the detention of the applicant’s workers. The witness statements and reports arising from the items of evidence submitted by the Council attest to arbitrary arrests, acts of physical and psychological violence, and other forms of systematic intimidation. In that context, having regard to the applicant’s aforementioned close ties with the regime of President Lukashenko (see paragraph 104 above), there can be no doubt as to their joint involvement in those acts of repression.

120President Lukashenko’s statement that the protestors could be replaced by miners from Ukraine takes on a particular relevance in that context, contrary to the applicant’s claims. That statement forms part of a wider trend of threats and intimidation on the part of the public authorities. It in fact reveals an attitude of contempt, on the part of President Lukashenko, for the right to strike and the concerns of the applicant’s workers.

121In the second place, as regards the dismissal of workers following the start of the strike, first, the applicant claims simply to have complied with Belarusian labour law, arguing that, having deemed the strike to be unlawful, it proceeded with the dismissals solely on account of the absence of its workers. However, the strict application of Belarusian law cannot justify all forms of repression taken against workers expressing their political views. In fact, a situation in which the compliance with national law of a specific action would serve to preclude, solely on those grounds, the possibility of inclusion on the lists at issue would mean that the listing criteria were rendered meaningless, since that would cancel out the Council’s broad discretion in that respect.

122Second, the applicant claims that, having deemed the strike to be unlawful, it proceeded to dismiss workers solely on account of their absenteeism.

123In that connection, even though the case file does not contain information directly indicating that the actual grounds for dismissing the workers was their absenteeism, those actions, taken as a whole, manifestly attest to a deliberate intention to sanction workers for their participation in activities expressing their opposition to President Lukashenko.

124It follows from the foregoing that the Council did not err in finding, when adopting the initial acts, that the intimidation and dismissal of the applicant’s workers who had taken part in the strikes and peaceful protests in the aftermath of the August 2020 presidential elections were sufficient for it to be considered that the applicant was responsible for the repression of civil society in Belarus and supported the regime of President Lukashenko within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) of Decision 2012/642.

125Consequently, the second plea in law must be rejected in its entirety.

–The second part of the first plea, alleging infringement of acts of international law

126The applicant claims that the initial acts breached various international multilateral treaties and rules, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, concluded at Montego Bay on 10 December 1982 (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1833, 1834 and 1835, p. 3; ‘UNCLOS’), having regard, in particular, to the extraterritorial effect of the restrictive measures taken against the applicant.

127The Council, supported by the Kingdom of Belgium and the Republic of Latvia, disputes the applicant’s line of argument.

128In the first place, the argument alleging infringement of the principle of territoriality must be rejected as unfounded, since the initial acts apply only to funds and economic resources located in the territory of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgments of 31 January 2007, Minin v Commission, T‑362/04, EU:T:2007:25, paragraph 106, and of 13 September 2023, Venezuela v Commission, T‑65/18 RENV, EU:T:2023:529, paragraph 111).

129In the second place, as regards the compatibility of the restrictions imposed by the initial acts with the GATT and the TFA, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, given their nature and structure, the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements are not, in principle, among the rules in the light of which the Courts of the European Union are to review the legality of acts of EU institutions. It is only where the European Union intends to implement a particular obligation assumed in the context of the WTO or where the EU act refers expressly to specific provisions of the WTO agreements that the Court of Justice can review the legality of that act in the light of the WTO rules (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2023, Venezuela v Council, T‑65/18 RENV, EU:T:2023:529, paragraph 107 and the case-law cited).

130First, the initial acts contain no reference to those agreements (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2023, Venezuela v Council, T‑65/18 RENV, EU:T:2023:529, paragraph 105).

131Second, the applicant has not indicated by which acts or on what occasion the European Union intended to implement, by means of the initial acts, any particular obligation assumed in the context of the WTO (judgment of 13 September 2023, Venezuela v Council, T‑65/18 RENV, EU:T:2023:529, paragraph 106).

132In any event, it should be observed that Belarus is party to neither the GATT nor the TFA. Thus, the European Union is not subject to any contractual obligation to Belarus under those agreements.

133In the third place, as regards the alleged infringement of the UNCLOS, it should be noted that, even though Articles 89 and 125 thereof grant access to the sea to any country without a coastline, they do not guarantee access to a specific sea or to a chosen port, in any situation. In any event, it is not the initial acts, in so far as they concern the freezing of the applicant’s funds, but rather the sectoral restrictive measures that might affect Belarus’ right of access to the sea.

134Consequently, the second part of the first plea must be rejected.

The first, third and fourth parts of the first plea – alleging, respectively, infringement of fundamental human rights, infringement of the objectives set forth by the European Union’s legal foundations, and infringement of the principle that measures must be targeted – and the fourth plea, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality

135By the first, third and fourth parts of the first plea and the fourth plea, which should be examined together, the applicant claims, in essence, that the initial acts infringe the principles of legality and proportionality, since they have an extremely negative impact on the fundamental rights of the applicant and of third parties.

136By the first part of the first plea, the applicant claims that the initial acts infringe the right to food, the right to life and the right to education, laid down in numerous acts of international law, namely Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 3 January 1976 (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 993, p. 3); Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948; the Preamble to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 18 December 1979 and entered into force on 3 September 1981 (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1249, No I‑20378, p. 13); Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which was adopted on 20 November 1989 and entered into force on 2 September 1990 (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1577, p. 3); Articles 25 and 28 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which was approved on behalf of the European Union by Council Decision 2010/48/EC of 26 November 2009 (OJ 2010 L 23, p. 35); and Article 31 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted at the World Conference on Human Rights of 25 June 1993.

137Human rights are interdependent, indivisible and interrelated. This, in the applicant’s submission, means that an infringement of the right to food can undermine the realisation of other human rights, in particular the right to health, education or life, and vice versa. In particular, when people are unable to feed themselves and face the threat of death from hunger, malnutrition or related diseases, their right to life is also threatened.

138As a result of the restrictive measures adopted against it, the applicant’s ability to trade ‘in a socially important commodity with humanitarian functions’ has been restricted.

139In support of its arguments, the applicant states that its share of potash in the global market is 20%. That product is supplied to more than 130 countries. Some countries rely heavily, if not completely, on potash produced by the applicant.

140Moreover, there are currently no ports capable of replacing Klaipėda (Lithuania) to export such volumes of Belarusian potash fertilisers.

141Therefore, the restrictive measures imposed by the Council on the applicant, by virtue of their extraterritorial effect, infringe the nutritional rights of millions, and possibly billions, of people around the world.

142The Council, within its competence, may introduce temporary restrictive measures, which should be preventive in nature. The restrictive measures against the applicant are inherently punitive in nature.

143By the third part of the first plea, the applicant claims that the initial acts infringe the objectives laid down in Articles 3 and 21 TEU since they have dramatic consequences that will reverberate not only within the European Union, but also throughout the world.

144By the fourth part of its first plea, the applicant claims that the initial acts infringe the principle that the measures must be targeted because they affect the civilian population not only in Belarus, but throughout the world.

145By its fourth plea in law, the applicant claims that the initial acts have had the effect of completely restricting its freedom of transit, in clear violation of international standards. Moreover, its freedom to conduct business, a fundamental right protected by EU law and international law, has also been blatantly breached.

146Thus, the initial acts have fully prevented the applicant from exporting potash throughout the world.

147The applicant adds that the restrictive measures at issue infringe the rights of third parties, and are therefore disproportionate, in so far as they have had a negative effect on many third countries and their citizens.

148In its request to the Council for reconsideration, the applicant proposed alternative, less restrictive measures that could be considered as an alternative or be used to ease the impact of the listing.

149The Council, supported by the Kingdom of Belgium and the Republic of Latvia, disputes that line of argument.

150As a preliminary point, it should be observed that, without formally putting forward a plea of inadmissibility in respect of the fourth plea in law, the Council contends that the latter is too vague and too general to make it possible to understand the scope of the alleged infringement of the principle of proportionality.

151The applicant has not commented on the Council’s argument in that regard.

152In that connection, it should be recalled that, under the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to proceedings before the General Court pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 53 thereof, and Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, the application must contain, inter alia, the subject matter of the dispute and a brief statement of the pleas in law on which the application is based. It is clear from the case-law that that summary must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and for the General Court to exercise its power of review. It follows that the essential elements of fact and law on which an action is based must be indicated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself. The application must, therefore, specify the nature of the plea in law on which the action is based, so that a mere abstract reference to that plea does not satisfy the requirements of the Rules of Procedure (order of 18 September 2018, eSlovenko v Commission, T‑664/17, not published, EU:T:2018:559, paragraph 29).

153Furthermore, according to the case-law, the application must be interpreted with a view to giving it practical effect by carrying out an overall assessment of the application (see, to that effect, order of 28 June 2011, Verein Deutsche Sprache v Council, C‑93/11 P, not published, EU:C:2011:429, paragraphs 20 and 21).

154In the present case, as is apparent from the presentation of the arguments raised by the applicant in the context of the fourth plea (see paragraph 145 above), it must be held that, contrary to what the Council contends, the fourth plea is sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to exercise its power of review.

155Consequently, the Council’s claims relating to the lack of clarity of the fourth plea must be rejected.

156As regards the merits, the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU law and is reproduced in Article 5(4) TEU, requires that measures implemented through provisions of EU law be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them (judgments of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa, C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 122, and of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 133).

157With regard to judicial review of compliance with the principle of proportionality, the EU legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in areas which involve political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. It follows that the legality of a measure adopted in those areas may be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council, T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 179 and the case-law cited).

158In so far as concerns the objectives pursued by Decision 2012/642 and by Regulation No 765/2006, it should be recalled that, according to Article 21(2)(b) TEU, the consolidation of and support for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law on the international scene are among the objectives of the European Union in the framework of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP).

159In the present case, the restrictive measures against Belarus were adopted in view of the gravity of the situation in Belarus and of the persistent human rights violations, systematic repression of civil society and democratic opposition, and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

160In that regard, the applicant’s argument that the initial acts infringe the objectives laid down in Articles 3 and 21 TEU cannot succeed.

161Under Article 3(5) TEU, the European Union must ‘contribute to peace, security, … the protection of human rights, … as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter’.

162It is apparent from Articles 24 and 29 TEU that, as a general rule, the Council is called upon, acting unanimously, to determine the persons and entities that are to be subject to the restrictive measures that the European Union adopts in the field of the CFSP. Taking account of the wide scope of the aims and objectives of the CFSP, as set out in Article 3(5) TEU and Article 21 TEU and in the specific provisions relating to the CFSP, in particular, in Articles 23 and 24 TEU, the Council has a broad discretion in determining such persons and entities (judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 88).

163In the present case, as is apparent from recital 1 of Decision 2012/642, the restrictive measures against Belarus were adopted on account of the continued lack of respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law in that country. Those measures are intended to put pressure on the Lukashenko regime to put an end to human rights violations and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition. Furthermore, as is apparent from the second recital and from the citations of the initial acts, those acts were adopted in view of the gravity of the situation in Belarus and in reaction to the persistent human rights violations and systematic repression of civil society and democratic opposition. The grounds of the initial acts also refer to the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

164It is clear that the approach of targeting persons, entities and bodies whose acts or activities contribute to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition is consistent with the objective referred to in paragraph 61 above and cannot, in any event, be considered to be inappropriate with respect to the objective pursued (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 February 2023, Belaeronavigatsia v Council, T‑536/21, EU:T:2023:66, paragraph 30).

165In so far as concerns the question whether the initial acts are appropriate, the applicant claims, first, that those acts have completely prevented it from exporting potash.

166That argument cannot succeed.

167The initial acts – unlike the sectoral restrictive measures, which are not disputed in the present case – do not concern the prohibition, imposed by the European Union, on potash imports. Consequently, neither the initial acts nor the sectoral restrictive measures prohibit the export of Belarusian potash to third countries.

168Furthermore, it is Article 2g of Decision 2012/642 and Article 1g of Regulation No 765/2006, introduced by Decision 2021/1031 and Regulation 2021/1030 on 24 July 2021, which expressly provide that the purchase, import or transfer from Belarus of potash products is to be prohibited. Consequently, the applicant is mistaken in claiming that the initial acts – which were adopted subsequent to the sectoral restrictive measures and consist in the freezing of the applicant’s funds – prevented the export or transfer of potash within the European Union. Furthermore, when questioned in that connection at the hearing, it accepted that between the introduction of the sectoral restrictive measures and the adoption of the initial acts, it was already unable either to export potash to, or to transfer its products through, the European Union.

169Next, the applicant claims that the adoption of the initial acts constituted a disproportionate interference with its freedom to conduct a business, Belarusian society and global food security.

170On the one hand, in so far as concerns the argument relating to the potential interference with the freedom to conduct a business and with Belarusian society, the applicant has failed to present specific arguments or produce evidence to support that claim. It follows that the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the initial acts constituted a disproportionate interference with its freedom to conduct a business and with Belarusian society.

171On the other hand, in so far as concerns the argument relating to the potential interference with global food security, the applicant refers, in order to support its line of argument, to a certain number of circumstances that, in its view, suggest that its inclusion on the lists at issue may have a negative effect on the price of potassium fertilisers in the world, which could exacerbate the food crisis.

172In that connection, the Council, supported by the Kingdom of Belgium and the Republic of Latvia, contends that that argument is inadmissible, in that the applicant has failed to demonstrate a personal and sufficiently direct interest in bringing proceedings since it relies on an alleged violation, not of its own rights, but of the human rights of unspecified groups numbering millions of people, in an abstract and general manner.

173In the present case, irrespective of the question concerning the applicant’s interest in relying on the fundamental rights of third parties, it should be noted – as the Council rightly pointed out at the hearing – that the items of evidence raised by the applicant do not concern the initial acts, which imposed the freezing of funds, but relate primarily to the trading of fertilisers, including potassium fertilisers, on the global market. These are therefore items of evidence concerning the potential impact of sectoral restrictive measures on the global market for potassium fertilisers, which is not the subject matter of the present proceedings. Furthermore, when questioned on this point at the hearing, the applicant failed to identify which of the items of evidence that it added to the case file were such as to demonstrate that the global food crisis has been exacerbated by the initial acts.

174On the one hand, the analysis entitled ‘Potash: Impact assessment for supply security’, dated April 2022, refers directly to the potential implications of introducing sectoral restrictive measures.

175On the other hand, first, the items of evidence submitted by the applicant include articles, reports and political statements on the impact of the war in Ukraine on the global food crisis. Second, these contain general information on global food security. Third, they include articles and reports on agricultural policies and undertakings that are active on the fertiliser market. Fourth, they include analyses of the fertiliser and potash market.

176Thus, while those documents make reference to the global food crisis, they do not concern the impact of the initial acts on that global food crisis.

177Moreover, some of the items of evidence on which the applicant relies relate to undisputed facts concerning its activities. First, according to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled ‘Safeguarding food security and reinforcing the resilience of food systems’ of 23 March 2022 (COM(2022) 133 final), potash exports from Russia and Belarus represent 40% of global trade in potash. Second, the applicant has submitted information from May 2022 on its production and exports for the years 2018 to 2021, including the 2021 statistical report from the International Fertilizer Association (IFA).

178Consequently, having regard to the examination of the items of evidence produced by the applicant, and irrespective of the question concerning the latter’s interest in relying on the fundamental rights of third parties (see paragraph 173 above), it must be held that the applicant has failed to produce evidence capable of demonstrating that the initial acts undermined global food security.

179Furthermore, the applicant claims that the Council ought to have used the less restrictive measure and refers to examples of alternative, less restrictive measures that could be used to ease the impact of inclusion on the lists at issue. The applicant in fact proposed, first, that conditions be established in order that the national authorities of the Member States be able to grant authorisations to EU persons and operators to enter into transactions with the applicant for the import, purchase and transfer of potash fertilisers and to provide related financing services and, second, the introduction of quotas for the supply of such fertilisers to the European Union.

180In order to substantiate its line of argument, the applicant relies on items of evidence indicating that the transport of potash fertilisers requires large tonnage and access to the sea. In that connection, it states that, by depriving it of access to the port of Klaipėda, the initial acts deprive it of the possibility of exporting its products, whereas other, less restrictive measures could be envisaged.

181It should be observed, first of all, that that line of argument does not actually relate to the initial acts, which are individual in scope, but to the sectoral restrictive measures, which are general in scope, as is clear from paragraph 167 above, in so far as it is the latter that prohibit the import, purchase or transfer, directly or indirectly, of potassium chloride products.

182In any event, on the one hand, that line of argument does not demonstrate that the applicant is completely prevented from exporting its products. It is in fact not excluded that the applicant be able to transport its products to the ports of other countries outside the European Union.

183On the other hand, the alternative measures proposed by the applicant concern the possibilities of exporting potassium fertilisers to the European Union and, consequently, would not make it possible efficiently to achieve the objectives pursued, namely targeting persons or entities supporting the regime and therefore, in particular, persons and entities supporting, financially or materially, the Lukashenko regime (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 20 September 2023, Mordashov v Council, T‑248/22, not published, EU:T:2023:573, paragraph 165 and the case-law cited). The Council rightly considered that the need to increase the economic cost, for Belarus, of the participation in the Russian aggression against Ukraine, to the point where it becomes unsustainable to pursue, was also an interest that outweighed the private interests of the applicant.

184In the light of the foregoing, the fourth plea, together with the first, third and fourth parts of the first plea, must be rejected.

The third plea, alleging infringement of the principle of non-discrimination

185In the first place, the applicant claims, in essence, that it was treated differently from Company A, which is, however, comparable in terms of potash production and exports and should have been subject to restrictive measures.

186One of the reasons relied upon in support of the imposition of restrictive measures on the applicant was that it is a major source of revenue for the budget of Belarus. The applicant and Company A are therefore in comparable situations. Comparable situations – in the present case, the treatment of potash producers in Russia and Belarus – should be treated equally.

187In that regard, the applicant submits that the Council’s decisions must not lead to more severe consequences for Belarusian persons than for Russian persons.

188In the second place, the applicant claims, in essence, that it was treated differently from Company B, the name of which was removed from the lists at issue on the ground that the restrictive measures had had the desired effect with regard to that entity. However, that is also the case with regard to the applicant.

189It is argued that the applicant is being sanctioned for actions, albeit legitimate ones, that had in any case ceased by March 2021, that is to say, more than a year after they occurred.

190The applicant submits, furthermore, that the Council does not seem to consider it necessary to sanction European companies for dismissing workers participating in unlawful strikes.

191The Council, supported by the Kingdom of Belgium and the Republic of Latvia, disputes that line of argument.

192It should be recalled that, according to the case-law, the principle of equal treatment, which constitutes a fundamental principle of law, prohibits comparable situations from being treated differently or different situations from being treated in the same way, unless such difference in treatment is objectively justified (see judgment of 31 May 2018, Kaddour v Council, T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 152 and the case-law cited).

193As regards the difference in treatment claimed by the applicant by comparison with Company A, it should be observed, as the Council did, that the applicant and Russian entities are subject to different regimes of restrictive measures.

194First, Article 4(1) of Decision 2012/642 and Article 2 of Regulation No 765/2006 provide for the freezing of all funds and economic resources of (i) the persons, entities or bodies responsible for serious violations of human rights or the repression of civil society and democratic opposition, or whose activities otherwise seriously undermined democracy or the rule of law in Belarus, or any natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them, as well as legal persons, entities or bodies owned or controlled by them, and (ii) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies benefiting from or supporting the Lukashenko regime, as well as legal persons, entities or bodies owned or controlled by them.

195Second, under Article 2(1) of Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16), all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by natural persons responsible for actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them, as listed in the annex to that decision, are to be frozen.

196The applicant is therefore in a different situation to that of the company to which it refers, since it is subject to a regime of restrictive measures that is based on different listing criteria to those under the regime of restrictive measures to which that company is subject.

197Finally, even if the Council had failed to take restrictive measures against other undertakings or other economic sectors, that fact could not reasonably be relied on by the applicant, since the principle of equal treatment must be reconciled with the broad discretion available to the Council when it determines the purpose of restrictive measures (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 132; of 6 March 2024, BSW – management company of ‘BMC’ holding v Council, T‑258/22, EU:T:2024:150, paragraph 90; and of 6 March 2024, Mostovdrev v Council, T‑259/22, not published, EU:T:2024:151, paragraph 81).

198As regards the difference in treatment claimed by the applicant by comparison with Company B, it should be noted that, although the latter company was included on the lists based on Decision 2012/642 – namely, that which formed the legal basis for listing the applicant – the criteria for those two listings differed. Thus, the criterion for listing Company B concerned facilitating the illegal crossing of the external borders of the European Union, which is different to the criteria for including the applicant on the lists at issue.

199Consequently, it must be held that the applicant is in a different situation to that of Company B.

200It should be borne in mind that restrictive measures are measures of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, the validity of which always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their objective. It is thus for the Council, in the course of its periodic review of those restrictive measures, to conduct an updated assessment of the situation and to appraise the impact of such measures, in order to determine whether they have made it possible to attain the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the list at issue or whether the same conclusion in respect of those persons and entities can still be drawn (judgment of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraphs 58 and 59).

201Furthermore, it should be observed that the listing of Company B was based on an ad hoc activity, namely the transport in Belarus of migrants intending to cross the external borders of the European Union illegally. That activity was not repeated, giving rise to the possibility of removing that company from the list.

202However, as is apparent from the information before the Court and the items of evidence produced by the Council, the applicant’s support for the Lukashenko regime takes the form of an ongoing activity which has not ceased, since it consists in regular payments of funds into the State budget.

203Third, as regards the difference in treatment claimed by the applicant by comparison with entrepreneurs in EU countries, it should be noted that the inclusion of the applicant on the lists at issue pursued a specific objective, namely that of increasing the pressure on the Lukashenko regime, particularly in the context of the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine and of the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

204Although that argument is irrelevant in the context of a case concerning restrictive measures under the CFSP, which therefore related to EU foreign policy, it should be noted that the situation of workers dismissed by employers within the European Union can in no way be compared to that of workers dismissed by the applicant for having taken part in a strike against the Lukashenko regime.

205Accordingly, the third plea must be rejected in its entirety.

206In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the application for partial annulment of the initial acts must be dismissed.

The application for partial annulment of the maintaining acts

207By a statement of modification, the applicant seeks, pursuant to Article 86 of the Rules of Procedure, annulment of the maintaining acts in so far as they concern it, reiterating the pleas in law and arguments raised in the application.

208The Council is of the view that it has already demonstrated in the defence and the rejoinder that the applicant supported and benefited from the Lukashenko regime, and contends that the evidence available to it justifies maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue.

209In the context of the third and fifth pleas alleging infringement, by the maintaining acts, of the principle of non-discrimination and of the obligation to state reasons, respectively, the applicant has failed to submit any arguments in addition to those put forward against the initial acts.

210Consequently, since the third and fifth pleas have already been examined and rejected in the context of the initial acts (see paragraphs 206 and 43 above, respectively), they must be rejected on the same grounds in so far as they are directed at the maintaining acts.

211In the context of the first plea, alleging infringement of the principle of legality, the applicant claims that the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Belarus and Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the Conditions of Transit of Cargo from the Republic of Belarus using the Ports and Other Transport Infrastructure of the Republic of Lithuania of 3 April 2000 guarantees it a right to transit cargo through Lithuanian territory to the ports of Belarus, in accordance with Article 125 of UNCLOS. The applicant maintains that that agreement is jeopardised by the restrictive measures, which constitutes an infringement of the international agreements in force. Furthermore, it refers to an investment in a port terminal in Lithuania, covered by an agreement of 5 March 1999 on the promotion and protection of investments, which ought to ensure that the applicant enjoys full legal protection and security. However, in accordance with Article 351(1) TFEU, the rights and obligations arising from those agreements should not be affected by the provisions of the EU Treaties.

212In so far as concerns that argument, it should be noted, first of all, that in the event of any infringement of bilateral agreements by a State party, the national court or the court or tribunal established on the basis of such an agreement has jurisdiction to hear actions against infringements of those agreements.

213Even if, in the present case, it were possible for the applicant to rely on the two bilateral agreements mentioned in paragraph 211 above and the European Union were bound to observe those agreements, pursuant to Article 351(1) TFEU, it should be noted that the applicant has failed to demonstrate, and it is not apparent from the information before the Court, whether and to what extent the aforementioned agreements were affected by the maintaining acts. In that regard, the applicant merely makes general assertions concerning the infringement of the aforementioned bilateral agreements, without specifying in what way and by what means the provisions of the bilateral agreements have allegedly been infringed by the maintaining acts. Furthermore, it should be noted that those agreements do not lay down unconditional obligations, but rather offer various options for departing therefrom.

214Consequently, the first plea must be rejected on that ground and on those referred to in the findings devoted to the examination of that plea in so far as concerns the lawfulness of the initial acts.

215In the context of the fourth plea, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality, the applicant submits that the Council, besides having failed to conduct a proper review of its initial decision, ignored the observations and information that it had submitted to the Council before the adoption of the contested acts.

216In that connection, it should be recalled, as is clear in paragraph 200 above, that restrictive measures are measures of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, the validity of which always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply. In addition, in order to justify retaining a person’s name on the list, the Council is not prohibited from basing its decision on the same evidence justifying the initial inclusion, re-inclusion or previous retention of the name of the person concerned on the list, provided that (i) the reasons given for inclusion remain unchanged and (ii) the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date. That context includes not only the situation of the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures was established, but also the particular situation of the person concerned (see judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).

217In the present case, the applicant’s claim as set out in its statement of modification concerning infringement of the Council’s obligation to carry out a periodic review is unfounded.

218First, by letter of 21 December 2022, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to extend the restrictive measures against it and enclosed additional evidence on which the Council relied in the context of the annual review of the measures, and the applicant submitted observations on the extension of the measures and the new evidence by letter of 12 January 2023.

219Second, by letter of 24 February 2023, the Council replied to the applicant’s observations. That letter contained detailed arguments explaining the reasons why the Council took the view that the applicant’s arguments were not sufficient for it to alter its assessment and that it was appropriate to continue to apply restrictive measures to the applicant.

220The applicant was therefore able to submit its comments before the maintaining acts were adopted, and its observations were taken into account by the Council.

221Moreover, inasmuch as the applicant essentially reiterates the arguments which have already been rejected in the context of the examination of the fourth plea in respect of the initial acts, without submitting fresh arguments concerning the maintaining acts, those arguments must also be rejected with regard to the maintaining acts.

222It follows that the fourth plea must be rejected.

223In the context of the second plea, the applicant alleges an error of assessment of the facts and infringement of Article 4(1)(a) and (b) of Decision 2012/642.

224In that regard, in the first place, it should be noted that, in so far as they concern the applicant, the grounds for the maintaining acts are, in essence, identical to the grounds for the initial acts. In addition, in support of the application for partial annulment of the maintaining acts, the applicant reiterates the arguments already relied on in respect of the initial acts. In its defence, the Council reiterates the same arguments as those already put forward to justify the validity of the initial acts.

225It follows that, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 79 to 104 and 113 to 124 above, the applicant has failed to establish that the grounds of the maintaining acts are vitiated by an error of assessment with regard to the question whether the applicant supports and benefits from the Lukashenko regime and is responsible for the repression of civil society. The applicant itself acknowledges that most of the items of evidence submitted by the Council on 21 December 2022 are the same as those relied upon in order to justify initially including the applicant on the lists at issue. As to the other items of evidence, it should be observed that the applicant has failed to put forward any argument capable of calling into question the grounds for maintaining its name on the lists at issue. In that regard, the information available on the applicant’s website, which was submitted by the Council as evidence in Working Document 17500/22 INIT, shows that the applicant continues to describe itself as ‘one of the world’s largest producers and exporters of potash fertilisers’ accounting for ‘one fifth of global potash production’, which ‘every year … increases production volumes, maintains its positions in traditional markets, enters and strengthens its positions in others, and develops and produces new types of fertilisers’. Consequently, the context of the applicant’s inclusion on the lists at issue as compared with its initial listing has not changed in such a way that the other evidence is now out of date, with the result that the Council could validly rely on the listing grounds (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 99).

226In the second place, the grounds on which the assessment that the applicant supports and benefits from the Lukashenko regime and is responsible for the repression of civil society is based are sufficiently detailed and specific, are free from error of assessment of the facts or error of law and constitute in themselves a sufficient basis for maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue.

227Consequently, the second plea must be rejected as unfounded and, accordingly, the application for partial annulment of the maintaining acts dismissed.

228In the light of all of the foregoing considerations, the present action must be dismissed in its entirety, without it being necessary to order the measure of inquiry sought by the applicant, consisting in an expert report, which it is for the Court to prescribe where it deems this necessary, in accordance with Article 91(1) of the Rules of Procedure.

Costs

229Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those of the Council, including those relating to the application for interim measures, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council.

230Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Member States and institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. Consequently, the Kingdom of Belgium and the Republic of Latvia must be ordered to bear their own costs.

Operative part

On those grounds,THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition)hereby:

1.Dismisses the action;

2.Orders Belaruskali AAT to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union, including those relating to the application for interim measures;

3.Orders the Kingdom of Belgium and the Republic of Latvia each to bear their own costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 18 September 2024.