425Second, while the Commission is correct in stating, in essence, that the factors referred to in paragraph 383 above should not be disregarded, the fact remains that those factors, while they may be relevant to assessing the capability of conduct to have anticompetitive effects, do not in themselves demonstrate, in the present case, anticompetitive effect and, in particular, foreclosure. The same applies in relation to the extent of the applicant’s dominant position (referred to in Section 10 of the contested decision), the duration and amount of the payments concerned (referred to in Section 11.4.1 and Section 11.8 of the contested decision), the market share covered by those payments (referred to in Section 11.4.3 of the contested decision) and the importance of Apple as a customer (referred to in Section 11.4.4 of the contested decision). Making reference to those factors cannot call into question the fact that, in the present case, the Commission’s demonstration of the capability of the payments concerned to have anticompetitive effects, in particular as regards the capability of the practice at issue to foreclose at least as-efficient competitors, was not carried out in the light of all the relevant factual circumstances surrounding the conduct concerned given the alleged reduction in Apple’s incentives to switch to the applicant’s competitors for all its LTE chipset requirements for iPhones and iPads.