27As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, in paragraphs 22 and 23 of the judgment of 4 June 2009, Pannon GSM (C‑243/08, EU:C:2009:350), the Court held that the system of protection introduced by Directive 93/13 is based on the idea that the consumer is in a weak position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, as regards both his bargaining power and his level of knowledge. This leads to the consumer agreeing to terms drawn up in advance by the seller or supplier without being able to influence the content of those terms. The Court has also held that, in view of that position of weakness, Directive 93/13 requires Member States to provide for a mechanism ensuring that every contractual term not individually negotiated may be reviewed in order to determine whether it is unfair (judgment of 26 March 2019, Abanca Corporación Bancaria and Bankia, C‑70/17 and C‑179/17, EU:C:2019:250, paragraph 50). In that context, the objective pursued by Article 6 of that directive would not be achieved if the consumer were himself obliged to raise the unfairness of a term of the contract, and effective consumer protection may be attained only if the national court acknowledges that it has the power to evaluate terms of this kind of its own motion (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 June 2000, Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores, C‑240/98 to C‑244/98, EU:C:2000:346, paragraph 26).
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