47In the third place, it is undoubtedly the case that, although the principal objective of the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading is to reduce emissions of such gases substantially, one of its sub-objectives is to preserve the integrity of the internal market and of conditions of competition (see, to that effect, judgments of 29 March 2012, Commission v Estonia, C‑505/09 P, EU:C:2012:179, paragraph 79, and of 22 June 2016, DK Recycling und Roheisen v Commission, C‑540/14 P, EU:C:2016:469, paragraphs 49 and 50). However, as the Advocate General noted in point 49 of her Opinion, there is an objective difference between an operator who releases greenhouse gases into the atmosphere and an operator who avoids such emissions by chemically transforming the CO2 produced into a new, stable chemical in which it is bound. Consequently, although as far as the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading is concerned such a difference allows the second operator to hold onto a greater allowance than the first, that difference cannot be regarded per se as distorting competition between those two operators.
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