law://eu/cjeu/1983/c-98-83/hd_1_1_3_2@2026-11-17Summary of the applicants' observationsThe applicants submit, first, that the Commission was in breach of its obligation to give the reasons for its decision, and secondly that the remission was wrongly refused.(a) They maintain that in order to meet the conditions laid down in Article 13 of Regulation No 1430/79 it is necessary both to have acted in good faith and to be able to prove the existence of special circumstances. However, they contend that in the statement of reasons for its decisions the defendant merely sets out the circumstances, the existence of which the applicants had proved, which showed that they had acted in good faith, and omitted to mention the special circumstances which they had relied on. These special circumstances were the following :deceit or fraud on the part of their clients;the issue of certificates of origin by the customs authorities in Egypt, Morocco, Turkey and Italy;the fact that they were unaware that the certificates were not valid;the fact that the applicants acted in their own name.(b) According to the applicants, the defendant justified its decision by means of the following argument: if the declaration of the goods for free circulation is made by a customs agent in his own name, a remission under Article 13 of Regulation No 1430/79 would nullify the effect of subsequent checks by the customs authorities which showed that the movement certificate or T 2 L document on the basis of which a preferential rate of duty had been levied was not valid. However, remission of import duties generally takes place as a consequence of facts which only come to light during a subsequent investigation. The examples now being quoted by the Commission (see below) support that argument because it is only after the event that it can be seen that too much customs duty has been paid. A handful of examples does not suffice to show that in practice subsequent checks are rarely, or never, carried out. Moreover, a subsequent investigation carried out in order to determine whether the criteria laid down in Article 13 of Regulation No 1430/79 had been satisfied would be irrelevant.(c) Van Gend & Loos states, moreover, that the defendant contends, in support of its decision in relation to that applicant, that no negligence whatsoever can be attributed to the Netherlands customs authorities in regard to the way in which they carried out the investigation to determine whether there had been an offence. However, any negligence on the part of the Netherlands customs authorities which occurred during the investigation of a possible offence is irrelevant in this case. What Van Gend & Loos criticized was in fact the authorities' negligence at the time that the goods were declared for the purpose of putting them into free circulation. Van Gend & Loos emphasizes that according to information recently received from the Netherlands customs authorities, there was at the time that the goods in question were declared a presumption that the certificates produced did not state the correct origin of the goods. Had Van Gend & Loos been informed of that presumption at the time of its declaration, it could have taken steps to protect its interests. It cannot agree with the defendant's statement that it is not generally appropriate during an investigation to communicate information about it to interested parties. It is clear that such parties might suffer considerable damage owing to the absence of information.The arguments concerning the passive role of the customs and the fact that it was impossible to keep all officials informed of developments in the case is not relevant since a single telephone call would habe been sufficient to allow the applicants to take steps to protect their interests. The defendant's arguments to the contrary do not justifiy the refusal of a remission because the two criteria laid down in Article 13 have nothing to do with the question of negligence on the part of the customs authorities.(d) According to the applicants, it is difficult to ascertain what were the criteria used by the defendant when applying Article 13 of Regulation No 1430/79, when in fact the preamble to the regulation requires that the procedure set out in that article be followed in order to define the situations which justify repayment or remission of import duties.The defendant is now attempting to put forward additional reasons for its decision in the observations it has presented to the Court by claiming that Article 13 can only be applied if the goods are destroyed, delivered free of charge to certain charities or reexported. Those additional reasons cannot be used to justify a decision which itself contains an insufficient statement of the reasons on which it was based. Moreover, compliance with such conditions was required neither during the procedure which led up to the adoption of the decision, nor in the decision itself.Similarly, when the defendant claims that it pointed out in its decision that “the customs agent, by making the declaration in its own name and on its own account, is itself liable for the importation, which implies that it is liable even if the certificates presented on that occasion are found to be invalid”, it is seeking to justify its decision after the event, since no such ground appeared in the decision itself.Even though the present level of knowledge and experience is not such as to permit the defendant to define the situations referred to in Article 13, it must determine in each individual case the grounds on which remission is not justified in a manner which is clear and comprehensible both for the applicants and for the Court.(e) Even though they refer to an examination by the Committee on Dutyfree Arrangements, the decisions at issue make no reference either to a proposal or to an opinion of that Committee, nor do they indicate either the contents of any proposal or opinion of the Committee on Duty-Free Arrangements which might exist or the result of any vote in the Committee, and it is thus impossible to verify that the defendant complied with the procedure laid down in Article 25 of Regulation No 1430/79 in adopting its decision. In any event, the defendant has infringed Article 5 of Regulation No 1575/80 and Article 190 of the Treaty.In exactly the same way as the procedural rules for determining which cases are covered by Article 13, the cases themselves are to be determined in accordance with the opinion of a group of experts. Unlike the text of the draft regulation (Official Journal C 54, 6.3.1976, p. 85) — on which the Commission is now basing its argument — the regulation in force provides that the procedure to be followed is that laid down in Article 25. However, Article 25 refers to the procedure laid down in Article 9 in Regulation No 1798/75 requiring the Commission to obtain the opinion of a group of experts. Moreover, it is clear from in the preambles to Regulation No 1430/79 and Regulation No 1575/80 that the Commission is obliged to obtain that opinion.(f) Finally, the applicants claim that the decisions at issue are void because they had no opportunity to be heard, even though the decisions had major financial consequences for them. The applicants were not in the same position as the representatives of the Netherlands who took part in the meetings of the Committee on Duty-Free Arrangements and who, moreover, were under no obligation to support an application put forward by the applicants. At national level, the procedure was limited to presentation of an application by the applicants and verification by the national authorities of the existence of sufficient ground for that application. The applicants submit to the Court a letter from the Netherlands Ministry of Finance indicating the conditions which the applications were required to meet. Case 294/81, Control Data Belgium NV, in which the Court, in a judgment of 17 March 1983, rejected the same argument in similar proceedings, can be distinguished from the present case inasmuch as the applicant in that case was relying solely on an infringement of essential procedural requirements. In this case, neither the group of experts nor, a fortiori, the applicants were consulted. Moreover, the applicants have relied upon an infringement of the general principles of law, which is more than just an infringement of procedural requirements (judgment of 13.7.1966, Joined Cases 56 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299).(g) The applicants invite the Commission to produce written evidence that the time-limits laid down in Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation No 1575/80 have been observed. Even though the defendant's letters were dated 11 January 1983, that does not mean that they were sent on the same date.(h) The applicants emphasize that Article 10 of Regulation No 1430/79 cites seven sets of circumstances which give rise to a special situation. In Article 11, remission on the grounds of those circumstances is conditional upon the goods having been destroyed, delivered free of charge to charities or reexported. Although the opening words of Article 11 (1) show that that article merely lays down detailed rules for the cases referred to in Article 10, the defendant apparently now wishes to apply the conditions laid down in Article 11 to remissions granted on the basis of Article 13. If the Community legislature had wished to make the conditions laid down in Article 11 applicable to the situations provided for in Article 13, it would have clearly indicated its intention to do so. The re-export in question in the examples now given by the defendant is not a special circumstance but merely a condition of remission within the meaning of Article 10.It should be noted that Article 13 (3), as adopted in Council Regulation No 1672/82 (Official Journal L 186, 30.6.1982, p. 1), provides that remission may be made subject to special conditions. However, the import duties at issue here were entered in the accounts before 1 July 1982 so that Article 13, as amended, does not apply to the present application. It is only under Article 13 (3), as amended, that re-export can in fact be imposed as a special condition, not under Article 13 in the form in which it was applicable in this case.(i) The applicants submit that the wording of Article 13 of Regulation No 1430/79 reflects the approach adopted by the Court in relation to the expression force majeure, as used in various regulations. According to that approach, it is necessary to bear in mind the legal context in which that concept must produce its effects, the special nature of the public law relationship existing between undertakings and the national administration, and the aims of the regulation in question. It appears from the Court's judgments that “the concept of force majeure is not limited to absolute impossibility but must be understood in the sense of unusual circumstances, outside the control of the importer or exporter, the consequences of which, in spite of the exercise of all due care, could not have been avoided except at the cost of excessive sacrifice” (judgment of 17.12.1970 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125).The applicants are surprised to note that the defendant considers that they did not take sufficient care, something which contradicts many other statements referring to “the absence of negligence or deception” on the part of the applicants. The defendant can therefore no longer contend that the applicants acted without sufficient care and can only claim that there are no special circumstances.The applicants also emphasize that the general interest requires that trade between Member States not be hindered by overly restrictive obligations. No doubt experienced customs agents such as the applicants can detect forgeries, but improper issue of certificates as a result of the unlawful act of the customs authorities of the country, from which the goods come or in which they originated is a circumstance entirely beyond their control. Moreover, the fact that the certificates Avere invalid did not emerge until after a particularly long investigation carried out by the Netherlands authorities.A customs agent has neither the means nor the powers to carry out such an investigation.A customs agent cannot act as agent for its clients since Article 55 of the General Law on customs and excise requires that customs agents act in their own name. The Netherlands customs authorities take no account of the concept of agency and import duties payable are deducted from the applicants' current account.In order to protect their interests, the applicants would have to require each of their clients to lodge a guarantee equal to the normal rate of duty and to maintain that guarantee for the period of several years during which additional duty could be demanded. That would be unacceptable to the applicants' clients.The fact that the importation is carried out by a customs agent has advantages not only for the clients but also for the authorities who have the benefit of the agent's experience and of the fact that it has a current account.In the context of the plea of force majeure, it is important to note that, in a case such as the present one, the Netherlands authorities granted a remission of duty both on grounds of equity and in the light of the special circumstances of the case in respect of import duties to which Regulation No 1430/79 was not applicable on account ot the date on which it came into force. It was not a case of applying legislation of a Member State which was subsequently replaced by Community rules, but rather of granting a remission on equitable grounds. The Court of Justice has not only based its own decisions on the practice of the national authorities but has also recognized the principle of equity.The applicants point out that the certificates of origin furnished were actually issued by the competent authorities of the exporting State declared on those certificates, so that the applicants had no reason to doubt the validity of the certificates. The requirement that the consequences of an exceptional event must also be umforeseeable if the concept of force majeure is to be relied upon is to be found neither in the law of the Member States nor in the case-law of the Court of Justice.It is significant that the Netherlands administration informed the applicants that proceedings for the recovery of the sums due would not be pursued “in the light of the special circumstances” and “on equitable grounds”, as regards the import duties to which Regulation No 1430/79 did not apply by virtue of the date on which it came into force.Finally, the applicants rely on the expectations raised by the customs authorities as regards the validity of the certificates furnished and contend that those expectations should be met when applying Regulation No 1430/79. The customs authorities are not required to carry out a thorough and systematic investigation, but when the national authorities carry out an investigation in a particular case because they suspect that clients of the customs agents have committed offences, they should act so as to limit as far as possible the damage suffered by third party undertakings.
The defendant emphasizes that what gives rise to the obligation to pay import duties is the act of bringing certain goods into the Community's customs territory. However, it may subsequently be discovered that the imported goods have left the customs territory or have been destroyed. In such cases, a customs debt is no longer justified. The Council adopted Regulation No 1430/79 so as to be able to cancel the customs debt in such cases.That regulation mentions four different situations and a residual category. It has proved impossible until now to define in general terms the cases which fall into the residual category since the knowledge and experience necessary to do so are still lacking. Thus, cases falling into the residual category must be defined by what is called the committee procedure.In the relatively numerous cases which have been referred to the defendant under Article 13 of the Council regulation, the defendant has always followed the spirit of the Council regulation, and consequently it has only granted remissions or repayments when, by reason of special circumstance, the goods in question were no longer within the customs territory, or had been placed under another customs procedure, placed in free circulation, destroyed, and so on.In two cases, for example, duty was reimbursed which had been paid at the time of importation of vehicles bought in the United States but which did not comply with the legislation in force in the United Kingdom and which, for that reason, had to be re-exported.In this case, there is no question of the goods having been re-exported or destroyed, nor of the application of a higher tariff than that provided for under the Common Customs Tariff; the goods were placed in free circulation in the usual way and have remained in the Community's customs territory. Moreover, the import duty levied by way of the demand for additional duty is at the rate applicable to the goods, having regard to their nature and their origin.(a) With regard to the argument that the Commission's decision infringes the obligation to state the reasons on which it was based, the defendant points out that it is sufficient if the decision sets out in a concise but clear and relevant manner the principal issues of law and of fact upon which it is based and which are necessary in order that the reasoning which led the Commission to adopt that decision mav be understood. In this case, the preambles to the decisions refer in each case first of all to the applications presented by the Netherlands authorities and also contain a detailed statement of the circumstances on the basis of which a remission of import duties is being sought. Two of the arguments on the basis of which the applicants are seeking die remission are mentioned, namely that “the customs agent acted in good faith” and that “the customs authorities could have informed them earlier of their suspicions”.
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