law://eu/cjeu/1981/c-262-81/hd_1_1_2_6@2026-11-16According to the United Kingdom, the essence of the question asked by the Belgian Cour de Cassation lies in the first part of the question. In the second part of its question, the Belgian court suggests two alternative reasons why the contract might not fall within Article 85. The United Kingdom submits that the agreement does not fall within Article 85, not only for the two reasons suggested by the Belgian court in the second part of its question but also “for the simple further reason that there is nothing in the contract — whether by object or effect — which either affects trade between Member States or which prevents, restricts or distorts competition within the common market”.Before embarking upon a legal analysis, the United Kingdom, like the French Government and the respondents in the main proceedings, emphasizes the fact that a declaration that exclusive licences were contrary to Article 85 would render unworkable the present system of making and distributing cinematographic works, since the characteristics of film production and of the system for distributing films are such that, in order for the system to work, it is necessary in many cases that the transfer of the various rights should be exclusive, particularly in the case of distributors, since they will promote the film only if in return they obtain the exclusive right to show the film.Turning to consider the relevant law, the United Kingdom first refers briefly to the difference between assignments and licences, emphasizing that an assignment is a transfer of property whereas a licence forms part of the law of contract. It states that this distinction does not eflect a genuine distinction in commercial reality, since what is important in this context is exclusivity and for that reason it considers that the distinction which it has pointed out between an assignment and a licence has no bearing on the decision in this case.The United Kingdom next considers the compatibility of such an assignment or exclusive licence with Article 85 of the Treaty. In its view such assignments or exclusive licences may constitute an infringement of Article 85 but that is by no means necessarily so. It states that in any event this is a question of fact which is to be determined by the national court. Moreover, in the present case neither the assignment nor the exclusive licence satisfies the requirements of Article 85, since the effect of the assignment or licence was simply to transfer the exclusive right from one party to another who was in a better position to manage it. That transfer neither increased nor decreased actual or potential competition, nor did it affect trade between Member States. Moreover, the United Kingdom contends that the Court has already effectively so held in paragraph 16 of its judgment in Case 62/79 Coditei, cited above.The United Kingdom adds that in this case no artificial barriers were created and that the Court, using in paragraphs 13 and 14 the expression “a copyright owner and his assigns”, considered that copyright could be assigned.Consequently, “a decision in the present case holding otherwise would be tantamount to rendering the first Coditei case a pointless exercise”.Turning next to what it refers to as the two reasons suggested by the Belgian Cour de Cassation for the non-applicability of Article 85, the United Kingdom maintains, first, with regard to Article 36, that it follows from the judgment of 18 February 1971 in Case 40/70 Sirena v Eda [1971] ECR 69 that the article is also applicable by analogy to matters governed by Article 85. On that basis the protection of Article 36 is also available for the protection òf the assignee or exclusive licensee on the ground that his right to require fees forms part of the specific subject-matter of the copyright.With regard to the legal status of the licensee, the United Kingdom understands that under Belgian law the exclusive licensee has been given the right to bring infringement proceedings or their equivalent against third parties. The United Kingdom considers that in this case the mere transfer of an industrial property right and the contract relating to the transfer cannot as such fall within Article 85, since they do not involve the creation of artificial barriers to trade between Member States.Finally, the United Kingdom considers the consequences of a decision declaring that the agreement in question is contrary to Article 85. Article 85(2) provides that the agreement is to be void, but that nullity is not necessarily total. Indeed, it may be that only the terms which have anticompetitive effect are void. However, “it does not appear that in the present case the exclusivity clause can be excised from the agreement and the remainder of the agreement enforced against the infringer”.The United Kingdom considers that another possibility would be to follow the solution adopted by the national court responsible for applying the decision of the Court in Case 40/70 Sirena. The result none the less, would be that even if the agreement were technically contrary to Article 85, the copyright could still be enforced against the infringer. If, however, the the agreement were to be declared totally null and void, it must follow that no transfer of the copyright could have occurred, in which case there would be no reason why the original owner of the rights could not enforce them against infringers. Such a decision would therefore mean that the licensee or assignee would not have the security of being able to enforce the copyright himself or to compel an unwilling licensor to do so and ultimately would permit “one party to renege on a deal which it is in the interests of an efficient Community film-distribution system to preserve”.Finally, if the agreement were held to be void simply because it involved the grant of an exclusive right, Community law would, in the view of the United Kingdom, favour unduly the large film-producing organizations, which exploit their film directly throughout the whole of the Community, at the expense of the small independent producer who does not have his own Communitywide organization.Consequently, the United Kingdom considers that the Court should answer the question asked in the negative and that it need do no more than reaffirm in the specific context of Article 85 what it stated in paragraph 17 of its judgment in the first Coditei case, namely:17. The exclusive assignee of the performing right in a film for the whole of a Member State may therefore rely upon his right against cable television diffusion companies which have transmitted that film on their diffusion network having received it from a television broadcasting station established in another Member State, without thereby infringing Community law.”
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