law://eu/cjeu/1981/c-262-81/hd_1_1_2_1_2@2026-11-17According to the appellants in the main proceedings, the question raises the issue as to whether Article 85 is inapplicable because the action derives from a legal status. Interpreted in that manner, the question asks in effect “where in this particular case the line is to be drawn between the existence of copyright and the exercise thereof”. The Court of Justice, in drawing that distinction itself, took the view that the exercise of such a right might fall within the ambit of the prohibitions contained in the Treaty each time it manifested itself as the subject, the means or the consequence of a restrictive practice. Consequently, since in this case the intellectual property right relied upon by Ciné-Vog unquestionably derives from a contract, it is necessary to examine that contract in the light of Article 85.Before embarking upon such an examination, the appellants in the main proceedings first of all raise the matter of the nature of the contract in question. In their view, there has always been uncertainty concerning the description to be applied to it. The contract which was called an “exclusive right to distribute” by the parties to the main proceedings was described by the Cour d'Appel as a “temporary and limited assignment” (the description adopted by the Court of Justice in Case 62/79), whereas in the Commission's view it is a contract granting an exclusive licence. The applicants in the main proceedings share the Commission's view on this matter bu stress that in any event the contract, whether it be a licence or an assignment, clearly restricts competition not only because it contains an exclusive-rights clause but also because in the contract there is a first clause in Articles 7 and 8 determining the proportion of the receipts to be attributed to the film “La Boucher” where it is shown jointly with another film and with short supporting films and a second clause to the effect that the television rights may not be exploited by Luxembourg television until thirty-two months after their exploitation by Belgian television. Since the latter clause applies dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions, it is expressly prohibited by Article 85 (d).Turning next to the lawfulness of the exclusive right granted to Ciné-Vog, the appellants in the main proceedings maintain that the grant of licences and the exclusive rights attaching thereto do not under any circumstances appertain to the existence of industrial property rights but solely to the exercise thereof. Thus, exclusive rights deriving from an agreement or from a concerted practice fall within the scope of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty. Those principles also apply in matters of copyright, as is demonstrated by the Commission's practice in that area.That analysis of the position with regard to exclusive rights under Article 85 is essentially the same where there is an exclusive assignment rather than an exclusive licence. The appellants in the main proceedings maintain that their view is confirmed by the judgment of the Court of 27 March 1974 in Case 127/73 Belgische Radio en Televisie v SABAM [1974] ECR 313 and that the judgment of 25 October 1979 in Case 22/79 Greenwich Film Production v Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Éditeurs de Musique [1979] ECR 3275.Finally, the appellants consider that, as is clear from the case-law of the Court, any assessment of the restrictive effect of a contract must take account of actual circumstances, and the existence of similar contracts is a circumstance which is capable of being a factor in the economic and legal context within which the contract must be judged (cf. judgment of 12 December 1967 in Case 23/67 SA Brasserie de Haecht v Wilkin and Wilkin [1967] ECR 407 and judgment of 25 October 1977 in Case 26/76 Metro v Commission [1977] ECR 1975). Consequently, in this case it is necessary to take into account the agreement concluded with German television and other contracts assigning rights for cinematographic and televised performance and exploitation, since, according to the appellants in the main proceedings, it is “almost certain that in other Member States similar contracts containing similar restrictions have been concluded”. In view of the exclusive rights on the one hand and the clauses apportioning receipts on the other, such a network of contracts has at least the effect of restricting competition. Consideration should also be given to the reputation of the producer and the principal actors and to the popularity to which that may lead on the market.Finally, the appellants in the main proceedings consider that the judgment given in Case 62/79 Coditei cited above does not alter their conclusions as to the unlawfulness of the contract of exclusive assignment by reason of its incompatibility with Article 85 (1). That judgment was concerned only with the freedom to provide services and was given in response to a request for a preliminary ruling. The sole issue which had been raised in that case was the lawfulness of the prohibition of televised retransmission and consequently the Court gave a ruling on that point and not on the issue raised by the present question submitted by the Belgian Cour de Cassation, namely the lawfulness under Article 85 of wholly exclusive performing rights which are valid not only with regard to the retransmission of television programmes broadcast in another Member State but also with regard to live televised retransmission and, in particular, cinematographic exploitation by other distributors.Consequently, the appellants in the main proceedings consider that if, as the Court has stated, the determinant factor, as far as a performing right in a cinematographic film is concerned, is the right of the owner to demand fees, it is inherent neither in the right to demand fees nor therefore in the existence of the performing right that the latter should be exercised exclusively by one of the contracting parties.Consequently, the appellants in the main proceedings propose that the following reply should be given to the second part of the question asked by the Cour de Cassation:“Where the performing right which the assignee seeks to enforce is the subject, the means or the consequence of an agreement which restricts competition, both by reason of its subject-matter, which comprises an exclusive-rights clause, tie-in provisions and discriminatory conditions, and by reason of the economic and legal context surrounding the agreement, it is not possible to dispense with an assessment of the compatibility of that performing right with Article 85 on the ground that the right derives from a legal status.”
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