law://eu/cjeu/1979/c-130-79/hd_1_1_2_2@2026-11-20The plaintiff in the main action considers that it is very important to know what is the position under Community law with regard to repayment. The answer to this question is even more important since the position is “far from clear” in the United Kingdom, where, according to the plaintiff, it may perhaps be impossible to obtain recovery of monies unduly paid. For this reason, the plaintiff in the main action hopes that the Commission will clarify its own attitude, that is to say, that it should state whether it will itself reimburse the monies unduly paid or whether it will undertake to reimburse the sums in question to any Member State making restitution of sums unduly paid. The plaintiff believes that in the other Member States, the appropriate national authorities have refunded the sums wrongly collected on powdered whey and that the only problem outstanding is that of interest. It is therefore only in case the Commission does not sufficiently clarify its position to theCourt that the plaintiff makes the following observations.In proceeding to an examination of three points, the plaintiff submits first that “Community law places upon the Commission the obligation to repay or to take all steps to ensure that monies so paid are refunded by national authorities”.On the basis of the decisions given in Case 11/76, Kingdom of the Netherlands v Commission of the European Communities [1979] ECR 245 and Case 18/76, Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities [1979] ECR 343, the plaintiff submits that the Commission has accepted that it has an obligation to bear the financial consequences of its own unlawful conduct in adopting unlawful legislation; and, in the present case, for compliance with that obligation it would suffice for the Commission to inform the defendant that it accepts that it must bear the financial consequences of its own conduct thus enabling the defendant to make the appropriate payments to the plaintiff.The plaintiff in the main action submits, secondly, that “Community law places upon the national authority, which has received such payments, the obligation to refund the monies so received, and then in turn the national authority can recover or obtain credit from the Commission for such sums refunded”. The plaintiff considers that that obligation flows clearly from the judgment in Case 6/60 (Humblet v Belgian State [1960] ECR 559) and that it arises not only when national legislation or provisions are unlawful by reason of Community law, but also when monies have to be paid to national authorities under Community legislation, where that Community legislation is unlawful.The plaintiff states, furthermore, that although a regulation is valid until it is declared invalid or unlawful, once the regulation is declared unlawful, it becomes unlawful ah initio, and the previous demands for payment also become unlawful. The plaintiff adds, on this matter, that any other interpretation would mean that monies paid could never be recovered. The plaintiff also lays stress on the fact that even in a situation where it has been held by the Court that national laws are to apply (Case 45/76, Comet BV v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1976] ECR 2043 and Case 33/76, REWE v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989), the Court accepted that the undertakings had rights which the national courts had to protect. Accordingly, in the present case, the plaintiff submits that were there to be no remedy in English law to allow for such repayment then Community law, particularly in the light of Article 5 of the EEC Treaty, would provide the necessary remedy in order to enable the English courts to make an order for repayment and thus- to facilitate achievement of the Community's tasks in accordance with Article 5 of the EEC Treaty.The plaintiff submits, thirdly, “that cases already decided by this court to the effect that national remedies must be used to recover from national authorities deal with the situation which arises when the payment was due to the misapplication or misinterpretation of the law, or error, but do not deal with the situation which arises when it is Community law itself which is unlawful”. In support of this argument the plaintiff cites Cases 45/76 Comet BV and 33/76 REWE (previously cited), 26/64 Roquette v Commission [1976] ECR 677, 177/78 Pigs and Bacon Commission v McCarren & Co. [1979] ECR 2161 and the opinion for Mr Advocate General Warner in Case 265/78, Ferwerda BV v Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees.The defendant in the main action is concerned above all to establish “that, having loyally enforced the regulation at a time when it had not been declared to be invalid, and having duly accounted to the Commission for the money collected under it”, the defendant is under no liability to compensate, out of its own funds, persons who are aggrieved by the invalidity of the Commission's regulation. Such repayments are a matter for the Community alone. The only obligation incumbent on the agencies of the Member States — acting as agents of the Commission — would be to effect out of Community funds any repayment to individuals required by Community law. In these circumstances, the defendant in the main action considers that the real question of interpretation for the Court is whether the Member States, in collecting these compensatory amounts and making them available to the Community, are acting on behalf of the Community; the defendant answers that question in the affirmative.This question is all the more important since English law does not admit a claim for repayment of such sums against the person having collected the money, the only action which it allows being one against the person on whose behalf it was collected. Accordingly, in the submission of the defendant, it is against the Commission that any action for the restitution of these amounts must be brought. The defendant submits that such a claim is not a claim in contract but a claim in quasi-contract and falls within the second paragraph of Article 215 of the EEC Treaty which is clearly intended to cover all forms of liability including claims quasi ex contractu.According to the defendant, if this solution is not adopted and the consequences of the invalidation of Community legislation are left to be regulated by the municipal law of each Member State, then, given the disparities which exist between the Member States in regard to recovery of undue payment, injustice to both individuals and Member States would result. The defendant submits further that the solution which it advances is not incompatible with the earlier case-law of the Court. Thus, in Case 101/78, Granaria [1979] ECR 623, Mr Advocate General Capotorti stated: “It is therefore impossible to refer to unlawful measures on the part of a Member State, or by an agency subject to its control, in relation to measures in implementation of Community provisions in force”. Liability on the part of a Member State may only arise if the Member State exercises a discretionary power to enact implementing legislation in such a manner as to enact specific provisions which are contrary to Community law or if it continues to give effect to a measure after it has been declared to be invalid.But, according to the defendant in the main action, the steps taken by it, in the present case, did not amount to either of these things. On the basis of the general principle thus formulated by Mr Advocate General Capotorti the defendant is of the view that it is appropriate to reconsider the decision in Case 96/71, Haegeman [1972] ECR 1005, in which the Court held, contrary to the opinion of Mr Advocate General Mayras, that a claim for a refund of countervailing charges which had been collected was inadmissible. It is submitted that that judgment cannot mean that the Member State may be liable to refund charges made under invalid regulations “in the absence of some unlawful act of its own in applying them”.Even though, according to the defendant in the main action, it appears that on that hypothesis the Court assumed that the Commission would provide the funds necessary to make any reimbursement, the defendant considers that any dispute as to the amount of refund or interest due could only be decided in proceedings between the claimant and the Commission.Finally, the defendant submits that the solution adopted in Case 46/75 (I. B. C. v Commission [1976] ECR 65) is not applicable to the present case either since the question is not whether the claims involve the Community's resources but whether there is any complaint against the Member State.Accordingly the defendant submits that the second question should be answered as follows:“When a Commission regulation has been declared invalid a Member State which has collected sums of money under the authority of that regulation before it was declared invalid and accounted for them to the Commission is under no obligation under Community law to refund any part of them to the person from whom they were collected”.The Commission is of the opinion that this general question cannot be answered in the abstract, for the reason that the answer must depend on the nature of the charge, the circumstances in which it was imposed, and the grounds and formulation of the Court's judgment. The Commission mentions, by way of reminder, that certain rules have been adopted at the Community level on the repayment of customs duties, which are defined to include compensatory amounts. These rules provide for the repayment of duties wrongly paid provided that an application for repayment is submitted within three years of the date on which the charges are entered into the accounts of the collecting authority. But the Commission points out, in this regard, that these provisions do not enter into force until 1 July 1980 and furthermore it is not clear that they cover the case where a duty is properly charged, but on the basis of a legislative act subsequently declared invalid.Reverting to the present case, the Commission submits that an individual who has been obliged to make payment of such a compensatory amount does not have a right to automatic reimbursement. It is submitted that the answer to the question put by the national court has to be sought, in the first place, in the principles of Community law, in order to avoid the differences which might arise if the solution of this problem were reserved to national law.It is true that, in the absence of express Community rules on the matter, the Court has always left it to national law to resolve the problems presented by the diversity of rules of procedure. But, according to the Commission, the reasons which induced the Court to adopt this position do not really apply where a matter of substantive law is concerned. After recalling that it has refrained from exercising its power to make specific rules to govern the practical consequences of a declaration of invalidity by the Court, the Commission wonders under what conditions the refunding of a Community tax, collected without any legal basis, could be refused whilst the tax has been passed on by the exporter to his purchaser and the claim for reimbursement has been presented some five years after the collection of the tax and after the judgment of the Court in Case 131/77.Given the differences to be found in the legal systems of the Member States in regard to recovery of undue payment, the Commission is of the view that the Court might apply by analogy the second paragraph of Article 174 of the EEC Treaty and state which of the effects of the regulations which it has declared void are to be considered as definitive, a possibility which appears to flow from the decision in De/renne, already referred to, and the opinion of Mr Advocate General Capotorti of 23 January 1979 in Case 101/78 (Granaria, also mentioned above).In this context, the Commission suggests that the Court limit the application of its declaration of invalidity by ruling, for example, that “reimbursement of a tax declared invalid should be limited to claims which had already been submitted to the national authorities prior to the date of the Court's judgment” and thus follow a principle analogous to that recognized by German and Italian constitutional law, according to which administrative decisions which are definitive and not subject to any remedy and which are based on a provision of an act declared void shall not be affected. The Commission adds that, although the judgment given in Case 131/77 did not include any limitation of that kind, the Court could, none the less, add such a qualification, even at a later stage, in another case concerning the question of invalidity, as is in fact the case here. Furthermore, that solution is all the more justified by the fact that a solution under national law involves not only a considerable difference in treatment between traders in the Community but also involves, in the case of traders having the advantage of national systems of law which permit recovery of undue payment, advantages which the Commission describes as “windfall profits”, which are without economic justification and would have to be made at the expense of the European taxpayer.Accordingly, the Commission is of the view that the second question should be answered in the following manner:“The competent authorities of the Member States are bound to refund the sums collected under the authority of the said regulations. In the absence of proof that the charge has not been passed on to customers, refunds should however be limited to these cases where claims have been made to the authorities prior to 3 May 1978, subject always to any more restrictive procedural provisions or limitation periods which are laid down by national law”.
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