law://eu/cjeu/1978/c-181-78/hd_1_1_2_1@2026-11-21The Companies maintain that it follows from the provisions of the Second Directive at issue that Article 4 thereof lays down a fundamental rule, to which Point 2 of Annex A provides an exception. Thus everyone is in principle a separate taxable person, and a Member State can introduce the system of the ‘single entity for tax purposes’ only by expressly applying the special, exceptional provision laid down in Point 2 of Annex A. In reliance upon the case-law of the Court of Justice (in particular the judgments in Cases 94/77 Fratelli Zerbone [1978] ECR 99; 79/72 Commission v Italy [1973) ECR 667; 52/75 Commission v Italy [1976] ECR 277; 123/76 Commission v Italy [1977] ECR 1449; 38/77 Enka [1977] ECR 2203; and 95/77 Commission v Netherlands [1978] ECR 863) the Companies submit that the binding nature of directives on the Member States has been acknowledged, and that therefore the Member State in the present case may regard persons who are linked to one another as a single taxable person only if:— it formally proposed to adopt such a system;— it entered into the consultations mentioned in Article 16, and the Commission did not raise any objection to the adoption of the proposed system;— and finally, it expressly adopted such a system.According to the three conditions laid down in the Directive, the Netherlands had to make express legal provision for any additional system which might have been specially adopted.Furthermore, the Companies consider that the Netherlands Law at issue must in no circumstances be interpreted in terms of the concept of an undertaking contained in the old Netherlands Law of 1954 but only in terms of the Directive, having regard to its binding nature demonstrated above.If interpretation were in terms of the old Netherlands Law, it would necessarily lead a priori to a divergent interpretation in the different Member States. Through the Directive, the concept of an ‘undertaking’ in Article 7 (1) of the present Law was automatically given a new content.The Companies continue their line of argument by reference to German legislation, which made express provision for the ‘Organschaft’ [single entity for tax purposes] in a separate paragraph. Thus the conclusion must be drawn that where there is no express provision on the single entity for tax purposes — such as that contained in Article 2 (2) (2) of the German Umsatzsteuergesetz [Turnover Tax Law] — as is the case with the Netherlands Law, it must be deemed that no system such as that referred to in Point 2 ‘Regarding Article 4’ of Annex A to the Directive, has in fact been adopted.Finally, the Companies submit that the Netherlands did not even legally propose to adopt a system involving the single entity for tax purposes, since the consultations provided for in Article 16 of the directive did not take place, and that therefore the question should be answered as follows:‘A Member State may adopt a system such as that referred to in Point 2 “Regarding Article 4” of Annex A to the Second VAT Directive only under the conditions as to substance and as to form which are laid down in that Directive. In the circumstances described by the national court making the reference, such a system cannot be held to have been adopted’.The Commission takes the view that the Second Directive left the Member States a wide area of discretion, and that the institution of the single entity for tax purposes appears to be a long standing concept in Netherlands case-law and theoretical writing. Therefore it does not seem necessary for the concept of an undertaking appearing in Article 7 (1) of the Turnover Tax Law 1968 to be defined expressly as is done in Point 2 of Annex A to the directive.The Commission also points out the Sixth Council Directive on the harmonization of legislation of Member States concerning turnover taxes (No 77/388/ EEC, Official Journal 1977 No L 145, p. 1) which empowers Member States to opt expressly for the German system of the ‘Organschaft’, which constitutes an exception to the normal system. In that case it is therefore no longer a question of a broad interpretation of the general concept of a taxable person. Consequently, the Commission considers that Question 1 should be answered as follows:‘It can be acknowledged that the Kingdom of the Netherlands has adopted a system in accordance with Article 4 of and Point 2 “Regarding Article 4” of Annex A to the Second Directive on VAT, even though only the preparatory stages of the Turnover Tax (VAT) Law 1968 show that the definition of the concept of an “undertaking” in Article 7 (1) of that Law also covers a combination of persons who, although independent from the legal point of view, are, however, organically linked to one another by economic, financial and organizational relationships’.The Netherlands Government makes the preliminary observation that Case 181/78 concerns the retroactive levying of turnover tax in respect of periods in 1971; and that since in its judgment of 2 February 1977 the Hoge Raad has already held that the common value-added tax system defined in the Second Council Directive did not come into force until 1 January 1972, it may well be asked whether the questions raised in the present case merit any attention.The Netherlands Government answers the first two questions very briefly, by insisting on the need to maintain in its entirety the principle of the single entity for tax purposes, because it constitutes a firmly established concept in the practice of the levying of value-added tax, and expresses the view that the Second Directive in no way prevents that principle from being retained in force.The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany draws the Court's attention to the fact that this question raises complex problems which may result from the relatively broad powers of interpretation of the courts in certain Member States. Thus, having regard to the possibilities for the interpretation of vague legal concepts, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany takes the view that preliminary consultations cannot be contemplated, because it would be neither reasonable nor practical to enter into consultations on the possible interpretations conceivable in theory which might be developed by subsequent case-law but which at the time of enactment of the law were still entirely uncertain or not even foreseeable.
Source: EUR-Lex, © European Union, 1998-2026. Reuse authorised under Decision 2011/833/EU.