law://eu/cjeu/1969/c-5-69/hd_1_1_4@2026-11-17With particular reference to Articles 1, 4 and 8 of the agreement in dispute, Vervaecke declares that it constitutes what is known as an exclusive distribution contract.Vervaecke sets out the following argument:— Article 8(a) of the contract is incompatible with Article 85 of the EEC Treaty together with the regulations adopted by the Commission in implementation thereof. This clause provides for a ‘complete and watertight exclusive dealing arrangement’, because it binds Erd & Co., not only to refrain from supplying other purchasers in Belgium and in Luxembourg, but in addition to take measures to prevent parallel deliveries in those countries.— furthermore tne contract binds Vervaecke to accept a minimum of 80 appliances per month, which it would have been initially unable to do if another undertaking had been distributing the same appliances in the protected sector. Consequently it would not have undertaken to order a minimum quantity without the guarantee of the territorial protection in question. It is thus not only Article 8(a) of the disputed contract but the entire contract which is automatically void.The observations or the Commission of the European Communities may be summarized as follows:(a) The following facts should be noted:— The disputed contract and its amendments were not notified to the Commission.— The total production or washing-machines in the Common Market was 2997000 units in 1963 and 4179000 units in 1966. The total production in the Federal Republic of Germany amounted to 1036000 units in 1963 and to 1482000 units in 1966. For 1963 Erd & Co.'s production (2361 units) thus represents 0.08 % of the total production of the Common Market and 0.2 % of the production in the Federal Republic.— In Belgium, the production of washing-machines was 121000 units in 1963 and 63000 units in 1966. In 1966, the total number of appliances distributed in Belgium and in Luxembourg was 163000; the annual number of appliances (960) which the disputed contract bound Vervaecke to distribute thus represents 0.6 % of the total sales in this sector.(b) as it has been formulated, the question put by the Oberlandesgericht, Munich, amounts to asking the Court to apply the Treaty to a particular case, which falls outside its jurisdiction under Article 177. Nevertheless it is simple to deduce from this the real question of interpretation, which is whether regard must be had to the proportion of the market controlled by the manufacturer who has concluded with a distributor an exclusive dealing contract containing ‘absolute territorial protection’, in determining whether Article 85(1) is applicable.(c) Neither tne decision of the Commission of 23 September 1964 (Official Journal of 20 October 1964, p. 2545 et seq.), nor the judgment of 13 July 1966 whereby the Court confirmed that decision in its essentials (Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, Grundig-Consten v Commission, [1966] E.C.R. 299) enables it to be concluded that all contracts displaying the above characteristics fall within the prohibition set out in Article 85.(d) The commission refers to certain regulations which either provide that it is obligatory to notify agreements or grant exemption or exempt from the prohibition certain categories of agreements:— Regulation No 17/62 of the Council (Official Journal of 21 February 1962, p. 204 et seq.);— Regulation No 153/62 or the Commission (Official Journal of 24 December 1962, p. 2918 et seq.);— Regulation No 19/65/EEC of the Council (Official Journal of 6 March 1965, p. 533 et seq.);— Regulation No 67/67/EEC of the Commission (Official Journal of 25 March 1967, p. 849 et seq.).The Commission declares that those regulations do not constitute a mandatory ruling on whether a specific agreement is caught by the prohibition (cf. also the judgment of the Court of 13 July 1966: Italy v Council and Commission, Case 32/65, [1966] E.C.R. 389, paragraph 2 of the summary). Nor can the fact that an agreement is not notified render it automatically void (judgment of the Court of 30 June 1966: Technique Miniere v Maschinenbau, Ulm, Case 56/65, [1966] E.C.R. 235; paragraph 4 of the summary).For the most part the clauses in the disputed contract satisfy the conditions for exemption for categories of agreements listed in Regulation No 67/67; apart from the lack of notification the factor which, under Article 3(b) of that regulation excludes its application, is that Erd & Co. undertook to ‘protect’ Vervaecke in the sales sector which was guaranteed to it. The considerations set forth above, however, show that the question before the Court does not turn on this point; the disputed contract must be considered independently of the abovementioned regulations.(e) The contract in question, continues the Commission, constitutes an ‘agreement between undertakings’ within the meaning of Article 85(1).It explains why, in its view, agreements like the present one have as their object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. Nevertheless, it adds that, according to the case-law of the Court and the practice followed by the Commission itself in adopting its decisions, in order for the prohibition set out in Article 85 to come into play it is insufficient that the agreement has as its objective the purely theoretical restriction of competition. Where regard must be had to the object of the agreement, it must show ‘the effect on competition to be sufficiently deleterious’ (‘hinreichende Beeinträchtigung’); when regard must be had to its effects, the Court requires that the agreement restrict competition ‘to an appreciable extent’ (‘spürbar’) (judgment in Case 56/65, loc. cit., p. 249).It is true that the Court has stated in its judgment in Joined Cases 56 and 58/64 (loc. cit., p. 342) that ‘there is no need to take account of the concrete effects of an agreement once it appears that it has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition’. The Commission, however, states that this declaration must be understood in the context of the particular facts which formed the basis of that judgment and there may not be attributed to it a general scope amounting to an inference that when it is established that an agreement has as its object the disturbance of competition it is no longer necessary to have regard to the seriousness of its effects. Moreover, it would be incompatible with the rationale of Article 85 to have recourse to different criteria depending on whether the object or the effect of the agreement under consideration was envisaged.(f) In deciding whether an agreement has an appreciable effect on the market, in the case of exclusive dealing agreements the situation arising from the agreement for third party undertakings and consumers must be compared with that which would obtain if that agreement did not exist (judgment in Case 56/65, loc. cit., p. 250). It is true that in this connexion account must be taken of the proportion of the market which a manufacturer controls or endeavours to acquire within the Common Market or in a ‘protected’ sales sector. The Commission declares that it is in accordance with this concept that the judgment in Case 56/65 (loc. cit., p. 252) requires that there be taken into consideration ‘the nature and quantity of the products covered by the agreement’ together with ‘the position of the grantor and of the concessionnaire on the market for the products in question’. Consideration of the present case in terms of those criteria leads to the following findings:— The brand or washing-machines manufactured by Erd & Co. remains almost unknown and is in competition with similar products of many other manufacturers who have penetrated the market much more successfully.— Erd & Co's production and the proportion of the market which it occupies are very small whether the entire Common Market, the Federal Republic or the sales sector of Belgium and Luxembourg are considered.— in these circumstances it must be admitted that even when an agreement guaranteeing strict ‘territorial protection’ is concluded, the manufacturer does not appreciably restrict competition.(g) The Commission declares that the the same reasons preclude recognizing that the agreement in dispute ‘may affect trade between Member States’ (Article 85(1)). In order for such a deleterious effect to be found it is necessary that it should be fairly widespread.
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