A —In its objection of inadmissibility the Council of the European Communities, the defendant, submits that the application can only be admissible by virtue of the second paragraph of Article 173 of the EEC Treaty in the following two cases:(a) if the application is directed against a decision addressed to the applicant within the meaning of Article 189 of the Treaty, that is to say, to the extent to which that decision specifies the applicant as the person affected by it;(b) if the application is directed against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the applicant.Since the contested measure takes the form of a regulation, clearly case (a) cannot apply here. According to the defendant, the application is only admissible if it is established that the contested measure is only a regulation in form and that it is in reality a decision which is of direct and individual concern to the applicant.The defendant says that, for the purpose of answering the question whether a measure described as a regulation in fact constitutes a decision, the Court does not base its judgment exclusively on the official title of the measure, but takes into account its object and content and inquires whether it has a ‘general “application”’, that is to say, whether it applies ‘not to a limited number of persons, defined or identifiable, but to categories of persons viewed abstractly and in their entirety’ (judgments of 14 December 1962 in Joined Cases 16 and 17/62, Confederation nationale des producteurs de fruits et legumes and Others v Council of the EEC and in Joined Cases 19 to 22/62, Federation du commerce de gros des viandes and Others v Council of the EEC, [1962] E.C.R. 471 and 491 respectively).The Court has in any event admitted that ‘it may happen that a measure which, taken as a whole, has the characteristics of a regulation, may nevertheless contain provisions addressed to specific persons in such a way as to distinguish them individually in the sense of the second paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty’ (judgment of 3 March 1968 in Case 30/67, Industria Molitoria Imolese and Others v Council, [1968] E.C.R.).It follows from this case-law that measures which are of direct and individual concern to certain natural or legal persons may be contested by those persons even if they are contained in a regulation properly described as such.In the present case, therefore, all that need be done is to examine whether the contested provisions of Article 9(3) of Regulation No 1009/67/EEC are of direct and individual concern to the applicant.In this connexion according to the consistent case-law of the Court, applicants may only claim to be individually concerned, by a contested measure if it ‘affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them, or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons, and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person addressed’ (judgment of 15 July 1963 in Case 25/62, Plaumann, Rec. 1963, p. 223; judgment of 2 July 1964 in Case 1/64, Glucoseries, [1964] E.C.R. 413; judgment of 1 April 1965 in Case 40/64, Sgarlata, [1965] E.C.R. 215; judgment of 1 April 1965 in Case 38/64 Getreide-Import, [1965] E.C.R. 203; judgment of 1 July 1965 in Joined Cases 106 and 107/63, Toepfer and Getreide-Import, [1965] E.C.R. 405).In the defendant s opinion the applicant is not to be regarded as ‘individually concerned’ in the sense of this case-law, since Regulation No 1009/67/EEC creates, for the whole of the EEC, a common organization of the market in sugar. Similarly to what has been provided in respect of other market organizations the market in sugar is regulated essentially by means of price. In order to maintain the price at the level desired the Regulation lays down in particular the obligation on the part of the intervention agencies designated by the sugar-producing Member States to buy in the sugar offered to them. This obligation is contained in Article 9(1) in respect of white sugar and raw cane sugar and in Article 9(2) in respect of raw beet sugar. These purchases are made, as regards each of the three kinds of sugar, at the intervention prices valid for the area of the Community in which the sugar is located at the time of purchase. The intervention prices are fixed, for the different areas and for each kind of sugar (white sugar, raw cane sugar and raw beet sugar), in accordance with the detailed rules specified respectively by Article 3(1) and (2), Article 3(4) and Article 9(7).The setting up of the intervention mechanism constitutes a measure which is wholly general in nature and which concerns an indefinite number of natural and legal persons engaged in production or marketing in the sector of sugar. More particularly, the obligation to buy in raw beet sugar and its necessary complement, the fixing of the intervention price for raw beet sugar, concern an indefinite number of persons who cannot be identified individually, but at most as constituting a category of persons defined in abstract, general terms. For these prices are of concern, in the areas in which they are valid, first of all to the intervention agencies designated by the Member States, which can only buy in at these prices, then to the producers of raw beet sugar engaged in production in these areas, irrespective of whether or not they process the raw sugar into white sugar, and finally to the various categories of industrial processers and deallers whose transactions are influenced by the fixing of the intervention price. The abolition under Article 9(3) of the intervention mechanism on 31 December 1969 is also of concern to an indefinite number of natural legal persons. The persons concerned cannot be identified individually, but at most only as categories of persons defined in abstract, general terms, although the abolition of the intervention system may have varying effects on different groups among the persons concerned.Even if one were to accept the point of view on which the applicant bases its argument, namely that the abolition of the intervention system for raw beet sugar on 31 December 1969 is of concern only to those sugar factories which are not equipped to process this sugar into white sugar, the persons thus concerned could not be ascertained individually but only as categories of persons defined in abstract, general terms. The applicant is only affected by the provision in dispute by virtue of the fact that it is a processer of beet into raw sugar, that is to say, by virtue of an industrial activity which may be carried on at any time by anyone and which therefore is not of such a nature as to differentiate the applicant from all other persons and thus to distinguish it individually just as in the case of a person addressed by a decision.When the applicant, in order to substantiate its opinion to the contrary, referred to the judgment of the Court of 1 July 1965 in Joined Cases 106 and 107/63, Toepfer and Getreide-Import ([1965] E.C.R. 405), it disregarded the fact that the measure annulled by the Court in these cases was concerned with transactions which occurred before that measure was adopted and which therefore made it possible to distinguish the persons concerned individually. In the present case, on the contrary, the persons who may be concerned on 31 December 1969 cannot be ascertained except as constituting categories of persons defined in general, abstract terms.The provisions in dispute are accordingly not of individual concern to the applicant. Finally the defendant alleges that if it is established that the contested measure is not of individual concern to the applicant, there is no need to inquire whether the said measure is of direct concern to it, since the application is only admissible if both conditions are satisfied simultaneously.The defendant therefore claims that the application is inadmissible.
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