18Second, at paragraphs 63 to 74 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance held as follows:63 Nevertheless, it has been held that, in certain circumstances, a provision in a measure of general application may be of individual concern to some interested persons (Case C-358/89 Extramet Industrie v Council [1991] ECR I-2501, paragraph 13, and Case C-309/89 Codorniu v Council [1994] ECR I-1853, paragraph 19). In such a case, a Community measure can be of a legislative nature and, at the same time, vis-à-vis some of the individuals concerned, in the nature of a decision (Joined Cases T-481/93 and T-484/93 Vereniging van Exporteurs in Levende Varkens and Others v Commission [1995] ECR II-2941, paragraph 50). Such is the case where the measure in question affects natural or legal persons by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons (Codorniu v Council, paragraph 20).64 In light of that case-law, it must be established whether there are such circumstances in this case which make it possible to distinguish the applicants in a way similar to that in which the addressee of a decision could be identified.65 The applicants have argued that because they are Members of the Parliament holding office at the time when the contested measure was adopted they belong to a closed circle of persons identifiable by name. The mere fact, however, that the number and even the identity of the persons to whom a measure applies can be determined in no way implies that those persons must be regarded as individually concerned by that measure, where that measure applies to them as a result of an objective situation of law or fact specified by the measure at issue (see, for example, the judgment in Case 6/68 Zuckerfabrik Watenstedt v Council [1968] ECR 595, 605 and 606, and the orders in Case C-10/95 P Asocame v Council [1995] ECR I-4149, paragraph 30, and CNPAAP v Council [Case C-87/95 P [1996] ECR I-2003], paragraph 34).66 As stated above, the contested measure affects the applicants only because they belong to a category of persons which is defined generally and in the abstract. The contested measure does not express the Parliament's intention to deal with a particular case, specifically that of the applicants. Furthermore, the applicants have neither claimed, nor adduced evidence to demonstrate, that adoption of the contested measure alters their legal situation or affects them, more particularly than other Members of the Parliament.67 Likewise, merely belonging to one of the two categories of persons to whom the contested measure is addressed — all the Parliament's staff, whether subject to the Staff Regulations or not, on the one hand, and its Members, on the other — is not sufficient to distinguish the applicants, since those two categories are defined generally and in the abstract...71 In addition, the Court must consider whether, in the circumstances, the case-law is applicable by virtue of which actions for annulment of measures of a legislative nature are admissible where a superior rule of law required the body responsible for it to take into account the applicants' particular circumstances (see, to that effect, Case 11/82 Piraiki-Patraiki and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 207, paragraphs 11 to 32; Case C-152/88 Sofrimport v Commission [1990] ECR I-2477, paragraphs 11 to 13; Case C-390/95 P Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission [1999] ECR I-769, paragraphs 25 to 30, and Case T-135/96 UEAPME v Council [1998] ECR II-2335, paragraph 90).72 The applicants in the present case have argued in essence that the contested measure compromises both their independence and the immunity conferred upon them by the Protocol on privileges and immunities of the European Communities. However, the Protocol refers to Members of the Parliament only in a general fashion and contains no provision explicitly governing internal investigations in the Parliament73 As the President of the Court of First Instance was able to observe in paragraph 107 of the order in Rothley and Others v Parliament [Case T-17/00 R [2000] ECR II-2085], the risk cannot be excluded a priori that, in conducting an investigation, [OLAF] might perform an act prejudicial to the immunity enjoyed by every Member of the Parliament. However, if that were to occur, any Member of the Parliament faced with such an act could, if he considered it damaging to him, avail himself of the judicial protection and the legal remedies provided for by the Treaty.74 In any event, the existence of such a risk cannot warrant altering the system of remedies and procedures established by Articles 230 EC, 234 EC and 235 EC which is designed to give the Community judicature the power to review the legality of acts of the institutions. It cannot by any means serve to make an action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person who does not satisfy the conditions laid down by the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC to be declared admissible (orders in Asocarne v Council, paragraph 26, and CNPAAP v Council, paragraph 38).’
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