(a)On the first claim, the applicant reminds the Court that the contested decision merely gave notice of the Administration's intention to terminate the contract of employment, without giving any reason, and that following the Court's previous judgment in Joined Cases 43, 45 and 48/59, this in itself is capable of evidencing the irregularity of the decision.To grant to the institution a discretionary power to terminate its contracts of employment with its servants, without assigning reasons, would be to open the way to all manner of abuse and would expose its servants to the most arbitrary treatment. The applicant adds that there is proof of this in the memoranda dated 29 June and 3 July 1959 lodged in the action, the first of which is a “general assessment” of the applicant's abilities.The applicant goes on to assert that the European Parliamentary Assembly is in breach of contract on the ground of the absence of reasoning in the disputed decision and that, as termination of the contract has become final, this liability must be discharged by way of damages, in accordance with the case law of the Court.As to the amount of compensation claimed, the applicant states that while, after much difficulty she was successful in finding a new job, it was still necessary, in assessing the damage which she suffered, to take into consideration not only the material loss suffered by the applicant, but also the mental distress caused by the precariousness of the position in which she had been placed by the fault of the Administration. Finally, she maintains that, although those damages had been assessed at 500 FB, and not at 60000 FB, in her application to the Luxembourg Arbitration Tribunal, the explanation for this is that she had had to limit her claim to the compensation fixed by Luxembourg law. On this point, the applicant claims that it will be for the Court to fix the amount in question ex aequo et bono.The defendant replies, in the first place, that the so-called “Brussels” rules, applied by the European Parliamentary Assembly since its inception on 19 March 1958 to servants recruited before the Staff Regulations provided for in Article 212 of the EEC Treaty and Article 186 of the EAEC Treaty were adopted, were established from a conglomeration of practices and decisions. The rules emerged from the deliberations of the “Inter-Community Administrative Committee”, which was never given official status; each institution drew from the Committee's deliberations the conclusions it required, based on memoranda, directives, even mere practices and, exceptionally, regulations. In such a situation, all that can form the basis of the servant's engagement is a letter of employment which intentionally creates only a very tenuous relationship between institution and servant.The contract is not one of limited duration referred to in Article 246 (3) of the EEC Treaty and Article 214 (3) of the EAEC Treaty, but is an engagement determinable at any time on a month's notice. As the Court pointed out in its judgments of 15 July and 16 December 1960, it was in fact impossible in such a case to argue the theory of a contract entered into before the adoption of the Staff Regulations, which developed in relation to the EAEC's original contracts. The defendant states that, in the circumstances, although it is true that, for an established official, or at the very least a servant engaged on a long-term, if not actually a permanent, basis, dismissal must be reasoned and supported by the dictates of public interest, it is equally true that where a servant is “on trial” and not definitively engaged, even as an auxiliary, it is not necessary to assign reasons. When the trial period ends, the employing institution must decide whether, in the light of the employee's skills and temperament, he can be definitively appointed. An evaluation of this kind can only be general in nature and cannot be subject to any sort of outside control, since it is for the institution with which probation was served to assess, in its own discretion, the results of the probation in question. According to the decision of the Court in Case 10/55, the only requirement that can be imposed in the matter is that the servant be given the opportunity during the course of the trial period of showing his capabilities.In the applicant's case, the defendant contends that it was a question of a servant taken on trial. Probation, and its extension owing to the employee's absence on sick leave, was intended precisely to make it possible to judge whether the applicant's technical abilities and general conduct merited the normal continuance of her employment. In these circumstances there was no need for the disputed decision of dismissal to be reasoned, and the applicant cannot claim compensation for breach of contract by the Assembly. As to the amount of such compensation, the defendant raises the objection that the applicant cannot claim to have suffered any loss either quantified or quantifiable, so that her claim would seem to be an endeavour to obtain an order for the defendant to pay punitive damages. The defendant raises the further objection that the sum claimed has increased from 500 BF to 60000 BF between July 1959 — that is to say, at the time of the action before the Arbitration Tribunal of the District of Luxembourg — and the date on which the present action was brought.
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