law://eu/cjeu/1963/c-87-63/hd_1_1_3_2_3@2026-11-21The contractual liability of the Com munity is governed by the law applicable to the contract in question (Art. 188 of the EAEC Treaty).According to the applicant, if she had been engaged by a Belgian authority, the ordinary provisions concerning contracts of employment would have applied in the absence of Staff Regulations.According to Belgian law, when the salary exceeds 120000 FB per annum, as in the present case, the length of notice is fixed by agreement, or by the Court, but cannot be less than three months if the employment has lasted less than five years and six months if it has lasted from five to ten years.On the other hand, the notice can begin to run only on the first of the month following that during which it was given (Consolidated Laws governing contracts of employment of 20 July 1955).Following the Belgian practice, and taking account of the circumstances, the applicant, whose employment had extended over a period of almost five years, could have claimed six. months' notice.Even if the application of the lex loci is to be excluded, it does not follow that the length of notice can be left to the discretion of the authority.The social considerations which apply in private law are equally valid in public law.Furthermore, it lollows from Article 188 of the EAEC Treaty that every contract is governed by a law. This law, which, according to the argument put forward here, falls within the category of public law, is set out neither in the Treaty nor in any other provision. It is necessary, then, to refer to the custom which may be deduced from the various national laws. There is certainly none which, apart from the case of disciplinary action, permits dismissal of a public servant at only a month's notice.The defendant replies that the length of notice depends on a contract of employment arising from the public law of the Communities. The Court, in its judgment ot 1 March 1962 (Case 25/60, Ve Bruyn v European Parliamentary Assembly, Rec. 1962 pp. 61 and 62), decided that one month's notice, appearing in the letter of appointment to which the servant had freely consented, has no unjust or oppressive character. The position is exactly the same in the present case.The defendant adds that it had suggested to the applicant that she should resign in order to facilitate her reclassification (see above, I, Facts): if the applicant had accepted this suggestion, she would have had the benefit of four months' notice (from 20 March to 1 October 1963) in order to seek a new position. In addition the applicant received compensation equivalent to two months' salary under Articles 34, last paragraph, and 102 (2), of the Staff Regulations of officials of the EAEC.The applicant answers that the conduct of the defendant during the period prior to dismissal led to the belief that the defendant hesitated to undertake its responsibilities and wished to suppress the matter. On the contrary, if the applicant had received the normal notice, she would have known what the intentions of the defendant were and would thus have had the necessary time to find new employment.The defendant replies that the decision against integration, taken by the Commission of the EAEC on 20 March 1963 and made known to the applicant on 9 April 1963, was irrevocable and that there could not be any question of suppressing the matter: the suggestion made to the applicant on 9 April 1963 that she offer her resignation had as its aim only that of saving her the disadvantages of being dismissed and making easier the search for a new position.
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