Contents
- (1) By Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/500, the European Com…
- (2) As noted in recital 552 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 20…
- (3) In this respect, the Commission considered that it did not…
- (4) Furthermore, the provisions of Article 1(3) of Implementin…
- (5) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accord…
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Unionnote (‘the basic Regulation’) and in particular Article 15 and Article 24(1) thereof,Whereas:
(1)By Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/500note, the European Commission imposed definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain aluminium road wheels originating in Morocco.
(2)As noted in recital 552 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/500, the level of cooperation was high and, thus, the Commission found it appropriate to set the residual subsidy rate at a level of the cooperating company with the highest subsidy rate. However, in recital 553, the Commission considered the situation of the company having the highest subsidy rate abnormal when compared to the other cooperating exporting producer. Accordingly, the residual subsidy rate was adjusted.
(3)In this respect, the Commission considered that it did not fully evaluate the evidence available to set the level of the residual subsidy rate in the specific circumstances of the case. Since the investigation covered the only two exporting producers of the product concerned in Morocco, the rate of the definitive countervailing duty applicable to all other imports originating in Morocco set by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/500 did not account for the possibility that a new exporting producer who would be subject to that rate could also be benefiting from support provided by the Government of China (‘GOC’) and attributable to the Government of Morocco (‘GOM’) in the context of the cooperation between the GOC and the GOM. In such circumstances, it is appropriate to set the residual duty at the level of the whole subsidy amount available in Morocco for such possible future exporting producer. The Commission noted that, in any event, any new exporting producer would be entitled to request an accelerated review pursuant to Article 20 of the basic Regulation to obtain an individual countervailing duty rate reflecting its specific circumstances. In view of the above it is considered necessary to amend Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/500, to set the residual subsidy rate at a level of the cooperating company with the highest subsidy rate.
(4)Furthermore, the provisions of Article 1(3) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/500 aimed to minimise the risk of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, as explained in its recital 708. However, in view of the fact that the residual duty for all other imports originating in Morocco was set at the level of the company with the lowest duty rate (see recital 553), the risk of circumvention could not be minimised in the cases where importers were not presenting a valid commercial invoice from a manufacturer subject to a higher duty rate. Thus, in order to ensure that the risk of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates is minimised, it is necessary to set the duty in the case of imports with invalid invoice at a level of the cooperating company with the highest subsidy rate, as of the date of entry into force of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/500 (i.e. 15 March 2025).
(5)The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee, established by Article 25(1) of the basic Regulation,
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