ECB/2026/21 · GlobalLawDB

Contents

THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK,Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,Having regard to Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council^note, and in particular Articles 5 to 9 thereof,Having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1075 of 23 March 2016 supplementing Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards specifying the content of recovery plans, resolution plans and group resolution plans, the minimum criteria that the competent authority is to assess as regards recovery plans and group recovery plans, the conditions for group financial support, the requirements for independent valuers, the contractual recognition of write-down and conversion powers, the procedures and contents of notification requirements and of notice of suspension and the operational functioning of the resolution colleges^note, and in particular Articles 16 to 21 thereof,Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions^note, and in particular Article 4(1), point (i), and Article 4(3) thereof,Having regard to Decision (EU) 2017/933 of the European Central Bank of 16 November 2016 on a general framework for delegating decision-making powers for legal instruments related to supervisory tasks (ECB/2016/40)^note, and in particular Article 4 thereof,Whereas:

(1)Within the framework of Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) carries out the exclusive task to supervise credit institutions with the aim of ensuring a consistent application of supervisory standards, fostering financial stability and ensuring a level playing field.

(2)Pursuant to Article 4(1), point (i), of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, the ECB carries out supervisory tasks in relation to recovery plans. As the competent authority for significant supervised entities, the ECB is responsible for the review and assessment of the recovery plans of such entities pursuant to Articles 5 to 8 of Directive 2014/59/EU, as transposed into national law. Moreover, the ECB, as consolidating supervisor or as the supervisor of significant supervised entities which are subsidiaries of a credit institution that has its head office in a non-participating Member State, must, together with the other relevant authorities review group recovery plans and assess the extent to which they satisfy the requirements and criteria laid down in Directive 2014/59/EU, as transposed into national law.

(3)The ECB is required in this context to adopt a substantial number of joint decisions on group recovery plans each year. To facilitate the decision-making process, a delegation decision is necessary in relation to the ECB’s adoption of such decisions. The Court of Justice of the European Union has recognised delegation of authority to be necessary and appropriate to enable an institution required to adopt a considerable number of decisions to perform its duties. Similarly, it has recognised the need to ensure that decision-making bodies are able to function as a principle inherent to all institutional systems.

(4)Delegation of decision-making powers should be limited and proportionate, and the scope of the delegation should be clearly defined.

(5)The scope of the delegation is to be limited to situations where the ECB and all the relevant competent authorities reach an agreement on a joint decision and by the framework set out in Articles 5 to 9 of Directive 2014/59/EU, Section A of the Annex to that Directive, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1075 and European Supervisory Authorities’ guidelines related to recovery planning.

(6)Decision (EU) 2017/933 (ECB/2016/40) specifies the procedure to be followed for adopting delegation decisions concerning supervision and the persons who may be delegated decision-making powers. That Decision does not affect the ECB’s exercise of its supervisory tasks and is without prejudice to the Supervisory Board’s competence to propose complete draft decisions to the Governing Council.

(7)Where the criteria for the adoption of a delegated decision are not met, decisions should be adopted in accordance with the non-objection procedure set out in Article 26(8) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 and Article 13g of Decision ECB/2004/2 of the European Central Bank^note. Furthermore, the non-objection procedure should also be used where heads of work units have concerns regarding the complexity of the assessment of the group recovery plan or the sensitivity of the matter or where the outcome of the relevant assessment directly impacts one or more other ECB decisions and therefore the decisions should be considered simultaneously by the same decision-maker in order to prevent conflicting outcomes.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: