Contents
B.Legal persons, entities and bodies| Name | Identifying information | Statement of Reasons | Date of listing1. | GRU Unit 29155ФКУ Войсковая Часть 29155 | Place of registration: 105077, Moscow 11th Parkovaya Street, 38ARegistration No: 7719737879OGRN: 1097746770395 | GRU Unit 29155 is a covert unit within the Russian military intelligence agency (GRU), known for its involvement in foreign assassinations and destabilisation activities across Europe. Through coups, assassinations, bombings, and cyberattacks against other countries around the world in connection with the war in Ukraine, it has sought to create chaos and destabilise European Union countries. By carrying out such actions, it seeks to help and benefit Russia. GRU Unit 29155 carried out cyberattacks and other attacks against critical infrastructure. Therefore, it is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating acts of violence, as well as planning, directing, engaging in, supporting or otherwise facilitating any actions aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure. | 16.12.20242. | Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l’InvestissementGPCI | Place of registration: Lomé, TogoDate of registration: January 2022 | Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l’Investissement (GPCI) is a disinformation network carrying out pro-Russian covert influence operations, particularly in the Central African Republic and Burkina Faso. GPCI was dismantled by Meta in May 2023. Despite this, GPCI is still active and is running structured and coordinated disinformation campaigns with the use of a vast network of information chains. Those campaigns target France in particular, including through accusations of conspiracy, terrorism, destabilisation operations or preparing coups against the Union or its Member States. GPCI has been indirectly funded by the Wagner Group.Therefore, GPCI is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. | 16.12.20243. | African Initiative | Place of Registration: Moscow, RussiaDate of registration: September 2023 | African Initiative is a news agency that operates on the African continent. It has been involved in spreading Russian propaganda and disinformation against the West, and has hired journalists and influencers for the purpose of spreading Russian propaganda. It has also organised press tours for African journalists in the illegally occupied territories of Ukraine, during which pro-Russian narratives about the war were spread. African Initiative has also organised events serving the interests of the Government of the Russian Federation, including by facilitating access to mineral resources.Therefore, African Initiative is responsible for or supporting actions and policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability and security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States or in a third country by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. | 16.12.20244. | AFA Media aka REDAFA Medya Anonim Șirketi aka REDAFA Медиа | Address: Kavacık Mahallesi, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Caddesi, Tonoglu Block No.: 3, Beykoz, Istanbul, TürkiyeType of entity: media companyPlace of registration: IstanbulDate of registration: 22.11.2022VAT Nr.: 0081804196Registration number 423277-5Principle place of business: TürkiyeWebsite: https://thered.stream/imprint/Founder: Hüseyin Dogru | AFA Medya A.Ș. is a media company based in Istanbul. AFA Medya A.Ș. operates RED, which comprises a number of media platforms, and which has close financial and organisational connections with Russian state propaganda entities and actors, and which shares deep structural ties including interlinkages between, and rotation of, individual personnel with Russian state media organisations.RED has used its media platforms – often publishing under redstreamnet or thered.stream – to systematically spread false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience, including by disseminating the narratives of radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas.During the violent occupation of a German university by anti-Israel rioters, Red personnel coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate their vandalism – which included the use of Hamas symbols – through RED’s online channels, thus providing them with an exclusive media platform.AFA Medya Anonim Șirketi thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation that undermine stability and security in the Union and in one or several of its Member States, including by indirectly supporting and facilitating violent demonstrations and engaging in information manipulation. | 20.5.20255. | Voice of Europe(Russian: Голос Европы) | Address: Krakovská 583/9, 110 00 Prague, Czech RepublicWebsite: www.voiceofeurope.com, www.voiceofeurope.euType of entity: Limited Liability Company (s.r.o.)Place of registration: PragueDate of registration: 14.3.2023Registration number: CZ05185327Principal place of business: Czech Republic | Voice of Europe is an online media outlet, engaged in a systematic international campaign of media manipulation and distortion of facts through its website and accounts on Facebook, YouTube, Telegram and X. Voice of Europe disseminated concerted disinformation related to Ukraine, the Union and its Member States with the aim of supporting the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation. It systematically undermined the public image of Ukraine and its efforts to defend itself against Russia’s war of aggression, and the credibility of the assistance of the Union and its Member States to Ukraine’s defence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections.Through its activities, Voice of Europe is implementing and supporting actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States, through engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, including the 2024 European Parliament elections, and through engaging in the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.Voice of Europe was secretly financed and directed by Viktor Medvedchuk, a pro-Russian Ukrainian politician and businessperson with close ties to the leadership of the Russian Federation, through his associate Artem Marchevskyi. Voice of Europe was used to funnel financial resources designated for the remuneration of propagandists and the building an influence network connecting Medvedchuk and his associates with representatives of political parties in Europe. Therefore, Voice of Europe was involved in activities facilitating the construction of Viktor Medvedchuk’s influence network in the Union and its Member States. | 20.5.20256. | Norebo JSC | Address: Office 510, 43 Schmidta Street, 183038 Murmansk, Russian FederationType of entity: Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: MurmanskDate of registration: 2.11.2007Registration number: 1201000007889TIN / KPP: 2901170107 / 519001001 | Norebo JSC is a Russian fishing company. Vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC show particular movement patterns that are inconsistent with regular economic practices and fishing activities. The movement patterns align with malign objectives, such as repeatedly being in the vicinity of or loitering near critical infrastructure and military sites. The movement patterns have been linked, including by Member States and the authorities of third states, to the Russian state-sponsored surveillance campaign that employs inter alia, civilian fishing trawlers, to conduct espionage missions directed against civilian and military infrastructure in the North and Baltic Sea. Those activities can facilitate future sabotage operations. Shipping vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC have also been equipped with technology that may be used for espionage. A Norebo JSC vessel has been banned from entering Dutch port facilities due to espionage.Norebo JSC has also received several loans from Sberbank, a Russian state-owned bank.Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new maritime doctrine, which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time.Norebo JSC thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure. | 20.5.20257. | Murman SeaFood(Russian: Мурман СиФуд, Мурманские морепродукты) | Address: Ulitsa Karla Marksa, 28, Murmansk, Murmansk Oblast, Russian Federation, 183025Type of entity: limited liability companyPlace of registration: Murmansk | Murman SeaFood (MSF) is a Russian fishing company. Melkart-5 (Russian: Мелькарт-5), a vessel owned and operated by MSF, has repeatedly shown untypical behaviour inconsistent with its regular economic practices and fishing activities, including its presence in close vicinity to an ongoing NATO military exercise, and regular presence close to Norwegian critical infrastructure and military sites. In particular Melkart-5 showed highly unusual navigation practices in the immediate vicinity of a subsea cable in the Norwegian North Sea, crossing the cable multiple times, immediately before the cable was severely damaged. In addition, crew of Melkart-5 violated Norwegian on-shoring regulations while being caught setting off to investigate a Norwegian bridge critical for military logistic purposes in a clandestine manner.Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new maritime doctrine, which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time.MSF thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure. | 20.5.20258. | Federal State Unitary Enterprise Main Radio Frequency CentreGeneral Radio Frequency CentreGRFCФедеральное Государственное Унитарное Предприятие Главный Радиочастотный ЦентрФГУП ГРЧЦ | Address: 7, Derbenevskaya nab. 7 p., Moscow 115114. 15115114, город Москва, Дербеневская наб, д. 7 стр. 15Type of entity: Federal agencyPlace of registration: Moscow, Russian FederationDate of registration: 30.3.2001BIN: 1027739334479INN: 7706228218KPP: 772501001Principal place of business: Russia | The General Radio Frequency Centre (GRFC) is responsible for ensuring the proper use of radio frequencies and devices for civil purposes, and monitors compliance with legislation. It is one of the main organisations which contribute to decisions about the use and supervision of the radio frequency sector.Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.The electronic warfare centre in Kaliningrad has received new jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas.Therefore, GRFC is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure and through supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. | 20.5.20259. | Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. | Date of registration: 10.2.2022Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom(maildrop address)Registration number: 13906017Website: https://stark-industries.solutions/Website: https://pq.hosting/ | Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is owned and operated by the Moldavian nationals Ivan Neculiti and Iurie Neculiti, through the web hosting service PQ Hosting. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world.Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities, including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against the Union and third countries, by providing services intended to hide those activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.Therefore, Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and a third country, by facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest.Stark is associated with Ivan Neculiti and Iurie Neculiti. | 20.5.202510. | Federal State-owned Enterprise Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network (RTRS);Федеральное государственное унитарное предприятие Российская телевизионная и радиовещательная сеть | Address: 13, Korolyov street, Moscow, RussiaWebsite: https://moscow.rtrs.ru/Place of registration: 13, Korolyov street, Moscow, RussiaDate of registration: 30.11.2001Registration number: ИНН: 7717127211; ОГРН: 1027739456084 | The Federal State-owned Enterprise Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network (RTRS) operatеs Russia’s terrestrial broadcasting infrastructure. It is directly subordinated to the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation and operates under the authority of a general director appointed by the Russian President. RTRS provides infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24. RTRS plays a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied regions is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the right to establish transmission infrastructure there.Therefore, RTRS is implementing and benefiting from policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. | 15.7.202511. | 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center of the Baltic Fleet841-й центр радиоэлектронной борьбы | Address: 238580, Kaliningrad oblast, Yantarny settlement, Balebin street, 09643238580, Калининградская обл., пгт.Янтарный, ул.Балебина, в/ч 09643Type of entity: Military unitPlace of registration: Kalininingrad region, Russian FederationPhone number: 8(40153)37-244Military unit 09643 | The 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center is at the core of one of the strongest electronic warfare groups in Russia. The centre is responsible for using technology to disorganise any system of shortwave communication, conducting electronic warfare exercises (EW) to disrupt enemy navigation and radio communications as well as for the collection and analysis of intelligence information obtained by observing electromagnetic radiation in the short and ultrashort wave ranges.Several European countries have experienced GPS signal failures, which have been attributed to electronic warfare activities by Russia, specifically from Kaliningrad. This includes deliberate jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. Interference and manipulation of GPS signals has led to obstacles for landing civil planes.The 841st Separate EW Center in Kaliningrad has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas.Therefore, 841st Separate EW Center, as part of Russia’s military forces enabling the misuse of radio frequency sector, is responsible for engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States. | 15.7.202512. | BRICS Journalist Association | Website: bricspress.live | The BRICS Journalists Association (BJA) is a Russian NGO linked to the Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI), created by Yevgeny Prigozhin, and headed by Oksana Vovk (Mira Terada). The BJA has been used as a vehicle to disseminate pro-Russian narratives and disinformation under the guise of independent journalism, including fake content originating from the Storm-1516 Information Manipulation Set (IMS).Therefore, the BJA is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States or in a third country through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. | 15.7.202513. | Center for Geopolitical ExpertiseЦентр геополитических экспертиз, CGE | Website: cge.evrazia.ru, cge.suPlace of registration: Ul. Dinamovskaya D.1a, Office 409, Moscow, RUS, 109044Date of registration: 17.12.2002Registration number: 1027739806940 | The Center for Geopolitical Expertise (CGE) is a Moscow-based think tank founded by Aleksandr Dugin, and headed by Valery Korovin, accused of orchestrating disinformation campaigns aimed at targeting Ukrainian interests, discrediting Western political figures, and influencing electoral processes in Western countries. CGE and its director, Valery Mikhaylovich Korovin, are reportedly involved in creating and disseminating false information by utilising artificial intelligence tools to produce deepfake videos, and supporting a network of hundreds of fake news websites. CGE is alleged to have worked closely with Russia’s military intelligence agency (GRU), receiving financial support to carry out these operations.Therefore, the CGE is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. | 15.7.202514. | Foundation to Battle Injustice | Date of creation: 23.3.2021Website: fondfbr.ru | The Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI) is a fake human-rights defence NGO created in March 2021 by Wagner group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin. The R-FBI has been involved in numerous information operations targeting France and Ukraine, including a campaign accusing French soldiers of having kidnapped children from Niger just after the military coup d’état in 2023. Since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023, the R-FBI has been involved in the amplification of numerous Storm-1516’s information operations.Therefore, the R-FBI is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. | 15.7.202515. | Tigerweb | Website: Tigerweb.ruPlace of registration: 295000, Krim Republic, Simferopol City, Oktyabirskaya Street, 3, Office 408Date of registration: 2019Registration number: 1199112018973 | Tigerweb is the Russian Crimea-based web-company that operates the informational manipulation project Portal Kombat, which disseminates pro-Russian content and targets several Western countries, including France, through various so-called informational portals.Therefore, Tigerweb is involved in the implementation of actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten the stability and security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. | 15.7.202516. | 142nd Separate Electronic Warfare Battalion142-й батальон радиоэлектронной борьбы142-й батальон РЭБ142-й отдельный батальон радиоэлектронной борьбы | 236000, Posyolok Kumachevo, Kaliningrad region, Russian Federation | The 142nd Separate Electronic Warfare Battalion, based in Kaliningrad region, is part of electronic warfare and plays an important role in ensuring the security and defence of the region. The battalion is responsible for using technology to disorganise any system of shortwave communication, conducting electronic warfare exercises to disrupt enemy navigation and radio communications as well as for the collection and analysis of intelligence information obtained by observing electromagnetic radiation in the short and ultrashort wave ranges.Recently, several European countries have experienced GPS signal failures, which have been attributed to electronic warfare activities by Russia, specifically from Kaliningrad. This includes deliberate jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. Interference and manipulation of GPS signals has led to obstacles for landing civil planes.The 142nd Separate Electronic Warfare Battalion in Kaliningrad has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas.Therefore, the 142nd Separate Electronic Warfare Battalion, as part of Russia’s military forces enabling the (mis)use of the radio frequency sector, is responsible for actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in, or the sovereignty of, the Member States of the Union by engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference or actions aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying critical infrastructure through malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities. | 15.12.202517. | International Russophile Movement(Russian: Международное движение русофилов)(French: Mouvement International Russophile) | | The International Russophile Movement is a movement responsible for amplifying destabilising narratives globally, on behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation. The movement has strong ties with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, receiving endorsements for their work. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov has given keynote speeches in congress meetings of the movement. The movement is also associated with the Kremlin’s top ideologue Aleksandr Dugin and media oligarch Konstantin Malofeev. The Government of the Russian Federation uses the movement as a cover for manipulating the public opinion of other countries, promoting anti-Western sentiment and echoing other Kremlin speaking points.Therefore, the International Russophile Movement is supporting or implementing actions attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in a third country (Ukraine) by engaging in, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. | 15.12.202518. | Euromorea.k.a. Euroviewa.k.a. Euroview Media | Address: Avenue Ariane 5, 1200 Brussels, BelgiumWebsite: https://euromore.eu/, https://euroview.media | Euromore is a media platform which operates within the pro-Kremlin information architecture as an unofficial media relay, intended to amplify, recycle, and legitimise Russian narratives and disinformation targeting European audiences. Euromore recurrently disseminates content challenging the legitimacy of Union institutions and justifying Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Its editorial line consistently converges with talking points promoted by the Kremlin, particularly regarding the alleged responsibility of NATO and the Union in the conflict in Ukraine and the delegitimisation of the Ukrainian authorities.The platform regularly hosts contributors known for their dissemination of conspiracy-driven narratives or disinformation, allowing those contributors to retain public visibility and to continue their influence activities. Euromore’s website appears to have been cleaned up and to contain only an article complaining about Western sanctions targeting propaganda media. However, the URL is still active, albeit now referring to the new name Euroview Media: euroview.media, and relays RT and Sputnik content.Therefore, Euromore is supporting, involved in and facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third country (Ukraine), through engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting and otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. | 21.4.202619. | The Foundation for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad (Pravfond)(Russian: Некоммерческая организация Фонд поддержки и защиты прав соотечественников, проживающих за рубежом) | Address: Arbat Street, 55/32, Moscow, 119200, Russian FederationPlace of registration: Moscow, RussiaDate of registration: 21.11.2011Registration number: 1117799023330Website: www.pravfond.ru | The Foundation for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad (Pravfond) constitutes a core instrument of the Russian Federation’s foreign influence and propaganda strategy.Founded and financed by the Russian state, the Foundation is fully embedded within the Kremlin’s soft power architecture and operates as a para-institutional relay for official narratives. Pravfond’s legal and analytical output is systematically used to reinforce key Kremlin talking points, notably allegations of the nazification of Ukraine, claims of widespread Russophobia, and assertions of systematic persecution of Russian-speaking populations in neighboring states.The Foundation channels funds to actors closely linked to pro-Kremlin influence networks. The Executive Director of Pravfond has publicly expressed support for President Vladimir Putin and for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. In parallel, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has praised the Foundation’s consistent work in countering alleged xenophobia, neo-Nazism, and attempts to falsify history, thereby confirming Pravfond’s direct integration into the Kremlin’s official communication and conflict-legitimation strategy.Therefore, Pravfond is responsible for, implementing, supporting, involved in and facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine or threaten sovereignty and stability in the Union or in a third country (Ukraine), through planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting and facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. | 21.4.202620. | Presidential Foundation for Cultural Initiatives/ PFKI(Russian: Президентский Фонд Культурных Инициатив / ПФКИ) | Address: Sredniy Ovchinnikovsky 8, Moscow, Russian FederationPlace of registration: Moscow, Russian FederationDate of registration: 1.6.2021OGRN: 1217700257170INN: 9704068763 | The Presidential Foundation for Cultural Initiatives is a foundation created by decree of Russian President Vladimir Putin. It provides grants for various projects, including for projects supporting the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. That foundation has also provided funding for public relations (PR) agency Limitless (Bezgranichnye), thereby enabling its operations. PR agency Limitless is responsible for managing Western influencers who echo Kremlin narratives and pro-war propaganda talking points, thereby destabilising Ukraine and Ukrainian allies by flooding the information space with disinformation.As the Presidential Foundation for Cultural Initiatives has funded the activities of PR agency Limitless, it is involved in actions attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of a third country (Ukraine) through supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. | 15.6.2026
Source: EUR-Lex, © European Union, 1998-2026. Reuse authorised under Decision 2011/833/EU.