Contents
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber)17 March 2026note(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Area of freedom, security and justice — Judicial cooperation in criminal matters — Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 — Article 1(1) and (4) — Confiscation order issued in criminal proceedings — Point 2 of Article 2 and point 3(a) and (d) of Article 2 — Confiscation in relation to a criminal offence, but without a final conviction — Confiscation order imposed in a judgment of acquittal finding that the goods to be confiscated are the product of a criminal offence other than the offence giving rise to that judgment and in which offence persons other than the defendants acquitted were involved — No indictment against those persons — Article 19(1)(h) — Grounds for non-recognition and non-execution of confiscation orders — Exceptional situations in which there are substantial grounds to believe, on the basis of specific and objective evidence, that the execution of the confiscation order would, in the particular circumstances of the case, entail a manifest breach of a fundamental right as set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights — Right to an effective remedy and rights of the defence — No use of effective remedies in the issuing Member State)In Case C‑8/24,REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Visoki kazneni sud (High Criminal Court, Croatia), made by decision of 4 October 2023, received at the Court on 9 January 2024, in the criminal proceedings againstTHE COURT (Grand Chamber),composed of K. Lenaerts, President, T. von Danwitz, Vice-President, K. Jürimäe, C. Lycourgos, I. Jarukaitis, M. Condinanzi and F. Schalin, Presidents of Chambers, S. Rodin, E. Regan (Rapporteur), N. Piçarra, N. Jääskinen, D. Gratsias, B. Smulders, S. Gervasoni and N. Fenger, Judges,Advocate General: J. Richard de la Tour,Registrar: M. Longar, Administrator,having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 3 February 2025,after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:– the Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Zagrebu, by S. Blažević, acting as Agent,– the Croatian Government, by G. Vidović Mesarek, acting as Agent,– the Slovenian Government, by A. Dežman Mušič, acting as Agent,– the European Commission, by R. Mrljić, J. Vondung and I. Zaloguin, acting as Agents,after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 12 June 2025,gives the following
Judgment
1This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 1(2) and points 3 and 10 of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on the mutual recognition of freezing orders and confiscation orders (OJ 2018 L 303, p. 1), and of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).
2The request has been made in an appeal brought by the company D. d.o.o. (‘D.’), established in Croatia, seeking to challenge the recognition and execution of a confiscation order transmitted by the Slovenian authorities to the Croatian authorities concerning shares in the company L.Z. d.d. (‘L.Z.’) owned by D.
Legal context
European Union law
Legislation concerning the mutual recognition and execution of freezing orders and confiscation orders
3Recitals 1 to 4, 11 to 13, 18, 31 and 34 of Regulation 2018/1805 state:(1) The [European] Union has set itself the objective of maintaining and developing an area of freedom, security and justice.(2) Judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the Union is based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions, which has commonly been referred to as the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters within the Union since the Tampere European Council of 15 and 16 October 1999.(3) The freezing and the confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime are among the most effective means of combating crime. …(4) As crime is often transnational in nature, effective cross-border cooperation is essential in order to freeze and confiscate the instrumentalities and proceeds of crime.…(11) In order to ensure the effective mutual recognition of freezing orders and confiscation orders, the rules on the recognition and execution of those orders should be established by a legally binding and directly applicable act of the Union.(12) It is important to facilitate the mutual recognition and execution of freezing orders and confiscation orders by establishing rules that oblige a Member State to recognise, without further formalities, the freezing orders and confiscation orders issued by another Member State within the framework of proceedings in criminal matters and to execute those orders within its territory.(13) This Regulation should apply to all freezing orders and to all confiscation orders issued within the framework of proceedings in criminal matters. “Proceedings in criminal matters” is an autonomous concept of Union law interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union, notwithstanding the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. The term therefore covers all types of freezing orders and confiscation orders issued following proceedings in relation to a criminal offence, not only orders covered by Directive [2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union (OJ 2014 L 127, p. 39)]. It also covers other types of order issued without a final conviction. While such orders might not exist in the legal system of a Member State, the Member State concerned should be able to recognise and execute such an order issued by another Member State. Proceedings in criminal matters could also encompass criminal investigations by the police and other law enforcement authorities. Freezing orders and confiscation orders that are issued within the framework of proceedings in civil or administrative matters should be excluded from the scope of this Regulation.…(18) The procedural rights set out in [Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings (OJ 2010 L 280, p. 1), Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings (OJ 2012 L 142, p. 1), Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty (OJ 2013 L 294, p. 1), Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ 2016 L 65, p. 1)], … should apply, within the scope of those Directives, to criminal proceedings covered by this Regulation as regards the Member States bound by those Directives. In any case, the safeguards under the Charter should apply to all proceedings covered by this Regulation. In particular, the essential safeguards for criminal proceedings set out in the Charter should apply to proceedings in criminal matters that are not criminal proceedings but which are covered by this Regulation.…(31) The recognition and execution of a freezing order or confiscation order should not be refused on grounds other than those provided for in this Regulation. ……(34) The creation of an area of freedom, security and justice within the Union is based on mutual trust and a presumption of compliance by other Member States with Union law and, in particular, with fundamental rights. However, in exceptional situations, where there are substantial grounds to believe, on the basis of specific and objective evidence, that the execution of a freezing order or confiscation order would, in the particular circumstances of the case, entail a manifest breach of a relevant fundamental right as set out in the Charter, the executing authority should be able to decide not to recognise and execute the order concerned. The fundamental rights that should be relevant in this respect are, in particular, the right to an effective remedy, the right to a fair trial and the right of defence. The right to property should, in principle, not be relevant because freezing and confiscation of assets necessarily imply an interference with a person’s right to property and because the necessary safeguards in that respect are already provided for in Union law, including in this Regulation.’
4Article 1 of that regulation, entitled ‘Subject matter’, provides:1. This Regulation lays down the rules under which a Member State recognises and executes in its territory freezing orders and confiscation orders issued by another Member State within the framework of proceedings in criminal matters.2. This Regulation shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect the fundamental rights and legal principles enshrined in Article 6 TEU.…4. This Regulation does not apply to freezing orders and confiscation orders issued within the framework of proceedings in civil or administrative matters.’
5Article 2 of that regulation, entitled ‘Definitions’, provides:‘For the purpose of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:(1) “freezing order” means a decision issued or validated by an issuing authority in order to prevent the destruction, transformation, removal, transfer or disposal of property with a view to the confiscation thereof;(2) “confiscation order” means a final penalty or measure, imposed by a court following proceedings in relation to a criminal offence, resulting in the final deprivation of property of a natural or legal person;(3)“property” means property of any description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, and legal documents or instruments evidencing title or interest in such property, which the issuing authority considers to be:(a) the proceeds of a criminal offence, or its equivalent, whether the full amount of the value or only part of the value of such proceeds;…(d) subject to confiscation under any other provisions relating to powers of confiscation, including confiscation without a final conviction, under the law of the issuing State, following proceedings in relation to a criminal offence;…(10) “affected person” means the natural or legal person against whom a freezing order or confiscation order is issued, or the natural or legal person that owns the property that is covered by that order, as well as any third parties whose rights in relation to that property are directly prejudiced by that order under the law of the executing State.’
6Article 3 of that regulation, entitled ‘Criminal offences’, provides:1.Freezing orders or confiscation orders shall be executed without verification of the double criminality of the acts giving rise to such orders, where those acts are punishable in the issuing State by a custodial sentence of a maximum of at least three years and constitute one or more of the following criminal offences under the law of the issuing State:…(9) laundering of the proceeds of crime;…2. For criminal offences other than those referred to in paragraph 1, the executing State may make the recognition and execution of a freezing order or confiscation order subject to the condition that the acts giving rise to the freezing order or confiscation order constitute a criminal offence under the law of the executing State, whatever its constituent elements or however it is described under the law of the issuing State.’
7Chapter II of Regulation 2018/1805, entitled ‘Transmission, recognition and execution of freezing orders’, contains Articles 4 to 13 of that regulation, while Chapter III, entitled ‘Transmission, recognition and execution of confiscation orders’, contains Articles 14 to 22.
8Article 14 of Regulation 2018/1805, entitled ‘Transmission of confiscation orders’, provides, in paragraphs 1 and 2:1. A confiscation order shall be transmitted by means of a confiscation certificate. The issuing authority shall transmit the confiscation certificate provided for in Article 17 directly to the executing authority or, where applicable, to the central authority referred to in Article 24(2), by any means capable of producing a written record under conditions that allow the executing authority to establish the authenticity of the confiscation certificate.2. Member States may make a declaration stating that, when a confiscation certificate is transmitted to them with a view to the recognition and execution of a confiscation order, the issuing authority is to transmit the original confiscation order or a certified copy thereof together with the confiscation certificate. However, only the confiscation certificate has to be translated, in accordance with Article 17(2).’
9Article 17 of that regulation, entitled ‘Standard confiscation certificate’, provides, in paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof:1. In order to transmit a confiscation order, the issuing authority shall complete the confiscation certificate set out in Annex II, shall sign it and shall certify its content as being accurate and correct.2. The issuing authority shall provide the executing authority with a translation of the confiscation certificate in an official language of the executing State or in any other language that the executing State will accept in accordance with paragraph 3.’
10Article 18 of that regulation, entitled ‘Recognition and execution of confiscation orders’, states, in paragraph 1:‘The executing authority shall recognise a confiscation order transmitted in accordance with Article 14 and shall take the measures necessary for its execution in the same way as for a domestic confiscation order issued by an authority of the executing State, unless the executing authority invokes one of the grounds for non-recognition and non-execution provided for in Article 19 or one of the grounds for postponement provided for in Article 21.’
11Article 19 of that regulation, entitled ‘Grounds for non-recognition and non-execution of confiscation orders’, provides in paragraphs 1 and 2:1.The executing authority may decide not to recognise or execute a confiscation order only where:…(c) the confiscation certificate is incomplete or manifestly incorrect and has not been completed following the consultation referred to in paragraph 2;…(h) in exceptional situations, there are substantial grounds to believe, on the basis of specific and objective evidence, that the execution of the confiscation order would, in the particular circumstances of the case, entail a manifest breach of a relevant fundamental right as set out in the Charter, in particular the right to an effective remedy, the right to a fair trial or the right of defence.2. In any of the cases referred to in paragraph 1, before deciding not to recognise or execute the confiscation order, whether wholly or partially, the executing authority shall consult the issuing authority by any appropriate means and, where appropriate, shall request the issuing authority to supply any necessary information without delay.’
12Article 23 of Regulation 2018/1805, entitled ‘Law governing execution’, states, in paragraph 1:‘The execution of the freezing order or confiscation order shall be governed by the law of the executing State and its authorities shall be solely competent to decide on the procedures for its execution and to determine all the measures relating thereto.’
13Article 25 of that regulation, entitled ‘Communication’, provides:1. Where necessary, the issuing authority and the executing authority shall consult each other without delay to ensure the efficient application of this Regulation, using any appropriate means of communication.2. All communications, including those intended to deal with difficulties concerning the transmission or authentication of any document needed for the execution of the freezing order or confiscation order, shall be made directly between the issuing authority and the executing authority and, where a Member State has designated a central authority in accordance with Article 24(2), shall be made, where appropriate, with the involvement of that central authority.’
14Article 33 of that regulation, entitled ‘Legal remedies in the executing State against the recognition and execution of a freezing order or confiscation order’, provides, in paragraphs 2 and 4:2. The substantive reasons for issuing the freezing order or confiscation order shall not be challenged before a court in the executing State.…4. This Article is without prejudice to the application in the issuing State of safeguards and legal remedies in accordance with Article 8 of Directive [2014/42].’
Legislation concerning the minimum rules on freezing orders and confiscation orders
15Article 1 of Directive 2014/42, entitled ‘Subject matter’, states, in paragraph 1:‘This Directive establishes minimum rules on the freezing of property with a view to possible subsequent confiscation and on the confiscation of property in criminal matters.’
16Article 8 of that directive, entitled ‘Safeguards’, provides:1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the persons affected by the measures provided for under this Directive have the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial in order to uphold their rights.…6. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that reasons are given for any confiscation order and that the order is communicated to the person affected. Member States shall provide for the effective possibility for a person in respect of whom confiscation is ordered to challenge the order before a court.7. Without prejudice to Directive [2012/13] and Directive [2013/48], persons whose property is affected by a confiscation order shall have the right of access to a lawyer throughout the confiscation proceedings relating to the determination of the proceeds and instrumentalities in order to uphold their rights. The persons concerned shall be informed of that right.…’
Legislation concerning the European arrest warrant and the recognition and enforcement of criminal sentences
–Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA
17Article 1 of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1), entitled ‘Definition of the European arrest warrant and obligation to execute it’, states, in paragraph 3:‘This Framework Decision shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 [TEU].’
–Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA
18Article 3 of Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union (OJ 2008 L 327, p. 27), entitled ‘Purpose and scope’, provides in paragraph 4:‘This Framework Decision shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 [TEU].’
Slovenian law
19Articles 227 and 245 of the Kazenski zakonik (Criminal Code) concern the criminal offence of acting to the detriment of creditors and that of money laundering, respectively.
20Article 498a of the Zakon o kazenskem postopku (Code of Criminal Procedure), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the ZKP’), provides:(1)In addition to cases where the criminal proceedings result in a judgment declaring the accused person guilty, the money or property of illegal origin referred to in Article 245 of the Criminal Code … shall also be confiscated:1) if the statutory criteria of a criminal offence under Article 245 of the Criminal Code have been fulfilled, indicating that the money or property under that article are proceeds of crime ……(2) Upon a reasoned request from the public prosecutor, the panel shall issue a special order relating to that matter … prior to that, the investigating judge shall, at the request of the panel, gather information and examine all circumstances relevant to establishing the illegal origin of the money or property …(3) A certified copy of the order referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be served on the owner of the confiscated money or property …, if his or her identity is known. …(4) The owner of the confiscated money or property … shall have the right to appeal against the order referred to in paragraph 2 of this article if he or she believes that the confiscation has no legal basis.’
21Article 500 of the ZKP provides:(1) Where confiscation of the proceeds of crime from another beneficiary (Articles 75, 77, 77a and 77b of the Criminal Code) is applicable, that beneficiary must be invited to be heard in the preliminary proceedings and at the main hearing. In the case of a legal person, its representative must be invited. In the invitation, it should be mentioned that the proceedings will be conducted even in his or her absence.(2) The legal person’s representative shall be heard at the main hearing after the accused person. The same applies to another beneficiary, if he or she has not been called as a witness.(3) The beneficiary and the representative of the legal person have the right, in connection with the determination of the proceeds of crime, to present evidence and, with the authorisation of the President of the Chamber, to put questions to the accused person, witnesses and experts.…(5) If the court discovers only during the main hearing that confiscation of the proceeds of crime is applicable, it must suspend the main hearing and invite the beneficiary or the representative of the legal person.’
The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
22On the basis of an indictment issued on 29 May 2017, the Okrožno sodišče v Mariboru (District Court, Maribor, Slovenia) conducted criminal proceedings against four persons (‘the four defendants’) suspected of having committed the criminal offence of abuse of position or of power by having, between 15 and 25 July 2007, obtained for the company I.J.S. d.d. (‘I.J.S.’) an unlawful economic advantage when they purchased shares in L.Z.
23In those proceedings, that court also established that the constituent criteria of two other criminal offences, namely that of acting to the detriment of the creditors of I.J.S. and that of money laundering, were satisfied in respect of persons other than the four defendants. In that regard, that court noted, inter alia, that, in June 2013, the nominee director of I.J.S., which was then insolvent, sold, without actual payment, shares in L.Z. to the company V.K. d.o.o. Subsequently, the latter company, in July 2013, sold those shares to D., through one of its directors, in order to conceal their origin.
24In the context of the preliminary criminal investigation relating to the criminal offence of acting to the detriment of the creditors of I.J.S., the shares in L.Z. owned by D., as the proceeds of that offence, were made subject to a freezing order, issued on 16 June 2014, by the Okrožno sodišče v Mariboru (District Court, Maribor). By that freezing order, which was initially applicable for a period of three months from the date of its adoption, that is to say, up to 15 September 2014, D. was prohibited from transferring those shares and informed of its right to appeal against that order. On request by the public prosecutor, that court adopted several orders extending the period in which those shares were frozen. Those freezing orders were recognised and executed by the Croatian authorities. However, those shares were not protected during the period from 16 September to 20 October 2014, owing to complications in the procedure for recognising those orders, and on 13 October 2014 they were transferred to trust accounts, which made it impossible to identify the actual owners.
25On two occasions, D. brought appeals against the freezing orders, which were unsuccessful. In addition, its action before the Županijski sud u Zagrebu (County Court, Zagreb, Croatia), seeking to challenge the recognition and execution of those orders by the Croatian authorities, and the subsequent appeal, were dismissed.
26On 27 January 2020, the Okrožno sodišče v Mariboru (District Court, Maribor), in the criminal proceedings referred to in paragraphs 22 and 23 of the present judgment, heard Z.Z., the representative of D. During that hearing, that court informed him of the possibility of confiscation of the shares in L.Z., owned by D., which were covered by the freezing orders, and, in accordance with Article 500 of the ZKP, of the opportunity to be heard as regards such confiscation and to submit evidence and ask questions. For his part, Z.Z. stated that he was aware of those freezing orders, that he considered them to be unjustified, and that for that reason had brought an action through his lawyer before the Županijski sud u Zagrebu (County Court, Zagreb), referred to in the preceding paragraph in order to challenge their recognition and execution by the Croatian authorities. He also stated that he would appeal if those shares were confiscated.
27On 22 May 2020, the Okrožno sodišče v Mariboru (District Court, Maribor) held the main hearing in the presence of the public prosecutor, the four defendants and their lawyers. In his closing speech, the public prosecutor sought the confiscation of those shares in so far as, in his view, they should be regarded as the proceeds of criminal offences, namely acting to the detriment of creditors and money laundering.
28However, no indictment was drawn up in respect of those two offences.
29By judgment of 27 May 2020, the Okrožno sodišče v Mariboru (District Court, Maribor), as regards the criminal offence of abuse of position or of power referred to in paragraph 22 of the present judgment, acquitted the four defendants while adopting, on the basis of point 1 of Article 498a(1) of the ZKP, a confiscation order relating to the shares in L.Z. owned by D. (‘the confiscation order at issue’). In respect of the latter, that judgment stated, inter alia, that it is apparent from the facts established during the procedure for the taking of evidence that those shares constitute the proceeds of the criminal offence of acting to the detriment of creditors and of money laundering, referred to in paragraphs 23 and 27 of the present judgment. The public prosecutor brought an appeal against that judgment before the Višje sodišče v Mariboru (Court of Appeal, Maribor, Slovenia), which dismissed that appeal by judgment of 24 November 2021, following which that confiscation order became final as from 22 December 2021.
30On 17 February 2022, the Okrožno sodišče v Mariboru (District Court, Maribor) issued the confiscation certificate provided for in Article 17(1) of, and Annex II to, Regulation 2018/1805, which designated the shares in L.Z. owned by D. as ‘the proceeds of a criminal offence’ within the meaning of point 3(a) of Article 2 of that regulation, and as being subject to ‘confiscation without a final conviction … following proceedings in relation to a criminal offence’, within the meaning of point 3(d) of Article 2 of that regulation.
31With a view to the recognition and execution of the confiscation order at issue, that court transmitted that certificate, pursuant to Article 14(1) of Regulation 2018/1805, to the Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Zagrebu (County Public Prosecutor’s Office, Zagreb, Croatia). That certificate was accompanied by a translation in Croatian, first, of extracts from the judgment of 27 May 2020, referred to in paragraph 29 of the present judgment, relating to the introduction, the operative part, the reasoning relating to the confiscated items and the reference to the legal remedies, and, secondly, of the introduction and operative part of the judgment of the Višje sodišče v Mariboru (Court of Appeal, Maribor) of 24 November 2021, referred to in the same paragraph, dismissing the appeal brought by the prosecutor against that judgment.
32By judgment of 25 November 2022, the Županijski sud u Zagrebu (County Court, Zagreb), hearing the case brought by the Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Zagrebu (County Public Prosecutor’s Office, Zagreb), recognised the confiscation order at issue.
33D. brought an appeal against that judgment before the Visoki kazneni sud (High Criminal Court, Croatia), which is the referring court.
34First, that court expresses doubts as to whether the property forming the subject matter of the confiscation order at issue falls within the scope of Regulation 2018/1805.
35In that regard, the referring court asks whether criminal proceedings closed by a judgment of acquittal which lead to the adoption of a confiscation order based on findings relating to a criminal offence which differs from the offence forming the subject matter of that judgment, committed by perpetrators other than those referred to in that judgment and against whom no indictment has been drawn up, may be regarded as ‘proceedings in relation to a criminal offence’, within the meaning of point 2 of Article 2 of Regulation 2018/1805, capable of resulting in ‘confiscation without a final conviction’ within the meaning of point 3(d) of Article 2 of that regulation. That court points out that, according to the ZKP, the confiscation of property may be provided for only in a judgment imposing a conviction or in a judgment finding that the person concerned has committed an unlawful act which is the subject of criminal proceedings.
36Secondly, the referring court asks whether, in the criminal proceedings which led to the adoption of the confiscation order at issue, the fundamental rights which D. derives from the Charter were observed.
37In particular, since, in accordance with Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805, the refusal to recognise a confiscation order on account of infringement of the fundamental rights of the person concerned is possible, having regard to the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions, only in exceptional situations, that court asks to what extent that regulation, in particular Article 1(2) thereof, and Article 47 of the Charter are capable of precluding the recognition and execution of that decision if it transpires that those fundamental rights have been infringed.
38First, the referring court notes that, at the hearing on 27 January 2020 before the Okrožno sodišče v Mariboru (District Court, Maribor), Z.Z. was questioned as the representative of D. and was informed of the possibility of the shares at issue in the main proceedings being confiscated and of the opportunity to submit evidence and raise questions in the course of the proceedings. However, he was not informed of the right of access to a lawyer throughout the confiscation proceedings, provided for in Article 8(7) of Directive 2014/42.
39Secondly, that court points out that the request for confiscation of the shares at issue in the main proceedings had not yet been made at the time when that hearing was held, since the public prosecutor made that request for confiscation only in his closing speech, that is to say at the hearing on 22 May 2020. The Okrožno sodišče v Mariboru (District Court, Maribor) therefore held a hearing on the basis of the indictment drawn up in 2017.
40Thirdly, the referring court notes that it is apparent from the confiscation certificate at issue in the main proceedings that the Okrožno sodišče v Mariboru (District Court, Maribor) served on D., on 13 October 2020, extracts from its judgment of 27 May 2020 issuing the confiscation order at issue, relating to the introduction, the operative part, the reasoning relating to the confiscated goods and the reference to the legal remedies, together with a translation in Croatian.
41In that regard, that court asks whether the full text of that judgment, as an essential document, should have been served on D., in order to ensure a fair hearing for that company.
42Moreover, that court notes that D. disputes that extracts from that judgment were actually served on it on 13 October 2020 and that that company proposes to adduce evidence of this by obtaining the certificate attesting to the service on that date and a handwriting expert’s report. That company states that it received a copy of that judgment only after requesting it, in February 2022.
43Fourthly and lastly, the referring court observes that D. did not lodge an appeal against the judgment containing the confiscation order at issue.
44In the light of those findings, the referring court asks about the scope of the checks it should carry out in the context of the dispute in the main proceedings and the extent to which it is supposed to consult, in that context, the authority issuing the confiscation order at issue, having regard to the principle of mutual recognition and Article 33(2) of Regulation 2018/1805, which provides that the substantive reasons which led to the issue of such a confiscation order cannot be challenged before a court of the executing Member State.
45In those circumstances the Visoki kazneni sud (High Criminal Court) decided to stay proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:(1) Does the term “proceedings in relation to a criminal offence that may result in confiscation of property, including confiscation without a conviction” within the meaning of [point 3 of Article 2] of Regulation 2018/1805 also include criminal proceedings concluded with an acquittal?(2) Does the term “proceedings in relation to a criminal offence that may result in confiscation of property, including confiscation without a conviction” within the meaning of [point 3 of Article 2] of Regulation 2018/1805 also include criminal proceedings concluded with a judgment of acquittal that includes an order to confiscate property as undue proceeds derived from another criminal offence, which is not the criminal offence of which the defendants were acquitted, and in whose commission the defendants were not involved, but rather persons against whom no indictment was brought?(3) Is it contrary to Regulation 2018/1805, Article 1(2) thereof, and Article 47 of [the Charter], to recognise a confiscation order issued in criminal proceedings in which [the] affected person, within the meaning of [point 10 of Article 2] of the regulation:– was not summoned to participate in all stages of the criminal proceedings;– was not advised of his or her right [of access] to a lawyer throughout the proceedings;– did not receive the full text of the judgment containing the confiscation order [at issue] in a language he or she understood, but only extracts from that judgment, and did not appeal against the judgment thus served?’
Consideration of the questions referred
The first and second questions
46By its first and second questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 1(1) and (4) and point 2 and point 3(a) and (d) of Article 2 of Regulation 2018/1805 must be interpreted as meaning that that regulation applies to a confiscation order issued, following criminal proceedings, in a judgment acquitting the defendants of the offence which was the subject of those proceedings and finding that the property to be confiscated constitutes the proceeds of a criminal offence other than that offence, in which a person other than the acquitted defendants was involved, against whom no indictment was drawn up.
47It should be noted that, under Article 1(1) of Regulation 2018/1805, that regulation lays down the rules under which a Member State recognises and executes in its territory freezing orders and confiscation orders issued by another Member State within the framework of proceedings in criminal matters. In accordance with Article 1(4) of that regulation, it does not apply to freezing orders and confiscation orders issued within the framework of proceedings in civil or administrative matters.
48Point 2 of Article 2 of that regulation states, in that regard, that the concept of ‘confiscation order’, within the meaning of that regulation, refers to a final penalty or measure, imposed by a court following proceedings in relation to a criminal offence, resulting in the final deprivation of property of a natural or legal person.
49Point 3(a) and (d) of Article 2 of Regulation 2018/1805 defines the concept of ‘property’ as including, inter alia, any property which the issuing authority considers to be the proceeds of a criminal offence or to be subject to confiscation, including ‘without a final conviction’, under the law of the issuing Member State following proceedings in relation to a criminal offence.
50It is thus apparent from the very wording of those provisions that the scope of Regulation 2018/1805 includes all types of confiscation orders which are issued following proceedings in relation to a criminal offence, including confiscation orders issued without a final conviction. As recital 13 of that regulation states, Member States should be able to recognise and execute such orders adopted under the law of the issuing Member State in accordance with that regulation, even though such orders might not exist in the legal system of the executing Member State.
51It follows that, as the Advocate General stated in points 28 to 36 of his Opinion and as all the interested parties who submitted written observations have maintained, Regulation 2018/1805 applies to a confiscation order, such as that at issue in the main proceedings. That order was issued by the national court having jurisdiction following criminal proceedings in which that court held that the confiscated property constituted the ‘proceeds of a criminal offence’ within the meaning of point 3(a) of Article 2 of that regulation, namely the offence of acting to the detriment of creditors and the offence of money laundering, and that that property was subject, under Slovenian law, to ‘confiscation without a final conviction’ within the meaning of point 3(d) of Article 2 of that regulation. It is irrelevant in that regard that those two offences did not give rise to an indictment and that persons other than those involved in those offences were acquitted in those proceedings.
52In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the first and second questions is that Article 1(1) and (4) and point 2 and point 3(a) and (d) of Article 2 of Regulation 2018/1805 must be interpreted as meaning that that regulation applies to a confiscation order issued, following criminal proceedings, in a judgment acquitting the defendants of the offence that was the subject of those proceedings and declaring that the property to be confiscated constitutes the proceeds of a criminal offence other than that offence, involving a person who was not one of the acquitted defendants, against whom no indictment has been drawn up.
The third question
53By its third question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805, read in conjunction with Article 1(2) of that regulation and in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that the executing authority of a Member State may refuse to recognise and execute a confiscation order on the basis of the alleged failure, in the issuing Member State, to observe the fundamental rights of a person affected by that order, within the meaning of point 10 of Article 2 of that regulation, on the grounds, first, that that person was not summoned to participate in all stages of the criminal proceedings which led to the adoption of that order, secondly, that he or she was not informed of his or her right of access to a lawyer throughout those proceedings and, thirdly, that he or she was not served, in a language which he or she understands, with the full text of the judgment imposing that order, even though that person did not make use of the legal remedies available to him or her in the issuing Member State in order to challenge that judgment.
Admissibility
54The Slovenian Government asserts that the third question is inadmissible on the ground that the examples of infringement of fundamental rights envisaged by the referring court in that question do not correspond to the actual facts of the case in the main proceedings.
55It should be noted that, according to settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 8 April 2025, European Public Prosecutor’s Office (Judicial review of procedural acts), C‑292/23, EU:C:2025:255, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
56In the present case, it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that the referring court, hearing a dispute concerning the recognition and execution of a confiscation order adopted following criminal proceedings brought in a Member State other than the Republic of Croatia, asks, by its third question, whether the proceedings which led to the adoption of that order were vitiated by infringements of the fundamental rights of the person concerned which are such as to justify, under Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805, a refusal to recognise and execute that order.
57In those circumstances, and since it is for that court alone to determine the accuracy of the factual circumstances to which it refers in its question as regards such possible infringements, it cannot be held that the interpretation of EU law which it seeks by that question is obviously unrelated to the actual facts of the case before it or its object or that that question is hypothetical.
58The third question is therefore admissible.
Substance
59As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that it is apparent, in particular, from Article 1(1) of Regulation 2018/1805, read in the light of recitals 1 to 4, 11 and 12, that, in so far as, first, the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime are among the most effective means of combating crime and, secondly, the often transnational nature of crime requires effective cross-border cooperation on the part of the Member States in that field, the objective of that regulation is to establish rules which oblige Member States to recognise freezing orders and confiscation orders issued by another Member State in the context of proceedings in criminal matters. That mechanism is based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions, which constitutes the ‘cornerstone’ of judicial cooperation between the Member States in criminal matters, and is intended to contribute to maintaining and developing an area of freedom, security and justice by strengthening that cooperation.
60In particular, in accordance with the principle of mutual recognition, which underpins the scheme of Regulation 2018/1805, a Member State is, in principle, required, under Article 18(1) of that regulation, read in the light of recitals 12 and 31 thereof, to recognise, without further formalities, confiscation orders issued by another Member State which have been transmitted to it in accordance with Article 14 of that regulation and to take the necessary measures for their execution, in the same way as for confiscation orders issued at national level, except in the cases expressly provided for by that regulation and, in particular, by Article 19 thereof, which sets out the grounds on which a Member State may decide not to recognise and execute a confiscation order.
61Those grounds for refusal of recognition and execution include that laid down in Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805, in accordance with which the executing authority of a Member State may decide not to recognise or execute a confiscation order issued in another Member State only where, in exceptional situations, there are substantial grounds to believe, on the basis of specific and objective evidence, that the execution of that confiscation order would, in the particular circumstances of the case, entail a manifest breach of a relevant fundamental right as set out in the Charter, in particular the right to an effective remedy, the right to a fair trial or the right of defence.
62It follows that the EU legislature provided, by Article 19(1)(h), for a specific ground for non-recognition and non-execution of a confiscation order, which is intended to ensure observance of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter and which gives concrete expression to Article 1(2) of that regulation, according to which that regulation does not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect the fundamental rights and legal principles enshrined in Article 6 TEU.
63In that regard, it is apparent from the very wording of Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805, also reproduced in recital 34 of that regulation, that that provision refers to the risk that the execution of a confiscation order entails ‘in the particular circumstances of the case’ a manifest breach of a relevant fundamental right enshrined in the Charter.
64Therefore, as the Advocate General observed in point 68 of his Opinion, and as the European Commission also maintained at the hearing before the Court, the EU legislature, in establishing that specific ground for refusal of recognition and execution of a confiscation order in respect of a breach of fundamental rights, intended to require the executing authority of the Member State concerned to carry out only an individual examination of whether there is a risk of such a manifest breach of a fundamental right.
65In particular, Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805 does not require that such an individual examination be necessarily preceded by a finding, by the executing authority of the Member State concerned, that there are, in the issuing Member State, systemic or generalised deficiencies or deficiencies affecting more specifically an identifiable group of persons. That finding is, however, required by the Court in the context of the two-step examination which must, in principle, be carried out, in the context of Framework Decisions 2002/584 and 2008/909, in order to assess, during proceedings for the execution of a European arrest warrant and proceedings for the recognition and execution of a criminal conviction, whether there is a real risk of an infringement of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Articles 4, 7, 24 and 47 of the Charter (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgments of 5 April 2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, C‑404/15 and C‑659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198, paragraphs 88 to 94; of 9 November 2023, Staatsanwaltschaft Aachen, C‑819/21, EU:C:2023:841, paragraphs 25 to 30; and of 29 July 2024, Alchaster, C‑202/24, EU:C:2024:649, paragraphs 52 to 54 and the case-law cited).
66That two-step examination is based, in the absence of a specific ground for refusal of recognition and execution on the ground of infringement of fundamental rights laid down by the EU legislature, on the interpretation of the general provision expressed in Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584 and Article 3(4) of Framework Decision 2008/909, which correspond to Article 1(2) of Regulation 2018/1805, cited in paragraph 62 above.
67It should be noted that, by Article 19(1)(h) of that regulation, the EU legislature expressly chose, as regards the system of recognition and execution of confiscation orders, to give concrete expression to that general provision through such a specific ground for refusal of recognition and execution, which is based on particular examination rules, requiring only an individual assessment of the existence of a risk of a manifest breach of fundamental rights.
68In those circumstances, although, in the context of an individual assessment, the existence of either systemic or generalised deficiencies or deficiencies affecting more specifically an identifiable group of persons as regards compliance, in the issuing Member State, with the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter could, where appropriate, be such as to contribute to establishing that there is a risk of a manifest breach of those rights, the fact remains that the executing authority of a Member State is not required to carry out the two-step examination, as referred to in paragraph 65 of the present judgment, in order to be able to invoke the specific ground for refusal of recognition and execution of a confiscation order, provided for in Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805.
69That said, it should be noted, first, as the Advocate General observed in point 78 of his Opinion, that that provision, by confining the ground for refusal of recognition and execution which it sets out to, according to its express wording, ‘exceptional situations’ and by requiring proof of the existence of ‘substantial grounds’ to believe, on the basis of ‘specific and objective evidence’, that the execution of a confiscation order will lead to ‘a manifest breach’ of a relevant fundamental right as set out in the Charter, lays down strict conditions and a high threshold of seriousness for such an infringement.
70Secondly, such a ground for refusal of recognition and execution, in so far as it constitutes an exception to the principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust on which the system of judicial cooperation in criminal matters between the Member States is based, must be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, judgment of 21 December 2023, GN (Ground for refusal based on the best interests of the child), C‑261/22, EU:C:2023:1017, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
71In the present case, the referring court is uncertain whether, in the issuing Member State, the fundamental rights of the person concerned by the confiscation order at issue have been respected, on the grounds that that person was not summoned to participate in all the stages of the criminal proceedings which led to the adoption of that order, that he or she was not informed of his or her right of access to a lawyer throughout those proceedings and that he or she was not served, in a language which he or she understands, with the full text of the judgment imposing that order.
72In that regard, it should be noted at the outset that, in particular, Directive 2014/42 requires the Member States, as is apparent from Article 1(1) thereof, to establish common minimum rules on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds in relation to criminal offences, with a view, inter alia, to facilitating the mutual recognition of judicial confiscation orders adopted in proceedings in criminal matters (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024, 1Dream and Others, C‑767/22, C‑49/23 and C‑161/23, EU:C:2024:823, paragraphs 72 and 73 and the case-law cited).
73Thus, Article 8(1) of that directive requires Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure that the persons affected by the measures provided for by that directive, which, according to the Court’s case-law, include not only those convicted of an offence, but also third parties whose property is affected by a confiscation order (judgment of 21 October 2021, Okrazhna prokuratura – Varna, C‑845/19 and C‑863/19, EU:C:2021:864, paragraph 76) have the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial in order to uphold their rights.
74In particular, under Article 8(6) of Directive 2014/42, Member States are to take the necessary measures to ensure that reasons are given for any confiscation order and that the order is communicated to the person affected. They must also provide for the effective possibility for a person in respect of whom confiscation is ordered to challenge that order before a court. Furthermore, Article 8(7) of that directive provides that, without prejudice to Directives 2012/13 and 2013/48, persons whose property is affected by that order are to have the right of access to a lawyer throughout the confiscation proceedings relating to the determination of the proceeds and instrumentalities in order to uphold their rights, and that the persons concerned are to be informed of that right.
75Moreover, as is apparent from recital 18 of Regulation 2018/1805, the procedural rights guaranteed by several other directives referred to in that recital apply to criminal proceedings covered by that regulation as regards the Member States bound by those directives.
76In any event, irrespective of the limits of the scope of the acts of secondary legislation referred to in paragraphs 72 and 75 of the present judgment, the safeguards provided for by the Charter must, as also stated in recital 18 of Regulation 2018/1805, apply to all proceedings covered by that regulation.
77Thus, the obligation to comply with the Charter is binding on the Member States when they decide on an application for recognition and execution of a confiscation order in accordance with Regulation 2018/1805, given that such an order constitutes the implementation of EU law, within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter.
78Those fundamental rights include, inter alia, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, laid down in Article 47 of the Charter, which comprises various elements; in particular, the rights of the defence, the principle of equality of arms, the right of access to a court and the right to be advised, defended and represented (judgment of 26 July 2017, Sacko, C‑348/16, EU:C:2017:591, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited). The right to an effective remedy, the right to a fair trial and the right of defence are expressly referred to in Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805.
79According to settled case-law, in the context of the system of judicial cooperation between the Member States in criminal matters, the observance of those fundamental rights falls primarily within the responsibility of the issuing Member State (see, by analogy, judgment of 29 July 2024, Breian, C‑318/24 PPU, EU:C:2024:658, paragraphs 32 and 52 and the case-law cited).
80It follows that, as the Advocate General observed, in essence, in point 93 of his Opinion, the person concerned by a confiscation order cannot, where he or she has not made use of the legal remedies available to him or her in the issuing Member State, be regarded as being in an exceptional situation characterised by the presence of specific and objective evidence such as to constitute substantial grounds to believe that the execution of that order would, in the particular circumstances of the case, entail a manifest breach of a fundamental right as set out in the Charter, within the meaning of Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805, unless he or she can demonstrate that particular circumstances made it impossible or, at the very least, excessively difficult for that person to exercise those remedies, or that those circumstances affected the effectiveness of those remedies.
81In the present case, according to the information set out in the order for reference, it appears that, first, Article 500 of the ZKP provides, in the case of confiscation measures, for the right of legal persons to be heard, through their representative, both during the preliminary procedure and at the main hearing, and for the right for that representative to submit evidence and ask questions. Secondly, Article 498a(3) and (4) of the ZKP states that a certified copy of the confiscation order referred to in that article is to be delivered to the owner of the confiscated property if his or her identity is known and that the latter has the right to appeal against that order. However, it is apparent from that order for reference that, although D., through its lawyer, appealed against the freezing orders adopted against it, it did not, however, make use of the legal remedies provided for by the legislation of the issuing Member State in order to challenge the confiscation order at issue.
82In those circumstances, subject to the checks to be carried out by the referring court, a legal person, such as D., can, as the Advocate General observed in point 92 of his Opinion, rely, at the stage of the recognition and execution of a confiscation order concerning it, on an alleged failure to observe its fundamental rights, referred to in paragraph 53 of the present judgment, during the proceedings which led to the adoption of that order in the issuing Member State, by relying on the ground for refusal of recognition and execution set out in Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805, only if it can demonstrate the existence of particular circumstances which made it impossible or, at the very least, excessively difficult for that person to exercise those remedies, to the detriment of their effectiveness.
83In that regard, as has been noted in paragraphs 41, 42 and 44 of the present judgment, it is apparent from the order for reference that, first, the referring court is uncertain whether the full text of the judgment of the Okrožno sodišče v Mariboru (District Court, Maribor) of 27 May 2020, imposing the confiscation order at issue, should have been served on D., in order to guarantee that company a fair hearing. Secondly, in so far as D. disputes, in the context of the case in the main proceedings, that extracts from that judgment and information relating to the legal remedies available in the issuing Member State were in fact served on it on 13 October 2020, that court asks whether it can verify that that service indeed took place and whether it must consult the issuing authority in that context.
84According to settled case-law, respect for the right to effective judicial protection requires not only the guarantee of actual and effective receipt of decisions, that is to say, the notification of those decisions to the addressees thereof, but also that such notification allow those addressees to ascertain the reasons upon which the decision taken in relation to them is based, as well as the legal remedies against such a decision and the time limit prescribed to that end, so as to allow them to defend their rights effectively and to decide, in full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in challenging that decision before the courts (judgment of 6 October 2021, Prokuratura Rejonowa Łódź-Bałuty, C‑338/20, EU:C:2021:805, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
85In the present case, it is apparent from the order for reference, as mentioned in paragraph 40 above, that the confiscation certificate at issue in the main proceedings, transmitted by the issuing authority in accordance with Article 14(1) of Regulation 2018/1805, indicates that extracts from the judgment imposing the confiscation order at issue, relating to the introduction, in the operative part, to the part of the statement of reasons relating to the confiscated goods and to the reference to the legal remedies, were served on D., along with a translation in Croatian.
86The service of those extracts from the judgment imposing the confiscation order at issue, provided that it was effected on D., appears, in principle, to allow that company effectively to exercise the legal remedies available to it in the issuing Member State in order to assert the alleged failure to observe its fundamental rights which vitiated the procedure which led to the adoption of that order. As is apparent from paragraphs 22 to 29 of the present judgment, the confiscation order at issue was based on criminal offences other than the offence in respect of which that judgment acquitted the four defendants concerned. To that extent, it does not appear that service on D. of the parts of that judgment relating to the latter criminal offence and to that acquittal was essential for the effective exercise of those remedies, which it is for the referring court to ascertain.
87As regards the fact that D. disputes before the referring court that that service actually took place, it should be noted that, in so far as the confiscation certificate is intended to facilitate the mutual recognition of confiscation orders, and in view of the mutual trust which the courts of the Member States must have, the executing authority had to rely on the information contained in that certificate in the absence of sufficiently specific and objective evidence capable of casting doubt on their credibility (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 July 2024, Breian, C‑318/24 PPU, EU:C:2024:658, paragraph 115 and the case-law cited).
88In any event, if, on the basis of specific and objective evidence, and notwithstanding the information contained in such a certificate, the referring court were to have doubts concerning the service of the confiscation order at issue or, more generally, concerning whether the fundamental rights of the person concerned were observed during the procedure which led to the adoption of that order, it would, in accordance with Article 19(2) of Regulation 2018/1805, be required, before deciding not to recognise or execute that order, in whole or in part, under Article 19(1)(h) of that regulation, to consult the issuing authority and, where appropriate, request it to provide any necessary information without delay, in order to determine whether or not those doubts were well founded.
89In that context, it should also be noted that, at the hearing before the Court, the Commission submitted that, following consultation of the national file relating to the case in the main proceedings, it found that certain parts of the judgment imposing the confiscation order at issue were illegible on account of poor print quality.
90In that regard, it should be recalled, so far as is relevant, that, under Article 19(1)(c) of Regulation 2018/1805, the executing authority of a Member State may also decide not to recognise and execute a confiscation order where the confiscation certificate, as provided for in Article 17 of, and Annex II to, that regulation, is incomplete or manifestly incorrect and that certificate has not been completed after the mandatory consultation referred to in Article 19(2) of that regulation.
91It is true that, in accordance with Article 14(1) of Regulation 2018/1805, that confiscation certificate constitutes, in principle, the means by which any confiscation order must be transmitted by the issuing authority to the executing authority for the purposes of recognition and execution of that order.
92That said, Member States may, under Article 14(2) of Regulation 2018/1805, make a declaration stating that, where such a certificate is addressed to them for those purposes, the issuing authority must also transmit the original confiscation order or a certified copy thereof together with that certificate. It is apparent from the order for reference that the Republic of Croatia made such a declaration.
93In such a case, since Article 18(1) of that regulation requires the recognition and execution of any confiscation order in so far as it has been transmitted ‘in accordance with Article 14’ of that regulation, the legibility of the text of the judgment imposing the original confiscation order or of the certified copy thereof may fall within the scope of Article 19(1)(c) of that regulation.
94However, as is apparent from the very wording of that provision and as was noted in paragraph 88 of the present judgment, in accordance with Article 19(2) of Regulation 2018/1805, the executing authority, before adopting a decision refusing to recognise or execute a confiscation order, is required to consult the issuing authority in order for it to send it a legible version of the original confiscation order or the certified copy of that order. The obligation to consult also derives from Article 25 of that regulation, paragraph 1 of which provides that the issuing authority and the executing authority, where necessary, are to consult each other without delay to ensure the efficient application of that regulation, and paragraph 2 of which refers precisely to the event of difficulties concerning the transmission or authentication of any document needed for the execution of the confiscation order.
95It is therefore only in the absence of the transmission by the issuing authority of a legible version of the text of the original confiscation order or of the certified copy thereof within a reasonable time that the executing authority could refuse to recognise and execute the confiscation order at issue on the ground set out in Article 19(1)(c) of Regulation 2018/1805.
96In the light of all of the foregoing, the answer to the third question is that Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805, read in conjunction with Article 1(2) of that regulation and in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that the executing authority of a Member State cannot refuse to recognise and execute a confiscation order on the basis of an alleged failure in the issuing Member State to observe the fundamental rights of the person affected by that order, within the meaning of point 10 of Article 2 of that regulation, where that person, having been effectively served, in a language which he or she understands, with parts of the judgment imposing that order sufficient to enable him or her to appeal against it, did not make use of the legal remedies available to him or her in the issuing Member State to challenge that confiscation order.
Costs
97Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.
Operative part
On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules:
1.Article 1(1) and (4) and point 2 and point 3(a) and (d) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on the mutual recognition of freezing orders and confiscation ordersmust be interpreted as meaning that that regulation applies to a confiscation order issued, following criminal proceedings, in a judgment acquitting the defendants of the offence that was the subject of those proceedings and declaring that the property to be confiscated constitutes the proceeds of a criminal offence other than that offence, involving a person who was not one of the acquitted defendants, against whom no indictment has been drawn up.
2.Article 19(1)(h) of Regulation 2018/1805, read in conjunction with Article 1(2) of that regulation and in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,must be interpreted as meaning that the executing authority of a Member State cannot refuse to recognise and execute a confiscation order on the basis of an alleged failure in the issuing Member State to observe the fundamental rights of the person affected by that order, within the meaning of point 10 of Article 2 of that regulation, where that person, having been effectively served, in a language which he or she understands, with parts of the judgment imposing that order sufficient to enable him or her to appeal against it, did not make use of the legal remedies available to him or her in the issuing Member State to challenge that confiscation order.
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