49In that regard, concerning, first, the appellant’s argument that the General Court did not correctly apply the test relating to the ‘manifest and serious breach’, as defined in the case-law of the Court of Justice, it should be recalled that, according to that case-law, the existence of a sufficiently serious breach of EU law must be assessed on the basis of each type of situation. Thus, a breach of EU law is sufficiently serious where, in the exercise of its legislative power, over which EU law affords it a margin of discretion, an EU institution has manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on the exercise of that power. Conversely, where that institution was not faced with legislative choices and had only considerably reduced, or even no, discretion, the mere infringement of EU law may be sufficient to establish the existence of a sufficiently serious breach (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 April 2007, Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission C‑282/05 P, EU:C:2007:226, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited, and of 5 March 2024, Kočner v Europol C‑755/21 P, EU:C:2024:202, paragraph 126 and the case-law cited).
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