28Thus, in the present case, given that there was no final decision because an appeal had been lodged against the CNMC decision and was pending on the date of the contested decision, it was for EU-OSHA to make its own assessment of the conduct of the applicant on the basis of the CNMC decision, which is one of the factors listed by the relevant provisions (see paragraph 23 above), but also on the basis of other relevant elements of the context, including, in particular, the suspension of that decision. The situation governed by Article 106(2) of the former Financial Regulation and by Article 136(2) of the Financial Regulation is precisely the scenario in which the decision potentially serving as the basis for exclusion is not final, either because the time limit for lodging an appeal against that decision has not expired or because such an appeal has been lodged, or because it has been suspended, as in the present case. To take the view, as the applicant does, that a suspended decision can no longer serve as a basis for an exclusion decision would be tantamount to rendering ineffective the possibility provided for by the applicable provisions, as well as Article 106(7)(c) of the former Financial Regulation and Article 136(6)(a) of the Financial Regulation, which encourage persons or entities that have not been the subject of a final judgment to adopt remedial measures designed to demonstrate their reliability despite the decision finding an infringement of competition law (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 19 June 2019, Meca, C‑41/18, EU:C:2019:507, paragraph 40; see also the paragraph 55 below).