131By their first complaint, the appellants maintain that, in paragraphs 180, 182 and 183 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court applied an erroneous legal test by relying on a concept of ‘superdominant’ position in order to assess the merits of Google’s conduct. First, the degree of dominance has no bearing on whether abuse of a dominant position exists, as such, within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU. Second, according to the appellants, the General Court was wrong to find that, because of Google’s ‘superdominant’ position, the equal treatment rule for internet access providers under Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 laying down measures concerning open internet access and amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services and Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 on roaming on public mobile communications networks and services within the Union (OJ 2015 L 310, p. 1), had to be taken into account in assessing Google’s conduct under Article 102 TFEU. Characterising Google as ‘superdominant’ or as a ‘gateway to the Internet’ cannot expand the application of the equal treatment rule in such a way as to introduce more expansive obligations under Article 102 TFEU.
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