19That interpretation is supported by the third sentence of recital 146 of the GDPR, which states that ‘the concept of damage should be broadly interpreted in the light of the case-law of the Court … in a manner which fully reflects the objectives [of that regulation]’. It would be contrary to that broad conception of ‘damage’, favoured by the EU legislature, if that concept were limited solely to damage of a certain degree of seriousness, in particular as regards the duration of the period during which the negative consequences of the infringement of that regulation were suffered by the data subjects (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 May 2023, Österreichische Post (Non-material damage in connection with the processing of personal data), C‑300/21, EU:C:2023:370, paragraph 46, and of today, Natsionalna agentsia za prihodite, C‑340/21, paragraph 81).