136Nor can Air Canada validly rely on a breach of the principle of equal treatment resulting from the fact that its own procedural position is no different from that of the air carriers which were successful before the General Court in claiming that the Commission’s action was partially time-barred. Since the plea based on limitation is not a matter of public policy and it is for the undertaking affected to raise it, the fact that the General Court found that the limitation period had expired in respect of the undertakings which raised that plea cannot constitute an unjustified difference in treatment to the detriment of Air Canada. Contrary to what the appellant claims, that difference in treatment results exclusively from the objective circumstance that it refrained from raising the plea alleging that the limitation period had expired, whereas it could have done so under the same conditions as the other air carriers which raised that plea (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 November 2017, British Airways v Commission, C‑122/16 P, EU:C:2017:861, paragraph 98).
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