51In that context, the independence of the judges of the Member States is of fundamental importance for the EU legal order in various respects (judgment of 9 July 2020, Land Hessen, C‑272/19, EU:C:2020:535, paragraph 45). It is, thus, essential to the proper working of the judicial-cooperation system embodied by the preliminary-ruling mechanism under Article 267 TFEU, in that that mechanism may be activated only by a body responsible for applying EU law which satisfies, inter alia, that criterion of independence (see, inter alia, judgment of 21 January 2020, Banco de Santander, C‑274/14, EU:C:2020:17, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited). Furthermore, the requirement that courts be independent, which is inherent in the task of adjudication, forms part of the essence of the right to effective judicial protection and the fundamental right to a fair trial as provided for by Article 47 of the Charter, which is of cardinal importance as a guarantee that all the rights which individuals derive from EU law will be protected and that the values common to the Member States set out in Article 2 TEU, in particular the value of the rule of law, will be safeguarded (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 March 2020, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, C‑542/18 RX‑II and C‑543/18 RX‑II, EU:C:2020:232, paragraphs 70 and 71, and of 2 March 2021, A.B. and Others (Appointment of judges to the Supreme Court – Actions), C‑824/18, EU:C:2021:153, paragraph 116 and the case-law cited).
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