33It should be noted, indeed, that paragraph 79 of the judgment under appeal follows from the uncontested findings of the General Court in the two preceding paragraphs of that judgment. In paragraph 77 of the judgment, the General Court rightly inferred from the approximation of Article 60(4) and recital 69 of the REACH Regulation that it is for the applicant for authorisation to show that no suitable alternative is available. In the subsequent paragraph of that judgment, it was correct to hold that Article 60(4) and (5) of the REACH Regulation requires the Commission to verify that the conditions laid down in Article 60(4) are in fact satisfied. In paragraph 79 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court concluded, in essence, from the preceding two paragraphs of that judgment that if, after its examination and in the light of all the evidence provided by the applicant and by other persons or gathered by itself, the Commission is of the view that the applicant fails to adduce the evidence which the burden of proof on the applicant requires, that institution must refuse the authorisation requested. Thus, contrary to the appellant’s submissions, paragraph 79 of that judgment does not contain any assessment of the ‘level of proof’ required of the applicant or admissible by the Commission.
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