409Moreover, none of the examples from the case-law cited by the applicant makes it possible to establish the relevance of that principle in support of an application for annulment of an act adopted by an EU institution or body. Thus, in paragraph 55 of the judgment of 11 December 1996, Barraux and Others v Commission (T‑177/95, EU:T:1996:187), the Court held that the argument that that principle would prevent the Council from adopting a regulation with retroactive effect was irrelevant. In paragraph 63 of the judgment of 10 July 2003, Commission v Fresh Marine (C‑472/00 P, EU:C:2003:399), the Court of Justice merely recalled the General Court’s finding that Fresh Marine contributed to the damage through its own negligence. In paragraph 13 of the judgment of 9 February 1984, Kohler v Court of Auditors (316/82, EU:C:1984:49), the Court of Justice held that the Court of Auditors’ argument as to the absence of any written form for the disputed act was unfounded quite apart from the fact that to accept those arguments would be tantamount to allowing the Court of Auditors to take advantage of an infringement, which it had itself committed, so as to deprive the applicant of her right of action.
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