Judgment_paragraph 99 · SQ v European Investment Bank (T-377/17)

99In order to rule on the merits of the second part of the first plea, in which the applicant questions the assessment of different acts which, even considered in isolation, she claims objectively constitute psychological harassment, it is necessary first of all to examine in turn each of the alleged acts and, against that background, point out that the concept of ‘psychological harassment’ referred to in Article 3.6.1 of the Code of Conduct is based on an objective concept which, although based on a contextual classification of the actions and behaviour of officials and other members of staff, which is not always straightforward, does not, in any event, call for complex assessments to be carried out, such as those that may have to be conducted in respect of economic concepts (see, concerning trade protection measures, judgments of 7 May 1991, Nakajima v Council, C‑69/89, EU:C:1991:186, paragraph 86, and of 27 September 2007, Ikea Wholesale, C‑351/04, EU:C:2007:547, paragraph 40), scientific concepts (see, in respect of decisions of the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), judgment of 7 March 2013, Rütgers Germany and Others v ECHA, T‑94/10, EU:T:2013:107, paragraphs 98 and 99) or technical concepts (see, in respect of decisions of the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO), judgment of 15 April 2010, Schräder v CVPO, C‑38/09 P, EU:C:2010:196, paragraph 77), which warrant a margin of discretion being afforded to the administrative body in applying the concept in question. Therefore, where it has been alleged that Article 3.6.1 of the Code of Conduct was misapplied, it is necessary to examine whether the Bank erred in its assessment of the facts in the light of the definition of psychological harassment laid down in that provision, not whether that error is manifest.