7The Civil Service Tribunal began by examining the second part of the first plea and upheld it in the following terms:81 With regard to competitions, it has been held that the wide discretion enjoyed by a competition selection board in determining the procedures for and detailed content of the oral tests to be undergone by the candidates must be counterbalanced by scrupulous observance of the rules governing the organisation of those tests (judgments in Girardot v Commission, T‑92/01, EU:T:2002:220, paragraph 24, and Christensen v Commission, T‑336/02, EU:T:2005:115, paragraph 38).82 It is settled case-law that a selection board in a competition is required to ensure that its assessments of all the candidates examined in the oral tests are made in conditions of equality and objectivity (judgment in Pantoulis v Commission, T‑290/03, EU:T:2005:316, paragraph 90).83 Although in the present case the pre-selection panel is not a selection board and its opinion is not binding either on the CCA or on the Commission, that case-law may still be applied in the present case, since the purpose of the pre-selection panel, like that of a selection board, was to choose the best candidates from among those who applied following the publication of the vacancy notice in question and it had significant discretion when organising the pre-selection tests (see, with regard to an internal recruitment selection panel, judgment in CG v EIB, F‑115/11, EU:F:2014:187, paragraph 60).84 Consequently, it was for the Commission, pursuant to the principles of sound administration and equal treatment, to ensure that the first stage of the selection procedure, taking place before the pre-selection panel, was properly organised. That required that all members of the pre-selection panel appointed by the Commission had the necessary independence to preclude any doubt as to their objectivity (see judgment in CG v EIB, EU:F:2014:187, paragraph 61).85 Moreover, it should be noted that the principle of sound administration, entailing a duty on the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case, is enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which, since the entry into force on 1 December 2009 of the Treaty of Lisbon, has the same legal value as the Treaties, and Article 41 thereof, entitled “Right to good administration”, provides that every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union.86 The Tribunal must therefore ascertain whether the pre-selection panel was formed and functioned properly, complying in particular with its duty to act impartially, compliance with such duty being one of the rules which govern the proceedings of selection boards in competitions and, by analogy, the proceedings of pre-selection panels, and which are amenable to review by the Courts of the European Union (see, with regard to selection boards, order in Meierhofer v Commission, F‑74/07 RENV, EU:F:2011:63, paragraph 62).87 In the present case, it is clear, first, from point 7.2 of the Guidelines, that the pre-selection panel starts the selection procedure by examining with the aid of a check-list whether candidates meet the eligibility criteria and then, on the basis of the selection criteria contained in the vacancy notice, draws up an evaluation grid which allows it to compare the candidates’ profiles with the profile sought and with the specific qualifications required in that notice. At the end of that assessment, the pre-selection panel draws up an initial short-list of candidates who are considered to correspond most closely to the profile sought and calls them for interview. After the interviews, it sends a full report to the CCA containing information on each interview, a qualitative assessment of all the candidates, whether or not they have been interviewed, and a draft list of the candidates considered to be best qualified. Secondly, it is clear from Article 64 of Regulation No 726/2004 and from point 10.3 of the Guidelines that the EMA’s Management Board, for its part, is required to select the Executive Director from among the candidates proposed by the Commission.88 The pre-selection panel is therefore competent to recommend several candidates to the CCA, although the decision on the appointment of the Executive Director of the EMA lies with the EMA’s Management Board. Consequently, the question is whether Ms D and Mr E, who were at the same time members of the pre-selection panel, the body making the proposal, and members of the EMA’s Management Board, the body taking the decision, complied with their duty of impartiality in the light of the very distinct competences of the pre-selection panel and the EMA’s Management Board.89 In that regard, the Tribunal notes that, although the draft list of candidates recommended by the pre-selection panel is not binding either on the CCA or on the Commission, that draft list and the qualitative assessment of all the candidates which the pre-selection panel includes in its report have a definite importance as regards the ensuing stage of the pre-selection procedure, since, first, the CCA is required to take them into consideration and, secondly, the portfolio Commissioner will, according to point 8.3 of the Guidelines, only interview candidates who have been short-listed by the CCA in its final opinion. Consequently, there is no denying that the pre-selection panel exerts a decisive influence over the final list of candidates proposed to the EMA’s Management Board by the Commission.90 Similarly, the Tribunal finds, first, that the members of the pre-selection panel who are also members of the EMA’s Management Board will be able to vote, at the meeting of the Management Board, in person or through their alternate, in favour of the appointment of one of the candidates short-listed by the Commission. The Tribunal notes, secondly, that the members of the EMA’s Management Board may play a particularly important part in the Management Board’s discussions, irrespective of whether or not they exercise their right to vote, and that in any event they are in direct contact with the other members of the Management Board.91 In the light of the above considerations, the conclusion must be drawn that combination of the functions of member of the pre-selection panel with those of member of the EMA’s Management Board may compromise the independence and objectivity of the persons who combine those functions.92 Consequently, without passing any judgment on the content of the discussions which took place among the members of the pre-selection panel and on the positions taken by the individual members of that panel, including those taken by Ms D and Mr E, the conclusion must be drawn that Ms D and Mr E, by the mere fact of sitting on the pre-selection panel, infringed their duty of impartiality. As a consequence, since each of the members of the pre-selection panel must possess the necessary independence to preclude the objectivity of the pre-selection panel as a whole being compromised, it must be held that the duty of impartiality of the pre-selection panel as a whole was infringed.93 That finding cannot be called into question by the Commission’s arguments.94 First, as regards the argument that the members of the EMA’s Management Board who had been appointed as members of the pre-selection panel did not in any event represent the EMA’s Management Board on the pre-selection panel and did not act on its behalf, since the EMA’s Management Board was in fact represented on the pre-selection panel by the observer, in the present case Mr A, suffice it to say that Mr A’s participation in the proceedings of the pre-selection panel as an observer is not called into question by [Mr Hristov]. As was held in paragraph 92 [above], the mere fact that Ms D and Mr E, both members of the EMA’s Management Board, sat on the pre-selection panel constituted an infringement of their duty of impartiality. Moreover, it is apparent from the documents in the case that on 5 May and 8 June 2011 Ms D took part in meetings of the EMA’s Management Board whose purpose was to appoint the new Executive Director of the EMA and that she therefore took part in interviewing the four candidates proposed in the Commission’s decision of 20 April 2011, and in the discussions leading up to the appointment of Mr C. This shows that [Mr Hristov] was fully entitled to doubt the impartiality with which Ms D chaired the proceedings of the pre-selection panel.95 Next, the Commission’s argument that the fact that only two of the 35 members of the EMA’s Management Board were also members of the pre-selection panel does not support the allegation that members of the EMA’s Management Board substituted their assessment for that of the pre-selection panel must also be rejected. Even if neither Ms D nor Mr E had taken part in the meetings of the EMA’s Management Board on 5 May and 8 June 2011, they did nonetheless take part in meetings of the pre-selection panel and were able, as members of that panel, to exert an influence over the assessment of each of the candidates by the other members of the pre-selection panel.96 It is also necessary to reject the Commission’s argument that the appointment of Ms D and Mr E as members of the pre-selection panel was objectively justified, and even necessary, since they were both experts in the field. As the Commission acknowledged at the hearing, it was not impossible to appoint as participants on the pre-selection panel experts who were not members of the EMA’s Management Board. Moreover, the Tribunal observes that under the Guidelines it is possible to avoid members of the pre-selection panel also being members of the EMA’s Management Board. First, point 7.1 of the Guidelines, allows the parent Directorate-General to select members of the pre-selection panel from among a number of senior management officials, stating that the pre-selection panel is to comprise the Director General or the Deputy Director General of the parent Directorate-General, a Director from the parent Directorate-General and a Director from another Directorate-General. Secondly, that provision also states that the members of the pre-selection panel are to be appointed “[a]s a general rule” from among the abovementioned officials. Consequently, if it happens, as in the present case, that the persons listed in point 7.1 of the Guidelines, namely the Director General, the Deputy Director General and a Director from the parent Directorate-General, are already members of the Management Board of the agency concerned, other persons may be appointed as members of the pre-selection panel.97 Similarly, it is necessary to reject the Commission’s argument that there is no rule that prevents members of the EMA’s Management Board from being appointed as members of the pre-selection panel. The combination of both those functions in a single person, as the Tribunal found above, constitutes an infringement of the pre-selection panel’s duty of impartiality and is therefore in breach of Article 41 of the Charter.98 Lastly, the Commission’s argument that Article 11a of the Staff Regulations constitutes a safeguard for the impartiality of members of the pre-selection panel must also be rejected. Although, Article 11a of the Staff Regulations provides that an official is required not to deal with a matter in which he has any personal interest such as to impair his independence, and although it is clear from the documents in the case that Mr A and a member of the pre-selection panel did not take part in an interview with one of the candidates, nonetheless Ms D and Mr E, regardless of Article 11a of the Staff Regulations, raised no objection to their appointment as members of the pre-selection panel, took part in all the interviews with the candidates and, in the case of Ms D, did not declare, under Article 11(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Management Board, any interest that could potentially be prejudicial to her independence at the meetings of the EMA’s Management Board on 5 May and 8 June 2011.99 In the light of the above considerations, the second part of the first plea, based on combination of the functions of member of the EMA’s Management Board and member of the pre-selection panel, must be declared well-founded.’
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