Judgment_paragraph 39 · European Ombudsman v Claire Staelen (C-337/15 P)

39In stating, in paragraph 86 of the judgment under appeal, that the Ombudsman did not have any discretion concerning respect for the principle of diligence in a specific case, before going on to infer from this that a mere breach of that principle was therefore sufficient to establish the sufficiently serious nature of that breach, the General Court clearly intended to draw on the case-law of the Court, referred to in paragraph 71 of the judgment under appeal, according to which, where an EU institution has only considerably reduced, or even no, discretion, the mere infringement of EU law may suffice to establish the existence of a sufficiently serious breach of that law (see, in particular, judgment of 10 December 2002, Commission v Camar and Tico, C‑312/00 P, EU:C:2002:736, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).