92With regard to the third reason, concerning the handling, in March 2009, of letters of credit of DIO, designated by UNSCR 1737 (2006), and of IEI, designated by Decision 2008/475, the Council notes that Bank Saderat Iran did not dispute their existence but claimed that they constituted ordinary banking services, in the context of export credits. Supported by the United Kingdom, it submits that the General Court erred in law by holding that the Council should have provided detailed information on those letters of credit. In its view, the handling of those letters of credit was sufficient of itself to justify the restrictive measures against Bank Saderat Iran. It recalls in that respect that a number of provisions, such as Articles 1(4) and 15(1) of Decision 2010/413, Article 4 of Regulation No 267/2012, paragraph 7 of UNSCR 1737 (2006) and paragraph 5 of UNSCR 1747 (2007), prohibit the export from Iran and, more particularly, the purchase or transport from Iran, of proliferation-sensitive materials, including in other countries, as well as arms and weapons, and it is therefore wrong to suppose that letters of credit enabling DIO and IEI to export goods would have no connection with the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Council submits that the General Court wrongly substituted its own assessment of what is appropriate for that of the Council with regard to the facts justifying the imposition of an asset freeze as a precautionary measure, contrary to its own case-law (see, to that effect, judgment in People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v Council, T‑256/07, EU:T:2008:461, paragraph 138).
Source: EUR-Lex, © European Union, 1998-2026. Reuse authorised under Decision 2011/833/EU.