40In the present case, it follows, first of all, that it is necessary to reject the arguments in support of the applicant’s contention that the Board of Appeal took account of ‘new evidence of bad faith’ of a kind not envisaged by the Court of Justice in cases such as Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli, paragraph 19 above, and which is even at variance with the criteria set out in that judgment. First, it should be noted that — as the Board of Appeal observed — the criteria laid down in the case-law are merely illustrative. Second, it should be stated that the criteria applied by the Board of Appeal in the contested decision are not at variance with the criteria established in Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli; rather, they add to those criteria, in accordance with the approach set out in that judgment, that is to say, through an overall assessment of all of the relevant factors in the particular case. Accordingly, the Board of Appeal was correct to evaluate both the origin of the sign which forms the contested mark Simca and the earlier use of that sign in business as a mark, in particular by competing undertakings, and the commercial logic underlying the filing of the application for registration of the mark at issue, formed by that sign. Furthermore, in that context, there was nothing to prevent the Board of Appeal from going on to analyse the awareness on the part of the proprietor of the mark in respect of which a declaration of invalidity was sought, at the time when the application for registration was made, of the existence of earlier marks featuring the sign SIMCA and the extent of their reputation.
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