71The lawfulness of measures taken by the Council against a group, on the basis of Common Position 2001/931, depends on whether that institution complied, in its decision, with the conditions and requirements defined in that common position, and not on whether other parties could possibly be subject to restrictive measures. Common Position 2001/931 and its implementation by the Council do not seek to determine who, in a conflict between a State and a group, is right or wrong, but to combat terrorism. In that context, having regard to the broad discretion conferred on the EU institutions as regards the European Union’s external relations (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 October 1982 in Faust v Commission, 52/81, ECR, EU:C:1982:369, paragraph 27; of 16 June 1998 in Racke, C‑162/96, ECR, EU:C:1998:293, paragraph 52, and of 27 September 2007 in Ikea Wholesale, C‑351/04, ECR, EU:C:2007:547, paragraph 40; order of 6 September 2011 in Mugraby v Council and Commission, T‑292/09, EU:T:2011:418, paragraph 60), there is no need, for the purposes of the present dispute, to examine whether restrictive measures under EU law could have been adopted with regard to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri-Lanka. In any event, even if the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri-Lanka were to have committed acts which are liable to give rise to criticism and be the basis for an action of the European Union, it should be noted that the principle of equal treatment must be reconciled with the principle of legality, according to which no one may rely, to his own benefit, on an unlawful act committed in favour of another (judgments of 9 July 2009 in Melli Bank v Council, T‑246/08 and T‑332/08, ECR, EU:T:2009:266, paragraph 75, and of 14 October 2009 in Bank Melli Iran v Council, T‑390/08, ECR, EU:T:2009:401, paragraphs 56 and 59).
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