69The first part alleges that the principle of procedural equality has been infringed because in the space of a few months the same chamber of the Court of First Instance, in two comparable cases, came to opposite conclusions as regards the locus standi of third parties who intervene in a formal examination procedure relating to State aid. More particularly, Sniace refers to Case T-36/99 Lenzing v Commission [2004] ECR II-3597, where the action brought by Lenzing AG against a decision of the Commission relating to aid awarded by the Spanish authorities to Sniace was held to be admissible. The Court of First Instance arrived at that decision by relying on a set of circumstances and evidence which, by contrast, it rejected as irrelevant in the judgment under appeal. Two comparable situations were accordingly treated differently and that difference is not objectively justified.
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