7As regards the first part of the fourth plea, the Court of First Instance responded to it in these terms in paragraphs 64 to 79 of the judgment under appeal:64 The aim of Article 92(1) of the Treaty is to prevent trade between Member States from being affected by advantages granted by public authorities which, in various forms, distort or threaten to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or certain products (Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior de Espana v Ayuntamiento de Valencia [1994] ECR I-877, paragraph 12, Case 173/73 Italy v Commission [1974] ECR 709, paragraph 26, and SFEI, paragraph 58).65 The concept of aid thus encompasses not only positive benefits, such as subsidies, but also interventions which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which, without therefore being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are of the same character and have the same effect{ SFEI, paragraph 58, Banco Exterior de España, cited above, paragraph 13, and Case C-200/97 Ecotrade v Altiforni e Ferriere di Servóla [1998] ECR I-7907, paragraph 34). In Case T-358/94 Air France v Commission [1996] ECR II-2109, paragraph 67, the Court of First Instance stated, with regard to Article 92 of the EC Treaty:“That provision therefore covers all the financial means by which the public sector may actually support undertakings, irrespective of whether or not those means are permanent assets of the public sector.”66 Furthermore, as the Court of Justice held in Case 78/76 Steinike Sc Weinlig v Germany [1977] ECR 595, paragraph 21, regard must primarily be had to the effects of the aid on the favoured undertakings or producers and not the status of the institutions distributing or administering the aid.67 It follows that the concept of aid is an objective one, the test being whether a State measure confers an advantage on one or more particular undertakings (Case T-67/94 Ladbroke Racing v Commission [1998] ECR II-1, paragraph 52, and Case T-46/97 SIC v Commission [2000] ECR II-2125, paragraph 83).68 The interpretation of the concept of State aid in the circumstances of the present case was given by the Court of Justice in the SFEI judgment, namely that “the provision of logistical and commercial assistance by a public undertaking to its subsidiaries, which are governed by private law and carry on an activity open to free competition, is capable of constituting State aid within the meaning of Article 92 of the EC Treaty if the remuneration received in return is less than that which would have been demanded under normal market conditions”.69 It follows from the above considerations that in order to determine whether the measures in question constitute State aid, it is necessary to examine the situation from the point of view of the recipient undertaking, in this case SFMI-Chronopost, and to establish whether it received the logistical and commercial assistance in question at a price which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions (SFEI judgment, paragraph 60, SIC v Commission, paragraph 78, Case C-342/96 Spain v Commission [1999] ECR I-2459, paragraph 41, and Case C-256/97 DM Transport [1999] ECR I-3913, paragraph 22).70 In the SFEI judgment the Court of Justice found that such a determination presupposes an economic analysis taking into account all the factors which an undertaking acting under normal market conditions should have taken into consideration when fixing the remuneration for the services provided (paragraph 61).71 In the present case, the Commission observes in the [decision at issue] that “the fact that the transaction takes place between an undertaking operating in a reserved market and its subsidiary operating in a competitive market is of no relevance to this case. The Court of Justice has never suggested that in determining whether State aid is involved the Commission must apply a different approach if one of the parties to the transaction has a monopoly”.72 Consequently, the Commission considered that the internal prices at which products and services are provided between companies belonging to the same group “do not involve any financial advantage whatsoever if they are full-cost prices (total costs plus a markup to remunerate equity capital investment)”.73 It is evident from these statements that the Commission did not base its decision on an economic analysis of the kind required by the SFEI judgment in order to show that the transaction in question would be comparable to a transaction between undertakings operating in normal market conditions. On the contrary, in the [decision at issue] the Commission merely verified the costs incurred by La Poste in providing logistical and commercial assistance and the extent to which those costs were reimbursed by SFMI-Chronopost.74 Even supposing that SFMI-Chronopost paid La Poste's full costs for the provision of logistical and commercial assistance, that would not be sufficient in itself to show that no aid within the meaning of Article 92 of the EC Treaty was granted. Given that La Poste might, by virtue of its position as the sole public undertaking in a reserved sector, have been able to provide some of the logistical and commercial assistance at lower cost than a private undertaking not enjoying the same rights, an analysis taking account solely of that public undertaking's costs cannot, in the absence of other evidence, preclude classification of the measures in question as State aid. On the contrary, it is precisely a relationship in which the parent company operates in a reserved market and its subsidiary carries out its activities in a market open to competition that creates a situation in which State aid is likely to exist.75 The Commission should thus have examined whether those full costs took account of the factors which an undertaking acting under normal market conditions should have taken into consideration when fixing the remuneration for the services provided. Hence, the Commission should at least have checked that the payment received in return by La Poste was comparable to that demanded by a private holding company or a private group of undertakings not operating in a reserved sector, pursuing a structural policy — whether general or sectorial — and guided by long-term prospects (see to this effect Case C-305/89 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1603, paragraph 20).76 It follows from the foregoing that, in the [decision at issue], by ruling out the very existence of State aid without checking whether the remuneration received by La Poste for the provision of commercial and logistical assistance to SFMI-Chronopost corresponded to the price that would have been asked under normal market conditions, the Commission based its decision on an incorrect interpretation of Article 92 of the Treaty.77 This interpretation is not invalidated by the Commission's submission that Article 222 of the EC Treaty (now Article 295 EC) provides that the Treaty in no way prejudges the system of property ownership in Member States. To require that the remuneration which a public undertaking with a monopoly receives in return for the provision of commercial and logistical assistance to its subsidiary should correspond to the payment which would have been demanded under normal market conditions, does not prohibit such a public undertaking from entering an open market but subjects it to the rules of competition, as the fundamental principles of Community law require. Such a requirement does not adversely affect the system of public ownership and merely ensures that public and private ownership are treated equally.78 It follows that the first part of the fourth plea is well founded.79 The first article of the [decision at issue] must therefore be annulled in so far as it finds that the logistical and commercial assistance provided by La Poste to its subsidiary SFMI-Chronopost does not constitute State aid to SFMI-Chronopost, and it is not necessary to examine the second part of this plea or the other pleas in so far as they relate to the logistical and commercial assistance provided by La Poste to SFMI-Chronopost. In particular, it is not necessary to examine the second plea, in which [Ufex and Others] allege that the statement of reasons for the [decision at issue] regarding logistical and commercial assistance is inadequate.’
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