61Eighth, the applicant submits that it did not apply the agreements in question during the relevant period (1987 to 1989) and that it adopted an autonomous commercial policy different from that of the other ferry operators, characterised by significantly lower prices. Nevertheless, in order to establish the existence of a cartel, the Commission is not obliged to take account of the actual effects of the agreement in question provided that its purpose is to prevent, restrict or distort competition. Moreover, the Court of First Instance has held that the fact that an undertaking does not abide by the outcome of meetings which it has attended and which have a manifestly anticompetitive purpose is not such as to relieve it of full responsibility for the fact that it participated in the cartel, if it has not publicly distanced itself from what was agreed in the meetings (Case T-310/94Gruber + Weber v Commission [1998] ECR II-1043, paragraph 130, Case T-317/94Weig v Commission [1998] ECR II-1235, paragraph 87, Tréfileurope v Commission, cited above, paragraph 85, and Cimenteries CBR and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 1389). Furthermore, it is clear from the file that even the discounts which the applicant applied, at least from 1988 onwards, fell within the margins authorised by the cartel and agreed with the other companies. The cartel in fact tolerated limited price variance in certain situations. For example, it is clear from the facsimile of 12 June 1989 and the telex of 20 June 1989, sent to the applicant by Minoan, that, under the agreement, discounts could be given of up to 10% of certain tariffs.