8The Court of First Instance went on to annul the contested decision, upholding Ms Hautala's first plea in so far as it criticised the Council for taking the view that it was not obliged to consider whether it could grant partial access authorising disclosure of the parts of the contested report which were not covered by the exception based on protection of the public interest. In this respect, it stated:75 As regards the third argument [of the first plea], which is supported by the Swedish Government, namely that the Council infringed Article 4(1) of Decision 93/731 by refusing to grant access to the passages in the contested report which are not covered by the exception based on protection of the public interest, it should be observed that the Council considers that the principle of access to documents applies only to documents as such, not to the information contained in them.76 It is thus for the Court to verify whether the Council was obliged to consider whether partial access could be granted. Since this is a question of law, review by the Court is not limited.77 Decision 93/731 is a measure of internal organisation adopted by the Council on the basis of Article 151(3) of the EC Treaty. In the absence of specific Community legislation, the Council determines the conditions for dealing with requests for access to its documents (see, to that effect, Case C-58/94 Netherlands v Council [1996] ECR I-2169, paragraphs 37 and 38). Consequently, if the Council so wished, it could decide to grant partial access to its documents, under a new policy.78 Decision 93/731 does not expressly require the Council to consider whether partial access to documents may be granted. Nor, as the Council accepted at the hearing, does it expressly prohibit such a possibility.79 In view of the above, the basis on which the Council adopted Decision 93/731 must be borne in mind for the purpose of interpreting Article 4 of that decision.80 Declaration No 17 recommended that the Commission should submit to the Council no later than 1993 a report on measures designed to improve public access to the information available to the institutions. That commitment was restated at the European Council in Copenhagen on 22 June 1993, which invited the Council and the Commission to “continue their work based on the principle of citizens' having the fullest possible access to information”.81 In the preamble to the Code of Conduct, the Council and the Commission refer expressly to Declaration No 17 and the conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen as the basis for their initiative. The Code of Conduct states the general principle that the public will have the widest possible access to documents.82 Furthermore, the Court of Justice stressed in Netherlands v Council, paragraph 35, the importance of the public's right of access to documents held by public authorities. The Court of Justice noted that Declaration No 17 links that right with “the democratic nature of the institutions”. In his Opinion in that case ([1996] ECRI-2171, point 19), the Advocate General stated, with reference to the individual right to information, as follows:“Instead, the basis for such a right should be sought in the democratic principle, which constitutes one of the cornerstones of the Community edifice, as enshrined now in the Preamble to the Maastricht Treaty and Article F [of the Treaty on European Union, now, after amendment, Article 6 EU] of the Common Provisions.”83 The Court of First Instance recently held in Svenska Journalistförbundet, paragraph 66, referring to Netherlands v Council, that:“The objective of Decision 93/731 is to give effect to the principle of the largest possible access for citizens to information with a view to strengthening the democratic character of the institutions and the trust of the public in the administration.”84 Next, it should be noted that where a general principle is established and exceptions to that principle are then laid down, the exceptions should be construed and applied strictly, in a manner which does not defeat the application of the general rule (see, to that effect, [Case T-105/95 WWF UK v Commission [1997] ECR II-313], paragraph 56, and [Case T-124/96 Interporc v Commission [1998] ECR II-231], paragraph 49). In the present case, the provisions to be construed are those of Article 4(1) of Decision 93/731, which lists the exceptions to the above general principle.85 Furthermore, the principle of proportionality requires that “derogations remain within the limits of what is appropriate and necessary for achieving the aim in view” (Case 222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651, paragraph 38). In the present case, the aim pursued by the Council in refusing access to the contested report was, according to the reasons stated in the contested decision, to “protect the public interest with regard to international relations”. Such an aim may be achieved even if the Council does no more than remove, after examination, the passages in the contested report which might harm international relations.86 In that connection, the principle of proportionality would allow the Council, in particular cases where the volume of the document or the passages to be removed would give rise to an unreasonable amount of administrative work, to balance the interest in public access to those fragmentary parts against the burden of work so caused. The Council could thus, in those particular cases, safeguard the interests of good administration.87 Accordingly, Article 4(1) of Decision 93/731 must be interpreted in the light of the principle of the right to information and the principle of proportionality. It follows that the Council is obliged to examine whether partial access should be granted to the information not covered by the exceptions.88 As appears from paragraph 75 above, the Council did not make such an examination, since it considers that the principle of access to documents applies only to documents as such and not to the information contained in them. Consequently, the contested decision is vitiated by an error of law and must therefore be annulled.89 It follows that there is no need for the Court to rule on the two other pleas in law put forward by [Ms Hautala] in support of her application.’
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