Bernard Connolly v European Commission (C-274/99 P)
law://eu/cjeu/1999/c-274-99/para_21@2026-11-13
Key facts
Court
Court of Justice · Full Court
Case
C-274/99 P · ECLI:EU:C:2001:127
Decided
6 Mar 2001
Procedure
Appeal
Applicant
Bernard Connolly
Defendant
Commission of the European Communities
Rapporteur
M. Wathelet
Advocate General
D. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer
Bench
10 judgesC. Gulmann, A. La Pergola, M. Wathelet, V. Skouris (Presidents of Chambers), D.A.O. Edward, J.-P. Puissochet, P. Jann, L. Sevón, R. Schintgen, N. Colneric
21The Court of First Instance held as follows:165 It is settled case-law that once the truth of the allegations against the official has been established, the choice of appropriate disciplinary measure is a matter for the appointing authority and the Community Courts may not substitute their own assessment for that of the authority, save in cases of manifest error or a misuse of powers (Case 46/72De Greef v Commission [1973] ECR 543, paragraph 45; F v Commission, paragraph 34; Williams I, paragraph 83; and D v Commission, paragraph 96). It must also be borne in mind that the determination of the penalty to be imposed is based on a comprehensive appraisal by the appointing authority of all the particular facts and circumstances peculiar to each individual case, since Articles 86 to 89 of the Staff Regulations do not specify any fixed relationship between the measures provided for and the various sorts of infringements and do not state the extent to which the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances should affect the choice of penalty (Case 403/85F v Commission [1987] ECR 645, paragraph 26; Williams I, paragraph 83; and Y v Parliament, paragraph 34).166 In the present case, it must be first be pointed out that the truth of the allegations against the applicant has been established.167 Second, the penalty imposed cannot be regarded as either disproportionate or as resulting from a manifest error of assessment. Even though it is not disputed that the applicant had a good service record, the appointing authority was nevertheless fully entitled to find that, having regard to the gravity of the facts established and the applicant's grade and responsibilities, such a factor was not capable of mitigating the penalty to be imposed.168 Furthermore, the applicant's argument that account should have been taken of his good faith regarding what he believed to be the scope of the duties of an official on leave on personal grounds cannot be accepted. It is clear from the case-law that officials are deemed to know the Staff Regulations (Case T-12/94D affix v Commission [1997] ECRSC I-A-453, II-1197, paragraph 116; Joined Cases T-116/96, T-212/96 and T-215/96Telehint and Others v Commission [1998] ECRSC I-A-327, II-947, paragraph 59), with the result that their alleged ignorance of their obligations cannot constitute good faith. That argument has even less force in the present case since the applicant has admitted that his colleagues knew of his intention to work on the book at issue during his leave on personal grounds, whereas, in his request to the appointing authority under Article 40 of the Staff Regulations, he had given reasons unconnected with his book. Given that such statements are contrary to the honesty and trust which should govern relations between the administration and officials and are incompatible with the integrity which each official is required to show (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 175/86 and 209/86 M v Council [1988] ECR 1891, paragraph 21), the appointing authority was entitled to treat the applicant's argument concerning his alleged good faith as unfounded.169 Consequently, the plea must be rejected.’