Judgment_paragraph 33 · Siderúrgica Aristrain Madrid SL v Commission of the European Communities (C-196/99 P)

33This ground of appeal is directed against paragraphs 526 to 532 of the judgment under appeal, which are worded as follows:526 The Court points out that, in parallel to the administrative procedure conducted by DG IV [Directorate General for “Competition” of the Commission] in this case, DG III conducted negotiations with the steel industry to bring about a thorough restructuring of the industry, partially financed through Community funds. Those negotiations were broken off, in the absence of agreement between the parties, on 15 February 1994, the day before the [contested] decision was adopted, during a meeting attended by representatives of the industry and Commission Members Bangemann and Van Miert.527 According to settled case-law, a measure may amount to a misuse of powers only if it appears, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent factors, to have been taken with the exclusive purpose, or at any rate the main purpose, of achieving an end other than that stated or of evading a procedure specifically prescribed by the Treaty for dealing with the circumstances of the case (see, for example, Case C-331/88 Fedesa and Others [1990] ECR I-4023, paragraph 24, Case T-143/89 Ferriere Nord v Commission [1995] ECR II-917, paragraph 68, and Case T-57/91 NALOO v Commission [1996] ECR II-1019, paragraph 327).528 The prosecution and punishment of infringements in competition matters are a legitimate objective of Community action, in accordance with the fundamental provisions of Articles 3 and 4 of the Treaty. If the commission of such infringements has actually been proved and it has been established that the fines have been calculated in an objective and proportionate way, the decision imposing such fines, in accordance with Article 65(5) of the Treaty, cannot be regarded as being vitiated by misuse of powers except in exceptional circumstances.529 In this case, neither the co-existence of parallel negotiations between the Commission and the industry on restructuring the European steel industry, dating back to the 1980s, or even the 1970s, nor the “coincidence” between the failure of those negotiations and the adoption of the [contested] decision, and the questions which this raised among some members of the European Parliament or journalists, constitutes per se evidence of misuse of powers.530 Nor has the Court found, in the file submitted to it under Article 23 [of the ECSC Statute of the Court of Justice], any evidence to establish that the procedure followed here for applying Article 65 of the Treaty was used for the purpose of forcing the steel industry to restructure itself or to penalise its lack of cooperation in that regard. There is indeed no reason to suspect that the procedure did not follow a normal course, from the first inspections in January 1991 to the adoption of the [contested] decision on 16 February 1994, and including the statement of objections notified to the undertakings concerned on 6 May 1992, the analysis of their replies sent around August 1992, their hearing in January 1993, the internal investigation carried out at the request of the interested parties in January/February 1993, the sending of the minutes of the hearing in two parts, on 8 July 1993 and 8 September 1993, and the preparation of the draft-decision, with translations into the various languages and consultation of the various services concerned. Furthermore, the applicant has not challenged the Commission's statement that the hearing was postponed from September 1992 to January 1993, a period of approximately four months, at the actual request of some of the undertakings, in order to enable their lawyers to concentrate on their defence in the antidumping proceedings instituted against them, at that time, by the American authorities.531 Finally, the argument that the [contested] decision would not have been adopted in its final form if the negotiations with the steel industry had not been broken off the previous day is not supported by any evidence whatsoever. The same is true of the allegations based on the existence of a parallel procedure in the “coils” sector, which the applicant has merely referred to in its written pleadings. Accordingly, the Court takes the view that it is unnecessary to grant the measure of inquiry sought.532 The applicant's arguments alleging misuse of powers must therefore be rejected as unfounded.’