14The Court of First Instance continued:30 In this case, the medical officer's report was not disclosed to the applicant although she sought such disclosure in her complaint. In those circumstances, since the grounds of the contested decision consisted merely of a reference to the finding that the medical officer had informed the applicant that he considered her fit to resume her duties on 5 May 1995 and to the fact that she did not actually do so until 8 May 1995, that statement of reasons was merely formal and therefore insufficient to allow the applicant to assess its merits.31 It follows that the applicant, despite her request to that effect, was not in a position at any time during the pre-litigation procedure to ascertain, either direct or through her attending medical practitioner, the precise medical reasons on which the decision taken against her was based or, therefore, to state her views on the findings and conclusions of the medical officer and, if need be, contest them.32 The principle of respect for the rights of the defence is a fundamental principle of Community law which must be observed in any procedure which is likely to result in an act adversely affecting a person, even if there are no rules governing the procedure concerned.33 Applied to the procedure for the medical examination referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 59(1) of the Staff Regulations, that principle requires that the person concerned, assisted if need be by his attending medical practitioner, should be in a position to make his views properly known concerning the conclusions of the medical examination and contest the merits thereof (Case T-169/95Quijano v Commission [1997] ECR II-273, paragraph 44). Since the person concerned is unable properly to contest the merits of such conclusions without being apprised of the medical findings on which they are based, that principle requires that the person concerned be in a position to make his views known on the entire report of the medical officer.34 In this case, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the defendant would have taken a different decision if the applicant had been able to give her views on the medical officer's report. Therefore, the plea alleging breach of the applicant's rights of defence is well founded.35 It follows that the first plea in annulment is well founded, in that, first, the decision is vitiated by a defective statement of reasons and, second, the applicant's rights of defence have been infringed.’